JUDGMENT 1. :-This writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner against the State of Rajasthan with the prayer to quash the issuance of notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and to declare that the recommendations made by the SDO under section 5A(2) of the Act are illegal with a further direction to respondent No.3 to hear the petitioner on the objections filed by her. 2. The facts as stated are that the State Government had issued a notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land mentioned therein including the land of the petitioner for the alleged public purpose i.e. for the office and residence of the SDO, Tehsil Building etc. The notification under section 4 dated 31.10.1987 was issued and published in the Rajasthan Patrika, a copy of which has been attached as Annexure-1. The petitioner had filed objections through her advocate as required under section 5-A(1) of the Land Acquisition Act within the prescribed time vide letter dated 7.12.1987, stating therein (1), that she had no other residential house except one constructed over the land acquired; (2) acquisition was malafide on the ground that the petitioners had filed a suit for ejectment against the State Govt. in respect of the house and it was only after the suit was filed that the Government had issued the notification for acquisition of building; and (3) that the Government was already in possession of the acquired land adjacent to the land/house of the petitioner and, therefore, there was no necessity to acquire such land. A copy of the objections is attached as Annexure-2. 3. It is submitted that the case was fixed on 23.1.1988 for hearing the objections, but was adjourned at the request of the counsel for the State for 27.1.1988 and it continued to be adjourned time and again on the request of the Government Advocate for filing of the reply. Ultimately, it was heard on 20.8.1988 before the SDO, Kotputli on transfer of the case from the Collector. Ultimately, it was heard on 20.8.1988 before the SDO, Kotputli on transfer of the case from the Collector. However, it is submitted that the Collector had never issued a notice of such transfer of the case and, therefore, ultimately report was submitted by the LAO under section 5-A(2) of the Land Acquisition Act on 13.9.1988 itself vide Annexure-4 and on receipt of such report notification under section 6 of the Act was issued on 27.10.1988 wherein the land of the petitioner bearing Khasra No.1326 and 1327 were included for acquisition as per Annexure-5. 4. The acquisition has been challenged on the ground that the petitioner was never allowed to argue on the objections and the objections had been decided without hearing the petitioner. An objection has been raised that the transfer of the case from Collector to SDO, Kotputli was without notice to her and that the case had been decided on the same day and that notification under section 6 has been passed in utter contravention of the law and is mala fide. 5. Written statement has been filed. It is stated that Khasra No.1327 was recorded as Dak Bungalow and it is submitted that Khasra No.1326 stood under the ownership of the petitioner. It is the case of the respondents that the house in question called the 'Lake House' was being used for the purpose of residence of the officers at that time and even is still being used for that purpose and the said house is being acquired for public purpose. It is also submitted that the notice of hearing of the objections was issued to Umakant Bhardwaj Advocate on 6.9.1988 and the petitioner was served through her advocate and for the reason that nobody had appeared, the objections were rejected. A copy of such notice has been attached as Annexure R/1. 6. It is the contention of the petitioner that it was in the knowledge of the respondent that the petitioner was staying at Calcutta but still the notices were not sent at the correct address. It is stated that the petitioner had purchased the property in question in June 1981. 6. It is the contention of the petitioner that it was in the knowledge of the respondent that the petitioner was staying at Calcutta but still the notices were not sent at the correct address. It is stated that the petitioner had purchased the property in question in June 1981. A further submission has been made that the petitioner had engaged only advocate J.P. Dixit and R.S. Purohit and not Umakant Bhardwaj and that the property was on rent with the State Government; if any notice had been issued to Umakant Bhardwaj, Advocate, that was without any jurisdiction and competence. 7. Record was called for from the State and the counsel appearing for the State was specifically directed to produce the record. 8. The State has attached a copy of the notice issued to Umakant Bhardwaj Advocate which notice is as vague as possible. Even though it has been issued to Umakant Bhardwaj Advocate, it even does not mention the name of the case or any details of the case, rather Umakant Bhardwaj has been directed to appear in person or through his counsel. No details what-so-ever have been mentioned in the notice. Apart from the fact whether Umakant Bhardwaj was counsel in the case or not, it was the duty of the respondent to have mentioned the particulars of the case i.e. the name/nature of the case which he was to represent. From the reading of the notice it seems that as Umakant Bhardwaj had been asked to appear in his personal case through his counsel. 9. The contention of the petitioner in this regard has merits. It can be said that for hearing objections when the case was transferred from the office of the Collector to the office of the SDO, no proper notice was issued to the petitioner. Apart from the fact that despite knowing the address of the petitioner of Calcutta, notice is said to have been sent to Kotputli where admittedly, the petitioner was not living. The objections filed by the petitioner under section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act have not been decided nor the copy of the decision of the objections has been placed on record by the respondent. 10. The objections filed by the petitioner under section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act have not been decided nor the copy of the decision of the objections has been placed on record by the respondent. 10. Counsel for the petitioner relies on (1) 1989 LACC 315 which was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2) 1999(7) SCC 44 , (3) AIR 1999 Madras 428 and (4) 1987 LACC 736. 11. Apart from above, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the premises in question i.e. the 'Lake House' as rented out to the Government in which the office of the Government was situated. It is submitted that the 'Lake House' did not fall under the definition of 'land' as defined under the Land Acquisition Act. It is no doubt true that the land can be acquired alongwith benefits attached to it but in the present case the house itself has been acquired and it shall amount to arbitrary use of powers to defeat the suit filed by the plaintiff for ejectment from the premises in question. 12. Counsel for the petitioner wants to submit that it is one of the isolated case where the suit of eviction had been filed by the petitioner but instead the Government had decided to acquire the residential house of petitioner for the purpose of residence of the officer, therefore, it cannot be termed to be public purpose. 13. In 1987 LACC 736, in case of R.P. Kapur v. Delhi Development Authority & others , Delhi High Court had held that the declaration under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued without considering the objections filed by landlord and when there was no discernible reason available on the record to show as to why there had been a deliberate departure from the normal policy which has been followed by the respondents with regard to the acquisition of land. It was accepted case that in no case the land of an approved colony had ever been acquired in Delhi, if this so, there has to be any reason as to why departure had been sought to be made in the instant case. 14. In 1989 LACC 315, in case of B.R. Gupta v. Union of India , the Division Bench of Delhi High Court has held that a mere statement, as is made in the present case that Lt. 14. In 1989 LACC 315, in case of B.R. Gupta v. Union of India , the Division Bench of Delhi High Court has held that a mere statement, as is made in the present case that Lt. Governor has carefully gone through the report and also considered the objections, is not sufficient compliance of Section 6 of the Act. His satisfaction that particular land is required to be acquired is also to be arrived at on cogent and intelligent appreciation of the objections and the Section 5-A report. Mere statement that he was satisfied about the acquisition of particular land without stating any reasons will be mindless exercise of the powers under Section 6 of the Act. 15. In case of Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others, 1999(7) SCC 44 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the opportunity of filing of the objection under Section 5 of the Act is required to be given and if filed must be decided. 16. In case of S. Sitataman v. Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravida Welfare Tindivanam, AIR 1999 Madras 428 , the Madras High Court has held that it is mandatory for respondent to have filed (sic ?) objections under Section 5 of the Act and mere considering objections of land owner without any personal hearing is not sufficient. 17. On 10.10.2000, this court had ordered respondents to produce the record by 18.10.2000 but no record had been produced for perusal of the courtto determine as to what had happened to the objections filed by petitioner nor any document has been placed on record to show that the objections filed by petitioner had been considered and the presumption is to be drawn against the respondents to the effect that the objections were not considered. 18. Apart from above, the defence of respondents to the fact that opportunity was granted is to be rejected in view of specific assertion made by petitioner to the effect that he had never engaged the counsel Shri Umakant Bhardwaj either for filing the objections or for arguments; therefore, any notice issued to said Mr. Bhardwaj has no relevancy to say that notice was issued to petitioner for personal hearing. The petitioner has specifically stated that they had engaged Mr. J.P. Dixit and Mr. R.S. Purohit as their counsel. Bhardwaj has no relevancy to say that notice was issued to petitioner for personal hearing. The petitioner has specifically stated that they had engaged Mr. J.P. Dixit and Mr. R.S. Purohit as their counsel. This fact could only be ascertained from the record, which has not been produced in Court, nor any counter affidavit has been produced to rebut the plea of petitioner. 19. The notice Annexure-R/1 which is said to have been issued to Mr. Bhardwaj is also vague. The notice itself shows that it was not even bearing the names of parties. It is the duty of the person concerned, who is supposed to hear the objections, to issue notice for personal hearing that the notice should bear names of parties and nature of the case and the full object of the notice. As such it can safely be said in the circumstances that the notice Annexure-R/1 was not a proper notice in the eyes of law. 20. The next question being raised by the counsel for petitioner is that the house of petitioner had been acquired for the purpose of residence of an officer, who was already residing in the house as tenant. Can it be called a public purpose ? The Government was tenant in the house. The tenant committed default in payment of rent. A suit for eviction was filed and the Government in the capacity of tenant had issued the notification for acquisition of the house in question called "Lake House". The State is already empowered with the provisions of acquisition and reacquisition; Where any accommodation is required, the Government under the provisions of Acquisition may acquire the house on lease. But the house in question was already on lease/rent with the Government and instead of contesting the eviction suit, a clever device had been adopted by the Government to acquire the house itself as to defeat the suit pending in the civil court. From the aforesaid facts, it seems that the house was not acquired bonafidy and had been acquired only to avoid the decree of eviction. In such situation it is doubtful to say whether such action of the acquisition of land can be called a bonafide public purpose. 21. From the aforesaid facts, it seems that the house was not acquired bonafidy and had been acquired only to avoid the decree of eviction. In such situation it is doubtful to say whether such action of the acquisition of land can be called a bonafide public purpose. 21. The officer concerned acted to acquire the house instead of contesting the eviction suit; if such action of Government is allowed except in very rare of rarest and exceptional case, it will lead to enamolous position and the State can always threaten to acquire the building and start acquisition proceedings, if the landlord of the building raises any dispute of recovery of rent or eviction. In my opinion, the contention of counsel for petitioner, specially when no record has been produced, has force and the writ petition is to be allowed. 22. For the discussions and reasons mentioned above, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. It is held that the acquisition of the building in question which was already with the Government on payment of rent on lease and for which a suit for eviction was filed by the landlord, cannot be held to be bonafide acquisition. Instead of contesting the suit of eviction, the State had chosen to defeat the suit by way of acquisition for the residence of the officer of the State; such purpose cannot be termed to be acquisition for public purpose. The officer who was already staying in the house for years together could not be accommodated in some Government built accommodation if at all the suitwild have been decreed against the Government. There is no application of mfid of the concerned authorities at the time of issuing of notification under section 6. 23. Apart from above, the objections under section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act were duly filed by the petitioner. No opportunity had been given to the petitioner for hearing the objections. The only notice which is said to have been issued for appearance was admittedly not issued to the petitioner or his any of the counsel; even the notice so issued is vague; it does not contain the particulars of the case, name of the parties, nature of the case etc. The language of the notice itself shows that the addressee even though some advocate was asked to appear personally or through his duly authorised advocate. The language of the notice itself shows that the addressee even though some advocate was asked to appear personally or through his duly authorised advocate. Apart from this fact, the State had failed to produce any record to show about the application of mind of deciding the objections and as such until and unless the objections filed at the time were disposed of in accordance with law, no further proceedings of acquisition could be sustained. Consequently, the acquisition of 'Lake House' vide notification Annexure-1 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and is quashed.The writ petition is allowed with a cost of Rs. 5,000/- to be paid to the petitioner by the respondents.Petition Allowed with costs. *******