Judgment :- K. NATARAJAN, J. This criminal revision case has been filed against the judgment dated May 17, 1996, in C.C. No. 181 of 1994 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Salem, for not awarding the minimum sentence as stipulated under sections 276C and 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The short facts are : The first respondent, first accused, is a partnership firm in which respondents Nos. 2 and 3/accused Nos. 2 and 3 are the partners. For certain violations committed, the company as well as the two partners were prosecuted under section 277 read with sections 278B and 276C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It appears that accused Nos. 2 and 3, who are the managing partners of the company represented the company and also themselves and pleaded guilty. On the plea of guilty, the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Salem, imposed a sentence of Rs. 500 each and also directed accused Nos. 2 and 3 to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court. The fine amount has been paid. In this revision, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner, the Income-tax Department, that a minimum sentence of six months imprisonment is provided, which the learned trial magistrate ought to have imposed on the respondents and the imposition of fine of Rs. 500 only on each of the respondents and imprisonment till the rising of the court is against the provisions of section 276C of the Income-tax Act, which has to be set aside and the matter has to be remanded to the trial court for imposing the minimum punishment of six months. It was pointed out by learned senior counsel for the respondents that neither the Assistant Public Prosecutor nor the defence counsel and the learned Judicial Magistrate were aware that a minimum sentence of six months has been provided and, therefore, there was no chance for the respondents to know about the same. It was pointed out by learned senior counsel for the respondents that neither the Assistant Public Prosecutor nor the defence counsel and the learned Judicial Magistrate were aware that a minimum sentence of six months has been provided and, therefore, there was no chance for the respondents to know about the same. Under the impression that after paying the fine they will be let off, the respondents/accused pleaded guilty and have paid the fine and, therefore, it may not be just and fair to remit the matter to the Judicial Magistrate for the limited purpose of imposing the minimum sentenceIt was argued that it is a case of plea bargaining and it is just and proper that the conviction and sentence has to be set aside and the matter has to be remitted back to the trial court for de novo trial. If at the de novo trial, the accused choose to plead guilty, it is open to the Judicial Magistrate to impose the minimum sentence. In support of the above arguments, the decision of the Supreme Court of India reported in Thippeswamy v. State of Karnataka, has been relied on. In that case, the apex court held thus (page 748), "We are of the view that this a case in which plea-bargaining seems to have taken place, because on the appellant pleading guilty to the charge, the learned Magistrate imposed upon him only a sentence of fine of Rs. 1, 000 even though the offence of which he was convicted was one under section 304A of the Penal Code. The High Court, in appeal by the State, acting upon the plea of guilty, maintained the sentence of fine and additionally imposed a substantive sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. It is obvious that by reason of plea-bargaining, the appellant pleaded guilty and did not avail of the opportunity to defend himself against the charge, which is a course he would certainly not have followed if he had known that he would not be let off with a mere sentence of fine but would be sentenced to imprisonment. It would be clearly violative of article 21 of the Constitution to induce or lead an accused to plead guilty under a promise or assurance that he would be let off lightly and then in appeal or revision, to enhance the sentence. It would be clearly violative of article 21 of the Constitution to induce or lead an accused to plead guilty under a promise or assurance that he would be let off lightly and then in appeal or revision, to enhance the sentence. Of course when we say this, we do not for a moment wish to suggest that the court of appeal or revision should not interfere where a disproportionately low sentence is imposed on the accused as a result of plea-bargaining. But in such a case, it would not be reasonable, fair and just to act on the plea of guilty for the purpose of enhancing the sentence. The court of appeal or revision should, in such a case, set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused and remand the case to the trial court so that the accused can, if he so wishes, defend himself against the charge and if he is found guilty, proper sentence can be passed against him." I am of the view that the law laid down by the Supreme Court squarely applies to the facts of this case, as this is also a case where sentence has been imposed on the plea bargaining. In the result, the revision is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the respondent/accused are set aside. The matter is remitted back to the learned Judicial Magistrate, No. 3, Salem, for fresh questioning and for de novo trial according to law. The fine amount paid by the accused shall be refunded to the accused. As the case has been filed in the year 1994, the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Salem, shall dispose of the matter not later than four months from the date of receipt of the records.