( 1 ) LEAVE granted. ( 2 ) APPELLANT in this case is a tenant against whom the respondent-landlord has moved a suit for eviction principally on the ground that landlord required the tenanted premises for his own use bona fide. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the claim of the landlord is not bona fide. But the Appellate Court allowed and decreed the suit. In a Second Appeal filed by the tenant learned Single Judge of the high Court after upholding the finding regarding the bona fide need of the landlord went into the question of comparative hardship. While dealing with that aspect learned Single Judge has observed thus: "hence from the material on the record. it cannot be inferred that the respondent-landlord has any other alternative accommodation available to him to occupy as on the date of filing of the eviction suit nor he has any other alternative accommodation available to him as of today and hence, comparative hardship of the respondent/landlord to occupy the suit premises is much greater than the appellant-tenant who is running the business as a milk vendor and for purposes of storing and selling the milk in the aforesaid premises and with regard to his comparative hardship the learned Counsel for the appellant has not been successfully able to assail the findings of the Appellate Court in this regard. " ( 3 ) MS. Indu Malhotra, learned Counsel for the appellant assailed the judgment of the high Court principally on the ground that learned Single Judge had committed an obvious mistake by referring to the facts of another case which he happened to hear earlier. In support of the said contention learned Counsel produced the judgment rendered by the same learned single Judge in Mitu Lal v. Kundan Lal in Second Appeal 340/96 (the judgment dated 8. 9. 97 ). We are extracting the following passage from the aforesaid judgment: "hence, from the material on the record, it cannot be inferred that the respondent-landlord has any other alternative accommodation available to him to occupy as on the date of filing of the eviction suit nor he has any other alternative accommodation available to him as that of today at Beawar. We are extracting the following passage from the aforesaid judgment: "hence, from the material on the record, it cannot be inferred that the respondent-landlord has any other alternative accommodation available to him to occupy as on the date of filing of the eviction suit nor he has any other alternative accommodation available to him as that of today at Beawar. Hence, on the question of comparative hardship of the parties, i am of the view that the comparative hardship of the respondent-landlord is much greater as compared to that of the appellant who is running the business as a milk vendor and for purposes of storing and selling the milk in the aforesaid premises and with regard to his comparative hardship, the learned Counsel for the appellant has not been successfully able to assail the findings of the Appellate Court in this regard. " ( 4 ) WHEN this was highlighted, Mr. S. S. Khanduja was not in a position to dispute regarding the mistake unwittingly committed by the learned Single Judge. But this mistake demonstrates that there was no judicial adjudication of the Second Appeal filed by the appellant in the High Court and that mistake has ultimately vitiated the impugned judgment. ( 5 ) WE, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and remit the Second Appeal to the High Court for disposal of the matter afresh in accordance with law. It is open to any of the parties to move for early hearing of the Second Appeal in the High Court. ( 6 ) APPEAL is disposed of accordingly.