V. M. SAHAI, J. ( 1 ) KM, Avinash Gupta, respondent No. 2 was appointed as Principal on 25. 3. 1975 on probation of one year in Vaidya Bhagwan Din Bailka Vidyalaya Higher Secondary School, Nanpara, district Bahraich (in brief institution ). She was suspended on 6. 2. 1977, 4. 4. 1977 and 11. 7. 1977 but these suspension orders were not approved by the Regional Inspectress of Girls School (in brief R. I. G. S. ). She was again suspended on 16. 4. 1981. This order was approved by R. I. G. S. The charge-sheet was issued to her on 17. 2. 1981. It was replied on 23. 3. 1981. The petitioner passed a resolution on 30. 4. 1981 for terminating the services of respondent No. 2. This resolution was sent to R. I. G. S. for approval, as provided by Section 16g (3) of the U. P. Intermediate Education act, 1921 (in brief the Act ). It remained pending with the R. I. G. S. for about four years. The approval was granted on 7th May, 1985, The respondent No. 2 filed an appeal before the Joint director of Education. This appeal was allowed on 18. 7. 1987. The appellate order was challenged by petitioners by way of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5562 of 1987 which was allowed on 16. 7. 1991 with direction to the Joint Director of Education to decide the appeal afresh, in accordance with law after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the management and the principal. The Joint Director of Education again allowed the appeal on 10. 7. 1992 and set aside the order dated 7. 5. 1985 granting approval. He held that R. I. G. S. had no power of approval on 7. 5. 1985 as under the U. P. Secondary Education Services Selection Boards Act", 1982, the power vested in the commission/board. It is this order, which has been challenged by the petitioners in this writ, petition. ( 2 ) SRI Rajiv Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that R. I. G. S. had power to grant approval to the resolution of the management terminating the service of the petitioner. It is this order, which has been challenged by the petitioners in this writ, petition. ( 2 ) SRI Rajiv Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that R. I. G. S. had power to grant approval to the resolution of the management terminating the service of the petitioner. He placed reliance on Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Service Commission and selection Board (Amendment) Act, 1985, by which proviso was inserted in Section 21 of the uttar Pradesh Secondary Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982. The learned counsel has urged that the Joint Director of Education has not complied with the direction in writ Petition No. 5562 of 1987 and has not decided the appeal considering all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. He lastly urged that once appellate authority held that the appeal before him was not maintainable, he could not decide the appeal. ( 3 ) THE respondent No. 2 Km. Avinash Gupta has appeared in person. She and Sri V. N. Agarwal the learned standing counsel both have supported the order passed by the Joint Director of education. The learned standing counsel placed the notification dated 27. 12. 1983 notifying 1. 1. 1984 as the date for enforcement of Section 21 of Uttar Pradesh Secondary Services commission and Selection Boards Act. 1982. The notification is extracted below :. . (VERNACULAR MATTER OMMITED ). . ( 4 ) IT is necessary to mention that Uttar Pradesh Secondary Services Commission and Selection boards Act. 1982, came into force on 14. 7. 1981 except Section 21 which was to come into force on the date to be notified by the Government. Section 21 was similar to Section 16g of the Act. It came into force on 1. 4. 1981. The effect of notification dated 27. 12. 1983 was that the R. I. G. S. ceased to have Jurisdiction to grant approval to resolution of termination. The R. I. G. S. granted approval on 7. 5. 1985 to the resolution dated 30. 4. 1981 sent by the management terminating the service of the respondent No. 2. On 7. 5. 1985, the Jurisdiction of approval vested in the commission. The R. I. G. S. did not have any power on 7. 5. 1985 to grant approval to the resolution of the petitioner. The approval granted by R. I. G. S. was without Jurisdiction. 4. 1981 sent by the management terminating the service of the respondent No. 2. On 7. 5. 1985, the Jurisdiction of approval vested in the commission. The R. I. G. S. did not have any power on 7. 5. 1985 to grant approval to the resolution of the petitioner. The approval granted by R. I. G. S. was without Jurisdiction. ( 5 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner has vehemently urged that R. I. G. S. could grant approval to the resolution of the management. He relied on proviso to sub-section (1) inserted by Section 3 of the amending Act (U. P. Act No. 19 of 1985 ). It is extracted below : 3. Amendment of Section 21.-- in Section 21 of the Principal Act: (a) in sub-section (1), the following proviso shall be inserted at the end, namely : "provided that, where reference for prior approval of the Inspector was made in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 160 of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, before January 1, 1984, no prior approval of the Commission shall be necessary and such reference shall be dealt with in accordance with the proviso of that Act as if this Act had not come into force. " Amending Act. 1985. by which proviso to Section 21 was inserted came into force on 12. 6. 1985. Therefore, when R. I. G. S. granted the approval on 7. 5. 1985, the proviso was not in existence. The claim of the petitioner is that since the petitioner had referred the resolution for approval prior to 1. 1. 1984, the R. I. G. S. had the Jurisdiction to exercise power under Section 16g and the appellate authority erroneously held that the order passed by her on 7. 5. 1985 was beyond section 16g. The argument does not appear to be correct. Proviso added to Section 21 has already been extracted. A literal reading of the proviso would make the section unworkable. For instance what would happen to the orders passed by the commission between 1. 1. 1984 till 11. 6. 1985. To avoid any anomaly, the Legislature did not make the amendment retrospective. The proviso would, therefore, apply to those references, which were made prior to 1. 1. 1984 and had not been disposed of till 12. 6. 1985. Since in this case the reference made to R. I. G. S. prior to 1. 1. 1. 1984 till 11. 6. 1985. To avoid any anomaly, the Legislature did not make the amendment retrospective. The proviso would, therefore, apply to those references, which were made prior to 1. 1. 1984 and had not been disposed of till 12. 6. 1985. Since in this case the reference made to R. I. G. S. prior to 1. 1. 1984 was disposed of by her on 7. 5. 1985, the amended provision was not attracted to it. The jurisdiction and power of R. I. G. S. has to be seen, in law, as it stood on the date i. e. , 7. 5. 1985 when she granted approval. And, on that date, the R. I. G. S. could not have exercised Jurisdiction under Section 16g. Therefore, the appellate authority did not commit any error in deciding and allowing the appeal of respondent No. 2. ( 6 ) AS regards the argument that the appellate authority committed an error of law in not deciding the appeal on merits as this Court has specifically directed to decide all questions raised by the parties, it is sufficient to say that the submission is devoid of any merits as the appellate authority did hold that the order on merits was not correct. In any case since the appellate authority held that the R. I. G. S. did not have any jurisdiction to exercise power under Section 16g he did not commit any error in not adjudicating on other points in detail. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has lastly urged that the Joint Director of Education having held that the appeal filed by the respondent No. 2 was not maintainable, therefore, he should have refrained from deciding the appeal. I am not inclined to accept this argument as respondent No. 2 has challenged the order dated 7. 5. 1985 passed by the R. I. G. S. to be without jurisdiction. It could not have been challenged in any other forum. She had no other option except to challenge the order passed by the R. I. G. S. by way of appeal before Joint Director of education, who has rightly allowed the appeal. Further even if there would have been some merit in this argument the order of R. I. G. S. being without jurisdiction, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Further even if there would have been some merit in this argument the order of R. I. G. S. being without jurisdiction, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. ( 8 ) FOR the reasons given above, this writ petition is dismissed. But it is necessary to issue directions about payment of salary and determination of post retiral benefits between the parties. The respondent No. 2 has pointed out that she has attained the age of superannuation on 30. 6. 2000, therefore, she is entitled for her entire arrears of salary and pension and other post retiral benefits of the post of principal. Since the services of the respondent No. 2 were terminated by the petitioners and approval granted to the resolution for termination was without jurisdiction, the respondent No. 2 is entitled for her salary. Therefore, she shall be paid salary from the date of suspension till she retired as principal of the institution. The petitioners shall calculate her salary with increment, if any, and the dearness allowance and other allowances payable to her and the amount so calculated shall be paid to her within three months. The petitioners shall fix her pension on the salary which would have been payable to her on the date of retirement. The respondent No. 2 shall be deemed to be in continuous service till she superannuated. The respondent No. 1 shall ensure compliance of this order and issue necessary directions to the petitioners and educational authorities for paying salary and pension and other post retiral benefits of respondent No. 2 within a, further period of three months. ( 9 ) PARTIES shall bear their own costs. .