E.Padmanabhan, J.: The present habeas corpus petition has been filed praying this Court to call for the records of the first respondent made in letter No.SR.I/891-5/2000, dated 24.7.2000 in ordering detention of Krishnan Govindaraj, quash the same and set the said detenu at liberty. 2. Heard Mr.B.Kumar, learned senior counsel for Mr.R.Loganathan, appearing for the petitioner, Mr.G.M.Syed Fasiuddin, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the respondent No.1 and Mr.Su.Srinivasan, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondent No.2. 3. The petitioner is the wife of the detenu Krishnan Govindaraj, a resident of Madras City. Before referring to the contentions advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, it is but essential to refer to the material facts leading to clamping of the detention by the first respondent. 4. Krishnan Govindaraj, the detenu was ordered to be detained as the first respondent had arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the detenu had indulged in smuggling activities and that he has to be detained under Sec.3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, with a view to prevent him from smuggling goods in future. 5. One of the grounds advanced by the learned senior counsel relates to the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority. Hence material facts leading to clamping of detention have to be set out. 6. Based upon the intelligence gathered that the detenu was proceeding to Singapore by Singapore Airlines and he would be carrying Foreign currencies with him without declaring the same, the customs Intelligence Officers of the Zonal unit kept surveillance at the Departure Hall of the Chennai International Airport. The detenu, a holder of Indian Passport, who was carrying an identity card issued by the Corporation, as its sitting councillor, after completion of the immigration and customs check was intercepted, while he was proceeding for security check. On preliminary enquiry the detenu replied that he was not carrying any foreign currency. A personal search was conducted before a gazetted officer and currency bundle was found inside his pant pocket. On examination, the said currency bundle contained assorted foreign currencies of various denominations as detailed hereunder. 7. On preliminary enquiry the detenu replied that he was not carrying any foreign currency. A personal search was conducted before a gazetted officer and currency bundle was found inside his pant pocket. On examination, the said currency bundle contained assorted foreign currencies of various denominations as detailed hereunder. 7. The detenu admitted that he did not declare the above foreign currencies at the time of customs clearance and that he did not possess any valid document for legal procurement/ possession/ export, the foreign currencies were seized under a Mahazar at the Airport itself. The detenu had made a voluntary statement wherein he had stated that the foreign currencies were given to him by a Burma Bazaar trader for being carried into Singapore and handed over to a person at Singapore, who would approach him at Singapore Airport and that he carried foreign currencies for a monetary consideration. The detenu was arrested and remanded to judicial custody. On the materials placed by the sponsoring authority the Detaining Authority clamped the order of detention against the said detenu while the detenu was under judicial remand, which remand is also being challenged in the present habeas corpus petition. 8. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the first respondent resisting the habeas corpus petition and contending that no interference is called for on any one of the grounds set out in the petition. On behalf of the second respondent also, a counter affidavit has been filed. 9. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner raised the following contentions: (i) The order of detention is liable to be quashed as the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority is vitiated as the Detaining Authority had taken into consideration of extraneous and irrelevant materials touching the character of the detenu, which is unconnected and which has no bearing on ground case. (ii) In the absence of a valid order of remand by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on the date of clamping of detention the order of detention is vitiated besides pointing that without producing a valid order of remand or extension of remand, there could be no valid detention at all. (ii) In the absence of a valid order of remand by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on the date of clamping of detention the order of detention is vitiated besides pointing that without producing a valid order of remand or extension of remand, there could be no valid detention at all. (iii) The retraction sent to the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai on 15.7.2000 had not been placed before the Detaining Authority, nor it has been called for from the said Court, not a copy of the same had been furnished to the detenu, despite his request resulting in infraction of Art.22(5) of the Constitution and consequently, the detention has been rendered illegal. (iv) It is nextly contended that the Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) officers are not proper officers within the meaning of the Customs Act an i the DRI officers not having being conferred with the powers, the entire search, seizure and recovery and the consequential order leading to clamping of detention is vitiated. 10. While meeting the said contentions, Mr.G.M.Syed Fasiuddin, learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority is not vitiated, nor it had taken into consideration of irrelevant or extraneous matters and the reference made to the personal conduct or the subsequent police complaint is only a passing reference and that the same will not vitiate the order. 11. While meeting the second contention it was contended that the remand proceedings have to be read as a whole and the earlier as well as later order and the rejection of the bail application would show that the detenu was in remand on the crucial date and there is no merit in this contention. It was further contended that the DRI officers are the authorised officers and a notification has been placed before this Court, besides pointed out that in an earlier writ petition, this Court had rejected an identical contention in S.Peer Mohammed v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, H.C.P.No.800 of 2000, dated 29.9.2000. 12. In our considered view, the last of the contentions just requires to be mentioned and rejected as DRI officers are also customs officers as seen from the notification dated 8th February, 1963, published in the Gazette and DRI officers have been conferred with the powers specified in Secs.100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107 and 110 of the Customs Act, 1962. In our considered view, the last of the contentions just requires to be mentioned and rejected as DRI officers are also customs officers as seen from the notification dated 8th February, 1963, published in the Gazette and DRI officers have been conferred with the powers specified in Secs.100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107 and 110 of the Customs Act, 1962. This contention is a favorite contention, which Mr.B.Kumar, learned senior counsel advances in every case and it had been considered in detail by a earlier Division Bench of this Court in S.Peer Mohammed v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, H.C.P.No.800 of 2000, dated 29.9.20.00, to which one of us (E.Padmanabhan, J.), was a party. In the said H.C.P., it has been held thus: “16. The learned senior counsel referred to the definition of the “Proper Officer” as found in Sec.2(34) of the Customs Act as well as Secs.77, 107, 124 of the Customs Act and contended that Directorate of Revenue Intelligence Officers who intercepted the detenu are not the Proper Officers and therefore no action could be taken, nor the detenu could be branded as a smuggler. We are not persuaded to sustain the said contention.” 13. In the circumstances, while accepting the view taken by the earlier Division Bench, we reject the last of the contentions as untenable. 14. As regards the second contention, the contention though attractive, in our considered view cannot be sustained as seen from the paper book. The detenu who came to be arrested on 28.6.2000 was remanded on that day itself. The detenu moved a bail application on 29th June, 2000 before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The said bail application was resisted by filing a detailed counter. By order dated 30th July, 2000, the bail application came to be rejected. The detenu applied to the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for directions to give medical treatment at Government General Hospital, while pointing out that he had undergone Colostomy surgery during 1992, that during 1984 he met with a road accident and underwent solactamy... (removal of spleen) and he has also sustained abdomen injury besides he is a chronic diabetic, dependent on insulin. The detenu had been referred to the Medical Officer for opinion and as per the orders of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, the Medical Officer had submitted a report. (removal of spleen) and he has also sustained abdomen injury besides he is a chronic diabetic, dependent on insulin. The detenu had been referred to the Medical Officer for opinion and as per the orders of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, the Medical Officer had submitted a report. After considering the report, the said Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate directed that the detenu be admitted in the General Hospital, Chennai for treatment. The detenu who had been lodged in Central Prison had been admitted in the General Hospital. The detenu was initially produced before the Court on 28.6.2000 and he was remanded till 12.7.2000. As the investigations was in progress the DRI officers moved the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for extension of remand of the detenu for a further period of 15 days from 12.7.2000. The petition under Sec.167(1) of the Act was filed on 12.7.2000. On 12.7.2000, on the said remand extension application, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate passed the following order: “12.7.2000: Accused not produced since the accused is admitted in the Hospital as inpatient. Case, call on 26.7.2000”. Inld. Addl. C.M.M. (E.O.-II) This was the order on 12.7.2000. Obviously, the accused could not be produced as he is bedridden and had been undergoing medical treatment in the Hospital and he is an inpatient as per the earlier orders of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. 15. According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor the said order has to be taken as an order of remand and it is not as if the said Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had rejected the request for extension of remand on and from 12.7.2000. It is rightly pointed out that after passing the said order on remand extension request, the bail application of the accused has been rejected on 13.7.2000 by passing a speaking order. It is also pointed out that the detenu moved another bail application on 17.7.2000 once again before the same Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the said application proceeds on the basis that he is in judicial custody. This bail application also came to be considered and rejected and in the mean-while the order of detention has been clamped on the detenu by the first respondent on 24.7.2000. This bail application also came to be considered and rejected and in the mean-while the order of detention has been clamped on the detenu by the first respondent on 24.7.2000. The order passed on 12.7.2000 on the earlier remand extension application, the rejection of bail on 13.7.2000, the filing of bail application on 17.7.2000 and the order passed thereon, if read together would definitely make it clear that the detenu is in remand and there could be a valid order of remand as well as on the facts of the case. All the previous orders read together would show that the detenu is in remand and the Detaining Authority is well founded in proceeding on the basis that the detenu is in remand and hence the contention advanced by the learned senior counsel cannot be sustained. 16. It is true for the remand extension, the detenu could not be be produced as he was hospitalised. But he is yet a remand prisoner. Either a person could be kept as a remand prisoner or if remand is declined, appropriate orders will have to be passed by the Magistrate declining to extend the remand. On the other hand the bail application came to be rejected after 12.7.2000 on 13.7.2000 and the petitioner himself moved the bail on 17.7.2000. On a conjoint reading of these proceedings with the order passed on 12.7.2000, we are satisfied that the detenu was in remand on the crucial date and the Detaining Authority is well founded in proceeding on the premise that the detenu is a remand prisoner and he is in judicial custody. Hence this contention cannot be sustained. Though the learned senior counsel for the petitioner referred to several decisions in support of his contention, in our considered view, those decisions are distinguishable on the facts of the case and they have no application to the case on hand. 17. In Jumma Khan v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, H.C.P.No.909 of 2000, dated 1.11.2000 to which one of us (E.Padmanabhan, J.), was a party, it has been held thus: “10. Nextly it was contended that the retraction addressed to the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Economic Offences, Chennai on 16.3.2000 had not been referred to, nor been taken note of by the Detaining Authority, nor copy furnished despite request. Nextly it was contended that the retraction addressed to the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Economic Offences, Chennai on 16.3.2000 had not been referred to, nor been taken note of by the Detaining Authority, nor copy furnished despite request. In this respect it is to be pointed out that the order of detention has been passed on 26.4.2000. Concedingly, the retraction letter had not been addressed either to the Sponsoring Authority or to the Detaining Authority. But it has been addressed to the judicial forum, namely the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, who had remanded the detenu to jail. It is not obligatory on the part of the said judicial forum to forward copies of such letters or communications to the Detaining Authority or to the sponsoring authority. Nor, the judicial Court is obliged to forward all the papers received by it to any other department. The retraction letter is normally kept with the miscellaneous papers and they will be taken up for consideration if at all at the time of trial of the criminal case. As such it is clear that when neither the sponsoring authority, nor the Detaining Authority were aware of the retraction dated 16.3.2000 addressed to the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, the omission to advert to the said retraction will not arise at all, nor it vitiates the detention. In fact an identical point was raised in H.C.P.No.1095 of 2000 and after elaborate consideration by order dated 31.10.2000, we have rejected such a contention.” Hence the third contention is rejected as unsustainable. 18. Incidentally it was contended that there is a violation of Art.22(5) in that copy of the complaint given by the DRI officers to the D.I.G. of Police had not been furnished and this has disabled the detenu from making effective representation resulting in infraction of Art.22(5) of the Constitution. In this respect it is rightly pointed out that the copy of the letter written to the DIG of Police is the very report and there is no other complaint except that which is furnished to the detenu (page 13 of the paper book). Hence, we hold that this contention has to be rejected as it is based on a factual misconception. 19. Taking up the first contention we are of the considered view that the learned senior counsel is well founded in advancing this contention. Hence, we hold that this contention has to be rejected as it is based on a factual misconception. 19. Taking up the first contention we are of the considered view that the learned senior counsel is well founded in advancing this contention. The order of detention impugned dated 24.7.2000 begins thus: “Grounds on which detention order in G.O.No.SR.1/891-5/2000, Public (SC) Department, dated 24.7.2000 has been made against Thiru Krishnan Govindaraj, son of Thiru Krishnasami No.24, Acharappan Street, Chennai-1 under Sec.3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974...” 20. As seen from the said grounds, in para. (i) the Detaining Authority had set out the details regarding the detenu being intercepted after completion of his immigration and customs check, questioning, recovery of foreign currencies, value equivalent to Rs.6,04,696.50 as detailed in the Mahazar, recovery of identity card, seizure of currency, air ticket, boarding pass for further investigation. 21. In para. (ii), the Detaining Authority had referred to the statement given by the detenu on 28.6.2000 before the DPI officers and the entire incident commencing from interception to recovery of the foreign currencies and the statement of the detenu that the said currencies had been handed over to him by a person from Burma Bazaar with an instruction to hand over the same at Singapore for a monetary consideration of Rs.5,000. 22. In para. (iii) search of the two residential premises of the detenu had been set out. In para. (iv), the violation of the various provisions of the Customs Act and the offences committed by the detenu by his attempt to export the foreign currencies have been set out in detail. In para. (v) the Detaining Authority has referred to the arrest and remand to judicial custody. In paras. (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix) and (x) of the grounds the Detaining Authority has set out the intimation of arrest, the remand, the rejection of bail applications in detail relating thereto, the details of contravention of foreign exchange provisions, filing of application for direction to admit the detenu in Hospital and the intimation given to the Commissioner of Chennai Corporation about the arrest and remand of the detenu. 23. In para. (xi) the Detaining Authority had referred to the remand extension ordered by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, E.O-I, Chennai till 26.7.2000. All these grounds are admittedly relevant to the detention. 24. 23. In para. (xi) the Detaining Authority had referred to the remand extension ordered by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, E.O-I, Chennai till 26.7.2000. All these grounds are admittedly relevant to the detention. 24. The challenge is with reference to para. (xii) of the grounds and therefore it is extracted hereunder: “(xii) The DRI in their letter dated 5.7.2000 requested the DIG Chengalpet to give necessary protection to the family members of the officers participated in the seizure made from you. The Intelligence Officer of DRI, whose family was threatened by your associates has also filed a complaint with the Chrompet Police Station on 29.6.2000. In this regard a case was registered in Sl.No.61/ 2000, dated 29.6.2000 by the Chrompet Police Station.” 25. While elaborating the contention, the learned senior counsel contended that the Detaining Authority had been influenced by this paragraph and it is an extraneous and irrelevant material which is unconnected with the ground case or the Customs Act and therefore the satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority while clamping the order of detention is vitiated. It is contended that the Detaining Authority had taken into consideration extraneous materials and this would vitiate the order of detention. 26.Per contra, it is contended by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the above paragraph is only a casual reference about threat and intimidation of DRI Officers and complaint made to Police and not a material which had been taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority. We are not persuaded to accept the said argument advanced by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. The above passage is definitely an extraneous material or irrelevant material which had influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority. It cannot be said that the said irrelevant or extraneous material had not been taken into consideration or whether it might or might not have influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority, who had to arrive at the subjective satisfaction and clamp the order of detention. The persuasive argument advanced by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the said passage is only a passing reference, we are not inclined to accept as in our considered view, it is a material which had been taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority as seen from the preamble portion of the detention order and also seen from paras.2 and 4 of the order which read thus: “2. From the above materials, the State Government are satisfied that you have indulged in smuggling goods.” xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx “4. While arriving at the subjective satisfaction to detain you under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the State Government have taken into consideration all the facts and materials referred to and relied upon in these grounds mentioned above and also the statements, mahazars, etc., accompanying thereto.” 27. The contents of paras.2 and 4 would mean that one of the ground which weighed or might have weighed the Detaining Authority is the materials referred to in para. (xii) of the grounds of detention and the possibility of the mind of the Detaining Authority being influenced by the facts set out in ground No.(xii) cannot be ruled out and the said passage also cannot be taken as a passing reference in the light of the contents of paras.2 and 4 of the order of detention. 28. In this respect, the leaned senior counsel relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in Vashisht Narain Karwaria v. State of U.P. and another, 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 372. In the said pronouncement S.Ratnavel Pandian, J., as he then was, while considering the identical contention held thus: “8. Mr.R.K.Jain, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant made a number of submissions at the hearing, one of which being that the sponsoring authority had placed certain irrelevant and extraneous matters before the Detaining Authority and stealthily crept into the decision of the said authority directing detention of the detenu and as such the impugned order is liable to be quashed. This argument was resisted by Shri Dalveer Bhandari, the learned appearing on behalf of the respondents that the Detaining Authority had not considered any other material save the material referred to in the grounds of detention. Therefore, the short question for our consideration is whether the sponsoring authority has placed before the Detaining Authority an extraneous and irrelevant materials which might have influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority. It cannot be disputed-indeed there is none-that the 4 documents referred to above copies of which were furnished to the detenu have been placed before the Detaining Authority. If follows that the Detaining Authority passed this order only on consideration of the above said materials....” “9. It cannot be disputed-indeed there is none-that the 4 documents referred to above copies of which were furnished to the detenu have been placed before the Detaining Authority. If follows that the Detaining Authority passed this order only on consideration of the above said materials....” “9. The preamble of the letter submitted by the Station House Officer of Colonelganj, Allahabad dated March 31, 1989 to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad reads as follows: “It is submitted that Shri Vashishtha Narayan Karvaria alias Bhukkai, the aforesaid accused is a hardened criminal and has a gang. In his gang his son Kapil and two other big offenders Ram Chandra Tripathi and Santhosh Kumar Tripathi, son of Gaya Prasad President of Gansput, P.S.Poormufti, District Allahabad, are included. These people often used to commit heinous crimes, by which terror and fear prevails in the people. Many crimes are registered against Vashishtha Narayan Karvaria in many police stations.” 10. The above averments made in the above two letters, the copies of which are furnished to the detenu along with grounds of detention unequivocally and clearly spell out that the detenu is a hardened criminal, having a gang under this control often committing heinous crimes, that many cases against the detenu are registered in various police stations and that he is in the habit of committing offences. No doubt, these averments are not made mention of in the grounds of detention. But can it be said that these materials placed before the authority might not have influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority in taking the decision of detaining the detenu? In our view, the above averments which are extraneous touching the character of the detenu though not referred to in the grounds of detention, might have influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority to some extent one way or other in reaching the subjective satisfaction to take the decision of directing the detention of the detenu.” The above pronouncement squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 29. The learned senior counsel also relied upon an order passed by this Court in H.C.P.No.2273 of 2000. In the said pronouncement it has been held thus: “5. 29. The learned senior counsel also relied upon an order passed by this Court in H.C.P.No.2273 of 2000. In the said pronouncement it has been held thus: “5. From a plain reading of Sec.3(1) of the Act, we are of the opinion that an order of preventive detention can be passed, upon the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority that it is necessary to do so to prevent the detenu, from acting an any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community, whereas from the detention order, we could see that the Detaining Authority has adverted to other grounds, which are totally irrelevant for arriving at his subjective satisfaction. If the Detaining Authority arrives at a subjective satisfaction by considering materials which are totally irrelevant or by considering materials which are partly relevant and partly irrelevant or baseless, then, the order of detention gets vitiated, and in such a case, it is well settled that when the Detaining Authority acts on materials partly relevant or partly irrelevant, it is impossible to say to what extent the mind of the Detaining Authority was influenced by the irrelevant materials relied on by it in arriving at its subjective satisfaction. In such a situation, the detention order will get vitiated because of the use of irrelevant materials by the Detaining Authority.” 30. The above two decisions squarely apply to the facts of this case and it is unnecessary to multiply with any other authority. The latter portion of the order namely paras.2 and 4 definitely discloses that ground No.(xii) had been taken into consideration as one of the reasons or aspects which the Detaining Authority had taken into consideration. The said ground No.(xii) is not at all connected with the alleged activities of smuggling or with respect to the alleged conduct of the detenu as a smuggler or the seizure or recovery of the foreign currencies. Yet, they have been referred in prominence and this would show that the said aspect had also been taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority as one of the materials to clamp the order of detention. 31. Yet, they have been referred in prominence and this would show that the said aspect had also been taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority as one of the materials to clamp the order of detention. 31. At the risk of repetition, it has to be stated, it is an extraneous and irrelevant material which had been taken into consideration in the decision making process by the Detaining Authority and following the decision of the Apex Court in Vashisht Narain Karwaria v. State of U.P. and another, 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 372, we hold that on this ground the order of detention cannot be sustained and it is quashed accordingly. It is not necessary to consider the remaining grounds. 32. Accordingly, this habeas corpus petition is allowed. The order of detention is quashed and there will be a direction to the respondents to forthwith set the detenu at liberty, unless his presence is required in connection with any other case.