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2000 DIGILAW 133 (KAR)

GUNA ALIAS KOONUMUTHU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

2000-02-11

ASHOK BHAN, R.GURURAJAN

body2000
ASHOK BHAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS judgment shall dispose of W. P. (hc) nos. 130 to 169 of 1999 as common questions of law and facts are involved in all these cases. The facts are taken from W. P. No. 130 of 1999. ( 2 ) THE common thread running through all these cases is that veerappan and his gang were involved in sandalwood smuggling and elephant poaching activities in the states of Karnataka and tamil nadu. In committing the crimes veerappan and his gang were alleged to have used various types of weapons and explosive materials like gelatin. Apart from committing numerous crimes in the cases in which offences under the terrorist and disruptive activities (prevention) Act, 1985 (for short, the 'tada act') are involved, they are said to have attacked police patrolling parties as also police stations by planning and organising ambushes, placing mine fields and so on. By causing explosions to take place when police convoys passed through and thereafter attacking the stranded police personnel, number of police personnel including senior officials were reportedly killed and many other injured. After the raids, the gang is alleged to have taken away weapons, ammunitions and explosives. ( 3 ) IT is averred that 143 persons were arrayed as accused in cases falling under the tada act. About 103 persons are alleged to have been members of veerappan's gang including veerappan himself. Of these people, about 46 persons are said to have been killed or otherwise died at the hands of the police either in encounters between the police and the gang or in other incidents. Of the remaining, 24 persons are said to be absconding (including veerappan ). Names of 22 persons have been deleted from the charge-sheet. The rest of the accused are said to have been local villagers and others who have harbored veerappan and his gang or have given him aid or shelter in their illegal activities. About 121 persons were apprehended in the present case and the connected cases. Arrested persons were incarcerated in central prison at Mysore from mid 1993 onwards. The rest of the accused are said to have been local villagers and others who have harbored veerappan and his gang or have given him aid or shelter in their illegal activities. About 121 persons were apprehended in the present case and the connected cases. Arrested persons were incarcerated in central prison at Mysore from mid 1993 onwards. Of these people, 71 persons have been released on bail by the designated court, Mysore by a common order dated 15-11- 1996, following the directions given by the Supreme Court in the case of Shaheen Welfare Association v Union of India and others, as they were judged to fall in category (c) as provided in that judgment. As regards the other 50 persons including the petitioner since the designated judge was of the opinion that they fall under category (a) of the judgment, bail was denied. ( 4 ) THE charge-sheet in these cases is under offences under sections 143, 144, 147, 148, 324, 326, 332, 333, 120-b, 302, 307, 427 read with 149 of the Indian Penal Code, sections 3, 4 and 5 of the explosive substances Act, sections 3 and 25 (l) (b) of arms act and sections 3, 4 and 5 of the tada Act, 1987. Sanction for prosecution under Section 20-a (2) of the tada act was granted by the director general and inspector general of police, Karnataka describing veerappan's gang as being involved in criminal and terrorist activities in Mysore district who were found to have committed serious crimes both in Karnataka and tamil nadu. It was made out in the sanction that veerappan and his gang posed great threat to the safety and security of the people and the public servants. Sanction was granted for prosecution amongst other offences under Indian Penal Code, explosives Act, arms and ammunition act and under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the tada act. ( 5 ) IT is stated that 50 accused persons including the petitioner are in jail for the last six and half years without any progress being witnessed in the trial of cases. Charges were framed in the year 1997. It is submitted that the petitioner and the co-prisoners numbering 50 have been prevented from being with their families for almost seven long years. They have been prevented from contributing to the preparation of their cases in defence as they are continuing in prison. Charges were framed in the year 1997. It is submitted that the petitioner and the co-prisoners numbering 50 have been prevented from being with their families for almost seven long years. They have been prevented from contributing to the preparation of their cases in defence as they are continuing in prison. ( 6 ) IT is submitted that the veerappan and his gang are essentially involved in smuggling and poaching activities and it is only towards this common object, he and his alleged gang have indulged in crimes such as attacking police stations and personnel, ambushing them, laying mine fields and so on thereby causing massive destruction to property and loss of many lives. The offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and the co-accused do not amount to terrorist act and disruptive activities as defined under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the tada act and as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Terrorism is a legal concept with political overtones. Terrorism is the intention and not the consequence. The intention should be to overawe the government, or the people or a Section of the people. The veerappan's activities have in no manner endangered the government established by law. There is no intention to overawe the people though it may be a consequence. The intention was to smuggle and not to overawe the government or the people. act of overawing was the consequence to the activity of smuggling and poaching and not the intention. Therefore, the acts committed by the veerapan's gang would not amount to a terrorist act under sections 3,4 and 5 of the tada act. ( 7 ) IT is further submitted that the tada act was original intended to be a temporary enactment valid for a period of two years. It was extended four times totalling the period of eight years. After the expiry of eight years, the act lapsed in the year 1985 . Saving clause in Section 1 (4) provided that the expiry of the operation of the act shall not affect the investigation, legal proceedings for an offence committed during the period when the act was in force. The same could be continued and enforced or punishment imposed as if the act had not expired. Saving clause in Section 1 (4) provided that the expiry of the operation of the act shall not affect the investigation, legal proceedings for an offence committed during the period when the act was in force. The same could be continued and enforced or punishment imposed as if the act had not expired. As the constitutional validity of Section 1 (4) has already been upheld, the petitioners without questioning the validity of Section 1 (4) have submitted that the saving clause in Section 1 (4) cannot be interpreted to mean that the prosecution initiated while the act was in force can be continued indefinitely. Any such interpretation would be violative of articles 14 and 21 of the constitution. A provision dealing with special situation could be valid to begin with but with the passage of time, may become arbitrary. The trial has not commenced and it is not likely to commence or conclude. The petitioners could not be deprived of their liberty indefinitely. ( 8 ) THE petitioner has not prayed for bail. Instead he has prayed that this court should issue writ, order or direction and in particular a writ in the nature of habeas corpus quashing the prosecution of the accused in the special case instituted on the file of the special judge, mysore, under tada act. That the court should decline the continued application of tada to the petitioner and others and declare the same to be invalid and pass such further orders as may be deemed fit and necessary in the circumstances of the case and thus render justice. ( 9 ) IN the counter affidavit filed, the state has, apart from contesting the petition on merits has taken a preliminary objection that the writ petition is not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed as the petitioners were not under illegal detention. Their detention being under a judicial order the petition for habeas corpus is not maintainable. The petitioners if aggrieved can resort to the remedy of appeal. The constitutional validity of saving clause in Section 1 (4) having been upheld by the Supreme Court of india, it could not be said that prosecution under the tada act could not continue against the petitioner or that it was liable to be quashed. The petitioners if aggrieved can resort to the remedy of appeal. The constitutional validity of saving clause in Section 1 (4) having been upheld by the Supreme Court of india, it could not be said that prosecution under the tada act could not continue against the petitioner or that it was liable to be quashed. ( 10 ) LEGAL objection taken is ,that charges have been framed under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the tada act; in the absence of a challenge to the same, the revisional jurisdiction of the high court cannot be permitted to be exercised in these proceedings which deals with the illegal detentions and production of corpus. The applicability or otherwise of the Provisions of tada Act, cannot also be permitted to be raised in these proceedings for the same reason. Correctness or otherwise of the charge having not been questioned, the conclusion arrived at by the special judge that the accused were involved in committing the offence under the tada act has become final. Allegation made on behalf of the petitioner that an offence under the tada act has not been committed by him as disclosed in the charge-sheet has been denied as being bereft of any material and material facts. That the interpretation sought to be made on the Provisions to the saving clause under Section 1 (4) of the tada act by the petitioner does not stand to reason. ( 11 ) ON facts, it has been denied that the alleged acts committed by veerappan and or his gang do not amount to terrorist act thereby excluding them from the operation of sections 3, 4 and 5 of the tada act. That the alleged acts committed by the veerappan and the members of his gang amount to terrorist act and therefore tada act has rightly been made applicable. The number of accused involved and number of witnesses cited being large, the cases were likely to consume more time. Keeping in view the nature of the offence, it was decided by all the concerned that trial proceedings should be held in camera at a place other than regular court hall. In the process, central jail, mysore, was considered and after thorough examination, it was found that it was not feasible to go with the trial in the jail. Keeping in view the nature of the offence, it was decided by all the concerned that trial proceedings should be held in camera at a place other than regular court hall. In the process, central jail, mysore, was considered and after thorough examination, it was found that it was not feasible to go with the trial in the jail. Another place chosen for holding the trial came to be a premises at nanjangud situated at a distance of 22 kms. From mysore. Particulars like cost of holding trial were taken into consideration during number of meetings and police found that it was hazardous to ferry the accused everyday from Mysore to nanjangud and back to mysore. That idea was also abandoned. This process which involved number of departments and various officers consumed quite sometime. The search however continued and ultimately the premises belonging to agricultural produce marketing society training centre (for short, 'apmstc') lying within the limits of mysore, on Mysore hunsur road was selected. The process of verifying the suitability of the place was commenced. Number of visits were made by the authorities concerned and meetings were also held in this behalf. Ultimately it was selected. Through governmental agencies the authorities of apmstc were approached who after due deliberations agreed to make available the premises by their order bearing No. Krk. Mm. 5350. 61:1999-2000, dated 23-10-1999. ( 12 ) THE preparations to equip the premises so as to make it fit for holding the trial has been completed and the special judge has commenced the trial on day-to-day basis. The trial of the sessions case always commences with the framing of charges and for all practical purposes, the trial commenced in the year 1997 when the charges were framed. The delay in not been able to examine the witnesses has been due to the bona fide reasons referred to above which were beyond the control of either the investigating agency or the prosecuting agency. Neither the investigating agency nor the prosecuting agency could be held responsible for delay. Violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India was denied as being false. ( 13 ) COUNSEL for the parties have been heard at length. Neither the investigating agency nor the prosecuting agency could be held responsible for delay. Violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India was denied as being false. ( 13 ) COUNSEL for the parties have been heard at length. The submissions made by them are on the same lines as per the averments made by them in the petition and the counter affidavit filed. ( 14 ) THE tada act was enacted on 23-5-1985 in the background of escalating terrorist activities in many parts of the country. Since the act tended to be very harsh and drastic containing the stringent Provisions providing minimum punishments and to some cases enhanced penalties also, it was provided to conduct the trial by designated court only. This was done to get the trials concluded speedily. Designated courts were defined under Section 11. Power of the designed court with respect to the offences is described under Section 12. Apartment of public prosecutors and the procedures and powers of designated courts and protection of witnesses is also provided. Against an order passed by the designated court, a right of appeal has been provided directly to the Supreme Court of India thus eliminating the jurisdiction of the high courts to hear the appeals from any judgments or orders passed by the designated courts except the interlocutory orders. ( 15 ) IN this background the jurisdiction of the high court to interfere with the trial of the proceedings under the tada act has to be examined. ( 16 ) SUPREME Court of India in the case of State of Maharashtra v Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed, examined the question as to whether the high court is empowered to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to examine the correctness of the view taken by the designated court and to quash the prosecution of an accused under the tada act? It was held that in extreme case, if the only accusation against the accused prosecuted in the designated court in accordance with the Provisions of the tada Act, is such, that ex facie it cannot constitute an offence punishable under the tada Act, then, the high court may be justified in invoking the power under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that detention of the accused is not under the Provisions of the tada act. Their lordships added that this can happen only in extreme cases which would be rare and that the power of the high court is not exercisable in cases where it may be debatable whether a direct accusation made in conjunction with the attendant circumstances if proved to be true is likely to result in conviction for an offence under the tada act. The moment there is a debatable area in the case, it is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the gamut of the procedure prescribed under the tada act must be followed, namely, raising the objection before the designated court and if necessary challenging the order of the designated court by appeal in the Supreme Court as provided under Section 19 of the tada act. Where the high court has to perform the laboured exercise of scrutinising the material containing the accusation made against the accused and the merits of the findings recorded by the designated court holding that the Provisions of the tada act were attracted, then, it indicated that the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not available. ( 17 ) THIS view was approved by the Constitution bench of the supreme court in the case of Kartar Singh v State of Punjab. While examining the right of a person indicted of an offence under the tada act to approach the high court for bail under Article 226 of the consti tution and after referring to the judgment of the Bombay high court in the case of Rafiq Abid Patel v Inspector of police, Thane, in which the Bombay high court had held that if no prima facie case is disclosed for filing the case under the tada Act, the high court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a petition for grant of bail. Their lordships after referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in 'abdul hamid haji mohammed's case, supra, and certain other cases held:"though the high courts have very wide powers under Article 226, the very vastness of the powers imposes on it the responsibility to use them with circumspection and in accordance with the judicial consideration and well established principles. The legislative history and the object of tada act indicate that the special act has been enacted to meet challenges arising out of terrorism and disruption. Special Provisions are enacted in the act with regard to the grant of bail and appeals arising from any judgment, sentence or order (not being an interlocutory order) of a designated court etc. The overriding effect of the Provisions of the act (i. e. , Section 25 of the tada act) and the rules made thereunder and the non obstante clause in Section 20 (7) reading, "notwithstanding anything contained in the code. . . . " clearly postulate that in granting of bail, the special Provisions alone should be made applicable. If any party is aggrieved by the Order, the only remedy under the act is to approach the Supreme Court by way of an appeal. If the high courts entertain bail applications invoking their extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and pass orders, then the very scheme and object of the act and the intendment of the parliament would be completely defeated and frustrated. But at the same time, it cannot be said that the high courts have no jurisdiction. Therefore, we totally agree with the view taken by this court in abdul hamid haji mohammed's case, supra, that if the high court is inclined to entertain any application under Article 226, that power should be exercised most sparingly and only in rare and appropriate cases in extreme circumstances. What those rare cases are and what would be the circumstances that would justify the entertaining of applications under Article 226, cannot be put in straitjacket. However, we would like to emphasise and re-emphasise that the judicial discipline and comity of courts require that the high courts should refrain from exercising their jurisdiction in entertaining bail applications in respect of an accused indicted under the special Act, since this court has jurisdiction to interfere and correct the orders of the high courts under Article 136 of the constitution". ( 18 ) THE bench observed that the court while dispensing Justice in cases under the tada act should keep in mind not only the liberty of the accused but also the interests of the victims, their near and dear ones and collective interests of society as well. It was observed:"no doubt, liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by the courts; nonetheless the courts while dispensing Justice in cases like the one under the tada Act, should keep in mind out only the liberty of the accused but also the interest of the victim and their near and dear ones and above all the collective interest of the community and the safety of the nation so that the public may not lose faith in the system of judicial administration and indulge in private retribution". ( 19 ) IN the present case, charges under the tada act have been framed against the accused persons. The contention raised by the counsel for the petitioners is that the veerappan and his gang are essentially involved in smuggling and poaching activities and it is only towards this common object that he and his alleged gang have indulged in crimes such as attacking police stations and personnel etc. Terrorism being a legal concept with the political overtones, the intention should be either to overawe the government or the people, or a Section of the people. That the veerappan and his gang's activities in no manner endangered the government, established by law; intention was not to overawe the people though it may be the consequence. On examination of the facts, we are of, the opinion that the argument raised may be far fetched at this preliminary stage of the trial. On prima facie examination of the facts present on record and the charges framed, it cannot be said that debatable question as to whether accusation made in conjunction with the attendant circumstances would not result in conviction for an offence under the tada act. The question is very much debatable and therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in abdul hamid haji mohammed's case, supra, a case for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution either for examining the merits of the controversy or for quashing of the prosecution of the accused is not made out. The question is very much debatable and therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in abdul hamid haji mohammed's case, supra, a case for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution either for examining the merits of the controversy or for quashing of the prosecution of the accused is not made out. All these questions shall be decided after the evidence is taken by the designated court and the high court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution at this preliminary stage when only skeleton facts are present, cannot prejudge the issues and come to conclusion that a case under tada act is not made out. ( 20 ) NEXT contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that saving clause in Section 1 (4) of the tada act cannot be interpreted to mean that prosecution initiated while the act was in force can be continued indefinitely. Any such interpretation would be violative of articles 14 and 21 of the constitution. A provision dealing with special situation may be valid to begin with but with the passage of time may become arbitrary. The fact that it would result in depriving the petitioners their liberty for an indefinite period makes it arbitrary and oppressive. ( 21 ) THE constitutional validity of Section 1 (4) of the tada act has been upheld by the Supreme Court. In kartar singh's case, supra, the Constitution bench had on consideration upheld the Provisions of the tada act generally. In the case of Abdul Aziz v State of West Bengal and another, the Supreme Court specifically upheld the saving clause of Section 1 (4 ). It was held that continuation of prosecution of the persons who had committed offences under the tada act prior to the expiry of the act would be treated differently as compared to those who may commit such acts after the expiry of the act. That the parliament had made a clear distinction between the two classes of offenders. Consequently, no fault can be found with Section 1 (4) of the tada act on that score. That the parliament had made a clear distinction between the two classes of offenders. Consequently, no fault can be found with Section 1 (4) of the tada act on that score. It was observed:"we may only indicate here that in the majority decision in kartar singh case, supra, it has been indicated that if the procedural law is oppressive and violates the principle of just and fair trial offending Article 21 of the Constitution and is discriminatory violating Article 14 of the constitution, then Section 15 of the tada act is to be struck down. As a distinction has been made in the tada Act, grouping the terrorists and disruptionists as a separate class of offenders from ordinary criminals under the normal laws and the classification of the offences under the tada act as aggravated form of crimes distinguishable from the ordinary crimes, it has to be tested and determined as to whether this distinction and classification are reasonable and valid within the term of Article 14. Hence, it is essential to examine the classification of 'offenders' and 'offences' so as to decide whether Section 15 is violative of Article 14. Viewed from this aspect, the majority decision has upheld the vires of the said section. We may also indicate here that although Section 1 (4) was not specially taken into consideration, the tada act was generally held intra vires in kartar singh's case, supra. Mr. Ramaswamy has also relied on another decision of this court in the case of State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar, for contending that accused in cases under tada act may be subjected to a different procedure for trial of their cases at the discretion of the state government and such discretionary power is unconstitutional. We may indicate here that in the instant case parliament has prescribed the procedure for deciding the cases under tada act. Hence, no discretionary option is left to the state government to choose the procedure for trial. Hence, the decision in state of West Bengal's case, supra, in our view is not applicable. Mr. We may indicate here that in the instant case parliament has prescribed the procedure for deciding the cases under tada act. Hence, no discretionary option is left to the state government to choose the procedure for trial. Hence, the decision in state of West Bengal's case, supra, in our view is not applicable. Mr. Ramaswamy has also submitted that in view of Section 1 (4) of the act those offenders who have committed offences prior to the expiry of the act will be treated differently as compared to those offenders who may commit such acts after the expiry of the act and therefore Section 1 (4) can be said to have made hostile discrimination qua such prior offenders. Even this submission cannot be supported in the light of anwar ali's case, supra. In that case, as noted earlier, it was left to the discretion of the executive to pick and choose offenders for the purpose of applicability of warrant procedure or summons procedure for trial of all similarly situated accused. In the present case, parliament itself by enacting Section 1 (4) has made a clear distinction between the two classes of offenders. (1) those offenders who have committed offences when the act was in force; and (2) persons who are not offenders under the act at all as their activities take place after the expiry of the act. These two classes of persons cannot be treated on a par. Consequently, no fault can be found with Section 1 (4) of the act on that score". ( 22 ) THE petitioner has not challenged the constitutional validity of Section 1 (4) in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the above case. But on close scrutiny of the arguments raised, it would be seen that in ultimate result, the argument raised goes to challenge the constitutional validity of Section 1 (4 ). In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court ef india, it is not open to the petitioners to raise this argument as the constitutional validity of Section 1 (4) has already been upheld by the Supreme Court of india. ( 23 ) IN shaheen welfare association's case, supra, the Supreme Court issued guidelines to release the under-trials on bail in cases falling under the tada act. ( 23 ) IN shaheen welfare association's case, supra, the Supreme Court issued guidelines to release the under-trials on bail in cases falling under the tada act. It was observed that since release of under-trials on bail is severely restricted under tada by virtue of the Provisions of Section 20 (8) of the Act, it is necessary that the trial does proceed and conclude within a reasonable time. Where this is not practical, it may be necessary to release some of them on bail. It was reiterated that right of speedy trial was embedded in Article 21. ( 24 ) FOR the purpose of grant of bail to tada detenus, under-trials were divided into four classes namely (a) hardcore under-trials, whose release would prejudice the prosecution case and whose liberty may prove to be menace to society in general and to complainant and prosecution witnesses in particular; (b) other under-trials whose overt acts or involvement directly attract sections 3 and or 4 of the tada act; (c) under-trials who are roped in, not because of any activity directly attracting sections 3 and 4, but by virtue of Section 120-b or 147 of the Indian Penal Code; and (d) those under-trials who were found possessing incriminating articles in notified areas and are booked under Section 5 of the tada act. After recording its reasons in paras 8 and 9 of the judgment guidelines for release of under-trials were given in paragraph 14 in the following terms: "ordinarily, it is true that the Provisions of Section 20 (8) and 20 (9) of tada would apply to all the aforesaid classes. But while adopting a pragmatic and just approach, no one can dispute the fact that all of them cannot be dealt with by the same yardstick. Different approaches would be justified on the basis of the gravity of the charges. Adopting this approach we are of the opinion that under-trials falling within group (a) cannot receive liberal treatment. But while adopting a pragmatic and just approach, no one can dispute the fact that all of them cannot be dealt with by the same yardstick. Different approaches would be justified on the basis of the gravity of the charges. Adopting this approach we are of the opinion that under-trials falling within group (a) cannot receive liberal treatment. Cases of under-trials falling in group (b) would have to be differently dealt with, in that, if they have been in prison for five years or more and their trial is not likely to be completed within the next six months, they can be released on bail unless the court comes to the conclusion that their antecedents are such that releasing them may be harmful to the lives of the complainant, the family members of the complainant or witnesses. Cases of under trials falling in groups (c) and (d) can be dealt with leniently and they can be released if they have been in jail for three years and two years respectively. Those falling in group (b), when released , on bail, may be released on bail of not less than Rs. 50,000/- with one surety for like amount and those falling in groups (c) and (d) may be released on bail on their executing a bond for Rs. 30,000/- with one surety for the amount subject to the following terms: (1) the accused shall report to the concerned police station once a week; (2) the accused shall remain within the area of jurisdiction of the designated court pending trial and shall not leave the area without the permission of the designated court; (3) the accused shall deposit his passport, if any, with the designated court. If he does not hold a passport, he shall file an affidavit to that effect before the designated court. The designated court may ascertain the correct position from the passport authorities, if it deems it necessary ; (4) the designated court will be at liberty to cancel the bail if any of these conditions is violated or a case for cancellation of bail is otherwise made out. (5) before granting bail, a notice shall be given to the public prosecutor and an opportunity shall be given to him to oppose the application for such release. The designated court may refuse bail in very special circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing. (5) before granting bail, a notice shall be given to the public prosecutor and an opportunity shall be given to him to oppose the application for such release. The designated court may refuse bail in very special circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing. It was then observed: these conditions may be relaxed in cases of those under groups (c) and (d) and for special reasons to be recorded, in the case of group (b) prisoners. Also these directions may not be applied by the designated court in exceptionally grave cases such as the Bombay bomb blast case where a lengthy trial is inevitable looking to the number of accused, the number of witnesses and the nature of charges unless the court feels that the trial is being unduly delayed. However, even in such cases it is essential that the review committee examines the case against each accused bearing the above directions in mind, to ensure that tada Provisions are not unnecessarily invoked". (emphasis supplied) ( 25 ) THE designated court following the direction issued by the supreme court in shaheen welfare association's case, supra, by an order dated 15-11-1996 granted bail to 71 accused persons falling in category (c) as provided in the judgment. As regards the others, 50 persons including the petitioner, since the designated court was of the opinion that they fall under category (a) of the judgment, the bail was denied. It cannot be made out from the facts disclosed in the petition that thereafter any appeal/ application was filed in the Supreme Court for grant of bail. The persons in jail who were denied bail by the designated court have filed this petition. This court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot grant bail thereby setting aside the order passed by the designated court. Petitioner if so advised can even today approach the Supreme Court of India for grant of bail by filing an appeal under Section 19 as the jurisdiction against an order passed by the designated court lies with the Supreme Court only. ( 26 ) PETITIONER has not prayed for bail, instead it has been prayed that this court should issue a writ, order or direction and in particular a writ in the nature of habeas corpus quashing the prosecution of the accused under the tada act because of the delay in concluding the trial. ( 26 ) PETITIONER has not prayed for bail, instead it has been prayed that this court should issue a writ, order or direction and in particular a writ in the nature of habeas corpus quashing the prosecution of the accused under the tada act because of the delay in concluding the trial. Reliance was placed on certain observations of the Supreme Court in the case of RAJ Deo Sharma v State of Bihar, wherein their lordships had laid down certain guidelines for closing the prosecution evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of recording of the charges framed where the accused was charged with offence punishable with imprisonment not exceeding 7 years, and in case of offences which are punishable with imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years to close the prosecution evidence on completion of 3 years from the date of recording the plea of accused on charge framed irrespective of the fact whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the stipulated period. Raj deo sharma's case, supra, was lateron explained by the Supreme Court in the case-of RAJ Deo Sharma v State of Bihar. The majority took the view that the court in RAJ deo sharma's case, supra, had not fixed any time limit for the conclusion of the trial, but it laid down guidelines for closing the evidence of the prosecution in certain circumstances. There is a difference between fixing of time limit for prosecution to complete its evidence and to quash the proceedings. No hard and fast Rule uniformly applicable to every case irrespective of facts and circumstances has been laid down. On examination of these two judgments, it cannot be held that Supreme Court has held that prosecution has to be quashed in case there is delay in the conduct of the trial. Direction has been given to close the prosecution evidence in case there is a delay on the part of the prosecution in concluding the trial. In the present case, simply because there has been a delay (which has been explained), the prosecution of the petitioner cannot be quashed. The charges in the 4 cases were framed between 28-11-1997 to 28-3-1998. Direction has been given to close the prosecution evidence in case there is a delay on the part of the prosecution in concluding the trial. In the present case, simply because there has been a delay (which has been explained), the prosecution of the petitioner cannot be quashed. The charges in the 4 cases were framed between 28-11-1997 to 28-3-1998. Even as per the judgment of the Supreme Court, the prosecution evidence cannot be ordered to be closed as three years have not lapsed from the date of framing of the charge and recording of the plea of the accused. There is no doubt that the prosecution should have been more prompt in completing the prosecution case but keeping in view the nature of offences committed; the numbers of cases, number of persons involved, the witnesses required to be produced and the amount of security required for conducting the trial, it cannot be said that the delay is without any justification. Charges have been framed. Government public prosecutor appearing on behalf of the state has assured that there would be day-to-day examination of the prosecution witnesses and the trial would be finished in the shortest possible time. The prosecutor could not give the time within which the trial would be finished because of the number of persons involved in different crimes and the number of witnesses which run into hundreds. He assured the court that there would not be any undue delay on the part of the prosecution in completing the prosecution evidence and in getting the verdict of the designated court. ( 27 ) FOR the reasons stated above, we find no merit in these petitions. Dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .