Judgment Narayan Roy, J. 1. Heard Mr. B.P. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. K.D. Chatterji, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 as also learned Counsel for the State. However, no one appeared on behalf of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 despite valid service of notices upon them. 2. This writ application has been filed for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing order dated 15.12.1990, as contained in Annexure-7, passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms in Ceiling Case No. 29 of 1990-91 allowing application of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 under Sec. 16(3) of the Ceiling Act, for quashing order dated 5.2.1997, as contained in Annexure-9., passed by the Collector, Patnain Ceiling Appeal No. 27 of 1991-92 upholding the order of the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms and also for quashing the order as contained in Annexure-11 dated 8.1.1998 passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, affirming the orders, as contained in Annexures-7 and 9, respectively. 3. It appears that the petition under Sec. 16(3) of the Ceiling Act was filed by respondent Nos. 4 and 5 before the Land Reforms, Deputy Collector, Barh, and, accordingly, Ceiling Case No. 29 of 1990-91 was registered and after hearing the parties, the application aforesaid was allowed holding respondent Nos. 4.and 5 adjoining raiyats to the land in question. The order passed by the learned Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, as contained in Annexure-7, was challenged before the Collector, Patna, which was dismissed on contest vide order as contained in Annexure-9. The petitioner, thereafter, challenged the order, as contained in Annexure-9, before the learned Member, Board of Revenue, which was heard by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, and the orders passed by the authorities concerned were upheld giving rise to this application. 4. It is submitted by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the land in question measuring 32 decimals of plot No. 195, khata No. 52, situate in village Ranisarai in the District of Patna, was purchased by the petitioner from Siddheshwar Pandey vide sale-deed dated 18.5.1990.
4. It is submitted by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the land in question measuring 32 decimals of plot No. 195, khata No. 52, situate in village Ranisarai in the District of Patna, was purchased by the petitioner from Siddheshwar Pandey vide sale-deed dated 18.5.1990. It is further submitted by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the landlord of plot No. 195, khata No. 52, namely, Bibi Ajiman, wife of Noor Mohammad had brought a rent suit in the year 1949 against the recorded tenants, Pushkar Pandey, Navin Pandey, Parmanand Pandey, all sons of Kailash Pandey, Saryug Pandey, Umapati Pandey and Siddheshwar Pandey, all sons of Bal Kishun Pandey. The Rent Suit was decreed against the recorded tenants, and thereafter Mst. Bibi Ajiman filed Execution Case No. 763 of 1952 and in the execution case the plot in question was auction-sold. The plot in question was purchased by Ambika Singh and the Court had delivered physical possession of the land to him on 24.1.1955, and, thus, he came in possession of the land in question. After the death of Ambika Singh, his son Balmiki Singh came in cultivating possession of the land and he made a gift of the entire land measuring 64 decimals of land to Siddheshwar Pandey, the vendee of the land, by registered deed of gift dated 14.12.1988. Siddheshwar Pandey, however, transferred 32 decimals of land of plot No. 195 in favour of the petitioner through a registered sale-deed dated 18.5.1990. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further submitted that the authorities under the Act have not appreciated the case of the petitioner nor have they considered the documents filed by her and since the petitioner was purchaser through registered sale-deed, she had a preferential right over the preemptors and, this aspect of the matter could have been considered by the authorities concerned. Learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that the orders impugned are not sustainable in law. 5. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.
Learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that the orders impugned are not sustainable in law. 5. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 4 and 5, on the other hand, submitted that the preemptors are the rightful owners of 32 decimals of land of plot No. 195 on the basis of four valid purchases made from a branch of the survey recorded tenant and in that way, they have acquired ownership over 32 decimals of land of plot No. 195, and, thus, came in possession of the same. It is further submitted by learned Counsel that the lands purchased by the preemptors by four sale-deeds are in one block in the southern boundary of the disputed land. It is further submitted that they have been mutated for the land they had purchased and rent receipts are being granted to them. It is also submitted that 32 decimals of land besides the land in question was purchased by the preemptors much before the registered deed executed in favour of the petitioner dated 18.5.1990 and even much before the deed of gift dated 14.12.1988 created in favour of Siddheshwar Pandey, who is said to be the vendor of the petitioner. Learned Counsel further submitted that the petitioner could not prove her claim before the authorities that she was the purchaser of the land already purchased by the preemptors, and, therefore, the authorities under the Act allowed the claim of the preemptors under Sec. 16(3) of the Act holding them as adjoining raiyats to the land in question. 6. I have perused the orders impugned. All the three authorities vide orders, as contained in Annexures-7, 9 and 11, have recorded concurrent findings of facts and have held that the deed of gift in favour of Siddheshwar Pandey with respect to 64 decimals of land in plot No. 195 was appear transaction, as the possession of the land in question, which is said to have been purchased in auction sale was never given in possession of Ambika Singh, the auction purchaser, and thus, no right was created in favour of Siddheshwar Pandey; and, the registered sale-deed executed by Siddheshwar Pandey dated 18.5.1990 was void.
The Courts below have categorically recorded a finding that the deed of gift was executed in the year 1988, whereas preemptors had purchased 32 decimals of land of plot No. 195 much prior to that and the sale-deeds so executed in favour of the preemptors or their father were never invalid dated by any competent Civil Court. The sale-deeds created in favour of the preemptors are of the years 1948 and 1950, respectively. The authorities further held that Siddheshwar Pandey had not desired his title by virtue of gift deed, and, thus, the purchases made by the petitioner from Siddheshwar Pandey are also of no avail to the petitioner. From the findings arrived at by the authorities under the Act and after hearing the parties as also considering their respective pleadings, I will have no hesitation to hold that the preemptors were the adjoining raiyats and the petitioner does not hold any land in the boundary of the land in question. 7. A plain reading of Sec. 16(3)(i) of the Ceiling Act clearly indicates that when any transfer of land is made after the commencement of the Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled within three months of the date of registration of the document of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions, contained in the said deed. 8. It is not in dispute that the authorities have held the preemptors to be raiyats holding land adjoining to the land sold to the petitioner by registered sale-deed. Under these circumstances, since two conditions have been specified by operation of Sec. 16(3)(i) of the Ceiling Act, the preemptors are entitled to preemption of the land in question. 9. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as referred to above, I do not find any merit in this application, which is, accordingly, dismissed, but without cots.