M. K. SHARMA ( 1 ) IN the present writ petition the petitioner has challenged the legality of the orderdated 15. 2. 1990 passed by the Special Secretary of Delhi Administration rejectingthe claim of the petitioner for allotment of alternative land. By this writ petition thepetitioner also seeks for adirection to the respondents for allotment of an alternativeplot in favour of the petitioner in terms of the scheme adopted by the respondents inthe year 1961. ( 2 ) LAND of the petitioner measuring 9 biswas comprised in Khasra No. "1189/317situated in Village Kilokari was acquired by the respondent. In respect of the aforesaidacquisition proceedings an award was passed on 16. 5. 1961. The petitioner receivedcompensation as admitted by her sometime in the month of April, 1969 and theconstruction standing on the said land was demolished by the respondent afteracquisition of the land sometime in the month of March, 1969. The petitioner reliesupon the scheme adopted by the respondents in the year 1961. She claims allotmentof an alternative plot of land in view of the aforesaid acquisition of her land inaccordance with the terms and conditions of the scheme adopted by the respondentin 1961. An application claiming allotment of alternative plot of land in view ofacquisition of her land was submitted sometime in the year 1982. The said applicationwas considered by the respondents and the same was rejected by the communicationissued on 15. 2. 1990 intimating that her case was carefully examined and that thesaid prayer was rejected on the ground that her case was time barred as she shouldhave submitted her application before 15. 12. 1963 whereas she submitted theapplication only in the year 1982 for land acquired underaward dated 20. 10. 1961. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid communication the petitioner has preferred thiswrit petition on which I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that no opportunity wasgiven to the petitioner to explain the delay, if any, in submitting the aforesaid applicationseeking for allotment of alternative plot in lieu of the acquired land. It was alsosubmitted that the said order does not take notice of the circular and the schemeadopted by the respondent in the year 1961 and the date of 15. 12. It was alsosubmitted that the said order does not take notice of the circular and the schemeadopted by the respondent in the year 1961 and the date of 15. 12. 1963 fixed by therespondent in the public notice was not binding on the petitioner in support of hiscontention the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Courtin Smt. Shiv Devi Virlley Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, reported in AIR1987 Delhi 47. He also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court innitya Nand M. Joshi and Another Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India andanother, reported in AIR 1970 SC 209 ; S. B. Kishore Vs. Union of India and others, air 1991 SC 90 and the decision in State of U. P. Vs. Smt. Pista Devi, reported in air 1986 SC 2025 . ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand submitted thatunder the aforesaid scheme adopted by the respondent in the year 1961 the petitionerdid not have a right to be provided with an alternative plot. The only right she had wasto be considered for allotment of a plot in lieu of acquisition of her land. He alsosubmitted that there was inordinate delay and laches on her part in lodging the claimfor allotment of alternative plot and that her claim was time barred. In support of thecontention the counsel relied upon the Press Notification dated 23. 11. 1963 issuedby the respondent, a copy of which is placed on record. He also relied upon the Fullbench decision of this Court in Rama Nand Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR1994 Delhi page 29 as also the decision in Jaswant Kaur Vs. Lt. Governor,reported in 1997 (40) DRJ 703 . ( 5 ) BEFORE appreciating the rival contentions of the parties it would be necessary toput on record certain admitted facts in the present writ petition. The land of thepetitioner measuring 9 biswas situated in Village Kilokari was acquired by therespondent pursuant to which an award was passed on 16. 5. 1961. The respondentadopted a scheme in 1961. Under clause 8 of the said scheme anyone whose landhas been acquired as a result of the notification mentioned in clause 8 of the schemewas entitled to apply for allotment of a plot. 5. 1961. The respondentadopted a scheme in 1961. Under clause 8 of the said scheme anyone whose landhas been acquired as a result of the notification mentioned in clause 8 of the schemewas entitled to apply for allotment of a plot. After the aforesaid acquisition theconstruction of the petitioner standing on the acquired land was also demolish by therespondent sometime in March, 1969 and that she received the compensationsometime in April, 1969. The application for allotment of alternative land in lieu ofacquired land was filed by the petitioner in the year 1982. Public notice was alsoissued by the respondents in which applications from persons whose lands wereacquired between the period from 1. 1. 1961 and 15. 11. 1963 were called forconsideration of allotment of alternative land. It was made clear in the said notificationthat Delhi Administration would not take any responsibility for allotment of alternativeplot of land if applications in the aforesaid regard were not received on or before15. 12. 1963. ( 6 ) STRONG reliance was placed by the counsel appearing for the petitioner on thedecision of this court in Shiv Devi Viriley (supra ). In that case reference to the Fullbench was made on the question as to who is entitled to the benefit of allotment of aplot on the acquisition of land. Earlier to the decision of the Full Bench in the saidcase the view taken by various benches of this Court was that individuals whose landhad been acquired could be considered for allotment of an alternative plot forresidential purpose in certain circumstances. Thereafter in Krishan Kumar Manikvs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1985 Delhi 225, it was held that a person whoowned the land at the time when notification under Section 4 was issued and not thesubsequent transferees would be entitled to apply for an alternative plot. The Fullbench disagreed with the view taken in Krishan Kumar Manik s case and confirmedthe earlier view taken that individuals whose land had been acquired would beentitled to allotment of an alternative plot in certain circumstances. The Fullbench disagreed with the view taken in Krishan Kumar Manik s case and confirmedthe earlier view taken that individuals whose land had been acquired would beentitled to allotment of an alternative plot in certain circumstances. The said Fullbench decision came to be considered in a subsequent Full Bench decision of thiscourt in Rama Nand \/s. Union of India, AIR 1994 Delhi 29, wherein the aforesaidposition was reiterated when it was held that an individual whose land had beenacquired for planned development of Delhi had no absolute right for allotment, but, heis eligible to be considered for allotment of an alternative plotter residential purposes;and that the DDA may allot Nazul land to such an individual, in conformity with theplans and subject to other provisions of the Nazul Rules. ( 7 ) IN the present case the application of the petitioner was not rejected on theground that she is not entitled to be considered for allotment of an alternative plot inlieu of her acquired land. The ground for rejection of her application was that her casewas time barred as she was to submit her application before 15. 12. 1963 whereasshe submitted an application in 1982, for the land acquired by award dated 20. 10. 1961. The counsel for the petitioner also sought to rely upon the Full Bench decision in Shivdevi Viriley (supra) for his plea that the delay in filing the application should havebeen condoned in similar way as was done in the aforesaid case of Shiv Deviviriley. However, on a carefully reading of both the cases I find that the facts of thetwo cases are distinguishable, for in the aforesaid case although the petitionerapplied late for allotment of land in accordance with the scheme she had givenreasons for making the application late which was accepted by the respondent andan alternative plot was directed to be allotted to her as she was found to be entitled toget the same. The aforesaid recommendation was however, later on withdrawnwithout giving reasons and in that view of the matter the Full Bench issued a directiondirecting for allotment of an alternative plot to the petitioner therein. The facts in thepresent case are distinguishable, for the land was acquired under the notificationissued under Section 4 of the Act on 16. 5. 1961 and the award was passed on7. 9. 1961. A Public notice was issued by the respondents on 23. 11. The facts in thepresent case are distinguishable, for the land was acquired under the notificationissued under Section 4 of the Act on 16. 5. 1961 and the award was passed on7. 9. 1961. A Public notice was issued by the respondents on 23. 11. 1963 invitingeligible persons to make application for allotment of alternative plots by 15. 12. 1963. The said public notice was widely circulated and was also published in thenewspapers, a copy of which is placed on record. In the said public notice it wasspecifically stated by the respondents that the Delhi Administration would not takeany responsibility for allotment of alternative plot of land if the applications in thatregard were not received before 15. 12. 1963. The petitioner, admittedly received thecompensation and her constructions on the acquired land were demolished in themonth of March and April, 1969. Even thereafter no application came to be made fora long time and after expiry of about 13 years the petitioner for the first time filed anapplication for allotment of an alternative plot. Even in the application filed by thepetitioner on 23. 3. 1982 for allotment of alternative plot, she has not given any reasonfor belated filing of the application except for saying again in column No. 12 that shewas an illiterate lady and was not aware of the scheme. Thus there was no explanationat all worth the name for the delay in filing the application. Therefore, there is wasinordinate delay and laches in petitioner approaching the Competent Authority forallotment of the alternative plot in lieu of her acquired land. In this connection referencemay be made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jaswant Kaur (Supra)wherein this court dismissed a similar petition on the ground of gross delay andlaches. In the said case the petitioner claimed to have made an application forallotment of an alternative plot of land on 17. 4. 1965, but the respondent DDA deniedhaving received any such application. The writ petition was filed on the basis of theimpugned decision communicated by letter dated 3. 12. 1990 which was taken on theapplication of the petitioner dated 19. 7. 1989, which was. held to be highly belated. Inmy considered opinion the facts of the said case are similar to the case in hand andtherefore, the ratio of the aforesaid decision is squarely applicable to the facts of thepresent case. ( 8 ) IN Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. 7. 1989, which was. held to be highly belated. Inmy considered opinion the facts of the said case are similar to the case in hand andtherefore, the ratio of the aforesaid decision is squarely applicable to the facts of thepresent case. ( 8 ) IN Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana, (1996) II SCC 698 the Supremecourt after referring to the ratio laid down in various earlier decisions of the Supremecourt held that laches dose the gates of the courts for a person who approaches thecourt belatedly. While coming to the aforesaid conclusion the Supreme Court reliedupon an earlier decision of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Greaterbombay Vs. Industrial Development and Investment Co. (P) Ltd. , reported in (1996) II SCC 501. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar, AIR 1995 SC 1991 , itwas held by the Supreme Court that when the writ petitioner was guilty of laches orundue delay in approaching the High Court, the principle of laches or undue delaydisentitled the writ petitioner for discretionary relief under Article 226. Although theaforesaid two decisions were rendered in the context of delay and laches of thepetitioner in approaching the High Court under Article 226, I do not see any reasonwhy similar consideration should not be made applicable to a matter where a timelimit was fixed for approaching the authority and doing the needful and the same wasdone after expiry of period of 13 years. ( 9 ) ON the other hand, decisions relied upon by the Counsel appearing for thepetitioner are found to be not applicable to the facts of the present case. I havealready indicated why the ratio of the decision in Shiv Devi Viriley s case (supra) isnot applicable. Nityanand M. Joshi s case (supra) deals with the provisions oflimitation Act which have no relevance with the present case. The other two decisionsalso have no relevance at all with the issue involved in the case. ( 10 ) IN the light of the aforesaid discussions I am of the considered opinion that therespondent did not commit any illegality in holding that the application of the petitionerwas time barred and bad on the ground of laches and inordinate delay. Therefore, Ifind no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed. However, there will be noorder as to costs.