Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 1360 (RAJ)

Sunil Industries v. Ram Chander Pradhan

2000-11-14

S.N.VARIAVA, S.RAJENDRA BABU

body2000
Honble VARIAVA, J.–This appeal is against an order dated 7.05.1997 by which the first appeal by the appellant has been dismissed in limine. (2). Briefly stated the facts are as follows: The petitioner is a sole proprietary concern. It runs its workshop of shaping steel sheets into various shapes and forms. The 1st respondent was, at the relevant time, working as a press operator with the appellant. On 27.01.1993 while working on a press, the 1st respondent sustained injuries to his right index finger and thumb. The appellant rushed the 1st respondent to the Civil Hospital at Gurgaon (Haryana). The injuries necessitated amputation of 2.5x0.5 cms. of the index finger. (3). On 4.06.1993, the 1st respondent filed a claim under the Workmens Compensations Act, 1923 claiming compensation in the sum of Rs.25,000/- with interest thereon @ 16% per annum. The appellant in his reply, inter alia, claimed that the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act would not apply to his establishment. (4). On 15.10.1996 the Commissioner held that the Workmens Compensation Act applied and that the appellant was liable to pay compensation in a sum of Rs.29,814/- together with Rs.5,000/- as penalty and interest at 12% per annum. (5). The appellant preferred an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act before the High Court of Punjab and Harayna. That appeal came to be dismissed in limine by the impugned order dated 7.05.1997. (6). It is admitted that the 1st respondent was working as a press operator with the appellant at the relevant time. It is admitted that the did took place on 27.01.1993 and that it resulted in injuries to the right index finger and thumb of the 1st respondent and that this necessitated amputation of 2.5 x 0.5 cms. of the index finger. Mr. Vasdev, however, submitted that the Workmens Compensation Act did not apply to the appellants establishment. He submitted that Section 2(n)(ii) of the Workmens Compensation Act provides that a workman is a person employed in capacity specified in Schedule II. The then referred to Schedule II of the Workmens Compensation Act and pointed out that under Item 2 of Schedule II a person would be a workman provided he is employed in any premises where a manufacturing process as defined in Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 was being carried on. The then referred to Schedule II of the Workmens Compensation Act and pointed out that under Item 2 of Schedule II a person would be a workman provided he is employed in any premises where a manufacturing process as defined in Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 was being carried on. He submitted that this showed that provisions of the Factories Act were being incorporated into the Workmens Compensation Act. He submitted that this is also clear from the fact that over the years there have been a number of amendments to the Workmens Compensation Act incorporating therein provision of the Factories Act or provisions similar thereto. He then referred to Sections 2(k) and 2(m) of the Factories Act and submitted that under the Factories Act the manufacturing process must be in a factory where ten or more workers are working (if the manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power) or twenty or more persons are working (if a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power. He submitted that a joint reading of all these provisions makes it clear that even for the purposes of the Workmens Compensation Act only those persons who are employed in a factory within the meaning of the Factories Act, 1948 would be entitled to make a claim under the Workmens Compensation Act. (7). We are unable to accept the submissions of the learned counsel. It is true that the Workmens compensation Act, 1923 has been amended on a number of occasions. However, inspite of numerous amendments the Legislature has purposely omitted to specifically provide that only a workman who is employed in a factory, as defined in the Factories Act, could make a claim. All that has been done is that in Schedule II of the Workmens Compensation Act it is inter alia clarified that persons employed, otherwise than in a clerical capacity, in any premises wherein a manufacturing process as defined in Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948, are workmen. Significantly the definition of the term ``Factory as appearing in Clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 has not been incorporated in the Workmens Compensation Act. Significantly the definition of the term ``Factory as appearing in Clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 has not been incorporated in the Workmens Compensation Act. Thus it is clear that for the Workmens Compensation Act to apply it is not necessary that the workman should be working in a Factory as defined in the Factories Act, 1948. It has not been denied that the workshop of the appellant would fall under Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act. Therefore, the 1st respondent would be a workman within the meaning of the term as defined in the Workmens Compensation Act. (8). Under the circumstances, we see no merit in the appeal. The same stands dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.