JUDGMENT Mehtab S. Gill, J. - The petitioner-appellant has filed an appeal against the judgment and decree dated November 6, 1998 passed by Additional District Judge, Moga, whereby the petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act filed by him was dismissed. 2. It has been averred that the petitioner-appellant had led cogent evidence that the respondent (wife) had deserted him for a continuous period of two years before filing of the petition. She left the house for the appellant in the month of February, 1993, when he was no duty in the Army. The appellant, in the month of August, 1993, went to the house of respondent No. 1 (wife) in village Samalsar and asked her to join his society, but she refused to do so and put a condition that the appellant should resign the Army service and do some other job. It has been further averred that the Additional District Judge, Moga, while giving his finding on issue No. 4, did not take into consideration that the respondent (wife) was living in adultery with her father-in-law, i.e., the father of the appellant. 3. Notice of motion of C.M. was issued to the respondents. Respondent No. 1 put in appearance and filed her reply. 4. While filing the appeal, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also moved as there was a delay of 370 days in filing the same. The applicant-appellant pleaded that he was working in the Army as a Sepoy and was then posted in Jammu and Kashmir. The impugned judgment was passed on November 6, 1998 and since November, 1998 to October, 1999, the applicant- appellant did not come on leave and when he came on leave in November, 1999, he came to know from his counsel in the trial Court that his case had been decided on November 6, 1998. He applied for certified copy of the order dated November 6, 1998 passed by Additional District Judge, Moga, on November 10, 1999 and obtained the same on November 12, 1999 and thereafter, the present appeal was filed. 5. In reply to this application, the respondent-wife pleaded that on July 6, 1999, her father along with respectable persons visited the residence of the appellant and also visited the house of appellants uncle Shri Amar Singh, as sometimes, appellant-Harjinder Singh used to stay with his uncle. 5. In reply to this application, the respondent-wife pleaded that on July 6, 1999, her father along with respectable persons visited the residence of the appellant and also visited the house of appellants uncle Shri Amar Singh, as sometimes, appellant-Harjinder Singh used to stay with his uncle. A compromise was struck between the parties and Shri Amar Singh, the uncle of the appellant, had told the Panchayat to leave respondent No. 1 in village Sivian in the house of Harjinder Singh appellant. On July 7, 1999, respondent No. 1 along with his father and other respectable persons went to village Sivian and left her in the appellants house. The compromise dated July 7, 1999 is annexed with the reply as annexure R-1. 6. We have perused the judgment passed by Additional District Judge, Moga and found that it was passed on November 6, 1998. The compromise (annexure R-1) which has been signed by the appellants father and other respectables of the village is dated July 7, 1999. Thus, after the order of the trial Court, compromise took place between the parties. It is not believable that this compromise came into effect without the knowledge of the appellant. 7. Going through the judgment, one comes to the conclusion that till the last, the case was being pursued by the appellants sister and mother, who came into the witness box along with appellants father, namely, Harnek Singh. Again it cannot be believed that they did not inform the appellant that the case had been decided against him. 8. Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act moved by the appellant is not supported by an affidavit, which again goes against him. 9. Taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the delay on 370 days, is deliberate and the circumstances show that the appellant knew about the case and its final outcome. We have come to the conclusion that there is no merit in the application filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal so late. It is, therefore, dismissed. Since the application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, the main appeal does not survive for consideration. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Application dismissed.