A. K. YOG, J. Heard Sri Satish Chandra Misra, advocate, holding brief of Sri U. S. Tiwari, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri Manish Goel, advocate, on behalf of the sole respondent. 2. The brief facts of the case are that petitioners (Mohd. Ilyas Khan, Santosh Kumar Pandey, Som Nath Rai and Jal Narain) claim to have been discharged from defence services-Indian Air Force w. e. f. 31-8- 1993, as stated in para 1 of the writ petition. 3. Before their discharge from the defence services, petitioners applied against the advertisement dated 7-12-1992 issued by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (for short called the Corporation" ). The copy of the said advertisement is not on record of the case. Petitioners contended themselves by stating that the said advertisement being illegible is not being filed here. It could be shown to this Honble Court at the time of arguments if so required. Learned Counsel for the petitioners, however, failed to produce the legible copy of the advertisement in spite of this fact brought to the notice of this Court on last date of hearing, i. e. , 24-11-2000. 4. Petitioners submit that they had received letters for appearing in the examination/interview proposed by the Corporation. It may be stated that these petitioners had applied for two different posts, namely - Assistant and Typist for which different dates were fixed for interview, etc. (See paras 4 to 6 of the writ petition ). 5. The Corporation, according to the petitioners, illegally withheld appointment letters with an objection that petitioners were not ex-servicemen at the time of submitting their application or on the last date of submitting application in response to the advertisement. Consequently, petitioners, according to the Corporation, were not ex-servicemen, on the last date prescribed for submitting application i. e. 11-1- 1993 as ex-servicemen. 6. Petitioners have annexed copy of notification of Ministry of Government of India dated 27th October, 1986, (An-nexure-2 to the writ petition ). Consequently, petitioners, according to the Corporation, were not ex-servicemen, on the last date prescribed for submitting application i. e. 11-1- 1993 as ex-servicemen. 6. Petitioners have annexed copy of notification of Ministry of Government of India dated 27th October, 1986, (An-nexure-2 to the writ petition ). Rule 2 Explanation clause of the said notification, relevant for the present case, is being quoted for ready reference: "explanation: The persons serving in the Armed Forces of the Union, who on retirement from service, would come under the category of ex-servicemen may be permitted to apply for re-employment one year before the completion of the specified norms of engagement and avail themselves of all concession available to ex-servicemen but shall not be permitted to leave the uniform untill they complete the specified term of engagement in the Armed Forces of the Union. " 7. Petitioners allege that they filed no Objection Certificate along with their application which clearly indicated that they shall be discharged from the services w. e. f. 31-8-1993. Petitioners by inference suggest that they have not misrepresented or concealed fact any material while submitting their application forms. The petitioners, consequently, by implication claim benefit of equitable principle of estoppel/acquiescence against the Corporation. 8. The Corporation has filed counter-affidavit (sworn by D. L. Srivastava-Ad-ministralive Officer (Legal ). Date of advertisement, in the counter-affidavit, is indicated as 7th December, 1992 (para 7 of the counter-affidavit ). The last date for submitting application is claimed to be 28-12-1992 which was extended up to 11-1-1993. The respondent has attempted to defend impugned action by alleging that eligibility of the candidate for submitting application forms was to be considered either with reference to the date of advertisement or the last date of eligibility indicated in the advertisement itself. The Corporation, however, concedes that eligibility of candidate was to be considered with reference to the last date for submitting application forms as indicated in the advertisement itself. 9. The Corporation has, further, elaborated the fact regarding the nature and statutory character of the instructions issued by Chairman in exercising of his power vested under Section 48 Life Insurance Corporation Act and contained in Life Insurance Corporation Recruitment (clause 3 and clause 4) Staff Instruction, 1979. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in 1994 (2) SCC 718 (para 2 ). Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in 1994 (2) SCC 718 (para 2 ). Learned Counsel for the respondent-Corporation also referred to the decision in 1994 (2) SC 323 (paras 10 and 11), wherein the Apex Court had the occasion to explain effect of deeming clause with reference to Section 48, L. I. C. Act. Reference is also being made to Regulation 4, Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (as modified by 31-12-1983), which confers power upon Chairman of the Board to issue instruction. 10. Learned Counsel for the Corporation made statement before the Court that some of the cases filed by the persons, who were similarly and identically situated as the present petitioner, had filed writ petitions in this Court against Corporation refusing to issue appointment letters. The said Writ Petition No. 46204 of 1993 was allowed by learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 7-2-1995. The intera-Court special appeal (filed by the Corporation) was allowed by Division Bench of this Court vide judgement and order dated 11th July, 1997, in Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay and Others v. Suraj Veer Singh and Others, 1998 All LJ 181. The above fact is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. 11. In aforesaid Division Bench judgment, this Court held that the advertisement dated 7-12-1992 in question indicated cut-of date for considering eligibility as the last date for submitting application forms as 11-1-1993. The petitioners were actually discharged w. e. f. 31-8-1993. The petitioners were therefore, not eligible to apply against the advertisement. The Division Bench further held that petitioners were not entitled to seek relief by invoking principle of estoppel and came to the conclusion that persons (like the present petitioners) were not entitled to any relief. 12. I find no distinguishing feature or any additional point being submitted at the bar for re- consideration. The case being decided by the Division Bench and there being no permissible ground to take a different view, this Court is bound by the decision in the special appeal by the Division Bench in Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra ). 13. Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to the relief claimed in the present petition. 14. Writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .