R. RAMANUJAM, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, who was working as an Assistant Manager in the service of United Commercial Bank, filed this writ petition claiming payment of full back wages, consequential benefit of increments, release of title deeds of the house property and payment of interest on lic policy maturity value from the respondents. ( 2 ) THE petitioner joined the service of the United Commercial Bank (hereinafter referred to as "the Bank" for short) as a clerk in the year 1967. In the year 1980 he was promoted as an Officer. During the year 1984 when he was working as an Assistant Manager at SD Branch, secunderabad, the Central Bureau of investigation, after investigation, launched prosecution against him and seven other employees of the Bank in CC No. 15 of 1987 on the file of the Special Judge for spe and ACB cases. The petitioner herein was figured as A3 in that case. After trial, the Special Judge acquitted Al, A6, A7 and a8 but convicted the petitioner herein, A2, a4 and A5, and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for three years. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioner filed Criminal appeal No. 513 of 1990 in this Court. Similar appeals were also filed by A2 A4 and A5. All the appeals were heard together and the appeal filed by the petitioner herein was disposed of on 21-12-1992 confirming the conviction but reducing the sentence to two years rigorous imprisonment. However, the other appeals filed by A2, A4 and A5 were allowed and they were acquitted. The petitioner was then dismissed from service by an order dated, 15-4-1993. The petitioner then approached the Honourable Supreme court by way of Criminal Appeal No. 358 pf 1993- The Supreme Court; by its order dated 7-3 1995 acquitted the petitioner giving him benefit; of doubt. Pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court acquitting the petitioner by giving benefit of doubt, the 2nd respondent issued order in Lr. No. SE/ genl/3042/95 dated 25-4-1995 reinstating the petitioner into service subject to the following terms and conditions: " (1) By reason of the order of acquittal passed by the Supreme Court, the position status quo ante as on 21-12-1992 has been restored. Consequently, Shri Narasimha Rao is deemed to be under suspension from the date of his dismissal from service, i. e. , 17-4-1993 to the date of his reinstatement. Consequently, Shri Narasimha Rao is deemed to be under suspension from the date of his dismissal from service, i. e. , 17-4-1993 to the date of his reinstatement. (2) Shri Narasimha Rao is eligible for payment of the subsistence allowance for the period from 17-4-1993 to the date of reinstatement at the same rates as he was drawing prior to 17-4-1993. ( 3 ) THE Supreme Court acquitted Shri narasimha Rao on technicalities and as such his acquittal is on benefit of doubt as stated in the last paragraph of the order. Consequently, the undersigned as the competent authority, treats the period of suspension of Shri Bh. Narasimha rao. Viz. , from 6-3-1987 to the date of his reinstatement as not spent on duty and that he would not be eligible for full pay and allowances and annual increments other than subsistence allowance, as per Regulation 15 (ii) of uco Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. " 3. The said order was received by the petitioner on 2-5-1995 and he has reported to duty on 5-5-1995. The case of the petitioner is that on the very same day, within minutes of his reporting to duty, he was suspended from service pursuant to the order dated 25-4-1995. Challenging that suspension order, the petitioner filed Writ petition No. 14662 of 1995. In that case an interim order was made by this Court in wp MP No. 17906 of 1995 on 13-7-1995 suspending the operation of the said suspension order. Thereafter the petitioner reported to duty on 1-8-1995. The petitioner claims that subsequently he made a representation to the respondents on 11-10-1996 claiming full back wages and other attendant benefits like normal increments for the period between 17-4-1983 and 1-8-1995. But there was no response. It appears that the petitioner was subsequently compulsorily retired from service in July, 1999 pursuant to an enquiry into certain other charges. ( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY the petitioner filed wp MP No. 30934 of 1999 seeking permission to amend the prayer in this writ petition by inserting the words - "the Letter no. SF:gen:3042:95 dated 25-4-1995 issued by the second respondent as discriminatory, illegal, arbitrary and to" - in the second line after the words "pleased to". ( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY the petitioner filed wp MP No. 30934 of 1999 seeking permission to amend the prayer in this writ petition by inserting the words - "the Letter no. SF:gen:3042:95 dated 25-4-1995 issued by the second respondent as discriminatory, illegal, arbitrary and to" - in the second line after the words "pleased to". ( 5 ) EVEN though the prayer in the writ petition, as framed originally, is wide, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is restricting the prayer only for payment of back wages, pension, etc. , for the period between 17-4-1993 and 1-8-1995. ( 6 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner, Smt. A. Anasuya, strenuously contended that when once the petitioner was reinstated into service consequent to his acquittal of the criminal charge by the Supreme Court, he is entitled to full back wages and the authorities are duty bound to treat the period between his dismissal and reinstatement, i. e. , 17-4-1993 to 1-8-1995, as on duty. She further contended that the acquittal of the petitioner by the Supreme Court shall be deemed as full exoneration mentioned under regulation 15 (i) of UCO Bank Officer employees (Discipline and Appeal) regulations, 1976 (for short "the regulations") and, therefore, the petitioner shall be granted full pay to which he would have been entitled to, but for the dismissal order. She also placed reliance on clause 22. 8 of the Manual on Disciplinary action and Related Matters (hereinafter referred to as "the Manual") which states thus:"22. 8. Where a suspended officer employee has been fully exonerated in the departmental enquiry or acquitted by the Court of law of the charges levelled against him or the competent authority holds that the suspension was unjustifiable, he would be entitled to all benefits to which he would have been normally entitled, had he been on duty. However, the employee in such a case would not be entitled to accumulate leave beyond the permissible limit". However, the employee in such a case would not be entitled to accumulate leave beyond the permissible limit". ( 7 ) COUNSEL for the respondents strongly disputed these contentions contending that: (a) the petitioner was only acquitted by giving benefit of doubt and in such a case the competent authority is entitled to exercise its discretionary powers under regulation 15 (ii) of the Regulations and, accordingly, the competent authority has exercised its discretion; (b) the petitioner without challenging the aforesaid conditions joined duty on 1-8-1995; (c) even in his representation dated 11-10-1996 the petitioner never claimed back wages for the period between 17-4-1993 and 1-8-1995; (d) even in this petition, the petitioner did not challenge the validity of the conditions imposed in the reinstatement order dated 25-4-1995; and (e) the petitioner s belated request fqr amending the prayer of the writ petition seeking to challenge those conditions should not be considered by this Court in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 8 ) IN my considered view, this writ petition has to fail on the ground that the petitioner failed to challenge the conditions attached to the reinstatement order within a reasonable time. As already noted, the reinstatement order, with the conditions, was served on the petitioner on 2-5-1995 and ultimately he joined duty on 5-5-1995. He did not challenge the aforesaid conditions then. Obviously he thought that such a challenge will endanger the very reinstatement order. A plain reading of the representation said to have been submitted by the petitioner on 11-10-1996, claiming back wages for the period between 17-4-1993 and 1-8-1995, clearly shows that in fact there is not even a whisper regarding payment of back wages for that period. What is requested therein is payment of salary for the period between 5-5-1995 and 31-7-1995. However, Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to another representation dated 13-10-1996. Even in this representation, except stating that his case should be considered in the line of others who were paid back wages, there is no categorical request for payment of back wages for the period between 17-4-1993 and 1-8-1995. For the first time the petitioner challenged the validity of the conditions in the reinstatement order, after his compulsory retirement in July, 1999, by filing WP MP no. 30924 of 1999 on 26-11-1999 seeking amendment of the prayer in the writ petition. For the first time the petitioner challenged the validity of the conditions in the reinstatement order, after his compulsory retirement in July, 1999, by filing WP MP no. 30924 of 1999 on 26-11-1999 seeking amendment of the prayer in the writ petition. In my considered view, the petitioner s request for amendment of the prayer in the writ petition after such a long lapse of more than four years cannot be considered. Further, his conduct in joining duty without challenging the aforesaid conditions of reinstatement, keeping quiet till he was compulsorily retired from service in july, 1999 and then filing an amendment petition in November, 1999 also disentitles him from invoking this Court s equitable and discretionary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 9 ) THE contentions advanced by the petitioner s Counsel cannot be accepted even on merits. Admittedly the Supreme Court has acquitted the petitioner only on giving him benefit of doubt. That cannot be termed as full exoneration of the charges under the aforesaid Regulation 15. The Supreme Court in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State of Maharashtra, 1997 SCC (L and S) 847, categorically held that the acquittal based on insufficient evidence in a criminal case does not entitle a person to back wages, pensionary benefits and other consequential benefits on his reinstatement and that the competent authority is empowered to treat the suspension period as not spent on duty. Similar view was expressed by a learned single Judge of this Court in judgment dated 22-12-1994 passed in WP No. 7463 of 1994 in the following terms:"it is true that if an accused is not acquitted honourably, but is acquitted on technical grounds or granting the benefit of doubt, then it is permissible for the disciplinary authority to exercise discretion in the matter and in a given case it may be permissible for them to withhold the payments towards back wages during the period of suspension. "in Chairman, ONGC New Delhi v. R. R. Naidu, 1996 (6) ALD 358 (DB), a Division bench of this Court, after survey of entire case law on the subject, held at para 13 of the report as follows:"13. "in Chairman, ONGC New Delhi v. R. R. Naidu, 1996 (6) ALD 358 (DB), a Division bench of this Court, after survey of entire case law on the subject, held at para 13 of the report as follows:"13. Having considered the facts of the case in the light of the principles of law aforementioned, we are of the definite view that - (1) A decision has to be taken by the employer even in the case of dismissal on the ground of conviction by the trial Court, which order of dismissal is recalled and the employee is reinstated after he is acquitted of the offence by the appellate Court. Rule 14 afore quoted has made no distinction between an order of dismissal in a disciplinary proceeding and an order of dismissal which is recorded as a consequence of conviction by a criminal court; (2) It is in the discretion of the employer to decide, depending upon the nature of the offence and the order of the court which has acquitted the employee of the criminal charge, whether the period of suspension until dismissal from service and the period of dismissal until reinstatement would be treated as period on duty, if so, what would be the quantum of back wages payable in terms of the principles of law aforementioned; and (3) Once, however, it is decided that the period shall be treated as on duty, the employee shall be entitled to back wages and the decision as the quantum of back wages would depend as the rules aforementioned have envisaged. " (emphasis supplied ). ( 10 ) FROM the aforementioned legal position it is clear that there cannot be any distinction between an order of dismissal in a disciplinary proceeding and an order of dismissal as a consequence of conviction by a criminal Court for the purpose of regulating the period not on duty under the aforesaid Regulation 15 of the Regulations. Since the petitioner was acquitted only on benefit of doubt, it cannot be said that he was fully exonerated of the criminal charges. Clause 22. 8 of the Manual, extracted hereinabove, will not in any way alter the aforesaid legal position, for there is nothing in that clause to the effect that the employee will be entitled to all benefits even if the acquittal is on benefit of doubt. Clause 22. 8 of the Manual, extracted hereinabove, will not in any way alter the aforesaid legal position, for there is nothing in that clause to the effect that the employee will be entitled to all benefits even if the acquittal is on benefit of doubt. Further, such an interpretation of the clause will run counter to the settled principle of law and, hence, to be avoided. In this view of the matter, the order of the 2nd respondent withholding back wages and other attendant benefits for the period between 17-4-1993 and 1-8-1995 cannot be faulted. ( 11 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner lastly contended that the other co-accused who were also acquitted of the criminal charges on benefit of doubt were given full back wages, but the petitioner alone was singled out and, therefore, the petitioner should also be given the same treatment. This was strongly disputed by the Counsel for the respondents stating that the other accused were not acquitted on benefit of doubt. Counsel for the petitioner could not and did not place any material to show that the other accused were acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. Be that as it may, even if it is assumed that such a benefit was given to the other accused by the respondents, that cannot be a precedent, particularly, in view of the clear legal position referred to above. (See the decision of the Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. Ramesh Kumar Sharma, AIR 1994 SC 854 ). ( 12 ) FOR the aforementioned reasons, both the writ petition and the WP MP, fail and are accordingly dismissed. No costs.