Per Sharma-J. 1. The questions involved in this Letters Patent Appeal are; (i) whether an award published under section 17 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act hereinafter) is enforceable when the reference was made by the incompetent authority; (ii) whether the writ petitioner-respondent herein is bound by the settlement dated: 22-03-1991 arrived at between the National Projects Construction Corporation Staff Association of which he was a member and all proceedings before the Labour Court and the award are infructuous; and (iii) whether the Writ Court in exercise of powers of judicial review was justified in directing execution of the award when the respondent took no steps to enforce the award either under S. 29 or S. 33 (c) of the Act. The Facts; 2. The petitioner is a retrenched employee of the National Project Construction Corporation (the NPCC hereinafter). The undisputed facts are that as many as 470 employees were retrenched by the NPCC by order dated: 29-08-1987. The NPCC Staff Association challenged the retrenchment order in C. W. No. 2824/87 before the High Court of Delhi which was dismissed on May 19, 1988. This dismissal of the writ petition was challenged by the writ petitioners in Civil Appeal No. 85/1989 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9798 of 1988) which was decided by the Supreme Court with the consent of the parties. It is admitted that the petitioner was a member of the NPCC Staff Association. In terms of this order the entire dispute was to be referred to the National Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section 7 (b) of the Act by the Central Government. However, before this judgment of the Apex Court, the writ petitioners it appears had approached the State Government under section 10 of the Act and the State Government vide SRO 87 dated: 15-03-1988 referred the question of legality of retrenchment of the respondents to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section 7 and 7 (a) of the Act. The Labour Court issued the award on 05-05-1992 which was published in the Government Gazette on 09-07-1992. However, while these proceedings were pending before the Labour Court, a settlement was reached between the NPCC Staff Association and the NPCC Management on 22-03-1991. In terms of this settlement most of the retrenched workers were to be reinstated in service in six phases. However, while these proceedings were pending before the Labour Court, a settlement was reached between the NPCC Staff Association and the NPCC Management on 22-03-1991. In terms of this settlement most of the retrenched workers were to be reinstated in service in six phases. The name of the petitioner also figures in the annexure to the aforesaid settlement. Accordingly, pursuant to this settlement vide letter dated: 06-08-1992, the petitioner was offered reinstatement on the condition that he will not get any wages, provident fund, gratuity, leave bonus, etc. w.e.f. the date of termination till the date he submitted his joining report at the new place of posting which was somewhere in Manipur. It is admitted that the petitioner did not accept this offer and instead continued to prosecute the proceedings pending before the Labour Court. 3. After the award was published under section 17 of the Act, he approached the Government for implementation of the award and the Government in the Labour Department vide letter dated 04-10-1992 directed the respondent No. 2 to implement the award within a period of one month. However, the management of NPCC admittedly did not implement the award. Since the award was not implemented for quite sometime, the petitioner filed the writ petition with the prayer that respondent No. 2 be direct to implement the award dated 0505-1992, in terms of the direction contained in the letter dated 14-10-1992 written by the State Government to the Management of NPCC. 4. The Management of the NPCC resisted the petition inter alia on the ground that the petitioner being a member of the NPCC Staff Association is bound by the judgment of the Apex Court in terms of which it was agreed that the entire dispute would be referred to the National Industrial Tribunal. Subsequently, the NPCC Staff Association reached a settlement with the NPCC Management, therefore, the petitioner was bound by the Settlement and the proceedings before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal were incompetent. It is also averred that respondent was offered reinstatement which he failed to accept and as such the petition was not maintainable. The maintainability of the petition was also challenged on the ground that award was not enforceable under law. 5. The contention of Mr. It is also averred that respondent was offered reinstatement which he failed to accept and as such the petition was not maintainable. The maintainability of the petition was also challenged on the ground that award was not enforceable under law. 5. The contention of Mr. Gupta appearing for the appellant is that once the Staff Association of which the petitioner was a member agreed that the dispute be referred to National Industrial Tribunal, the proceedings before the Labour Court or Tribunal constituted under sections 7 and 7 (a) became infructuous and the award, if any, passed by the Court/Tribunal would be a nullity. He next argued that even otherwise the appropriate Government in this case being Central Government, the reference having been made by the State Government was incompetent. Moreover, according to the learned counsel section 29, 33 (a) and 34 of the Act prescribe a very effective mechanism for enforcement of the award published under section 17 and failure of the writ petitioner to initiate action under these provisions was a sufficient ground to decline the relief prayed by the writ petitioner because the Act itself provides efficacious alternate remedy which has not been availed. Mr. Raina appearing for the respondents, however, argued that the Act provides penalties for failure of the employer to implement the award which if not availed cannot be a ground to decline relief in exercise of powers of judicial review. He further argued that as the award has not been terminated in terms of sub-section (6) of section 19, therefore, there is no bar to its enforcement and accordingly the judgment impugned cannot be faulted. The appropriate Government according to him in this case was the State Government because the NPCC Unit was operating within the territory of the State and therefore the reference was made by the competent authority. Question No. 1. 6. The question involved is whether in case of NPCC the appropriate Government as defined in section 2 (9) of the Act is the Central Government or the State Government. This question was considered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in National Hydro-Electric Power Corporation Vs. M.M. Padha and others, 1997 KLJ 552. Relying on the law laid down in "Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar" AIR 1970 SC 82, this court held that the appropriate Government was the State Government. This question was considered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in National Hydro-Electric Power Corporation Vs. M.M. Padha and others, 1997 KLJ 552. Relying on the law laid down in "Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar" AIR 1970 SC 82, this court held that the appropriate Government was the State Government. However, in Air India Statutory Corporation etc. Vs. United Labour Union and others etc., AIR 1997 SC 645, the law laid down in Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar (AIR 1970 SC 82) has been over-ruled holding as under:- "28. From this perspective and on deeper consideration, we are of the considered view that the two-Judge Bench in Heavy Engineering case (AIR 1970 SC 82) narrowly interpreted the words "appropriate Government" on the common law principles which no longer bear any relevance when it is tested on the anvil of Article 14. It is true that in Hindustan Machine Tools R.D. Shettys (AIR 1979 Sc 1628) and Food Corporation of India (AIR 1985 SC 488) cases the ration of Heavy Engineering case formed the foundation. In Hindustan Machine Tools case, there was no independent consideration except repetition and approval of the ratio in Heavy Engineering case. It is to reiterate that Heavy Engineering case is based on concession. In R.B. Shettys case, the need to dwelve in-depth into this aspect did not arise but reference was made to the premises of private law interpretation which was relegated to and had given place to constitutional perspective of Article 14 which is consistent with the view we have stated above. In Food Corporation of Indias case (AIR 1985 SC 488), the Bench proceeded primarily on the premis that warehouses of the Corporation are situated within the jurisdiction of different State Governments which led it to conclude that the appropriate Government would be the State Government. 29. In the light of the above principles and discussions, we have no hesitation to hold that the appropriate Government is the Central Government from the inception of the Act." Since the judgment in the case of NHPC Vs. N.M. Padha (1997) KLJ 552 is founded on-the law laid down in Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union (supra), it is no longer good law. The reference made by the State Government vide SRO 87 dated 15-03-1988 was thus incompetent and therefore the award is nullity. Question No. 2. 7. N.M. Padha (1997) KLJ 552 is founded on-the law laid down in Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union (supra), it is no longer good law. The reference made by the State Government vide SRO 87 dated 15-03-1988 was thus incompetent and therefore the award is nullity. Question No. 2. 7. While disposing of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 9798 of 1988 their Lordships observed as under:- "It is agreed that joint request will be made by both the parties to the Central Government for making a reference to the National Tribunal relating to the retrenchment of the appellants by the impugned orders of retrenchment, all dated August 29, 1987. In such a reference, the appellants will be at liberty to raise the question as to whether the provision of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was complied with or not and also as to the applicability of Section 25N of the said Act. In considering the questions, the Tribunal will not be influenced by any observation made by the High Court in its judgment dated May 19,1988 -,¢ disposing of the writ petition No. 2824." So the parties had agreed that they would make a joint reference to the National Tribunal for settlement of the dispute relating to the retrenchment of the respondents representing 470 retrenchment employees. Once the association agreed for reference to the National Industrial Tribunal, sub-section (6) (a) of Section 10 became operative, it reads as under:- "(6) (a): Where any reference has been made under sub-section (1 A) to a National Tribunal then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no Labour Court or Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any matter which is under adjudication before the National Tribunal, and accordingly. - (a) if the matter under adjudication before the National Tribunal is pending in a proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, in so far as it relates to such matter, shall be deemed to have been quashed on such reference to the National Tribunal." 8. The reference was incompetent for yet another reason. As noticed above the order of retrenchment of 470 workers was challenged by the NPCC Staff Association representing the workers including the petitioners in the High Court of Delhi. C.W. No. 2824/87 which was dismissed on 19-05-1988, the Association filed SLPNo.9798of 1988 which was decided on 10-01-1989. The reference was incompetent for yet another reason. As noticed above the order of retrenchment of 470 workers was challenged by the NPCC Staff Association representing the workers including the petitioners in the High Court of Delhi. C.W. No. 2824/87 which was dismissed on 19-05-1988, the Association filed SLPNo.9798of 1988 which was decided on 10-01-1989. (supra) It appears the Staff Association and Management agreed for a negotiated settlement and finally a settlement under section 18 (1) of the Act was signed between the Management of the Corporation and the Staff Association on 22-03-1991 in terms of which all the retrenched employees were to be reinstated in service in six phases. In pursuance of this settlement the appellant vide letter dated 06-08-1992 reinstated the respondent on the terms and conditions stipulated therein. But the respondent appears to have ignored the order of reinstatement as he continued to prosecute the proceedings before the Labour Court, Srinagar on a reference made by the State Government. The question arises whether he was bound by the settlement being a member of the Staff Association a fact pleaded by the appellant and not disputed by the respondent. The Supreme Court in Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited (1991) I SCC 4 analysed the provisions of section 18 (1) and 18 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and held as under:-"It may be seen on a plain reading of subsection (1) and (3) of section 18 that settlements are divided into two categories namely; (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings. A settlement which belongs to the first category has limited application in that it merely binds the parties to the agreement but the settlement belonging to the second category has extended application. Since it is binding on all parties to the dispute, to all others who were summoned to appear in the conciliation proceedings and to all persons employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be. To which the dispute related on the date of the dispute and to all others who joined the establishment thereafter. Since it is binding on all parties to the dispute, to all others who were summoned to appear in the conciliation proceedings and to all persons employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be. To which the dispute related on the date of the dispute and to all others who joined the establishment thereafter. Therefore, a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings with a recognized majority, Union will be binding on all workman of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same......" 9. As there was only one staff association representing the worker employed by the appellant and the respondent admittedly was its member, therefore, he was bound by the order dated 10-01-1989 passed in S.L.P. (Civil)No. 9798/ 88, in terms of which the dispute of retrenchment was to be referred by the Central Government to the National Industrial Tribunal. So the respondent could not have in his individual capacity approached the State Government for referring the dispute to the Labour Court. Assuming that the reference was valid and it was made before the parties agreed for referring the dispute to the National Industrial Tribunal, the proceedings before the Labour Court were without jurisdiction after the date of the said order. But even if it is assumed that the proceedings were not vitiated as the Labour Court was not informed and there was no reference to the National Tribunal to attract clause (i) of sub-section (6) of section 10 of the Act, the award is not executable in view of the settlement dated 22-03-1991 by virtue of which all the retrenched employees were reinstated when the settlement is neither unjust nor unfair as observed in National Engineering Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2000 (1) SCC 371 which reads as under:- "A settlement of dispute between the parties themselves is to be preferred, where it could be arrived at, to industrial adjudication, as the settlement is likely to lead to more lasting peace than an award." Further, while reiterating the law laid down in Sirsilk Ltd. Vs. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 160 their Lordships held that:-"15. In Sirsilk Ltd. Vs. Govt. of A.P. industrial disputes were referred for adjudication. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 160 their Lordships held that:-"15. In Sirsilk Ltd. Vs. Govt. of A.P. industrial disputes were referred for adjudication. The Industrial Tribunal gave its award and forwarded the same to the State Government for publication as required under section 17 of the Act. Before, however, the publication of the award, parties to the dispute came to a settlement. Request was, therefore, made to the State Government to withhold the publication of the award. The State Government, however, did not accede to this request as, according to it, it was a mandatory provision of law to public the award. A writ petition was filed in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution praying that the Government might be directed to withhold the publication of the award. This was dismissed as the High Court was also of the view that the provisions of section 17 of the Act were mandatory and not writ, therefore, could be issued. The matter them came to this Court. The Court rejected the argument that the provisions of section 17 of the Act were directory and not mandatory. This Court then noticed the provisions of section 2 (p), Sections 18(1) and (3) and section 19 of the Act. It was contended that the main purpose of the Act was to maintain peace between the parties in an industrial concern and where, therefore, parties to industrial disputes had reached a settlement which was binding under section 18 (1), the dispute between them really came to an end. It was submitted that the settlement arrived at between the parties should be respected and industrial peace should not be allowed to be disturbed by the publication of the award which might be different from the settlement. The Court observed that there was no doubt that the settlement of disputes between the. parties themselves was to be preferred, where it could be arrived at, to industrial adjudication, as the settlement was likely to lead to more lasting peace than an award, as it is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. parties themselves was to be preferred, where it could be arrived at, to industrial adjudication, as the settlement was likely to lead to more lasting peace than an award, as it is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. The Court said that even though that might be so, still the provisions of section 17 (1) which are mandatory requiring publication of the award had to be reconciled with the equally mandatory character of the binding nature of the settlement arrived at between the parties as provided under section 18(1) of the Act. Then the Court went to hold as under:-"difficulty however arises when the matter has gone beyond the purview of the tribunal as in the present case. That difficulty in our opinion has to be resolved in order to avoid possible conflict between section 18 (1) which makes the settlement arrived at between the parties otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding binding on the parties and the terms of an award which are binding under section 18 (3) on publication and which may not be the same as the terms of the settlement binding under section 18 (1). The only way in our view to resolve the possible conflict which would arise between a settlement which is binding under section 18 (3) on publication is to withhold the publication of the award once the Government has been informed jointly by the parties that a settlement binding under section 18(1) has been arrived at. It is true that section 17 (1) is mandatory and ordinarily the Government has to public an award sent to it by the tribunal; but where a situation like the one in the present cases arises which may lead to a conflict between a settlement under section 18(1) and an award binding under section 18 (3) on publication, the only solution is to withhold the award from publication. This would not in our opinion in any way affect the mandatory nature of the provision in section 17 (1), for the Government would ordinarily have to publish the award but for the special situation arising in such cases." The Court also examined the issue from another angle and said: "The reference to the tribunal is for the purpose of resolving the dispute that may have arisen between employees and their workmen. Where a settlement is arrived at between the parties to a dispute before the tribunal after the award has been submitted to Government but before its publication, there is in fact no dispute left to be resolved by the publication of the award. In such a case, the award sent to Government may very well be considered to have become infructuous and so the Government should refrain from publishing such an award because no dispute remains to be resolved by it." This Court also said that in case there is a dispute regarding the bona fide nature of the settlement that would be yet another industrial dispute which the Government may refer to for adjudication." 10. But since the award had not been published so in Sirsilk case the question whether it could be enforced was not decided. But the observation that, "In such a case, the award sent to Government may very well be considered to have become infructuous and so the Government should refrain from publishing such an award because no dispute remains to be resolved by it" cannot be understood to lay down that an infructuous award if published under section 17 (1) would become valid and thus enforceable. We are thus of the opinion that the settlement having been arrived at before the Labour Court made the award. The same was infructuous and its publication under section 17(1) could not make it enforceable. The entire case lies on the question of validity of the reference and settlement under section 18(1) and 18 (3) of the Act has been considered by a three member Bench of the Supreme Court in National Engineering Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan and others, (2000) 1 SCC 371. In para 18 their Lordships observed as under:- "18. In K.C.P.C. Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer a labour dispute had erupted at the engineering unit of the appellant employing about 500 workmen. The workmen were demanding higher amount of bonus. There were strike and lockout. The appellant dismissed 29 workmen on the charges of misconduct after holding inquiries. An agreement was reached between the appellant and the Union representing all the workmen on the quantum of increase in wages etc. It was further agreed that the issue of non-employment of 29 dismissed workmen would be discussed separately. On that basis all the workmen except the 29 dismissed workmen agreed to resume work. An agreement was reached between the appellant and the Union representing all the workmen on the quantum of increase in wages etc. It was further agreed that the issue of non-employment of 29 dismissed workmen would be discussed separately. On that basis all the workmen except the 29 dismissed workmen agreed to resume work. Subsequently a settlement was arrived at between the appellant and the respondent Union under section 12 (3) of the Act that the issue of non-employment of 29 dismissed workmen would be discussed in proceedings to be initiated by the Joint Labour Commissioner. Meetings were held by the Joint Labour Commissioner but no settlement could be reached. Report of the failure of conciliation proceedings was submitted to the State Government which referred the issue of non-employment of 29 workmen for adjudication to the Labour Court. This Court noticed that the industrial disputes was referred for adjudication pursuant to the demand espoused by all the workmen and raised by the second respondent Union under section 2 (k) of the Act and that of the said 29 workmen who were members of the respondent Union had authorised the second respondent to represent them before the Conciliation Officer. This Court noticed that none of the said 29 workmen raised industrial dispute in their individual capacity under section 2-A of the Act. During the pendency of the dispute before the Labour Court, the appellant and the respondent Union held discussions regarding non-employment of 29 workmen and ultimately an understanding was reached that option would be given to the 29 workmen either to accept reinstatement without back wages or a lump sum amount of Rs. 75,000/- with other monetary benefits. Some of the workmen out of these 29 workmen did not accept the proposed settlement, Nevertheless, the respondent Union entered into a settlement with the appellant under section 18 (1) of the Act on behalf of the 29 workmen. A joint memorandum was signed between them and it was filed before the Labour Court before whom the Industrial dispute was pending. It was requested that award in terms of the settlement may be passed. The first respondent who was presiding over the Labour Court declined to do so on the ground that some of the workmen had not approved settlement and, therefore, industrial dispute in respect qua them would continue. It was requested that award in terms of the settlement may be passed. The first respondent who was presiding over the Labour Court declined to do so on the ground that some of the workmen had not approved settlement and, therefore, industrial dispute in respect qua them would continue. The order of the Labour Court not to make the award in terms of the settlement was challenged by the appellant in a writ petition before the Madras High Court. The High Court did not agree with the contention raised by the appellant and dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved, the appellant came to this court. This Court held that the terms of the settlement could not be considered to be in any way ex facie, unjust or unfair and the settlement consequently must be held to be binding on the workmen who did not accept the settlement. This Court referred in great detail to the provisions of sections 2 (k) and 18 (1) of the Act and noticed the decision of this Court in Herbertsons Ltd. Vs. Workmen, 1976 (4) SCC 736 where this Court had said that when a recognised union negotiations with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union, which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of the labour enters into a settlement in the best interests of the Labour. This would be the normal rule. There may be exceptional cases where there may be allegations of malafides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But in the absence of such allegations a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration. This Court then observed as under: (SCC p. 453, para 25) "25. It has to be kept in view that under the scheme of labour legislations like the Act in the present case, collective bargaining and the principle of industrial democracy permeate the relations between the management on the one hand and the union which resorts to collective bargaining on behalf of its members-workmen with the management on the other. It has to be kept in view that under the scheme of labour legislations like the Act in the present case, collective bargaining and the principle of industrial democracy permeate the relations between the management on the one hand and the union which resorts to collective bargaining on behalf of its members-workmen with the management on the other. Such a collective bargaining which may result in just and fair settlement would always be beneficial to the management as well as to the body of workmen and society at large as there would be industrial peace and tranquillity pursuant to such settlement and which would avoid unnecessary social strife and tribulation on the one hand and promote industrial and commercial development on the other hand. Keeping in view the aforesaid salient features of the Act the settlement which is sought to be impugned has to be scanned and scrutinized. Settlement of labour disputes by direct negotiation and collective bargaining is always to be preferred for it is the best guarantee or industrial peace which is the aim of all legislations for settlement of labour disputes. In order to bring about such a settlement more easily and to make it more workable or necessary that such a settlement is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings which may be the first step towards resolving the industrial dispute which may be lingering between the employers and their workmen represented by their unions but even if at that stage such settlement does not take place and the industrial dispute gets referred for adjudication, even pending such disputes, the parties can arrive at amicable settlement which may be binding to the parties to the settlement unlike settlement arrived at during conciliation proceedings which may be binding not only to the parties to the settlement but even to the entire labour force working in the organisation concerned even though they may not be members of the Union which might have entered into settlement during conciliation proceedings." This Court then referred to the difference between the settlement arrived at under the Act during conciliation proceedings by the parties and the settlement arrived at otherwise than during conciliation proceedings as pointed out in Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad case." 11. So where recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individual do not come into picture and they are bound by the settlement. So where recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individual do not come into picture and they are bound by the settlement. The question of binding nature of the settlement arrived at under section 18(1) of the Act had earlier been considered by the Apex Court in Sirsilk Ltd. Vs. Government of A.P. (supra). Question No. 3. 12. The question has been formulated to examine the scope of judicial review in the matter of execution/enforcement of award published under section 17 of the Act assuming that the reference was valid and the award does not suffer from any other infirmity as noticed in this case. Section 19 (1) of the Act provides that award shall remain in operation for a period of one year from the date it becomes enforceable under section 17 (A). However, notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation the award remains binding until notice in terms of sub-section (6) of section 19 is given by any party bound by the award to the other party intimating its intention to terminate the award. 13. It is admitted case of the appellant that no notice in terms of section 19(6) was given to the respondent. It is also admitted case of the respondent -worker that he took no steps to execute the award by proceeding under sections 29 of the Act. Section 29 reads as under:- "29. Penalty for breach of settlement or award.- Any person who commits a breach of any term of any settlement or award, which is binding on him under this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both, (and where the breach is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to two hundred rupees for every day during which the breach continues after the conviction for the first and the Court trying the offence, if it fines the offender, may direct that the whole or any part of the fine realised from him shall be paid, by way of compensation, to any person who, in its opinion has been injured by such breach). It is a very effective provision which provides for coercive and punitive action against the employer. It is a very effective provision which provides for coercive and punitive action against the employer. Why the petitioner did not apt for this remedy is not explained as there is not even a whisper in the averments made in the petition. The only justification for filing the writ petition has given in para 10 of the writ petition is as follows:- "10. That the presiding officer of the Labour Court/Industrial Disputes Tribunal is not available in Srinagar and the petitioner is not in a position to bring the aforesaid non-compliance of the award dated: 05-05-1992 to his notice, he as such, seeks the exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the Honble Court as he has no other efficacious, alternate remedy available." 14. This certainly cannot be ground for filing petition seeking execution of the award in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises jurisdiction through out the State. He holds sitting both at Srinagar and Jammu, therefore, if he was not available at Srinagar, he must at that time be sitting in Jammu. Assuming that he was not at Srinagar even this would not be a ground because for execution of award the petitioner had to proceed under section 29 without approaching the Labour Court. He had only to approach the appropriate Government or the authorised officer to file the complaint under section 29 of the Act before a Judicial Magistrate. He never approached the Government except once. This aspect of the matter has been ignored by the learned Writ Court. Even after noticing the fact that the Act provides the procedure for enforcement of the award, the writ court directed as under:- "It be seen that there is a procedure provided under the Industrial Disputes Act for getting the awards enforced. The petitioner should have availed of these remedies. The petitioner submits that some preliminary steps were taken in this regard, but it was not agreed to by the respondent-authorities for prosecution of the officer responsible for default. Taking into consideration the above facts, this petition is disposed of with a direction that respondents would now comply with the award within a period of two months from the date a copy of this order is made available to them by the petitioner." 15. Taking into consideration the above facts, this petition is disposed of with a direction that respondents would now comply with the award within a period of two months from the date a copy of this order is made available to them by the petitioner." 15. The judgment does not deal with the objections raised by the appellants either with regard to the maintainability of the petition or invalidity of the award as noticed above. Since the Act provides the procedure for implementation of the award which remedy is quite efficacious, the writ could not be entertained. This view is in accord with the observations of their Lordships in Scooters India Vs. Vijai E.V. Eldred, 1998 SCC 549 that there was no occasion for the High Court to entertain the writ petition directly for adjudication of an industrial dispute involving the termination on disputed question of fact for which remedy under the Industrial Law was available to the workman. 16. Similarly, in "Durga Prasad Vs. Naveen Chandra and others, 1996 (3) SCC 300, it was held that a writ petition would not be entertained even where remedy of revision is available while observing as under:- "In view of the fact that the matter does not come within the four corners of any of the three remedies, the appellant is left with no other remedy except approaching the High Court under Article 226. It is true that the impugned order is not an appealable one either under section 96 or under order 43 Rule 1 read with section 104 CPC. But still a revision would be maintainable and whether the order could be revised or not is a matter to be considered by the High Court on merits. But instead of availing of that remedy, the appellant has invoked jurisdiction under Article 226 which is not warranted and the procedure prescribed under the CPC cannot be by passed by availing of the remedy not maintainable under Article 226. Under these circumstances, we decline to interfere with the order." This principle was reiterated in "State of H.P. Vs. Pirthi Chand & anr", 1996 (2) SCC 37 by holding as under:- "When the remedy under section 482 (Cr.P.C.) is available, the High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 since efficacious remedy under section 482 of the Code is available." Again in "Sheela Devi Vs. Pirthi Chand & anr", 1996 (2) SCC 37 by holding as under:- "When the remedy under section 482 (Cr.P.C.) is available, the High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 since efficacious remedy under section 482 of the Code is available." Again in "Sheela Devi Vs. Jaspal Singh", 1999 (1) SCC 209, where the petitioner had given no reason for filing writ petition without availing of the remedy for filing writ petition without availing of the remedy of revision, the High Court while setting aside the order of High Court observed as under:- "2. No reason has been given by the respondent for not availing of the remedy of revision under section 18 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972. The respondent straightway filed a writ petition before the High Court where the High Court had re-examined the facts. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The respondent will be at liberty to avail of the alternate remedy of revision, if he so desires." 17. As noticed above the only reason given by the petitioner for filing the writ petition is that the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal was not available at Srinagar which could not be a ground to entertain the petition. It is strange that although the award was published on 09-07-1992 and was enforceable upto 09-07-1993 the petitioner instead of seeking enforcement approached this court in November, 1993 for execution of the same which was not proper as he had sufficient time to have recourse to section 29 of the Act. Conclusions:- 18. So our conclusions are; (i) that the reference was incompetent because in view of the law laid down in "Air India Statutory Corporation etc. Vs. United Labour Union and others" AIR 1997 SC 645, the appropriate Government under section 2 (a) of the Act is Central Government and not the State Government; (ii) the Settlement was arrived at between the NPCC Staff Association of which the petitioner was a member with the Management of NPCC all proceedings before the Labour Court were incompetent and the award was rendered infructuous in view of the law laid down in Sirsilk Ltd. Vs. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 160 and reiterated in National Engineering Industries Ltd. Vs. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 160 and reiterated in National Engineering Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 2 SCC 371 (supra), and (iii) that the writ petition was wrongly entertained before the workman had exhausted alternate remedy which is quite efficacious and very effective as well. In view of the above this appeal is allowed and the judgment impugned is set aside. However, Mr. Gupta learned counsel appearing for the appellant has made a statement that the offer made to the writ petitioner-respondent for his reinstatement on the terms and conditions stated therein is still open provided he is willing to accept the same. In view of the concession, we direct that if the writ petitioner-respondent reports at the head office of the appellant at Raja House, Nehru Place, New Delhi within a period of one month, the Management will reinstate him on the same terms and conditions as mentioned in letter dated 06-08-1992. We make the order accordingly.