Judgment Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. 1. We have a bunch of eight appeals filed by the Provident Fund Inspector against the order of the trial Court by which the accused-Mr. I.D. Mehta has been acquitted. Applications under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been filed for the grant of special leave to appeal. It is prayed that leave be granted and the order of acquittal passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ropar, be set aside. Learned counsel for the applicant has referred to the facts in Criminal Misc. No. 374-MA of 2000. These may be briefly noticed. 2. According to the applicant, a complaint had been filed alleging that the accused had failed to make deposits of Rs. 34.10, Rs. 34.80 and Rs. 32.25 by the due dates viz. May 15, June 15 and July 15, 1994. As such, he was alleged to have committed offence under para 38 of the Employee Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 read with Sections 6, 6A, 14(1A) and 14-A of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. 3. The accused was summoned. At the end of the trial, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ropar, passed an order dated November 7, 1996 by which it was held that he was guilty of the offence punishable under "para 8 of the said Scheme read with Sections 6-D and 14(1-B) of the Act." He was, thus, sentenced to pay a fine of an amount of Rs. 5,000/-. The accused filed an appeal. It was heard by the Session Judge, Rupnagar. A certified copy of the judgment has been today handed over by the learned counsel for the applicant. It is taken on record as Mark A. 4. The learned Sessions Judge (as his Lordship then was) found that "the order of the Court below regarding conviction of the accused is not sustainable as he has not been convicted of the charges framed." On this basis, it was observed that "I have no option but to set aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and direct the trial Court to, after hearing arguments, pass a fresh judgment in accordance with law." Thus, the appeal was accepted. The order of conviction and sentence was set aside and the matter was remanded to the trial Court "to pass a fresh judgment in accordance with law." 5. The order of conviction and sentence was set aside and the matter was remanded to the trial Court "to pass a fresh judgment in accordance with law." 5. On remand, the Chief Judicial Magistrate vide his order dated October 23, 1999 inter alia found as under : "The contention of the complainant is that the accused is the occupier of the factory. After remand of the case, the accused when further cross-examined the complainant, brought on record a number of documents. With document Ex. D-3, is attached a list of Directors as Ex. D-4 and the accused is not mentioned in the list of Directors and form No. 5-A, which was submitted with the list of Directors, as per Ex. D-5, again does not contain the name of the accused as any of the Directors and not even in the revised form 5-A Ex. D-6. Mere assertion that the accused could be held responsible for the actions of the others, cannot be believed. Even as per document Ex. DA, the accused was appointed as Vice President, Commercial only on 12.8.1994 and the period to which the deduction pertains and the responsibility is being levied upon the accused, is much prior to the appointment of the accused. As per the allegations of the complainant, the deduction of 4/94 was required to be paid on 15.5.1994, of 5/94 upto 15.6.1994 and 6/94 upto 15.7.1994 which means that the due date for repayment and deduction is much prior to the joining of the accused with M/s United Pulp and Paper Mills and the accused cannot be held responsible for the lapses of others prior to him. So, it is to be held that the prosecution has badly failed to bring guilt home to the accused. So, the accused is acquitted and file be consigned to the record room." 6. Aggrieved by the above order of acquittal, the complainant has approached this Court with the petition for grant of special leave. 7. We have heard Mr. Kamal Sehgal, learned counsel for the applicant. 8. It is not disputed that the accused was employed with M/s United Pulp and Paper Mills, Rupnagar, only on August 12, 1994. The default regarding deposit had admittedly occurred prior to that date. Still further, nothing has been pointed out to show that the default was ever brought to the notice of the accused. 8. It is not disputed that the accused was employed with M/s United Pulp and Paper Mills, Rupnagar, only on August 12, 1994. The default regarding deposit had admittedly occurred prior to that date. Still further, nothing has been pointed out to show that the default was ever brought to the notice of the accused. In this situation, we find that the view taken by the trial Court is a possible one. It is not perverse. It is not such as a reasonable person could not have arrived at. Still further, it is not disputed that the accused has gone through the agony of a protracted trial since November, 1994. Besides this, it is also admitted that he is no longer employed with M/s United Pulp and Paper Mills, Rupnagar. 9. Mr. Sehgal submits that in Crl. Misc. No. 375-MA of 2000 the deposit had to be made by August 15, 1994. He further submits that in Crl. Misc. Nos. 377-MA, 379-MA and 381-MA of 2000 the deposit had to be made after August 12, 1994 viz. on August 15, 1994 or thereafter. Assuming it to be so, learned counsel is unable to refer to any thing on the record to show that the default was ever pointed out to the accused. Still further, it is the admitted position that there were Directors of the company who were responsible for the affairs thereof. Yet, the accused, who was only an employee, was chosen. Why ? There is no answer. No other point has been raised. Taking the totality of circumstances into consideration, we find that the view taken by the trial Court calls for no interference. Resultantly, we decline the prayer for the grant of special leave to appeal. All the eight petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.