PER A.M. MIR, JUDGE (ORAL): 1. This is a CMP filed interms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 210 days delay caused in filing the appeal. 2. Court had issued notice on 07-04-2000. Registry issued notice through registered post. No body turned up even after such issuance of notice and more than 30 days from the date of issue of the notice have elapsed. As such on the strength of noting of the registry, we presume that respondents were served. This is how we heard learned counsel for the petitioner in exparte. For purpose of bringing the whole position of facts pleaded to the notice of those who may read this order, we deem it appropriate to produce the averments made in the application in to as under:- " 1. That above titled appeal has been filed in this Honble Court and there is every possibility of success on its merit. 2. That appellants were not aware of the passing of impugned order and for the first time came to know, of the same in the 1st week of March, 2000 when son of the opposite party came in the village and threatened the appellants to evict them from the land in question. Immediately thereafter they applied for certified copy through the Advocate which was supplied on 16-03-2000. Thereafter due to gazetted holidays from 17-03-200 to 21 -03-2000 and also curfew in the city, the same could not be presented and on the working day immediately thereafter the same has been presented. 3. That the appellants despite being all vigilant did not come to know of the passing of impugned order nor they were apprised of the same by their counsel and only came to know in the first week of March, 2000 as indicated above. 4. That the appellants preferred this appeal immediately on coming to know of the impugned order and without wasting any time. 5. That under the circumstances the appellants are entitled to benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act and after giving them the benefit of Section 5 of Limitation Act the appeal may be treated to have been filed within time and disposed of on merit. An affidavit in support is annexed." 3. A perusal of the above reproduced CMP shows that the appellants-applicants came to know of the judgment in the first week of March, 2000. An affidavit in support is annexed." 3. A perusal of the above reproduced CMP shows that the appellants-applicants came to know of the judgment in the first week of March, 2000. The judgment had been passed on 30-06-1999. Why did petitioners not have the knowledge of the judgment in time is not explained. They moved an application for issuance of certified copy on 08-03-2000. 4. We have perused the copy is sued by the registry. It shows that the amount of fee chargeable was notified on 10th March, 2000. The fee was however deposited on 16th March, 2000. There is no explanation as to why the petitioners waited from 10th March, 2000 to 16th March, 2000. However the copy was issued on 16th March, 2000 itself. The CMP has been presented on 27th March, 2000 and no explanation has been given for taking that amount of time for filing the same. 5. That with respect to gazetted holidays and curfew nothing has been placed on record. The story of delay taken up in filing the appeal prospectively relates to the period of time commencing from 1st week of March, 2000 itself. The applicants-appellants are silent about the period from the date of the judgment to 7th March, 2000, the most important and crucial period of time. We are conscious that liberal construction of Law of Limitation is the general policy of the Apex Court and also this court. In this behalf we would like to refer a judgment reported in AIR 1987 Sc 1353, "Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag & another Vs. Mst. Khatiji & others." 6. However, the sum and substance of this judgment is that where substantial justice is pitched against procedural wrangling, the latter must give way to the former. In the present case we do not find substantial justice tried to be throttled in the guise of law of procedure. Infact no public interest is involved. We find this to be a case of no pleadings and no proof. Their lordships of the Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandaran and anr. Vs. State of Kerala and another, reported in AIR 1998 SC, 2276, how ever, set aside the order of the High Court whereunder the delay was condoned without reply of the otherside having been relied upon or without there being a just and cogent reason for doing so. Their lordships of the Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandaran and anr. Vs. State of Kerala and another, reported in AIR 1998 SC, 2276, how ever, set aside the order of the High Court whereunder the delay was condoned without reply of the otherside having been relied upon or without there being a just and cogent reason for doing so. Their lordships in this behalf authoritatively held as under:- "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statue so prescribed and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable ground. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No cost." 7. This judgment has been no noticed by a Division Bench of this Court, of which one of Us (Goel-J) was a member, in case titled M/s Grover Tankers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., in CMP No: 114/1997, decided on 18-10-1999. 8. We, after going through the judgments are of the view that law of limitation vests a right with the party against whom the appeal was not filed within the prescribed limitation period. This right can be defeated only by establishing a cause which in the estimation of the court is sufficient to have prevented the party applying, for such condonation, within time. The liberal attitude taken by the Apex Court cannot be held to be a substitute for the statutory law of limitation and what the Supreme Court by that liberalization policy meant to convey was that in case of non-personal entities like the Government or Government Corporations where the in terest of the bureaucrats is quite impersonal, Courts should not be unmindful of safeguarding the State Coffers and the policy of being liberal, in such cases, for condonation of delay will not be impermissive. Where-ever the party applying for condonation of delay has not pleaded any ground worth the name and has proved nothing, Courts will in no case condone the delay on equities alone. Where-ever the party applying for condonation of delay has not pleaded any ground worth the name and has proved nothing, Courts will in no case condone the delay on equities alone. In such cases law of limitation must be applied in its letter and spirit. On the analogy of reasoning advanced above we do not find any cogent ground muchless a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. We accordingly dismiss the CMP. Result being that the appeal also stands dismissed.