R. K. AGARWAL, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, Parashu Ram Semwal has filed the present petition seeking a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 11. 1. 1988 passed by the Registrar, Hemwati Nandan Bahuguna, garhwal University, Srinagar, Garhwal, respondent No. 1 (Copy of which has been filed as annexure-5 to the writ petition) and order dated 5. 8. 1999 passed by the Chancellor, Hemwati nandan Bahuguna, Garhwal University, respondent No. 3 (copy of which has been filed as annexure-9 to the writ petition ). ( 2 ) THE petitioner further seeks a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages along with interest and all benefits of service and to pay his salary as and when it falls due. ( 3 ) THE facts of the case in brief are that according to the petitioner, he was appointed on daily wage basis as a clerk in the Garhwal University, Srinagar, Garhwal, on 1. 4. 1979. He was appointed on temporary basis on the sanctioned post of clerk on 1. 4. 1981 in the pay-scale of Rs. 200-230. It appears that some action was taken against the petitioner under Section 60 of the U. P. Excise Act, on 20. 11. 1984 for possessing illicit liquor. He was arrested and was released on bail from the police station. According to the petitioner, the Director, Garhwal University, under whom he was working as a clerk sought a clarification on 3. 12. 1984 as to whether he was in lock up for more than 24 hours or not to which the petitioner replied that the information was incorrect. Till December, 1987, nothing happened against the petitioner. A Criminal Case No. 189 of 1985 proceeded against the petitioner in which he was released under Section 4 of the probation of Offenders Act, 1958, by the Munsif Magistrate, Pauri Garhwal vide order dated 20. 3. 1986, on furnishing a bond of Rs. 1,000 with a surety of equal amount undertaking to live peacefully. The Presiding Officer, Pauri Garhwal, issued a certificate on 19. 1. 1999, that the conduct and character of the petitioner was found good as was required in the order dated 20. 3. 1986. However, on 11. 1. 3. 1986, on furnishing a bond of Rs. 1,000 with a surety of equal amount undertaking to live peacefully. The Presiding Officer, Pauri Garhwal, issued a certificate on 19. 1. 1999, that the conduct and character of the petitioner was found good as was required in the order dated 20. 3. 1986. However, on 11. 1. 1988, the petitioner was served with an order of termination of his service with immediate effect on the ground of his conviction by the Munsif Magistrate. The said order was passed on the basis of the resolution No. 59, dated 26. 9. 1987 passed by the Executive council of the University. The petitioner challenged the resolution dated 26. 9. 1987, by filing civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5793 of 1988, which was dismissed by this Court on 11. 3. 1988, on the ground that the petitioner has an effective statutory remedy under Section 68 of the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973. Thereafter, the petitioner made a representation on 7. 4. 1988 before the Chancellor, Garhwal University and when the said representation was not decided within a reasonable period by the Chancellor, the petitioner again approached this Court by filing Civil misc. Writ Petition No. 22824 of 1988, which was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 4. 5. 1999 with a direction to the Chancellor to decide the representation within a period of two months from the date of production of the certified copy of the said order before him. The chancellor vide order dated 5. 8. 1999 had rejected the representation made by the petitioner under Section 68 of the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973. The orders dated 11. 1. 1988 and 5. 8. 1999 are under challenge in the present petition. ( 4 ) I have heard Sri Sunil Ambwani, assisted by Sri S. N. Babulkar on behalf of the petitioner and sri L. P. Naithani, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Niraj Tripathi, on behalf of the respondents. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the impugned order casts a stigma, the same could not have been passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. He further submitted that the appointing authority of the petitioner is the Registrar of the University and, therefore, the Executive Council had no power to issue the termination order. He further submitted that the appointing authority of the petitioner is the Registrar of the University and, therefore, the Executive Council had no power to issue the termination order. He further submitted that the impugned order does not come within the scope of Statute 21. 30 of the statutes of Garhwal University and further the petitioner has not been convicted on the charge involving any moral turpitude. In any event, he submitted that the possession of the illicit liquor cannot be said to be an offence involving moral turpitude and, therefore, the two orders impugned in the present writ petition cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside. Sri Sunil ambwani further submitted that in a similarly situated case one Jaswant Singh Sajwan, who was also punished by the Court with a fine of Rs. 150 was initially terminated by the University, but later on reinstated and have been made permanent and now promoted. Whereas, the petitioner, who stands on a better footing as he was released and given the benefit of Section 4 of the probation of Offenders Act, 1958, has been arbitrarily discriminated. He further submitted that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate and, therefore, liable to be set aside. ( 6 ) SRI L. P. Naithani, learned senior counsel, on the other hand, submitted that the petitioner was found guilty of possessing illicit liquor under Section 60 of the Excise Act. He had admitted his offence as would be clear from the judgment and order dated 20. 3. 1986 passed by the Munsif magistrate, Pauri Garhwal. The said offence, thus, amounts to moral turpitude and, therefore no opportunity of hearing was required to be given to the petitioner and his services were rightly terminated straightaway. So far as the case of Jaswant Singh Sajwan is concerned, he submitted that Sri Jaswant Singh Sajwan has served the University for more than 12 years and has sought pardon. Apart from it, he was found in possession of only two pouch of liquor and authorities took a lenient view being satisfied with the pardon sought by Sri Jaswant Singh Sajwan. Sri naithani further submitted that the post on which the petitioner was appointed, was temporary in nature and was abolished by the State Government on 15. 10. 1988. Apart from it, he was found in possession of only two pouch of liquor and authorities took a lenient view being satisfied with the pardon sought by Sri Jaswant Singh Sajwan. Sri naithani further submitted that the post on which the petitioner was appointed, was temporary in nature and was abolished by the State Government on 15. 10. 1988. ( 7 ) IN reply the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the appointment of the petitioner was against a sanctioned post of clerk and he was a Routine Grade Clerk and had worked in various departments. The abolition of the post of the clerk in the museum will not affect the petitioner. He further submitted that all the Routine Grade Clerks in the University are treated as a single cadre and seniority is determined accordingly. He further relied upon Section 12 of the probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and submitted that a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of Section 3 or Section 3 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law. ( 8 ) THE question as to whether the conduct of the petitioner amounts to moral turpitude or not has to be first seen. The word moral turpitude has not been defined in the Act or in the Statutes of the Garhwal University, however in Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate/collector, Varanasi and others, AIR 1959 All 71 , this Court had considered the expression of "moral turpitude" as follows : "the expression moral turpitude is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and weakness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty, which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general. If, therefore, the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. If, therefore, the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man. " ( 9 ) THE aforesaid case was followed subsequently, in the case of Mangali v. Chakki Lal and others, AIR 1963 All 527 , wherein the Court had held as follows : "with great respect, it appears to me that some of the observations made in these decisions have been too widely stated and if followed literally, may make every act punishable in law an offence involving moral turpitude, that, however could not be the intention with which those observations were made. From consideration of the dictionary meaning of the words moral and turpitude as well as the real ratio decided of the cases, the principle which emerges appears to be that the question whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not will necessarily depend on the circumstances in which the offence is committed. It is not every punishable act that can be considered to be an offence involving moral turpitude. Had that been so, the qualification "involving moral turpitude" would not have been used by the Legislature and it would have disqualified every person who had been convicted of any offence. The tests which should ordinarily be applied for judging whether a certain offence does or does not involve moral turpitude appear to be : (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of the society in general, (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and (3) whether on account of the act having been committed, the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person, who was to be looked down upon by the society. No absolute standard can be laid down for deciding whether a particular act is to be considered one involving moral turpitude, but the above are the general tests which should be applied and which should in most cases be sufficient for enabling one to arrive at a correct conclusion on the question. No absolute standard can be laid down for deciding whether a particular act is to be considered one involving moral turpitude, but the above are the general tests which should be applied and which should in most cases be sufficient for enabling one to arrive at a correct conclusion on the question. " In the aforesaid case Chakki Lal, the respondent No. 1 was found in possession of bhang and was convicted of an offence under Section 60 of the U. P. Excise Act and have been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 10 for that offence. This Court had held that there was no base or motive leading to the crime. It further held as follows :"the act did not also show any depravity in the character of the respondent nor had the respondent done anything which was considered abase or demeaning by society in general. In these circumstances the conviction of the respondent was really a technical one and could not be considered to be in respect of an offence involving moral turpitude. " ( 10 ) IN the case of Management of Tractors and Farm Equipment Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, 1st additional Labour Court and T. A. Doss, 1983 Landic 460, the Honble Madras High Court after considering the various decisions on the subject and the dictionary meaning of the word moral turpitude had held as follows : "from the above, it is clear that every act punishable in law would not amount to an offence involving moral turpitude. If that had been the intention, then there is no necessity at all for statutes to say that a person convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude would be exposed to certain consequences or disqualification. The Legislature would have merely stated that person who is punished for violation of any law would be exposed to such consequences, or disqualification. The question whether conviction for a particular offence involves moral turpitude will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. However, in order to come within the scope of the phrase moral turpitude ; there must be an element of baseness and depravity in the act for which a particular individual has been punished. The act must be vile, a harmful to society in general or contrary to accepted rules or rights and duties between man and man. However, in order to come within the scope of the phrase moral turpitude ; there must be an element of baseness and depravity in the act for which a particular individual has been punished. The act must be vile, a harmful to society in general or contrary to accepted rules or rights and duties between man and man. Mere violation of a particular statute cannot amount to the commission of an act involving moral turpitude. I am in complete agreement with Srivastava, J. , of the Allahabad High Court in mangali v. Chakki Lal, AIR 1963 All 527 , who has laid down the following tests : (1) Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general, (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and (3) whether on account of the act having been committed, the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society. Tested in the light of the above principles, the punishment of an individual for consuming liquor without permit in violation of the provisions of the Prohibition Act cannot be said to be an offence involving moral turpitude. It cannot be said that drinking is considered by society to be so base or vile as to characterise a man, who consumes liquor as one of depraved character or as one who is to be looked down upon by society. Further Prohibition Act itself provides permit to be granted by the state Government under certain circumstances. The question whether consumption of alcoholic liquor by itself makes a man to be ostracised by society on the ground that he is a man of depraved character has to be decided, in my opinion, not on the basis of a prohibition law prevalent in a particular State but on the basis of the situation in the country as a whole. No doubt, in the State of Tamil Nadu, there is a Prohibition Act, which at the relevant time was more stringent than what it is today. At the same time, there were States in India where there is no prohibition, at all. No doubt, in the State of Tamil Nadu, there is a Prohibition Act, which at the relevant time was more stringent than what it is today. At the same time, there were States in India where there is no prohibition, at all. I am emphasising this aspect only to show that drinking as such is not considered as harmful to society in general or contrary to accepted rules of rights and duties between men and men. I am, therefore, of the view that conviction for an offence for consumption of liquor under the Prohibition Act does not amount to an offence involving moral turpitude. " ( 11 ) IN the case of Pavan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1996 (4) SCC 17 , the Honble Supreme court has held that moral turpitude is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe the conduct which is inherently based, vile, depravity or having any connection showing the depravity. The Honble Supreme Court held as follows : "it is of no significance that the appellant treats himself a convict as he had pleaded guilty, ex facie, it only shows that the entry concerns F. I. R. No. 231 of 3. 6. 1980 under Section 294. I. P. C. Therefrom it is difficult to discern the steps taken in the summary trial proceedings and what had the appellant pleaded to as guilty, whether to the allegations in the F. I. R. , or to the provision of the I. P. C. or any other particular? Mere payment of the fine of Rs. 20 does not got to show that the conviction was validly and legally recorded. Assuming that the conviction is not open to challenge at the present juncture, we cannot but deprecate the action of the respondents in having proceeded to adversely certify the character and antecedents of the appellant on the basis of the conviction per se, opining to have involved moral turpitude, without satisfying the tests laid down in the policy decision of the Government. We are rather unhappy to note that all the three courts below, even when invited to judge the matter in the said perspective, went on to hold that the acts involved in conviction under Section 294, I. P. C. per se established moral turpitude. We are rather unhappy to note that all the three courts below, even when invited to judge the matter in the said perspective, went on to hold that the acts involved in conviction under Section 294, I. P. C. per se established moral turpitude. They should have been sensitive to the changing perspectives and concepts of morality to appreciate the effect of Section 294. I. P. C. on todays society and its standards, and its changing view of obscenity. The matter unfortunately was dealt with causally at all levels. " it further observed as follows : "before concluding this judgment, we hereby draw the attention of Parliament to step in and perceive the large many cases which per law and public policy are tried summarily, involving thousands and thousands of people throughout the country appearing before summary courts and paying small amounts of fine, more often than not, as measure of plea-bargaining. Foremost among them being trafficked, municipal and other petty offences under the Indian Penal Code, mostly committed by the young and/or the inexperienced. The cruel result of a conviction of that kind and a fine of payment of paltry sum on plea-bargaining is the end of the career, future or present, as the case may be, of that young and/or inexperience person, putting a last to his life and his dreams. Life is too precious to be staked over a petty incident like this. Immediate remedial measures are, therefore, necessary in raising the toleration limits with regard to petty offences especially when tried summarily. Provision need be made that punishment of fine up to a certain limit, say up to Rs. 2,000 or so, on a summary/ ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for any purpose and all the more for entry into and retention in Government service. This can brook no delay, whatsoever. " ( 12 ) THE Honble Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and another v. Deepak Kumar bhola, JT 1997 (3) SC 539, had followed the meaning of the word expression moral turpitude given by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Pavan Kumar (supra) and have approved the decision of this Court in the case of Baleshwar Singh (supra ). This Court in the case of Mahak singh v. State of U. P. and others, 1993 (3) AW 1838, had held as follows : "this expression has been more elaborately explained in Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, Banaras, AIR 1959 All 71 , where it was observed as follows : "the expression moral turpitude is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty of good morals. It implies depravity and weakness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty, which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general. If, therefore, the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to do act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man. " in our opinion the aforesaid observations correctly spell out the true meaning of the expression "moral turpitude. " Applying the aforesaid test, if the allegations made against the respondent are proved, it will clearly show that he had committed an offence involving moral turpitude and, therefore, the appellant had the jurisdiction to suspend him under the aforesaid clause 21. 30. The high Court observed that there was nothing on record to suggest that the management had formed an opinion objectively on the consideration of all relevant material available against the petitioner that in the circumstances of the case the criminal acts attributed to the petitioner implied depravity and vileness of character and are such as should involve moral turpitude. It did not regard entering into a criminal conspiracy to commit the aforesaid offences as being an offence involving moral turpitude. We are, to say the least, surprised at the conclusion, which has been arrived by the Allahabad High Court. It did not regard entering into a criminal conspiracy to commit the aforesaid offences as being an offence involving moral turpitude. We are, to say the least, surprised at the conclusion, which has been arrived by the Allahabad High Court. There was material on record before the appellant, in the form of the report of the C. B. I. /s. P. E. , which clearly indicated the acts of commission and omissions, amounting to "moral turpitude" alleged to have been committed by the respondent. Furthermore the respondents has been charged with various offences allegedly committed while he was working in the bank and punishment for which could extend upto ten years imprisonment (in case the respondent is convicted under Section 467, I. P. C.)" ( 13 ) SRI L. P. Naithani, learned senior counsel has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad Pandey v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and another, 1998 (3)UPLBEC 2088 , and submitted that anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle or good moral and social duty, which a man owes to his fellowmen or society in general, involves moral turpitude. Applying the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Baleshwar Singh (supra), which have been approved by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and another v. Deepak Kumar Bhola (supra) and in the case of Pawan Kumar (supra), I find that in the present case, the petitioner had been convicted under Section 60 of the U. P. Excise Act, for possession of illicit liquor in a summary manner and was released under Section 4 of the probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The petitioner was found in possession of six pouches of illicit liquor. There was prohibition imposed in the area. In other parts of the State, there was no prohibition, The petitioner had earlier refused to accept his guilt, but subsequently, accepted it and was released under the Probation of Offenders Act, on furnishing bond of Rs. 1,000 and a surety of the like amount. The conduct of the petitioner has been found to be good always thereafter. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner is guilty of an act involving moral turpitude. 1,000 and a surety of the like amount. The conduct of the petitioner has been found to be good always thereafter. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner is guilty of an act involving moral turpitude. ( 14 ) SO far as the question as to whether the petitioner is entitled for an opportunity of hearing before passing the order of removal where the order of removal had been passed on the ground of involvement of an act of moral turpitude is concerned, I find that prior opportunity of hearing by the disciplinary authority before imposing punishment is not necessary as has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in Trikha Ram v. V. K. Seth and another, AIR 1988 SC 285 , and the principles laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerji v. Satvendra Nath Base National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others, JT 1999 (1) SC 396, relied upon by the petitioner would not be applicable in the present case. ( 15 ) SO far as the question of the applicability of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, is concerned, I find that the dismissal from service consequent upon a conviction is not a disqualification within the meaning of Section 12 of the said Act, as has been held by the honble Supreme Court in Shanker Das v. Union of India and another, AIR 1985 SC 772 , Swarn singh v. State Bank of India and another, 1986 (Suppl) SCC 566 and Union of India and others v. Bakshi Ram, AIR 1990 SC 987 . ( 16 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that where a person was convicted and was imposed a fine of Rs. 150 for an offence committed under Section 60 of the Excise Act, for possessing of liquor, the respondent University had reinstated him and the petitioner is being arbitrarily discriminated. He relied upon the decision of the Honble Supreme Court. In the case of Sengara Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, 1983 (4) SCC 225 , wherein the honble Supreme Court had held as follows : "what then should be done? The appellants have been accused of participating in a procession taken out by the members of the Police for ventilating their grievances about their service conditions. In the case of Sengara Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, 1983 (4) SCC 225 , wherein the honble Supreme Court had held as follows : "what then should be done? The appellants have been accused of participating in a procession taken out by the members of the Police for ventilating their grievances about their service conditions. May be that still having not reached the stage of tolerance for formation of associations amongst police personnel, the demonstrators may be looked upon with disfavour. But approaching the matter from this angle, all the 1,100 dismissed members of the police force were guilty of same misconduct, namely, indiscipline the same extent and degree as the present appellants. Now if the indiscipline of a large number of personnel amongst dismissed personnel could be condoned or overlooked and after withdrawing the criminal cases against them, they could be reinstated, we see no justification in treating the appellants differently without pointing out how they were guilty of more serious misconduct of the degree of indiscipline in their case was higher than compared to those who were reinstated. Respondents failed to explain to the court in distinguishing features and thereof, we are satisfied in putting all of them in same bracket. On that conclusion, the treatment meted to the present appellants suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and Article 14 forbids any arbitrary action which would tantamount to denial of equality as guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court must accordingly interpose and quash the discriminatory action. " ( 17 ) SRI Naithani, however, submitted that this Court should not interfere in the decision of the academic authorities and relied upon a decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of the chancellor and another v. Dr. Bijayananda Kor and others, 1994 (1) SCC 169 . It is not disputed that the respondent University had reinstated Sri Jaswant Singh Sajwan, who had been convicted under Section 60 of the Excise Act, and was imposed a fine of Rs. 150 for possessing two pouches of illicit liquor. Thus, from the said fact it can be safely presumed that the University is not treating the possession of illicit liquor as an offence involving moral turpitude. 150 for possessing two pouches of illicit liquor. Thus, from the said fact it can be safely presumed that the University is not treating the possession of illicit liquor as an offence involving moral turpitude. The action of the respondents in terminating the services of the petitioner, who have been held guilty of similar offence under Section 60 of the Excise Act, is arbitrary and discriminatory. ( 18 ) SO far as the question that the post on which the petitioner had been appointed has been abolished is concerned, I find that the petitioner was appointed as clerk on a temporary post and persons junior to him are working and, therefore, the University cannot take advantage of the said plea. In view of the findings that the offence did not amount to moral turpitude, the impugned orders cannot be sustained and are hereby quashed. ( 19 ) IN the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. .