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2000 DIGILAW 1414 (ALL)

JAGATPAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2000-11-10

JAGDISH BHALLA, S.K.SEN

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S. K. SEN, C. J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari to quash the challan of his vehicle (Vikram tempo No. UP 32 T 4341) dated 13. 09. 2000, contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition. He has further prayed for a writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to release his above vehicle-The vehicle of the petitioner has been seized under Section 207 (1) of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988. ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in similar cases, orders for release of the vehicle through Chief Judicial Magistrate have been passed by this Court earlier. In support, he has filed a copy of such order as Annexure-6 to the writ petition. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that under Section 207 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 power to release such vehicle has been given to the transport authority or any officer authorized in this behalf by the state Government and the Chief Judicial Magistrate has no power to release the vehicle. ( 3 ) WE have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and also of the state counsel. Section 207 of the Act provides as follows :- "207. Power to detain vehicles used without certificate of registration, permit, etc.-- (1) Any police officer or other person authorized in this behalf by the State Government may. ( 3 ) WE have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and also of the state counsel. Section 207 of the Act provides as follows :- "207. Power to detain vehicles used without certificate of registration, permit, etc.-- (1) Any police officer or other person authorized in this behalf by the State Government may. If he has reason to believe that a motor vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 or Section 39 or without the permit required by sub-section (1) of Section 66 or in contravention of any condition of such permit relating to the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used, seize and detain the vehicle, in the prescribed manner and for this purpose take or cause to be taken any steps he may consider proper for the temporary safe custody of the vehicle : provided that where any such officer or person has reason to believe that a motor vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of Section 3 or Section 4 or without the permit required by sub-section (1) of Section 66 he may, instead of seizing the vehicle, seize the certificate of registration of the vehicle and shall issue an acknowledgment in respect thereof. (2) Where a motor-vehicle has been seized and detained under sub-section (1), the owner or person in charge of the motor vehicle may apply to the transport authority or any officer authorized in this behalf by the State Government together with the relevant documents for the release of the vehicle and such authority or officer may, after verification of such documents, by order release the vehicle subject to such conditions as the authority or officer may deem fit to impose. " ( 4 ) FROM a perusal of Section 207 of the Act it appears that the remedy available to the petitioner is to apply to the transport authority or any officer authorized in this behalf by the State government together with relevant documents for the release of the vehicle in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 207 of the Act. We are of the view that since statute provides power to release the vehicle on the concerned authority under subsection (2) of Section 207 of the Act on the application of the writ petitioner, the writ petitioner should act according to the statute and take appropriate steps in terms of Section 207 (2) of the Act and make appropriate application before the concerned authority. We are of the further view that it is incumbent on the part of the parties to follow the procedure laid by the statute and we have no jurisdiction or authority to direct release of the vehicle through Chief Judicial Magistrate, with all respect to the other division Bench orders which have been passed from time to time which are not in the form of judgment and in fact no ratio has been laid down therein. It is well-settled that mere orders will not have binding nature unless a ratio has been laid down. This view finds support from the following decisions : (i) B. Shama Rao a. Union Territory of Pondichery, AIR 1967 SC 1480 : (1967) 2 SCR 650 : (1967) 2 MLJ (SC) 98 : 12 Law Rep 163 : (1967) 2 ITJ 684 : 20 STC 215. In this case, the honble Supreme Court has held that a decision is binding not because of its conclusion but in regard to its ratio and the principle laid down therein. (ii) ADM v. Shavakant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521 : AIR 1976 SC 1207 : 1976 Cri LJ 945. In this case, the Apex Court observed as under: "the generality of the expressions which may be found in a judgment are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. " (iii) Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai, (1976) 3 SCC 832 : AIR 1976 SC 1455 . In this case the Honble Supreme Court observed as under :"it is trite, going by Anglophonic principles, that a ruling of a superior court is binding law. " (iii) Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai, (1976) 3 SCC 832 : AIR 1976 SC 1455 . In this case the Honble Supreme Court observed as under :"it is trite, going by Anglophonic principles, that a ruling of a superior court is binding law. It is not of scriptural sanctity but is of ratiowise luminosity within the edifice of facts where the judicial lamp plays the legal flame. " (iv) Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab. (1979) SCC 727. In this case also, the Apex Court held that only the ratio decidendi is binding and decision of matters of fact is not binding. ( 5 ) IF a ratio is laid down by the Court, it is required to be followed and the law of precedent is binding. In the instant case, no such ratio has been laid down in any of the orders passed by this court earlier and as such those orders have no binding effect. ( 6 ) IN view of what has been discussed above, the writ petition stands disposed of with a direction that it will be open to the writ petitioner to make an appropriate application for release of the vehicle before appropriate authority under sub-section (2) of Section 207 of the Motor Vehicles act, 1988 and the said authority shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. .