JUDGMENT 1. :- The instant writ petition is directed against the order impugned dated 20.4.96, Annexure-2 to the writ petition, passed by the Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred as "the Tribunal"), constituted under Section 83 of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred as "the Act of 1982"), whereby, the Tribunal has declared that the Jaipur Development Authority (hereinafter referred as "the JDA"), through its Secretary, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Jaipur, and Lankapuri Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd., Jaipur, through its Secretary, Prithvi Singh Shekhawat, have no legal authority, to interfere, with the possession of the respondent No.1, Rajasthan Gau Sewa Sangh, with regard to Khasra No. 363, situated in Village-Goplapura, falling under Shanti Nagar Scheme, shown by letters 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D', in the approved sanctioned map, as facility area, for public utility. 2. The aforesaid order, dated 20.4.96, Annexure-2 to the writ petition, passed by Tribunal, is based on the findings, recorded by it that on the basis of agreement to sell, executed in favour of the petitioner, by the respondent No.1, it (the petitioner), is not entitled to move an application, for permission, before the JDA, for sub-division, reconstitution or improvements of plots, under the Rajasthan Urban Areas (Sub-Division, Reconstitution and Improvement of Plots) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred as "the Rules of 1975"). It is held by Tribunal that under the statutory rules, an application for permission for sub-division, reconstitution and improvement of plots, can be moved only by a person, before the JDA, who possessed undisputed title-deed of ownership of land in question. It is further held by Tribunal that since in the present case, the petitioner does not possess undisputed title-deed of ownership, on basis of agreement to sell, executed by the respondent No.1, in its favour, hence, JDA has no jurisdiction under the statutory rules, to approve the sanctioned map, at the behest of the petitioner, before obtaining a decree of specific performance from a competent civil court. As the respondent No.1, Rajasthan Gau Sewa Sangh continues to be the owner of the land in dispute and it has not moved an application for permission, for sub-division, reconstitution or for improvement of plots, the facility area, earmarked by letters 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D', in the sanctioned map, area for public utility, does not vest in JDA, under the law. 3. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, at length. Perused the averments made in the writ petition and the replies filed thereto, by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 4. At the first instance, it is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri G.L. Pareek, that under sub-rule (3) of Rule-6 of the Rules of 1975, the petitioner, Lankapuri Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd., which is a registered society under the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1964, after conversion of land, was entitled to get the map of Shanti Nagar Scheme, sanctioned from JDA. In support of his aforesaid contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision, rendered by Supreme Court, in case of Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur and another, reported in AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1923 , wherein the connotation "belonging" has been defined by the Apex Court. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent No.2, Shri N.K. Joshi, adopted the aforesaid argument, advanced on behalf of the petitioner. In addition to the aforesaid argument, the learned counsel, Shri N.K. Joshi, appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2, submits that it is true that the application of the petitioner was required to be supported by documentary evidence relating to its undisputed title over the land in dispute, but since the land in dispute was converted from agricultural land to abadi land, therefore, even if on basis of agreement to sell, executed by the respondent No.1, in favour of the petitioner, by virtue of which, no title is passed on it, yet JDA was entitled to sanction the Shanti Nagar Scheme, earmarking the disputed land as facility area, on the application of the petitioner. 6. The aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondent No.2, are refuted by the learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1, Shri S.N. Kumawat, with equal vehemence. The learned counsel, Shri S.N. Kumawat, supported the order im ugned, passed by Tribunal, Annexure-2 to the writ petition. According to the learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1, Tribunal has committed no error in passing the impugned order dated 20.4.96, Annexure-2 to the writ petition and it does not require interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, raised at the Bar. According to the learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1, Tribunal has committed no error in passing the impugned order dated 20.4.96, Annexure-2 to the writ petition and it does not require interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, raised at the Bar. The rival contentions, raised in the present case, create doubt, leading to an ambiguity with the expression "belongs", used under sub-rule (3) of Rule-6 of the Rules of 1975, which provides that the application shall be accompanied by a proof to the satisfaction of the Trust (now, replaced as JDA, in place of Trust) that the land intended to be sub-divided, reconstituted, or improved "belongs" to the applicant and it is abadi land. The aforesaid ambiguity with the connotation "belongs", deserves to be settled in the case on hand, for all time to come, in the light of Form-I, attached to the Schedule, which is integral part of the Rules of 1975, framed by the State Government. For correct interpretation of the connotation "belongs", used under sub-rule (3) of Rule-6 of the Rules of 1975, the relevant rule is quoted hereinbelow, for ready reference:- 8. Sub-rule (3) of Rule-6 of the Rules of 1975, reads thus: 6(3). "The application shall be accompanied by a proof to the satisfaction of the Trust that the land intended to be sub-divided, reconstituted or improved belongs to the applicant (and is abadi land)." 9. The relevant portion of Form-I, attached to the Schedule, framed under Rule-6 of the Rules of 1975, is also reproduced hereinbelow, for ready reference: "2....... (i)...... (ii) Title-deed of ownership ... copies of the title deeds, certified by any Magistrate, Judge or a Gazetted Government servant may be attached." 10. It is to be noticed that existing sub-rule (3) of Rule-6, was amended vide notification dated 26.12.77, published in Rajasthan Gazette, Part-IV, on 5.1.78, authorising only a person, to move an application before JDA, for permission for sub-division, reconstitution, or improvement of plots, to whom, the land belongs in prescribed Form-I, attached to the Schedule, framed under Rule-6 of the Rules of 1975, disclosing in paragraph 2(ii), of his/their application, title-deed of his/their ownership, accompanied with the copies of title-deeds, certified by any Magistrate, Judge or any Gazetted Government servant. 11. 11. A conjoint reading of sub-rule (3) of Rule-6 of the Rules of 1975, and Form-I, attached to the Schedule, leads towards an irresistible conclusion that only a person, who possessed an undisputed title-deed of ownership, can move an application before JDA, for permission, sub-division, reconstitution, or for improvement of plots of abadi lands, and a person, who has an agreement to sell in his favour, is not entitled to move such an application, because, under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an agreement to sell does not of itself create any right, title or interest or charge on such immovable property of several lacs. To my mind, if such practice is allowed by JDA, it would not only be per se illegal, but it would also lead to grotesque result, causing colossal loss to public exchequer, in shape of registration-fee, which is impermissible. I am of the view that para-2(ii) of Form-I, attached to the Rules of 1975, can be used as a key to unlock the ambiguity, attached by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent No.2, with the connotation "belongs", used under sub-rule (3) of Rule-6 of the Rules of 1975. 12. My attention is invited to Annexure-1 to the writ petition, by the learned counsel, appearing for the respondent No.1, whereby, conditional recognition was given by JDA, for conversion of land, wherein, in Condition No.2, it is sepcifically stated that undisputed title-deed (bhoomi ka nirvivad swamitva), would be a necessary condition precedent for passing order converting agricultural land to abadi land. Thus, this Court is satisfied that JDA has no doubt that either for moving an application, for conversion of agricultural land to abadi land, or for moving an application under sub-rule (3) of Rule-6 of the Rules of 1975, the applicant is required to possess undisputed title-deed. 13. Thus, this Court is satisfied that JDA has no doubt that either for moving an application, for conversion of agricultural land to abadi land, or for moving an application under sub-rule (3) of Rule-6 of the Rules of 1975, the applicant is required to possess undisputed title-deed. 13. In the present case, I have no hesitation to hold that JDA having full knowledge that the petitioner registered society has no undisputed title-deed to the land in question, yet, without being satisfied that the land in dispute belongs to the petitioner, it has illegally granted permission to the petitioner, for sub-division, reconstitution and improvement of plots, earmarking the disputed land as facility area for public utility, therefore, the facility area, earmarked in the sanctioned map, in letters 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D', does not vest in JDA, and an argument, contrary to it, is not acceptable. 14. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri G.L. Pareek that the expression "belongs" changes its meaning with reference to different contexts. There is no quarrel with the aforesaid submission, made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The expression "belongs" may take a different colour in different contexts, but in the present case, in context of moving an application, to obtain a sanction from JDA, under sub-rule (3) of Rule-6, read with Form-I, the expression "belongs" is capable only of one meaning, i.e., of absolute, undisputed title, and an argument, contrary to it, is hereby repelled. My aforesaid view is butterssed by the decision, rendered by the Apex Court, in case of Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan (supra). 15. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Tribunal, has no jurisdiction, to adjudicate a private dispute between the petitioner and the respondent No.1, relating to agreement to sell or relating to payment of entire money, in pursuant to the agreement for sale. 15. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Tribunal, has no jurisdiction, to adjudicate a private dispute between the petitioner and the respondent No.1, relating to agreement to sell or relating to payment of entire money, in pursuant to the agreement for sale. The aforesaid argument is raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, merely to be rejected, and it is hereby rejected, for the simple reason that a dose scrutiny of the order impugned, dated 20.4.96, Annexure-2, passed by Tribunal, reveals that Tribunal has not adjudicated the private dispute relating to payment or non-payment of the amount, agreed between the parties, in lieu of the agreement between the petitioner and the respondent No.1, but as a matter of fact, the Tribunal has adjudicated that JDA has transgressed the statutory rules in granting sanction to the Shanti Nagar Scheme, and earmarking the land, as facility area, by letters 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D', in the sanctioned map, in utter disregard of the fact that the petitioner has no absolute title, to move such application, for sanction of the map, under sub-rule (3) of Rule-6 of the Rules of 1975, read with Form-I, attached to the Schedule, framed under the said rule. 16. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Pareek that reference made by the respondent No.1, before the Tribunal, under sub-section (8)(b) of Section 83 of the Act of 1982, was beyond time and the Tribunal has committed manifest error of law in entertaining a time-barred reference, made at the behest of the respondent No.1, a private individual. According to Shri Pareek, for making a reference by JDA, to Tribunal, under sub-section (7) of Section 83 of the Act of 1982, no limitation is prescribed, but, for making a reference by a private individual, it is to be made within 30 days of the communication of the order or within 30 days from the knowledge of threatened act or injury, from which a private individual claims himself to be aggrieved. 17. The aforesaid argument, advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is refuted by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1. 17. The aforesaid argument, advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is refuted by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 that since the aforesaid plea of limitation was not raised before Tribunal, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to raise a new plea before this Court, under Article 226, of the Constitution. 18. In my considered opinion, there is substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1. I am of the view that the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise a new plea before this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, which was available to it, before Tribunal. There is yet another reason, to arrive at the aforesaid conclusion. The aforesaid plea of limitation, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is not a pure question of law, but it is a mixed question of law and facts. A mixed question of law and facts, cannot be allowed to be raised at first time, in writ jurisdiction, inasmuch as such mixed question of law and facts, involves factual investigation, which cannot be allowed to be raised under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. The second limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, which is inter-linked, with the point discussed hereinabove, in the preceding paragraph of this order, relates to applicability of Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Procedure Code), by virtue of sub-section (6) of Section 83, which provides that Tribunal shall have the same powers, as are vested in a civil court, under the Civil Procedure Code, in respect of hearing and deciding of an appeal or dispute, referred to it. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of sub-section (6) of Section 83 of the Act of 1982, since all the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are made applicable before Tribunal, hence, Tribunal was under legal obligation, to reject the reference of the respondent No.1, treating it beyond limitation, under Order-7, Rule-11(d) of Civil Procedure Code. 20. 20. It is well to remember that now-a-days, it is mordern trend of legislation that whenever any enactment is passed and any statutory tribunal is created, applicability of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code and Limitation Act both, are extended before such tribunals, but here, in case on hand, under the Act of 1982, only applicability of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, is extended, in respect of hearing and decidingg of an appeal, referred to Tribunal. In the present case, as mentioned hereinabove, since the provisions of Limitation Act are not extended to the Act of 1982, therefore, Tribunal was not legally authorised to examine the question of limitation, without being raised by the petitioner, before it. It is to be imbibed that sub-section (1) of Section 3 of Limitation Act provides that subject to the provisions, contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made, after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed, although, limitation has not been set up as a defence. I am of the view that since in the present case, Limitation Act is not extended to the Act of 1982, for deciding an appeal or dispute, referred to Tribunal, therefore, Tribunal was not under legal obligation, to examine the question of limitation, without being raised before it. It is reiterated at the risk of repetition that in the present case, for dismissing the reference on ground of limitation, under Order-7, Rule-11(d) of Civil Procedure Code, the petitioner was required to raise this plea before Tribunal, and if the petitioner has failed to raise it before Tribunal, then, Tribunal itself had no legal justification, to take up this plea suo motu, within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of Limitation Act, which is not extended for hearing an appeal or dispute, referred to it. 21. I am satisfied that the order dated 20.4.96, annexure-2 to the writ petition, passed by Tribunal, is eminently just, fair, proper and legal, and it does not require interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Upshot of the aforesaid discussion, is that the instant writ petition is devoid of merit and it is hereby dismissed. The order impugned, dated 20.4.96, Annexure-2 to the writ petition, passed by Tribunal, is hereby affirmed. In the peculiar circumstances of the present case, both the parties are directed to bear their own costs.Petition dismissed. *******