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2000 DIGILAW 133 (HP)

PURAN CHAND v. MELA SINGH

2000-06-05

M.R.VERMA

body2000
JUDGMENT (M.R. Verma, J.): This appeal has been preferred by the appellant/plaintiff (hereafter referred to as plaintiff) against the judgment and decree dated November 1, 1993 passed by the learned District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan. 2. Briefly stated facts of the case are as follows. The plaintiff instituted a suit praying for grant of a decree of permanent injunction restraining the original defendant Dharam Singh (since deceased and now represented by his legal representative, the present respondents and here-after referred to as the defendants) from interfering in possession of land owned by the plaintiff comprising Khata No. 8, Khatauni No. 12, Khasra No. 47/8 measuring 7 Bighas 10 Biswas, situate in Mauza Rajban, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur (here-after referred to as the suit land) himself or through his relatives or servants and in the alternative, a prayer for granting decree for possesion was made in the event of the defendants dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit land during the pendency of the suit. The case of the plaintiff, as made out in the plaint, is that he is owner in possession of the suit land. The plaintiff resides at Paonta Sahib and manages the cultivation of the suit land from Paonta. Thus, taking undue advantage of his periodical absence, the defendant interfered in his possession by letting loose their cattle or removing the crop from the suit land. The defendant on being requested to desist from their unlawful acts threatened with dire consequences and declared that they would occupy the land. On October 25, 1989 the defendant wanted to forcibly oust the plaintiff from the suit land but his attempts of forcible occupation were foiled but he caused loss of Rs.500/- to the plaintiff. The defendant, however, persisted in his unlawful threats. The suit land is stated to be mortgaged with the State Bank of India which was originally impleaded as defendant No.2 but no relief against the said Bank was prayed for. Hence the suit seeking relief against the defendants. 3. The suit was contested. The defendant, however, persisted in his unlawful threats. The suit land is stated to be mortgaged with the State Bank of India which was originally impleaded as defendant No.2 but no relief against the said Bank was prayed for. Hence the suit seeking relief against the defendants. 3. The suit was contested. The defendants in their written statement raised the preliminary objections that the present suit is not maintainable in the present form, the plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands, that the plaintiff, not being the owner of the suit land, has no locus standi to institute the suit, that the defendants are non-occupancy tenants of the suit land, hence the plaintiff has no right, title or interest therein and that the plaintiff is not in possession of even an inch of the suit land and is, therefore, not entitled for the relief claimed. On merits, it has been claimed that the plaintiff is not the owner in possession of the suit land nor has any right, title or interest therein. It is claimed that the defendants are Gair Mouroosi tenants on payment of one-forth Gala Batai to its original owner Devi Singh since 1958 and since then they are in the cultivating possession of the suit land. The defendant Dharam Singh (deceased) was an old man of 90 years, therefore, the allegations of attempts to take forcible possession of the suit land have been denied and it is contended that since the land is in possession of the defendants, therefore, there is no question of forcible dispossession. 4. The plaintiff filed replication wherein the grounds of defence as taken in the written statement, were denied and the case as made out in the plaint was re-affirmed. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land? OPP 2. In case issue No. 1 is not proved whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree of possession as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the defendant is in possession of the suit land as non-occupancy tenant? OPD 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi? OPD. 6. Relief." 6. In case issue No. 1 is not proved whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree of possession as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the defendant is in possession of the suit land as non-occupancy tenant? OPD 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi? OPD. 6. Relief." 6. By its judgement dated April 18, 1992, the trial Court decided issue No.l in favour of the plaintiff, issue no.2 was decided against the plaintiff and the remaining issues were held against the defendants. As a result, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed and he was declared to be owner in possession of the suit land. The decree for possession was declined. The judgment does not say anything about the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for. 7. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in the Court of the learned District Judge Sirmaur. The defendants also preferred cross objections. The learned District Judge by the impugned judgment dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross objections and as a consequence, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed in its entirety. Hence, the present appeal by the plaintiff. 8. This appeal had been admitted for hearing on the following substantial question of law: "Whether the finding of tenancy in favour of defendant are vitiated due to variance pleadings and proof?" 9. Be it stated that the learned counsel for the appellant had pointed out at the very outset that this is a case of gross mis- appreciation and mis-construction of the oral as well as documentary evidence by the lower appellate Court resulting not only in denial of the title of the plaintiff over the suit land contrary to the entries in the revenue records but also in up setting the well reasoned and correct finding of the trial Court about the right, title and interest of the plaintiff. Therefore, the substantial question of law, as proposed at St. No. 4 of page 8 of the paper book is essentially involved in this appeal. Therefore, the substantial question of law, as proposed at St. No. 4 of page 8 of the paper book is essentially involved in this appeal. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case so proposed, following substantial question of law was treated to be so and permitted to be argued: "Whether learned District Judge has misconstrued, misinterpreted pleadings and evidence on record and has wrongly dismissed the appeal of appellant and wrongly accepted cross objections of respondents?" 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. 11. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that a tenancy is created by a contract between the land owner and the tenant with terms and conditions thereof. In this case, the defendant has, in his written statement, denied the title of the plaintiff and claimed to be a tenant under one Devi Ram on payment of l/4th Galla Batai to him and tenancy is alleged to have been created in 1958. On the contrary, there are contradictory statements of witnesses about the alleged creation of tenancy inasmuch as according to defendant (DW-1) the tenancy was created 30 years before his making statement in the Court which means that the alleged tenancy was created in December 1961 or thereafter, whereas according to DW Guljar Singh (DW-3) the alleged tenancy was created 20 to 25 years before his statement in the Court which means that it was created sometime between 1966-71. It was further contended that the written statement, ownership of the plaintiff had through been denied but evidence has been led to prove that the defendant had been paying the rent i.e. l/4th of Galla Batai to the plaintiff. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff these variations in the pleadings and proof were sufficient to disbelieve the version of the defendant regarding tenancy, more-so when there is even otherwise no evidence to prove the plea of tenancy set up by the defedent whereas the revenue entries to which the presumption of truth is attached show that the plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit land, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree are liable to be set aside and the suit of the plaintiff deserves to be decreed for possession. 12. 12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the defendant had argued that variance in pleadings and proof as pointed out is of insignificant nature, hence inconsequential. There are concurrent findings of the Courts below that defendant is in possession of the suit land. It was further contended that though there may not be consistent entries in the revenue records regarding the defendant being a tenant but he is shown in possession of the suit land vide copy of Jamabandi for the year 1968-69 Ex. P-4 but this entry had been unauthorisedly deleted in the subsequent records. Therefore, the substituted entry showing the plaintiff in possession of the suit land will not carry the presumption of truth whereas the delted entry showing the defendant in possession of the suit land will carry such apresumption. The learned counsel for the defendant, to support her contention, has referred to Sections 38 and 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act and has relied on Shyam Lal v. Johali & Ors. (1995)3 SLJ1806 and Lal Chand & Ors. v. Pola (1998)2 SLJ1526. According to the learned counsel for the defendant the impugned judgement and decree do not call for any interference. 13. The defendant vide para 4 of the preliminary objections and paras 1 and 2 on merits of the written statement has claimed that he was inducted as tenant over the suit land by Devi Singh, owner on payment of l/4th Galla Batai in the year 1958 and continues to be so and the plaintiff had no right title or interest in the suit land and is not owner thereof. A perusal of the evidence led by the defendant reveals that the defendant led the evidence to prove his claim of tenancy on payment of rent in the form of l/4th of Galla Batai and all DWs in their examination-in-chief in essence deposed about the creation and existence of such tenancy and a few receipts regarding payment of rent as aforesaid have also been produced in evidence in support of the plea of tenancy raised by the defendant. Thus, what emerges is that the witnesses have not stated about the precise year of the creation of the alleged tenancy but there are variations in their statements as to the time when such tenancy was created. Thus, what emerges is that the witnesses have not stated about the precise year of the creation of the alleged tenancy but there are variations in their statements as to the time when such tenancy was created. Such omissions/contradictions in the statements discrepant but if such statements tend to support the plea as taken in the pleading, these cannot be said to be at variance with the pleadings. The pleadings and evidence is led to prove another distinct fact not so pleaded. Since DWs in their examination-in-chief have stated about the creation and existence of the tenancy, therefore, it cannot be held that the evidence led by the defendant is at variance with his pleadings. Therefore, the question that the impugned judgment and decree are vitiated due to variance in pleadings and proof is not at all involved in this case. 14. Next comes the question of mis-appreciation/mis-construction of the oral as well as documentary evidence by the lower appellate Court. Before, I proceed to examine this question, it may be pointed out that both the Courts below appear to have misunderstood the relief claimed by the plaintiff. The admitted position in pleadings is that the suit was for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff therein and in the alternative, for possession if the plaintiff was dispossessed during the pendency of the suit. The trial Court found the plaintiff to be the owner in possession of the suit land despite admission of the plaintiff that he had been dispossessed in June 1990 and proceeded to pass a decree for declaration that the plaintiff is owner in possession. Evidently the decree so passed has never been claimed by the plaintiff nor could it be granted in view of the admission of the plaintiff that he had been dispossessed in June 1990 i.e., during the pendency of the suit. The relief of permanent injunction as prayed for, was not granted despite holding the plaintiff to be the owner in possession. 15. In the appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge, the ground of attack mainly was that non- suiting the plaintiff regarding his claim for possession was contrary to the evidence on record and decree for possession of the suit land ought to have been passed by the trial Court. 15. In the appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge, the ground of attack mainly was that non- suiting the plaintiff regarding his claim for possession was contrary to the evidence on record and decree for possession of the suit land ought to have been passed by the trial Court. In the cross-objections, the grievance of the defendant was that since there was evidence on the record to prove that the defendant is in possession of the suit land as tenant, therefore, the findings that the plaintiff is in possession and defendant is not the tenant as returned buy the trial Court are unwarranted and illegal, and in-fact the suit was not maintainable. 16. It appears that the learned District Judge proceeded under the misconception that the suit was for declaration of the title of plaintiff and for injunction. This misconception is writ large vide contents of para 2 of the impugned judgment, the relevant portion whereof reads as under: ".....The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for declaration that he was owner in possession of 7.10 Bighas of land bearing khasra No.47/8, Khata Khatauni No.8/12 as entered in the jamabandi for the year 1983-84 situate in Mouza Rajban, Teh. Paonta Sahib, Distt. Sirmaur, hereinafter called the suit land, and also prayed for issuance of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining respondent-defendant Dharam Singh from interfering in his possession over the said land and in the alternative for possession of the suit land in case he was dispossessed during the pendency of the suit or was found to be out of possession even prior to the institution of the suit." 17. It is evident from the above quoted portion of the impugned judgement that the learned District Judge proceeded with the case as if it was a suit for declaration and injunction and in the alternative for possession whereas the suit was only for permanent prohibitory injunction and in the alternative for possession. It is, thus, clear that both the Courts proceeded with the suit with apparent misconception about the relief claimed and the judgements were rendered under such misconception about the relief, in ignorance of the precise relief(s) claimed. It is, thus, clear that both the Courts proceeded with the suit with apparent misconception about the relief claimed and the judgements were rendered under such misconception about the relief, in ignorance of the precise relief(s) claimed. The result was that the trial Court passed a decree which was not prayed for and the District Judge proceeded to set aside the declaration about the plaintiff being owner in possession and also dismissed the suit in its entirety and the effect of the judgement and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is that plaintiff may not even be the owner of the suit land. At the same time the corss-objections were allowed, meaning thereby that the defendant is in possession of the suit land as a tenant. Though not specifically so mentioned in the impugned judgement, it can be inferred there from that according to the learned District Judge, the defendant was a tenant under Devi Singh and after the purchase of the land by the plaintiff, under the plaintiff. The defendant himself has, however, specifically and in so many words denied the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit land. A person who has denied the title of the land owner over a specific piece of land, he cannot legally be a tenant of such piece of land under the person whose ownership has been so denied. It is against this background that I now proceed to examine the question about appreciation of evidence. 18. It is case of the plaintiff is that he purchased the suit land from its earlier owner Devi Singh for consideration and came to possess it as owner. The sale deed in his favour is Ex.PW-1/A and the signatures of Devi Singh, seller thereon are admitted to be his signatures by his son DW-2 Sunder Singh. This deed has been admitted in evidence without objection. Vide Ex.PW- I/A the then owner of the land comprising Kh.No.8/3 had, i.e. the suit land, measuring 7-Bighas 10 biswas, sold it to the plaintiff for consideration in the sum of Rs.7500/- on 11-5-1971. It is not the case of DW-2 Sunder Singh that he or any other legal representative or legatee succeeded to the land in suit after the death of said Devi Singh. It is not the case of DW-2 Sunder Singh that he or any other legal representative or legatee succeeded to the land in suit after the death of said Devi Singh. On the contrary, he has admitted that he did not inherit any landed property from his father Devi Singh because he had sold the same during his life time. Even the defendant has not named any person as the owner of the suit land. Thus, there is no evidence worth the name to doubt the genuineness of the sale deed Ex.PW-1/A. On the basis of this sale deed, mutation Ex.P-6 had been attested in favour of the plaintiff. The contents of the sale deed executed by a person who is now dead and those of mutation Ex.P-6 clearly show that the suit land was sold by Devi Singh to the plaintiff, at the time of sale, it was in possession of the vendor, it was free from any encumbrance and its possession was delivered to the vendee i.e. the plaintiff. These facts are further supported by the statement of the plaintiff. 19. The revenue record/papers subsequent to the year of sale, which have been produced in evidence are the copies of Jamabandis for the years 1973-74 and 1983-84 respectively Exs. P-5 and P-7 and copies of Khasra girdawari Exs. P-8 and P-9. The said Jamabandis and the copies of Khasra girdawari which contain the entries from October 1984 to October 1989 show the suit land as owned and in the cultivating possession of the plaintiff. Thus the revenue entries from the year 1971 till the latest available khasra girdawari at the relevant time i.e. October, 1989 constantly show the ownership and possession of the plaintiff over the suit land. 20. As per the case of the plaintiff, prior to the said sale in his favour, the suit land was owned and possessed by Devi Singh. It is not diputed even for the defendant that Devi Singh owned the land. The claim of the defendant, however, is that said Devi Singh had created tenancy over the suit land in his favour in the year 1982 on payment of l/4th Galla Batai. The revenue records relating to the land prior to the sale which has been produced in evidence consists of copies of jamabandi for the years 1955-56, 1959-60, 1963-64 and 1968-69 respectively Exs. P-1, P-2, P-3 and P-4. The revenue records relating to the land prior to the sale which has been produced in evidence consists of copies of jamabandi for the years 1955-56, 1959-60, 1963-64 and 1968-69 respectively Exs. P-1, P-2, P-3 and P-4. The entries in these documents show Devi Singh as the owner in possession of land Kh.No.8 measuring 20-10-0 bighas, from 1955 to 1964. However, in Ex.P-4, jamabandi for the year 1968-69, he is shown owner in possession of khasra No.8 min measuring 15-10-0 Bighas and Khasra No.8 min measuring 5-0-0 bighas is though shown in his ownership but in cultivating possession the defendant as a mortgage. This from the year 1955, the land of which the suit land is a part is shown in the cultivating possession of its then owner Devi Singh except a stray entry in the jamabandi for the year 1968-69 which shows the defendant in possession of a portion of the entire land then owned by Devi Singh to the extent of 5 Bighas only and that too as a mortgage. It is, thus, evident from the entries in the revenue record that defendant has not been shown to be in possession of the suit land as a tenant at any point of time from 1955 till 1989. 21. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant that the entries subsequent to the entries in Ex.P-4 are unauthorised as already set out in para 12 supra has to be examined. 22. Section 38 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1954 reads as under: "38. Restrictions on variations of entries in records: Entries in records-of-rights of in (periodical)records, except entries made in (periodical) records by patwaris under clause (a) of section 36 with respect to undisputed acquisitions of interest referred to in that section, shall not be varied in subsequent records otherwise than by - a) Making entries in accordance with facts proved or admitted to have occurred; b) Making such entries as are agreed to by all the parties interested therein or are supported by a decree or order binding on those parties; and c) Making new maps where it is necessary to make them." 23. The above section evidently imposes restriction on the variation of entries made in the revenue records except the entries made by a Patwari in the periodical records. The above section evidently imposes restriction on the variation of entries made in the revenue records except the entries made by a Patwari in the periodical records. The changes in the entries are, however, permissible in the following circumstances: i) Where the facts justifying the change is proved or admitted; ii) Where all the interested parties agree to such a change, iii) Where the entries are to be made in accordance with a decree binding on the interested parties, iv) Where such a change is required while making new maps. 24. In Lal Chands case supra, learned Single Judge of this Court held that change made in the entries in the revenue record without authority and against the relevant law and procedure automatically loses their legal entity. In Shyam Lais case supra, it was held that any change made in the revenue entries without any enquiry, behind the back of the tenants without any order from any competent authority, will not be competent in the eye of law and has to be ignored. 25. Neither Section 38 supra nor the cases referred to above are of any help to the defendants for more than one reason. Primarily, there is no evidence that the entry showing the defendant in possession of 5-0-0 bighas of land was made in compliance of the provisions of Section 38 above. Secondly, there is no evidence mat this entry relating to 5-0-0 bighas of land has any relation with the suit land measuring 7-10-0 bighas. Above all, this entry shows the possession of defendant over the land measuring 5-0-0 Bighas as a mortgage and not as a Gair Marusi tenant. Thus, the fact that this entry is not correct is evident from the case of the defendant himself. Being a stray entry, not in conformity even with the claim of the defendant and not shown to be related to the suit land, the entry in Ex.P-4 is of no use and consequence and has to be ignored. 26. Section 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act reads as follows: "45. Being a stray entry, not in conformity even with the claim of the defendant and not shown to be related to the suit land, the entry in Ex.P-4 is of no use and consequence and has to be ignored. 26. Section 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act reads as follows: "45. Presumption in favour of entries in records-of-rights and periodical records: An entry made in a record of rights in accordance with the law for the time being in force, or (a periodical) record in accordance with, the provisions of this chapter and the rules thereunder, shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefore; Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in this section any entry made, in the areas comprised in Himachal Pradesh immediately before 1st November, 1966 (during the period between the first day of April, 1948 and the first day of April, 1956) in record-of-rights or in (a periodical) record where-by the land is shown as under self cultivation shall not be presumed to be true." 27. It is clear from a bare reading of the provisions of Section 45 supra that presumption of truth is attached to the entries in the revenue records unless the contrary is proved. There is only one exception to the general rule i.e. no such presumption shall be attached to an entry made during the period between 1st April,1948 to 1st April,1956 in respect of land with in the areas comprised in the State of H.P. immediately before 1st November, 1966 whereby the land is shown under self cultivation. With reference to the context and the object of these provisions, expression "self cultivation" as used in the section must be read as "self cultivation of the owner". Even in view of these provisions, it cannot be said that entries about the self cultivation of the land in suit by the owner as in the copies of jamabandis Exs. P-2 to P-7 not carries the presumption of truth because these entries came into being after 1st April, 1956. Even in view of these provisions, it cannot be said that entries about the self cultivation of the land in suit by the owner as in the copies of jamabandis Exs. P-2 to P-7 not carries the presumption of truth because these entries came into being after 1st April, 1956. Therefore; the entries in the revenue records right from the year 1955 till the year 1989 except a stray entry vide Ex.P-4, cannot be ignored, particularly in view of the contents of the sale deed Ex.PW- I/A and the mutation Ex.P-6 which show that immediately before sale of the suit land, it was in possession of vendor and on sale in favour of plaintiff on 11.5.1971, he came to possess it. Thus, the documentary evidence including revenue entries., particularly the latest revenue entries which are consistent for a period of more than 19 years and thus liable to be presumed to be correct could not be ignored unless rebutted by cogent, trustworthy and reliable evidence. 28. The evidence led by the defendant to prove that he is holding the suit land as a tenant as alleged is far from being of the nature which could rebut the plaintiffs evidence for being inconsistent, discrepant and suffering from improbabilities. 29. It is pleaded case of the defendant that tenancy was created in his favour in the year 1958 by Devi Singh. As per the statement of the defendant, the time of creation of the alleged tenancy works out to the end of the year 1961. As per the statement of DW-3 the year of its creation works out to sometime in between 1966 to 1971. According to DW-2 he is not aware as to when the alleged tenancy was created. Agreed that minor discrepancies about the time in such cases are bound to occur but difference of years together cannot be treated as a minor discrepancy nor the contradictions of time in years can be said to be a minor contradiction. The discrepancies and contradictions about the time/year of the alleged creation of tenancy as in the pleading and statements of the witness’s inter-se render the version of the defendant highly doubtful. There is no dispute that the H.P. Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act was enforced in the State in the year 1955. The discrepancies and contradictions about the time/year of the alleged creation of tenancy as in the pleading and statements of the witness’s inter-se render the version of the defendant highly doubtful. There is no dispute that the H.P. Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act was enforced in the State in the year 1955. The Act provided for conferment of the right, title and interest of the owner on the tenant on payment of nominal amount of compensation. The said Act remained in force till 1974 when it was repealed by the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act which again made provisions for conferment of ownership rights on the tenants. It is, therefore, improbable that a land owner would induct a tenant over his land after the coming into force of the said Act. Thus creation of tenancy by Devi Ram in favour of the defendant in the year 1958 appears to be improbable. In case for any reason whatsoever Devi Singh had created such a tenancy, it is improbable that the defendant would not take steps to acquire property rights in the parcel of tenancy on payment of nominal amount which the defendant being owner of more than 100 bighas of land could afford to pay at any time of at least would not take steps to get his name entered as a tenant of the suit land despite being Lambardar of the area. 30. There is yet another aspect of the matter. There is no dispute that Devi Singh has died. It is stated by DW-1 and DW-3 that he died within months of their statements in the Court recorded on 27.12.1991 according to which the year of death of Devi Singh works out to 1991. It is clearly and unambiguously stated by DW- 1 on oath that Devi Singh died at the age of 40 years. There is no evidence to show that at the time of death Devi Singh was more than 40 years of age. If so, in the year 1958 he was about 7 years of age and, therefore, incapable of creating a tenancy as claimed by the defendant. 31. The defendant himself is a highly unreliable witness. In his written statement, he denied the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit land and even on oath denied that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land. 31. The defendant himself is a highly unreliable witness. In his written statement, he denied the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit land and even on oath denied that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land. However, at one state he stated that he had paid a few Galla Batai to the plaintiff. He has, however, not explained as to why he paid Galla Batai to the plaintiff, who, according to him, had nothing to do with the land and is not owner thereof. A party-witness who makes such statement, in my view, is the most unreliable and undependable witness. 32. The defendant has produced receipts Ex.DW-2/A to Ex.DW-2/E about his having given Galla Batai to Devi Singh. DW-2 Sunder Singh has stated that these receipts are in the hand-writing of and signed by his father Devi Singh. These receipts are of highly suspicious nature. These receipts are admittedly dated 20.2.1960, 16.11.1965,25.4.1962,5.5.1961 and 15.4.1958 and acknowledge the receipt of Galla Batai. It is well known that in cases of tenancy the crop after harvest is weighed and then Galla Batai is separated and given to the land owner who either in person or whose agent remains present at the time of weighing of the yield of the crop. Most of these receipts purport to have been issued and Galla Batai received during the period when the crops are not harvested. Two of these receipts Exs. PW-2/A and PW-2/B are written in Hindi and other is Urdu. Comparison of the two receipts Exs. PW-2/A and PW-2/B makes it clear that these receipts are not in the handwriting of the same person. In the receipt Ex.PW-2/A even the name of Devi Singh is not correctly written as in the Ex .PW-2/B. The signatures of Devi Singh as on Ex.PW-2/B, in no manner tallies with his admitted signatures in Hindi within red encircled portion on each page of the sale deed Ex.PW-1/A. The receipts Exs. PW-2/C to PW-2/E does not appear to have been written by a semi-literate person as Devi Singh admittedly was. These receipts produced in support of the case of the defendants are, thus, highly suspicious and unreliable. 33. PW-2/C to PW-2/E does not appear to have been written by a semi-literate person as Devi Singh admittedly was. These receipts produced in support of the case of the defendants are, thus, highly suspicious and unreliable. 33. The statement and other documentary evidence of the plaintiff has been disbelieved by the learned District Judge mainly for the reason that the plaintiff had stated that he had been cultivating the land by borrowing bullocks and plough from others and could not correctly state about the crops sown in the suit land in particular seasons. These are no good grounds to disbelieve the statement of the plaintiff which is supported by a long chain of revenue entries consistently for a period of more than 19 years i.e. from the date of purchase of land by him till the date of last khasra Girdawari operations immediately before the institution of the suit, coupled with the assumption that in the ordinary course of human conduct no person shall buy a piece of land which is in possession of a tenant who under the law is entitled to acquire ownership thereof on payment of compensation in a sum which will be negligible in comparison to the sale price paid by him. It is not unusal for an agriculturist to borrow the bullocks etc. from another agriculturist particularly when the former is not residing himself in the locality. It is also not possible to remember as to which crops were sown in the land three or four years before making of the statement. Thus, the statement of the plaintiff could not be so lightly ignored as has been done by the learned District Judge. On the contrary, as already seen above, the evidence led by the defendant is inconsistent, discrepant and suffers from improbabilities hence incapable of proving the plea of tenancy and rebutting the evidence of the plaintiff regarding his ownership as also about possession over the suit land till he was dispossessed in June, 1990. 34. In view of the above, the learned District Judge has mis-read and misconstrued the evidence on the record resulting in injustice to the plaintiff. 35. It is admitted case of the plaintiff that he had been dispossessed of the suit land in June 1990 during the pendency of the suit. 34. In view of the above, the learned District Judge has mis-read and misconstrued the evidence on the record resulting in injustice to the plaintiff. 35. It is admitted case of the plaintiff that he had been dispossessed of the suit land in June 1990 during the pendency of the suit. Therefore, there was no occasion for the learned trial Judge to have held the plaintiff to be in possession of the suit land and to grant unclaimed relief of a decree for declaration and deny the alternative relief of possession as prayed for. 36. As a result, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgement and decree are set aside. A decree for possession of the suit land is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against defendants. The suit stands decreed to the aforesaid extent. Parties, however, are left to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.