R. GURURAJAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is filed by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation aggrieved by the order of the Karnataka State Transport Appellate tribunal in Revision Petition No. 1353 of 1999, dated 19-11-1999. ( 2 ) FACTS: The petitioner sought for a permit on the route Sullia -Mandikolu before Regional Transport Authority, Mangalore. Regional transport Authority granted a permit vide Resolution dated 23-8-1999 in Sub. No. 2/99/2000. The second respondent, aggrieved by the said resolution filed a writ petition in W. P. No. 32153 of 1999 which was rejected on the ground of an alternative remedy. Further, second respondent filed a revision under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('the Act' for short) before the third respondent. His main ground of attack was that his application for grant of a permit was still pending and hence, without considering his application, the Regional Transport authority could not have granted the permit in favour of the corporation. ( 3 ) THE Tribunal, after notice, heard the matter and after hearing, the tribunal was of the view that the impugned resolution before the tribunal is unsustainable for the simple reason that the Regional Transport authority ought to have considered both the applications of the petitioner as well as respondent 2. In short, he found fault with the Regional transport Authority for not clubbing these two applications for consideration. In that view of the matter, he remanded the matter to respondent 1 to reconsider the application of the petitioner and respondent 2 together as expeditiously as possible. ( 4 ) THE petitioner's learned Counsel Sri Ramesh, while reiterating the facts and grounds raised in the petition, contended before this Court that the Tribunal is wrong in passing the impugned judgment. According to him, in view of the liberalised policy of the State which has been approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Mithilesh Garg v union of India and Others, the Tribunal is wrong in allowing the revision. He further contended that the earlier two judgments cannot be of any assistance in view of change in law. He wanted this Court to set aside the impugned order. He further contended that the earlier two judgments cannot be of any assistance in view of change in law. He wanted this Court to set aside the impugned order. ( 5 ) PER contra, Sri C. V. Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents strenuously and strongly argued before this court that the earlier two judgments in Karnataka State Road Transport corporation, Bangalore and Another v Karnataka State Transport authority and Another and Sheik Dawood Sahib v Regional Transport authority, Kolar and Another, categorically provides for clubbing and therefore the Tribunal is fully justified in its order. He also contended that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not in any way alter the situation. ( 6 ) IN reply, Mr. Ramesh, learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that those judgments were rendered on the basis of the law prevailing then which has been subsequently altered to a large extent in 1988 Act. The 1988 Act has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme court and in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the tribunal ought to have rejected the permit granted in his favour. He further relied on a judgment of this Court in the case of Suresh Rai v Regional transport Authority and Others, in support of his submission. ( 7 ) AFTER careful consideration of the submission made at the Bar, it is my duty to find out as to whether the impugned order suffers from any infirmity. Admittedly, the permit granted in favour of the Corporation is in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no dispute on this issue. The only argument which found favour with the tribunal is that the application filed by the respondent is not considered and without considering the said application, the Corporation could not have granted the permission to the Corporation. That is to say, that without clubbing both the applications, no orders could have been passed by the Regional Transport Authority according to Tribunal. ( 8 ) IN this connection it is pertinent to refer to the judgment of a division Bench of this Court in Karnataka State Road Transport corporation's case, supra. The facts in that case would show that on the date the petition was taken up by the STA, there were other applications pending for additional trips and that the existing permits for the same route. The facts in that case would show that on the date the petition was taken up by the STA, there were other applications pending for additional trips and that the existing permits for the same route. Those applications were pending and ripe for consideration when the STA took up the petitioner's application and respondent 2's application. The STA should have clubbed all these applications and considered them together. Admittedly the same was not done by the STA. The non-clubbing found favour in the judgment of the Division Bench. For the said purpose, the Division Bench has considered the scope of Section 63 (1) and 63 (3-A) of the Act as it stood then. With regard to the non-consideration of pending application , the Court was of the view that there are chances of refusal of other applications. The question of need was a primary consideration prior to the amendment. The other grounds were as it stood before amendment. It was in these circumstances this Court ruled that all applications are to be considered together. In short, the clubbing was insisted upon by this Court. In the second case namely in sheik Dawood Sahib, supra, a learned Single Judge of this Court fol- lowed the Division Bench and ruled that clubbing will definitely affect the interests of those others and therefore the clubbing was accepted following the Division Bench judgment. After these two judgments have been rendered in 1984-85, the Act is substantially amended. In mithilesh Garg's case, supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has at paras 5 and 6 ruled as under. "a comparative reading of the provisions of the Act and the old act makes it clear that the procedure for grant of permits under the Act has been liberalised to such an extent that an intended operator can get a permit for asking irrespective of the number of operators already in the field. Under Section 57 read with Section 47 (1) of the old Act an application for a stage carriage permit was to be published and kept for inspection in the office of the Regional transport Authority so that the existing operators could file representations/objections against the said application. The application, along with objections, was required to be decided in a quasi-judicial manner. The application, along with objections, was required to be decided in a quasi-judicial manner. Section 47 (3) of the old Act further permitted the imposition of limit on the grant of permits in any region, area or on a particular route. It is thus obvious that the main features of Chapter IV "control of transport vehicles" under old Act were as under: 1. The applications for grant of permits were published and were made available in the office of the Regional Transport Authority so that the existing operators could file representations. 2. The applications for grant of permits along with the representations were to be decided in quasi-judicial manner; and 3. The Regional Transport Authority was to decide the applications for grant of permits keeping in view the criteria laid down in Section 47 (1) and also keeping in view the limit fixed under Section 47 (3) of the Act. An application for grant of permit beyond the limited number fixed under Section 47 (3) was to be rejected summarily. The Parliament in its wisdom has completely effaced the above features. The scheme envisaged under Sections 47 and 57 of the old Act has been completely done away with by the Act. The right of existing operators to file objections and the provision to impose limit on the number of permits have been taken away. There is no similar provision to that of Section 47 and Section 57 under the act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act shows that the purpose of bringing in the Act was to liberalise the grant of permits. Section 71 (1) of the Act provides that while considering an application for a stage carriage permit, the Regional Transport authority shall have regard to the objects of the Act. Section 80 (2), which is the harbinger of Liberalisation, provides that a Regional transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under the Act. There is no provision under the Act like that of Section 47 (3) of the old Act and as such no limit for the grant of permits can be fixed under the Act". I n t he very same judgment again at para 10 at page 450 the Hon'ble supreme Court has ruled. There is no provision under the Act like that of Section 47 (3) of the old Act and as such no limit for the grant of permits can be fixed under the Act". I n t he very same judgment again at para 10 at page 450 the Hon'ble supreme Court has ruled. "the said restricts have been taken away and the provisions of sections 47 (3) and 57 of the old Act have been repealed from the statute Book. The Act provides liberal policy for the grant of permits to those who intend to enter the motor transport business". ( 9 ) THIS Court in Suresh Rai's case, supra, has ruled as under. "the Supreme Court has observed that even in case of grant of permanent permit under the new Act, the authorities must be liberal in approach and as such the contentions raised by the petitioner that being an aggrieved party in respect of the temporary permit granted in favour of the 3rd respondent cannot be countenanced". ( 10 ) IN the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in mithilesh Garg's case, supra, there is and sea-change in granting permits under the new Act. The earlier restriction of 'need' etc. , has been completely given a go-by by the new Act. Therefore, the principle as it stood pletely to amendment is of no use in view of subsequent legislation. The two decisions of this Court are rendered in the light of the repealed legislation Those cases are clearly distinguishable on facts in view of the new Act and in view of the declaration of law by the Hontble Supreme court in Mithilesh Garg's case, supra. Therefore, the earlier principle of clubbing for the purpose of grant of permits cannot be made applicable to the case on hand. In the light of the judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Mithilesh Garg's case, supra, with regard to substantial difference between Sections 47 and 57 of the Act, I am of the view that the Tribunal is wrong in allowing the petition on the ground of non-clubbing only. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order Annexure-B is set aside. The order of Regional Transport Authority is restored. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order Annexure-B is set aside. The order of Regional Transport Authority is restored. It is further observed that the Regional Transport Authority may consider the application of the contesting respondents on its merits and pass appropriate orders. Parties to bear their respective costs. --- *** --- .