Judgment : This civil revision petition has been directed against the order and decree, dated 17. 98 on the file of the VII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai (Rent Control Appellate Authority) in R.C.A.No.442 of 1995, confirming the order of eviction dated 4. 1995 on the file of the X Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai (House Rent Controller) in R.C.O.P.No.1548 of 1993 on his file. 2. Theshort facts are: The respondent/landlord instituted the petition for eviction under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of The Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Act 18 of 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) on the ground that he is the owner of the shop at No,2/22, Raja Annamalai Road, Madras-84 and that the revision petitioner is the tenant of the shop on a monthly rent of Rs.625 and he is carrying on electrical goods business. The respondent was a partner along with his father in Imitation Jewellery business and having acquired considerable experience, he wanted to set up a separate business of his own and for that purpose, he required the premises in the occupation of the revision petitioner. He had made all preparations and was only waiting for vacant possession of the premises, He issued a notice dated 2. 1991 requiring vacant possession. The respondent thought it would take some time to get vacant possession of the shop through court proceedings and, therefore, set up business at Coimbatore under the name and style “Traditions Jewellery” at No.106/38, Big Bell, D.B.Road, Coimbatore. However, the climate at Coimbatore was found to be not suitable to him and his wife. Hence, he closed the business at Coimbatore and shifted it to Madras. Another notice, dated 4. 1993 was issued requiring the revision petitioner to vacate and deliver vacant possession for the own business of the respondent and as the same was not complied with, he filed the petition for eviction. 3. The revision petitioner/tenant resisted the petition stating the requirement of the shop for the own business of the respondent/landlord is not genuine land bona fide. The allegation that the climatic condition at Coimbatore is not suitable to the respondent and his wife is only a ruse to get vacant possession and the respondent is carrying on business at Coimbatore even now. The allegation that the climatic condition at Coimbatore is not suitable to the respondent and his wife is only a ruse to get vacant possession and the respondent is carrying on business at Coimbatore even now. The alleged notices have not been addressed to the revision petitioner but to one Gopal Bai and, therefore, are not valid. The respondent is intending to sell the shop at a fancy price after getting vacant possession and the allegation that he requires the shop for starting his own business is not true. 4. TheX Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai who enquired into the petition, on a consideration of the evidence placed before him, reached the conclusion that the requirement of the shop for the own buildings of the respondent/landlord is genuine and bona fide and, therefore, allowed the petition and ordered eviction, 5. Aggrieved with the said order of eviction, the revision petitioner filed R.C.A.No.442 of 1995. The VII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai who heard the appeal, for the reasons stated by him in his order dated 17. 1998 concurred with the reasoning of the trial court, confirmed the order of eviction and dismissed the appeal, which is being challenged in this revision petition. 6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted even though both the courts below concurrently found the requirement of the respondent/landlord is reasonable and bona fide, the said conclusion is manifestly wrong as both the courts have failed to appreciate the evidence in the proper perspective, due to which, miscarriage of justice had occurred. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the main legal requirement as per Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is the landlord or any member of his family shall be carrying on business on the date on which the petition was filed for eviction under the said section. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the main legal requirement as per Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is the landlord or any member of his family shall be carrying on business on the date on which the petition was filed for eviction under the said section. Sec.10(3)(a)(ii) of the Act reads as follows: Sec.10: Eviction of tenants: (3)(a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d) apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building- (iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a nonresidential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own: In the case on hand, it is pointed out the revision petitioner/ landlord has stated during his deposition that he was not carrying on any business before filing the petition and in April, 1993, he was not doing business at Madras. It as argued even though the father of the revision petitioner has an established business for more than 25 years, the respondent who is the landlord of the building as per his admission was not carrying on any business, particularly in April, 1993, when the petition was filed for eviction. It was contended that both the courts below have omitted to notice the above important admission in the evidence of the respondent and, therefore, the concurrent finding of both the courts the respondent requires the shop for his own business is reasonable and bona fide, is incorrect in law which is liable to be set aside. 7. Thelearned counsel for the revision petitioner refuted the above contention by submitting, the respondent set up his business at Coimbatore as he thought it will take some time for him to get vacant possession of the shop through court proceedings and, as a matter of fact, he took his wife also to Coimbatore but the weather and climatic condition at Coimbatore are not suitable to them and, hence, he lifted his business to Madras and since he could not secure any non-residential building, he set up his business in a portion of the house where his father is residing as a tenant. The fact that the respondent was carrying on business at Coimbatore is not disputed by the revision petitioner and according to him, the revision petitioner is still carrying on business at Coimbatore. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted, in the above set of evidence it is clear the respondent was carrying on business at Coimbatore. It was also pointed out the revision petitioner in the chief-examination though had stated through one David, his friend, he verified that the respondent is not carrying on business in a portion of the residential premises occupied by his father, in the cross-examination he had categorically admitted the said David did not go to the residential house of the father of the respondent which shows no verification has been done. 8. The attention of this Court is invited to the decision reported in Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkund and another Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkund and another Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkund and another, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 2226 wherein it has been pointed out the genuineness of the requirement by the landlord of the premises for his own occupation is not to be tested on par with dire need of a landlord, because the same is much greater need which is not the intention of the Act. The landlord has only to prove that his requirement is reasonable and genuine. The same principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the ruling reported in Raghunath Panhale (Dead) by Lrs. v. M/s.Chaganalia Sundarji and Company Raghunath Panhale (Dead) by Lrs. v. M/s.Chaganalia Sundarji and Company Raghunath Panhale (Dead) by Lrs. v. M/s.Chaganalia Sundarji and Company , (1999)8 S.C.C. 689. In para.6, we find the following observation: “6. the word “reasonable’, in our view connotes that the requirement or need is not fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be a mere desire. The word ‘requirement’ coupled with the word reasonable means that it must be something more than a mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity. Aitken v. Shaw , 1993 S.L.T. 21, Nevile - A reasonable and bona fide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end. It may be a need in present or within reasonable proximity in the future. Aitken v. Shaw , 1993 S.L.T. 21, Nevile - A reasonable and bona fide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end. It may be a need in present or within reasonable proximity in the future. The use of the word ‘bona fide’ is an additional requirement under Sec.13(1)(g) and it means that the requirement must also be honest and not be tainted with any oblique motive.” 9. The learnedcounsel for the respondent further contended both the courts below have concurrently found the requirement of the landlord, namely, the respondent, is reasonable and bona fide and have ordered eviction and, therefore, it is not open to this Court to interfere with the concurrent finding of the courts below, as the scope of the revision is only mere superintendence and not re-hearing the appeal. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar , (1980)4 S.C.C. 259 where the scope of appeal and revision in rent control proceedings has been dealt with by the Apex Court. It is important to notice particular reference has been made in the above decision to the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960), and the scope of Sec.25 of the said Act which provides for a revision. In para.3 of the said decision, it has been held: “3. Sec.23 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, enables any person aggrieved by an order passed by the controller to prefer an appeal to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. Sec.25 provides that: The High Court may on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the Appellate Authority, call for and examine the record of Appellate Authority, to satisfy, itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration it may pass orders accordingly”. The language of Sec.25 is indeed very wide. The language of Sec.25 is indeed very wide. But we must attach some significance to the circumstances that both the expressions “appeal’ and ‘revision’ are employed in the statute. Quite obviously, the expression ‘revision’ is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveys by the expression ‘appeal’. In fact it has to be noticed that under Sec.25 of the High Court calls for and examine the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself. The dominant idea conveyed by the in-corporation of the words ‘to satisfy itself’ under Sec.25 appears to be that the power conferred on the High Court, under Sec.25 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Sec.25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on the High Court under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under Sec.115, Civil Procedure Code, but in the words of Untwalia, J., in Datotnapani Copalvarao Devakate v. Vithalarao Maurthirao Tangaval , (1975)2 S.C.C. 246 ” it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second of first appeal. 10. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, merely because the High Court does not agree with the finding of the subordinate courts, the High Court cannot interfere with the concurrent finding of both the courts below in a revision. I find there is substantial merit in the above contention in view of the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the above ruling. Both the courts below have found concurrently that the respondent/landlord was carring on business at Coimbatore at the relevant time and closed the said business and shifted the same to Chennai, as the climatic condition at Coimbatore was not suitable to him and his wife, which act has not been established to be untrue or false by the revision petitioner/tenant. As pointed out above, the revision petitioner himself has admitted in the evidence the landlord is carrying on business at Coimbatore and according to him the business is continued even now. Therefore, the fact that the respondent is carrying on business even now is clearly established. As pointed out above, the revision petitioner himself has admitted in the evidence the landlord is carrying on business at Coimbatore and according to him the business is continued even now. Therefore, the fact that the respondent is carrying on business even now is clearly established. In my opinion, whether the respondent is carrying on business at Coimbatore or at Madras does not make any difference, as Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act only insists that on the relevant date the landlord shall be carrying on business. The act does not specify that the business should be carried on only in the place where the impugned premises is situated. As both the courts below have concurrently found that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide, in my opinion, it is not open to this Court to interfere with the said concurrent finding of fact in the revision as no manifest error of law has been noticed. 11. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted the rent control appellate authority has not understood the scope of Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and he concentrated mainly on the question whether permission has to be obtained by the respondent to carry on business in a portion of the residential premises occupied by his father as a tenant and he had failed to answer the crux of the case, namely, whether the requirement of the respondent is reasonable and bona fide. On a perusal of the order of the appellate authority, I am of the view that even though the appellate authority had made some lengthy discussion as to whether the respondent has to obtain permission from the concerned authority for conducting his business in the residential premises of his father, ultimately, he found the requirement of the respondent is reasonable and bona fide. In my opinion, the discussion as to whether the respondent has to obtain permission to conduct business in the portion of the residential premises of the house occupied by his father as a tenant is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of this case, but the fact remains that the appellate authority also found the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide. 12. 12. Another contention that was raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is though the revision petitioner is a tenant of the impugned shop, the two notices issued by the respondent/landlord under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act requiring vacant possession had been addressed to one Gopal Bai, the father of the revision petitioner, about which the revision petitioner has no knowledge and on that ground the petition for eviction filed by the respondent has to fail. The fact that the notices have been addressed to Gopal Bai, the father of the revision petitioner is not in dispute. However, the learned counsel for the respondent, placing reliance on the decision reported in V.Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal V.Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal V.Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal , (1979)4 S.C.C. 214 argued after the said decision of the Supreme Court no notice to quite under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act need be issued by the landlord to the tenant and it is not a necessary pre-requisite for an eviction petition and, therefore, the fact that the two notices to quit have been issued to Gopal Bai does not loom large. In para.18 it has been held: “…….If we were to agree with the view that determination of lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is a condition precedent to the starting of a proceeding under the State Rent Act for eviction of the tenant, we could have said so with respect that the view expressed in the above passage is quite correct because there was no question of determination of the lease again once it was determined by efflux of time. But on the first assumption we have taken a different view of the matter and have come to the conclusion that determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. But on the first assumption we have taken a different view of the matter and have come to the conclusion that determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient tan did is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act.” In view of the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court of India, the fact that the notices to quite have been addressed to Gopal Bai, in my opinion, does not alter the situation and no importance need be given to the contention in this regard. 13. For the reasons discussed above, I am of the view that the concurrent finding of both the courts below cannot be interferes with an the revision deserved to be dismissed. 14. In the result, the concurrent finding of both the courts below is confirmed and the revision petition is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.