Judgment J.C. Gupta, J. (1) This is a review petition on behalf of the tenant. (2) Tenant Inayat Elahi filed writ Petition No. 32389 of 1999 before this Court challenging the orders of the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority dated 8.9.1997 and 25.5.1999 respectively, whereby eviction of petitioner was ordered from the shop in question. After hearing parties counsel the said writ petition was dismissed in limine by the Court by the order dated 4.8.1999 and petitioner was al lowed six months period to vacate the premises on certain conditions. It further appears that instead of complying with the undertaking given before this Court, the petitioner filed Special Leave Petition No. 17376 of 1999 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The said Special Leave Petition was decided by the Apex Court by the order dated 3.1.2000. The said order is reproduced below:- "We have seen the affidavit filed by Shri Kabirul Haq, son-in-law of the petitioner who has said that the counsel for the petitioners pressed the points before the High Court and urged that the matter may be remanded to the Additional District Judge's Court, but the High Court decided the case without adverting to these submissions. If that is so, the petitioner is required to be relegated to the proceedings by way of review before the High Court. The petitioner is permitted to withdraw this petition to enable him to file appropriate review proceedings. As the learned counsel has submitted before us that 'he stay granted by the High Court is expiring on 4.2.2000, further six weeks time is granted to enable the petitioner to get appropriate orders from the High Court. We do not express any opinion on the merits of the proposed review proceedings. In the meantime, status quo regarding possession shall be maintained. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed as withdrawn." Consequently the petitioner has filed this review petition. It further appears that as review petition could not come up for hearing and the petitioner was apprehending eviction on the basis of release order, he filed a fresh writ petition No. 21343 of 2000 before this Court and the same has also been connected with the review petition. (3) I have heard Sri S.A. Ansari learned counsel for petitioner and Sri Ramendra Asthana learned counsel for the respondents. (4) Sri Ansari pressed the review petition mainly on four following grounds – 1. (3) I have heard Sri S.A. Ansari learned counsel for petitioner and Sri Ramendra Asthana learned counsel for the respondents. (4) Sri Ansari pressed the review petition mainly on four following grounds – 1. That the petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing before the Prescribed Authority which has greatly prejudiced the petitioner. 2. That the lower Appellate Authority was biased in as much as despite the fact that a transfer application had been moved against the learned Appellate Judge,, the Appellate Authority proceeded to pronounce the judgment. 3. That the finding on the question of bona fide need is perverse. 4. That the finding on the question of comparison of hardship is vitiated in law as the same is based only on the ground that the tenant has available with him two other alternative accommodations, therefore, he was not likely to suffer any hardship, without at all adverting to the question whether those accommodations were suitable for commercial purpose. Sri Ramendra Asthana on the other hand argued that none of the grounds aforesaid could be a valid ground to review the order passed by this Court dismissing the writ petition in limine. It was further argued that the tenant-petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence before the Prescribed Authority and when he failed to produce the same, the Prescribed Authority had no option but to proceed with the case. It was also argued that in case the petitioner was really deprived of his right to adduce evidence, he could have produced the same before the Appellate Authority but that was also not done. Sri Ramendra Asthana further submitted that as far as second ground is concerned, the Appellate Authority had also given sufficient time to the appellant to make his submissions but on several dates adjournments were sought and hearing was got adjourned on one pretext or the other. Transfer application was moved after the arguments had been heard and case was under judgment. No stay was granted by the Court before which transfer application was moved and therefore, the Appellate Authority was fully justified in pronouncing the judgment. Transfer application was moved after the arguments had been heard and case was under judgment. No stay was granted by the Court before which transfer application was moved and therefore, the Appellate Authority was fully justified in pronouncing the judgment. Regarding the finding of bonafide need the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that both the courts below have given a concurrent finding on this question which is based on appraisal of evidence and therefore, it is not open for this Court to disturb the said finding of fact without there being any sufficient ground. With regard to the finding on the question of hardship the submission of Sri Asthana is that it has been categorically found by Appellate Authority that the tenant has available with him two accommodations, one of which is a shop and therefore, it has rightly been held that the tenant will not suffer hardship in case he is evicted from the shop in question. (5) After going through the record, this Court finds no weight in the first three submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Perusal of record leaves no room of doubt that the tenant-petitioner adopted all dilatory tactics in prolonging the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority. He was given sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence which he did not avail, hi any view of the matter if he could not adduce evidence before the Prescribed Authority, he should have made an attempt to avail that opportunity before the Appellate Authority. There fore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has been prejudiced on account of denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing. (6) As far as ground No. 2 is concerned again this Court finds no weight therein. It would appear that even before Appellate Authority all sort of dilatory tactics was adopted by the tenant petitioner and when no alternative was left with the Court below the appeal was heard and 25.5.1999 was fixed for delivery of judgment. It would further appear that on 21.5.1999 an application was moved on behalf of the petitioner before the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar for transfer of appeal to some other Court. The learned District Judge did not grant any interim order and fixed 2.7.1999 for disposal of transfer application. It would further appear that on 21.5.1999 an application was moved on behalf of the petitioner before the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar for transfer of appeal to some other Court. The learned District Judge did not grant any interim order and fixed 2.7.1999 for disposal of transfer application. The allegation of the petitioner is that he moved an application before the Appellate Authority on 25.5.1999 stating that the petitioner has moved a transfer application before the District Judge in which 2.7.1999 has been fixed. According to him, this application was moved before the judgment was pronounced by the Appellate Authority. This allegation has been specifically denied by contesting respondent in the short counter-affidavit filed before this Court. This allegation of the petitioner apparently seems to be wholly incorrect on the face of the record. When the aforesaid application on behalf of the petitioner was moved on 25.5.1999 before the Appellate Authority, the following order was passed thereon order – Heard. Since the judgment has been pronounced, application has become infructuous. File. Had the application been moved before delivery of judgment, it is inconceivable that the Appellate Authority would have passed the aforesaid order even before judgment was delivered. It is pertinent to note here that no application for transfer against the Appellate Authority had been moved earlier and the same was moved only when the case was under judgment. It, therefore, cannot be said that the Appellate Authority was in any way biased. The tenant-petitioner had been given sufficient opportunity of hearing by the Appellate Authority. So far as finding on the bona fide need is concerned, the release of the shop in question was claimed on the ground that the landlord himself was a tenant of another shop in premises No. 42/134, Bisati Bazar, Meston Road, Kanpur Nagar and eviction proceedings were initiated against him and the landlord had to vacate the said shop. The shop in question was thus required by him for himself and his unemployed son Firoz Jamal. On the basis of material on record both the Courts below have recorded concurrent finding against the petitioner that the need of the landlord is bona fide. It could not be pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the said finding is defective or perverse. On the basis of material on record both the Courts below have recorded concurrent finding against the petitioner that the need of the landlord is bona fide. It could not be pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the said finding is defective or perverse. (7) Now coming on the last limb of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the finding on the question of comparison of hardship is vitiated in law, this Court finds substance. (8) A perusal of the order of Appellate Authority would indicate that while answering the question of comparative hardship, the lower appellate Court concluded that since the petitioner-tenant has with him two accommodations, premises No. 39/70-B and 39/69 at Majeed Ahmad Road, Kanpur the balance of hardship tilts in his favour. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited the attention of the Court to Clause (b) of Rule 16 (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Rules, 1972 which runs as under:- "Where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application." Mr. Ansari learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that before the claim of the tenant is rejected by applying the aforesaid clause (b), it is necessary for the landlord to satisfy the Court that the tenant not only has available with him suitable accommodation but also that he can shift his business therein without any substantial loss. (9) In the Case of Remington Rand of India Limited, Meerut vs. Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge and another, 1998 (2) A.W.C. 1580 ; 1998 (2) JCLR 500 (All), it was observed as follows:- "In the present case, the finding of the lower appellate Court recorded on the question of comparative hardship also suffers from manifest error of law inasmuch as the lower appellate Court has not considered the question as to whether the shifting of business of the tenant petitioner in any of the alleged newly constructed shops would be without any substantial loss. In this connection, a reference may be had to Section 16(2)(b) which says that where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss, there shall be greater justification for allowing the application. In this connection, a reference may be had to Section 16(2)(b) which says that where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss, there shall be greater justification for allowing the application. Therefore, for applying this rule, it is not only necessary that the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation but also that he can shift his business in that alternative accommodation without substantial loss. It would thus follow that even where there may be some other shops in which the tenant could shift his business but if the shifting of business causes substantial loss to the tenant, no benefit can be availed of by the landlord on the basis of this sub-rule." (10) In the instant case the lower appellate authority without weighing the hardships of the parties has answered the question regarding comparative hardship in favour of the landlord by observing that the tenant-petitioner has available with him two accommodations, therefore, he was not likely to suffer any hardship. While weighing hardship of the parties the Courts are bound to take several factors into consideration. It is true that the mere fact that the tenant is likely to suffer a loss in his business on account of his eviction from tenanted accommodation by itself will not be sufficient to discard the need of the landlord which is otherwise found to be bona fide and genuine. It is also well established that mere length of occupation of tenanted premises by a tenant cannot be the sole ground for rejection of landlord's claim of personal requirement. Goodwill earned by the tenant is also to be taken into consideration. It appears that in the instant case the lower appellate authority decided the issue of comparative hardship only on the basis of Rule 16(2)(b). While answering the said question the lower appellate authority has merely found that the tenant has available with him two alternative accommodations, without at all adverting to the other requirement, that the said accommodations are suitable to the tenant to shift his existing business there without suffering any substantial loss. As per the landlord's case both the aforesaid premises are commercial buildings wherein the tenant-petitioner could shift his business without suffering any substantial loss. As per the landlord's case both the aforesaid premises are commercial buildings wherein the tenant-petitioner could shift his business without suffering any substantial loss. However the tenant-petitioner's case before the Court below was that both the premises are in the shape of godowns and none of them is a shop and they are not business places. In view of this defence of the tenant-petitioner, it was incumbent upon the lower appellate authority to have examined the rival contention of the par ties regarding the nature of the aforesaid two accommodations and record a positive finding whether those alternative accommodations are suitable for business and further whether tenant-petitioner could shift his existing business in those premises without any substantial loss. Since this aspect of the matter has not been examined and answered by the lower appellate authority nor the hardships of the parties have been compared on the basis of other relevant factors, the finding recorded by the lower appellate authority on the question of comparison of hardship of the parties is vitiated in law and cannot be sustained. Since the aforesaid mistake is apparent on the face of record, this Court has ample power and jurisdiction to correct the said error. (11) For the reasons stated above, this review petition is allowed. The order of this Court dated 4.8.1999 dismissing the writ petition in limine is ignored and the order of the appellate authority dated 25.5.1999 is set aside and case is sent back to the appellate authority to decide the same again and record a clear cut finding on the question of comparative hardship without touching or disturbing the concurrent finding recorded on the question of bona fide need as the same has been up-held by this Court. It is further made clear that as the matter has become quite old, the appellate authority shall decide the remaining controversy as ordered in this judgment, expeditiously, preferably within a period of two months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before it. It is further made clear that the parties shall be at liberty to adduce their evidence only so far as issue of comparison of hardship is concerned. (12) In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Office is directed to furnish certified copies of this order to counsel for respective parties, within five days on payment of usual charges. (12) In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Office is directed to furnish certified copies of this order to counsel for respective parties, within five days on payment of usual charges. Parties are also directed to appear before the Court concerned on 14.12.2000. Petition allowed.