R. H. ZAIDI, J. ( 1 ) IN this case counter and rejoinder-affidavits were filed by the parties. As desired by the learned counsel for the parties, case was heard and is being decided finally at this stage. ( 2 ) THE instant revision arises out of the proceedings under Section 92, C. P. C. and is directed against the judgment and order passed by the District Judge, Jhansi, dated 4. 12. 1992, granted permission to the contesting respondents to institute a suit under Section 92, C. P. C. with respect to the temple, known as, Sri Kalyan Rai Ji Virajman Mandir, Madhopura, village Bhasneh, pargana Garautha, district Jhansi, for short property in dispute. The opposite parties filed an application under Section 92, C. P. C. praying for granting permission to file the suit for constitution of a trust committee and to frame a scheme of administration for managing the trust property. It was claimed that the said property was a public trust, which was being mismanaged, therefore, it was necessary to frame a scheme of administration for proper administration of the trust property. On receipt of the notices from the court of the District Judge, applicants filed their objection pleading that the trust in question was not a public trust, that it was an ancestral and personal temple established by Bhagwan Das who appointed Mahant Ram Das Chela as manager/ Sarvarakar of the properties of the temple. He also executed a registered will dated 6. 9. 1983 in favour of Chela Prabhu Dayal. It was contended that the application filed under section 92, C. P. C. therefore, was liable to be dismissed. ( 3 ) IT is evident from the material on record that the suit, for the above-mentioned relief, was filed and simultaneously application under Section 92, C. P. C. was also filed the applicants are alleged to have filed voluminous documentary evidence in support of their case. The court below, thereafter, passed the following order : 4. 12. 1999--Case called out. The parties counsels are present. 3a is an application for permission under Section 92, C. P. C. to file the suit in respect of the property of the trust created for the religious purpose. The plots mentioned in the list 4-A-1 are said to be the property of the deity Kalyanji Maharaj, situated in village Madhopura. 12. 1999--Case called out. The parties counsels are present. 3a is an application for permission under Section 92, C. P. C. to file the suit in respect of the property of the trust created for the religious purpose. The plots mentioned in the list 4-A-1 are said to be the property of the deity Kalyanji Maharaj, situated in village Madhopura. The revenue records have been filed and the entries are shown to be in the name of the deity. Subsequently the efforts are shown to have been made to convert--the property in the private names of opposite parties Udai Narain Chela Prabhu Dayal, Ramjiwan and Girjanandan. Since the property is shown to be that of deity and efforts have been made to privatise and take it by usurption, under the aforesaid circumstances it appears quite justifiable to give permission under section 92, C. P. C. This finding will not, however, prejudice the final disposal of the suit between the parties. ORDER application 3a is hereby allowed. Prayer for permission to file the suit under Section 92, C. P. C. is granted. District Judge, jhansi. " challenge the validity of the above noted order, as stated above, the present revision has been filed by Prabhu Dayal Tiwari and others. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicants vehemently urged that permission to institute a suit under section 92, C. P. C. was a condition precedent. The respondents have acted illegally in filing the suit and simultaneously applying for permission under Section 92, C. P. C. The court below is also stated to have acted illegally and in excess of its jurisdiction for entertaining the said application and allowing the same. It was also urged that the order passed by the court below is a non-speaking order inasmuch as the court below failed to take into consideration and examine critically the documentary evidence filed by the applicants and acted illegally and arbitrarily in allowing the same. The impugned order was, thus, liable to be quashed. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents submitted that the order impugned in the present revision was an administrative order, which was not revisable under Section 115, c. P. C. The revision as framed and filed, was therefore, liable to be dismissed. The impugned order was, thus, liable to be quashed. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents submitted that the order impugned in the present revision was an administrative order, which was not revisable under Section 115, c. P. C. The revision as framed and filed, was therefore, liable to be dismissed. It was submitted that the court below has rightly granted permission to institute the suit under the facts and circumstances of the present case. The revision filed by the applicants was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. It was also urged that the order under challenge was appealable under Order XLIII, rule 1 read with Section 104, C. P. C. Learned counsel for the parties in support of their contentions also referred and relied upon certain decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme court, which I will deal with hereafter at appropriate place. ( 5 ) I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and also carefully perused the record. ( 6 ) THE impugned order dated 4. 12. 1999 was passed by the District Judge, Jhansi, purported to be in exercise of power under Section 92, C. P. C. Section 92, C. P. C. reads as under: "92. ( 6 ) THE impugned order dated 4. 12. 1999 was passed by the District Judge, Jhansi, purported to be in exercise of power under Section 92, C. P. C. Section 92, C. P. C. reads as under: "92. Public charities.-- (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the (leave of the Court), may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree : (a) removing any trustee ; (b) appointing a new trustee ; (c) vesting any property in a trustee ; [ (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property ;] (d) directing accounts and inquiries ; (e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust ; (f) authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged : (g) settling a scheme ; or (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. " ( 7 ) A reading of the aforesaid section reveals that leave of the Court is a condition precedent for institution of a suit to obtain a decree of the nature enumerated in clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 92, C. P. C. In the present case, application for leave is stated to have been filed along with the plaint, which was legally not permissible. The learned District Judge, Jhansi acted illegally in entertaining the plaint as well as the application for leave simultaneously. By order dated 19. 5. 2000, however, proceedings of the above noted suit were stayed. The interim order granted by this Court remained operative till date. The learned District Judge, Jhansi acted illegally in entertaining the plaint as well as the application for leave simultaneously. By order dated 19. 5. 2000, however, proceedings of the above noted suit were stayed. The interim order granted by this Court remained operative till date. The questions which arise for consideration in the present case are as to whether present revision was legally maintainable, whether the impugned order was appealable and as to whether the impugned order passed by the court below was a valid order or not. ( 8 ) SO far as maintainability of the revision or appeal is concerned, Order XLIII, Rule 1, C. P. C. , provides that the appeal shall lie under Section 104, C. P. C. from the orders enumerated under rule (1) of the said order. Clause (ffa) of sub-section (1) of Section 104, C. P. C. reads as under: "104. (1), (ffa) an order under Section 91 or Section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in Section 91 or Section 92, as the case may be. " Section 91 deals with public nuisance and other wrongful acts affecting the public while Section 92 deals with public charities. ( 9 ) FROM a reading of the aforesaid rule, it is evident that the appeal lies from an order refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in Section 92, C. P. C. and not from an order granting the leave. In the instant case, therefore, the order was not appealable and inasmuch as the application 3a for permission to file a suit under Section 92, C. P. C. was granted by the district Judge by means of the impugned order. In Lilanand Thakur Pagal Baba Trust Prabandh samiti v. Thakur Radha Govindji Maharaj Vrindaban and others, 2000 (3) AWC 2064 , learned single Judge dealing with the question as to whether order passed under the said section granting leave was revisable or not, was pleased to hold as under: "grant of leave to institute a suit does not amount to case decided within the meaning of the term used under Section 115, C. P. C. It was subject to revocation of objection/application filed by the opposite party, therefore, against an order granting leave, a revision under Section 115, c. P. C. was not maintainable. " ( 10 ) IN R. M. Narayana Chettiar and another v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar and others, (1991) 1 scc 48 , the Supreme Court took the view that before institution of the suit for the relief in the nature enumerated under Section 92, C. P. C. leave must be obtained from the Court as it imposes certain check on filing of frivolous suits. It was held that leave could be granted without any notice to the respondents as it can be set aside on the application by party aggrieved. The Apex court has upheld the validity of the said order challenged, subject to the condition only that the court while granting permission under Section 92, C. P. C. must afford opportunity of hearing and to file objection, to the contesting opposite parties and to record reasons for granting or refusing to grant permission. Even in Mahanth Gurmukh Das v. Bhupal Singh and others, 1987 ALJ 369, learned single Judge was pleased to hold that the Court should apply its mind to the question on the basis of the material on record and come to a conclusion that prima facie though it may be, on the question whether person seeking its leave can be treated to be a person having an interest in the trust. The insistence was given to record reasons before an order either granting or refusing to grant permission is passed by the District Judge and revision filed in this Court was disposed of with certain directions to record reasons. Now coming back to the case of R. M. Narayana Chettiar, referred to above, the Apex Court has specifically ruled that obtaining permission before institution of a suit for the relief of the nature mentioned in Section 92, C. P. C. obtaining permission is a condition precedent, the Court before granting such permission should give notice to the defendants as a rule of caution. According to it, non-issuance of a notice would not render the suit bad inasmuch as the defendants can any time apply for revocation of the leave. According to it, non-issuance of a notice would not render the suit bad inasmuch as the defendants can any time apply for revocation of the leave. It was observed as under : "the legislative history of Section 92 of the Code indicates that one of the objects which led to the enactment of the said section was to enable two or more persons interested in any trust created for a public purpose of a charitable or religious nature should be enabled to file a suit for the reliefs set out in the said section without having to join all the beneficiaries since it would be highly inconvenient and impracticable for all the beneficiaries to join the suit ; hence any two or more of them were given the right to institute a suit for the reliefs mentioned in the said Section 92 of the Code. However, it was considered desirable to prevent a public trust from being harassed or put to legal expenses by reckless or frivolous suits being brought against the trustees and hence, a provision was made for leave of the Court having to be obtained before the suit is instituted. " it was ultimately ruled as under : "keeping in mind these considerations, in our opinion, although, as a rule of caution, Court should normally give notice to the defendants before granting leave under the said section to institute a suit, the Court is not bound to do so. If a suit is instituted on the basis of such leave, granted without notice to the defendants, the suit would not thereby be rendered bad in law or non-maintainable. The grant of leave cannot be regarded as defeating or even seriously prejudicing any right of the proposed defendants because it is always open to them to file an application for revocation of the leave which can be considered on merits and according to law. " ( 11 ) IN the instant case, as stated above, the grievance of the applicants, in substance, is that they have filed objection and as many as 52 documents in support of their cases, but the court below acted wholly illegally and arbitrarily and completely ignoring the said documents and passed an order, which is bereft of reasons. The same is, therefore, liable to be set aside. The same is, therefore, liable to be set aside. ( 12 ) UNDER the facts and circumstances stated above and in the light of the law laid down of this court and other Courts as well as the Apex Court, the District Judge, in exercise of power under section 92, C. P. C. must act judiciously, if objections are filed before or after the order under section 92, C. P. C. is passed granting or refusing the leave to file a suit, he is bound to take into consideration the documentary or oral evidence on record and examine the same critically and thereafter pass the order. In the instant case, court below did not take the evidence filed by the applicants into consideration and did not record cogent reasons, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. ( 13 ) THIS revision succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 4. 12. 1992 is hereby set aside. The case is, however, sent back to the court below for decision in the light of the observations made above expeditiously within a period of two months from the date a certified copy of this order is communicated to the court below. It is further provided that the case shall be decided by a Judge other than the Judge who has passed the impugned order. The District Judge, Jhansi shall pass appropriate orders in this regard in exercise of power under Section 24, C. P. C. .