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2000 DIGILAW 148 (JK)

Union Of India v. Moti Lal

2000-07-26

A.K.GOEL, A.M.MIR

body2000
PER ARUN KUMARGOEL, JUDGE 1. This Letters Patent appeal is directed against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in CIMA No.259/98, whereby the appeal of the appellants under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been dismissed. Thus the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jammu in File No. 125/ claims on 23-04-1997 to the tune of Rs. 1,65,000/ - has been upheld. 2. Shri Chandel, learned Addl, Central Govt. Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants urged that compensation awarded is excessive as also it has been awarded higher than what was claimed. In this behalf he made special reference to the award of Rs. 12,000/- on account of the expenses for attendant against Rs. 8,000/- as claimed in the claim petition. He also pointed out that keeping in view the extent of disability and nature of injuries sustained by the respondent, learned Single Judge has fallen into error as such appeal deserves to be allowed and the compensation reduced. 3. With a view to properly appreciate the submissions of Shri Chandel few facts emerging out of the record of the trial court file need to be noted. Respondent at the time of the accident was of 23 years age and was a bachelor. At the time of the accident he was going on his scooter from Akhnoor side to Jammu. Truck being driven by the appellant No. 3 and belonging to respondents 1 and 2 was turning towards its right side when the accident took place. 4. As per version of the driver-appellant No. 3 accident was on account of the negligence of the respondent as he had signaled to take right turn. In a hurry to cross over, the accident was caused. 5. However, when a reference is made to the statements recorded during the course of trial before the Tribunal below particularly to those of respondent-Moti Lal PWs Sham Lal, Narinder Lal and Behari Lal, it is clearly established that the Scooterist, i.e., Moti Lal respondent was hit from behind. It has further been established that with a view to overtake the Scooter, appellant No. 3 hit the respondent from behind. This resulted in Scooter as well as Moti Lal respondent being thrown into the Nullah. It has further been established that with a view to overtake the Scooter, appellant No. 3 hit the respondent from behind. This resulted in Scooter as well as Moti Lal respondent being thrown into the Nullah. Statements were read over by Shri Chandel with a view to support his plea that the accident was not the result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the appellant No. 3. 6. On an examination of the entire evidence we feel that no exception can be taken to the findings recorded under issue No. 1 by the Tribunal below and as upheld by the learned Single Judge. 7. So far the compensation having been awarded at higher rate is concerned, it may be observed that as per the provisions of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Tribunal in an application for compensation made under Section 166 of the said Act, after giving notice to the insurer and other parties is required to hold an inquiry and then determine "the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just." (Emphasis supplied). What is just compensation in a case would depend upon the circumstances, nature of the case and evidence examined in it. While assessing just compensation courts are required to ensure that it does not have to be too excessive as also to be too meagre. At the same time on account of death or injury as the case may be, compensation does not have to come as a bounty to the claimant. In addition to this it is expected that the compensation should provide sum equivalence to misfortune that has befallen on the concerned claimant. The word "just" has different meanings and connotations. While examining the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, we have to see the context in which it is used as also the purpose for which it has been used. Thus the word "just" is used in the context of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act would mean that the compensation assessed is guided by truth, reason and fairness, given or awarded rightly and it must have legitimacy. 8. Thus the word "just" is used in the context of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act would mean that the compensation assessed is guided by truth, reason and fairness, given or awarded rightly and it must have legitimacy. 8. It may also be observed in this context that when law as in the present case enjoins duty upon the Tribunal to award compensation which has to be just, what is meant is that an amount which a man of ordinary prudence would not instinctively regard it as either mean or excessive, whereas he would consider the same to be sensible and fair. Damages are compensation in money. In "Damages for Personal Injuries and Death", by John Munkman, 6th Edn., the author has observed that "when one person causes harm of any kind to another person, whether it is personal injury, damage to property or financial loss, the normal remedy which the law gives is a right to recover damages." The damages are compensation for an injury or loss, that is to say, full equivalent in money, insofar as the nature of money admits. The author while dealing with the subject of damages has observed: i) Damages must be full and adequate. ii) Damages are assessed once and for all; and iii) Difficulty and uncertainty of assessment does not preclude an award of damages. 9. Since compensation has to be awarded in terms of money, therefore, while determining the just amount of compensation, it is necessary that the same be full and adequate. It be assessed once for all and difficulty or uncertainty in assessment does not preclude an award being made. 10. After examining the provisions of Section 168 (supra) in our considered view, there is nothing to suggest that the claimant like respondent in the present case is required to specify the amount of compensation. Besides this, when a reference is made to the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Rules framed thereunder no such duty is enjoined upon the claimant to specify the amount. Rather a duty is enjoined in law upon the Tribunal to assess just compensation in terms of the said Section. These are some of broader aspects which are to be kept in view by the Courts while dealing with the cases under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 11. Rather a duty is enjoined in law upon the Tribunal to assess just compensation in terms of the said Section. These are some of broader aspects which are to be kept in view by the Courts while dealing with the cases under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 11. Whether the compensation, i.e., assessed can be more than what is claimed or not. Great emphasis was laid by Shri Chandel while questioning sum of Rs. 12,000/- as noted above against the claim of Rs. 8,000/- made before the Tribunal below. In this behalf reference can be made to a decision of Supreme Court of India reported in 1971 ACJ 206, Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd., wherein it was held that pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would depend upon the data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture and this is so then it is reasonable to accept precisely amount of damages or compensation that it would be entitled to. Natural consequence of it that falls is, that is for the Tribunal equipped with expertise in deciding such cases to estimate properly compensation that the claimant would be entitled to in a proper case. 12. It may also be pointed out in this behalf that the Tribunal is well within its right to grant and award in excess of the sum claimed in the original claim petition. Reason is not different to find. It is because of the fact that there are no fetters on the powers of Tribunal to award compensation. All that it is required to ensure is that the compensation assessed is just, which will depend upon a number of factors which are brought by the parties during the course of trial before it. 13. On this aspect of the case reference can also be made to a Division Bench judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court reported in 1994 ACJ 505, Surjit Singh Vs. Warayam Singh and another. In this case appellant sustained injury and as a result of which disability was reported to the extent of 100%. He filed a claim petition seeking compensation to the extent of Rs. 3.00 lac alongwith interest. After elaborately dealing with the matter just compensation was assessed to Rs. Warayam Singh and another. In this case appellant sustained injury and as a result of which disability was reported to the extent of 100%. He filed a claim petition seeking compensation to the extent of Rs. 3.00 lac alongwith interest. After elaborately dealing with the matter just compensation was assessed to Rs. 5.60,000/- with 12% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of payment. 14. To similar effect is decision of Patna High Court reported in 1999 ACJ 929, National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Saro Devi. 15. Shri Chandel on the quantum of compensation referred to few decisions of different courts and made an attempt to persuade us for slashing down the compensation payable to the respondent. We have examined those judgments as referred to in paragraph No. 12 of the memo of this appeal. After having gone through those we find that they do not compel us to take different view of the case from the one adverted to by the learned Single Judge. We cannot loose sight of the fact that keeping in view the age of the respondent, nature of injuries sustained, costs of hospitalisation, medicines, expenses of going to and fro for follow upon etc.; as also chances of the respondent getting a better bride due to his permanent disability on account of shortening of leg besides enjoying the marital bliss having been reduced, by no stretch of imagination the compensation awarded can be termed to be either unjust and or excessive. 16. No other point is urged. As a result of aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs.