O. P. GARG, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition the order dated 5. 9. 2000 passed by the learned District Judge, Chitrakoot. allowing the Revision Application No. 36 of 1999 whereby the order dated 29. 9. 2000 passed by the trial court in Suit No. 10 of 1990 has been challenged. ( 2 ) HEARD Sri K. S. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner-Radhey Shyam who happens to be defendant No. 3 in the original suit as well as Sri Iqbal Ahmad, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4. ( 3 ) SUIT No. 10 of 1990 was instituted by respondent No. 3 Ayodhya for the relief of partition of his l/4th share in the disputed property. It was alleged that the property in question was purchased jointly by Ram Adhar and Gaya Prasad. Radhey Shyam alias Radhey Lal-petitioner, and Jogesh the present respondent No. 6 are the sons of Ram Adhar while plaintiff-respondent no. 3-Ayodhya and Bhola Prasad-respondent No. 4 are the sons of Gaya Prasad. The suit was ordered to proceed ex parte against the defendant No. 4-Jogesh (presently respondent No. 6 who is real brother of the present petitioner ). Jogesh was later on allowed to file the written statement and the order to proceed the case ex parte against him was recalled. Thereupon, the present petitioner-defendant moved an application under Section 88ka for transposition of his brother jogesh-defendant No. 4 as co-plaintiff on the ground that his interest is identical to that of the plaintiff-respondent No. 3. This application for transposition was allowed by the trial court on 29. 9. 1999. Against this order, the plaintiff-respondent No. 3 filed a Revision Application No. 36 of 1999 which has been allowed and the application moved by the present petitioner for transposition was rejected. It is in these circumstances that the defendant No. 3 has come before this Court as petitioner to challenge the order rejecting his application for transposition of his brother Jogesh defendant No. 4 as co-plaintiff. ( 4 ) SRI K. S. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the application for transposition could not be rejected by the revisional court and he committed a grave illegality in setting aside the order passed by the trial court. ( 4 ) SRI K. S. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the application for transposition could not be rejected by the revisional court and he committed a grave illegality in setting aside the order passed by the trial court. In support of his contention, Sri Misra placed reliance on the decision of the Privy Council in Bhupendra Narayan Sinha v. Rajeshwar Prasad Bhakat and others, AIR 1931 PC 162, in which the provision of Order I, Rule 10, C. P. C. came to be considered. It was held that the course of adding proforma defendants as co-plaintiffs should always be adopted where it is necessary for a complete adjudication upon the questions involved in the suit and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. This decision, which has been followed subsequently in a number of cases lays down a general principle that with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, a proforma defendant may be transposed as the co-plaintiff. Another decision referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is R. S. Moddanappa v. Chandramma and another. AIR 1965 SC 1812 . In that case, the transposition of the defendant as co-plaintiff in a suit for partition was sought. The Courts below failed to do so. It was held that the technical defect stood cured by Section 99, C. P. C. in view of the fact that the defence raised by the other defendants was fully considered. In the said case, the plaintiffs suit was for partition of the suit properties on the ground that they were inherited jointly by her and by the first defendant and she claimed possession over the property falling in her share from the other defendant who were wrongfully in possession of the property. She also alleged that the first defendant did not cooperate in the matter and so she had to institute the suit. The first defendant throughout admitted the plaintiffs title over half share in the properties and claimed a decree in her favour to the extent of remaining half share in the properties. It was observed that the first defendant could also have prayed for her transposition as a co-plaintiff and under Order 1, Rule 10 (2), C. P. C. the Court could have transposed her as co-plaintiff. It was ruled that the power under this provision is exercisable by the Court even suo motu. It was observed that the first defendant could also have prayed for her transposition as a co-plaintiff and under Order 1, Rule 10 (2), C. P. C. the Court could have transposed her as co-plaintiff. It was ruled that the power under this provision is exercisable by the Court even suo motu. The observations made in the aforesaid case would not apply to the facts of the present case. The plaintiff and the first defendant, in that case, claimed their right, title and interest under the same title. In the instant case, though the fathers of the rival parties had jointly purchased the property, they are claming through different persons. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is a. Jayaraj v. A. Kumaravel and others, AIR 1986 Mad 367 , in which the view taken was that the rights of the parties in a partition action should be settled in that action only and none of them should be driven to a different action. In partition action everybody has a right to transpose himself from the rank of plaintiff to that of a defendant and vice versa and to request for allotment of his share individually. The trial court has got inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 to make the order transposing the parties. It is not correct to say that Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C. alone is applicable. Even after the passing of the preliminary decree in the partition suit, as long as there is no stay granted pending the appeal against the decree in the suit, the rights of the parties have to be worked out in the Court of the first instance. Mere pendency of appeal after the passing of the preliminary decree would not bar the trial court to entertain an application for transposition of parties to determine their individual shares. Application to the appellate court for that purpose is not necessary. ( 5 ) ON the strength of the above decisions Sri K. S. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner criticized the order passed by the revisional court and urged that in all fairness, the Court should have maintained the order for transposition of the defendant No. 4 as co-plaintiff even though there was no application on behalf of the defendant No. 4 or consent of the plaintiff for transposition. Sri Iqbal Ahmad, learned counsel for the contesting respondent Nos. Sri Iqbal Ahmad, learned counsel for the contesting respondent Nos. 3 and 4 repelled the above submissions and maintained that in a suit for partition, it is immaterial as to who is the plaintiff or defendant as each of the parties whether he be a plaintiff or defendant has a right to seek partition of his share and to obtain possession after the property is partitioned by metes and bounds. It was pointed out that it is an indubitable fact that the property which is subject-matter of partition was jointly purchased by the father of the present petitioner and respondent No. 6 as well as the father of respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The respondent No. 6, who happens to be the real brother of the petitioner, has admitted the fact of joint purchase of the property. The petitioner and the respondent No. 6 have to get their share in the property through their father while the plaintiff-respondent No. 3 and his brother-respondent No. 4 are to get the share of their father in the property. Both the sets have to get their shares from two different branches. In these circumstances, the exercise of transposition of Jogesh presently respondent no. 6 as co-plaintiff was unwarranted and otiose. In support of his aforesaid contention, Sri Iqbal ahmad placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of Travancore Cochin High Court in narayaman and other v. Roman, AIR 1953 TC 366. In that case, defendant No. 4 was allowed to continue the suit by an order passed in a Civil Misc. Writ Petition, it was held that the defendant no. 4 had to remain content with retaining her position as defendant No. 4 in the case and her transposition as plaintiff, it was ordered, should not be carried into effect because that procedure was asked for and allowed on the ground that no one of the plaintiffs who brought the suit could maintain it and that if in a suit for complete partition, a situation arises when there is no plaintiff to conduct the suit, a defendant who has a share can be transposed as plaintiff. It was further held that Order 1, Rule 10 (3), C. P. C. prohibits the addition of the plaintiff without the consent of the existing plaintiffs. It was further held that Order 1, Rule 10 (3), C. P. C. prohibits the addition of the plaintiff without the consent of the existing plaintiffs. This observation is general and applies to the addition of plaintiff by transposition from the array of defendants except in the cases where a defendant could have been originally a plaintiff. The plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 are there to prosecute the suit. They have not given consent for transposition of the defendant No. 4. Further, there is no need to transpose defendant no. 4 as a plaintiff as this is a suit for complete partition and every sharer is essentially a plaintiff albeit arrayed as a defendant. In another case in A. Thakurdas and another v. A. Venilal and others, AIR 1977 Kar 60 , the question of transposition with reference to a partition suit was considered. It was held that in a partition suit, every party whether arrayed as plaintiff or defendant is substantially the plaintiff in a suit and is entitled to a decree and he can move the court for a partition of his share. Being governed by this principle the defendants inter se could, in that case, certainly claim for a partition of their respective shares and especially in view of the compromise decree they could do so. The mere fact that at one stage some of the defendants were not permitted to be arrayed as plaintiffs, will not stand in their way for claiming a final decree for partition. ( 6 ) A close reading of the decisions referred to above reveals that in a suit for partition, there is hardly any difference in the status of the plaintiff or a defendant. Each one of the parties to the suit-whether he be a plaintiff or a defendant-can claim partition of his share in the properly. A defendant in the suit may get his share determined and partitioned and may also pray for a final decree, though he is not a plaintiff in the suit. In these circumstances, the question of transposition loses significance. It is true that in certain exceptional cases, the Court may even suo motu order for the transposition of a defendant as co-plaintiff, but where the transposition is sought to be effected not by the party concerned but by another defendant, his application has to be judged with care and caution. In these circumstances, the question of transposition loses significance. It is true that in certain exceptional cases, the Court may even suo motu order for the transposition of a defendant as co-plaintiff, but where the transposition is sought to be effected not by the party concerned but by another defendant, his application has to be judged with care and caution. The present petitioner was the defendant No. 3 in the suit. It was he who moved an application for transposition of his brother Jogesh-defendant No. 4 as the co-plaintiff by entertaining an apprehension that an order to proceed the case ex parte against the defendant No. 4 has been set aside and perhaps he has fallen in the fold of the plaintiffs of the suit. The application for transposition on behalf of the present petitioner was resisted and opposed by the plaintlff-respondent No. 3. The revisional court has recorded very convincing and cogent reasons for rejecting the application of the petitioner (defendant No. 3) for transposition of his brother as co-plaintiff. The rights of the petitioner to seek partition of his share is not, in any manner, affected by the order to refuse the transposition of his brother as co-plaintiff. The well merited and justified order passed by the revisional court cannot be interfered with the invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the constitution of India. ( 7 ) THE writ petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. .