Sahib Singh dead (By his Legal heirs) v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana
2000-12-06
JAWAHAR LAL GUPTA, K.S.GAREWAL
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. (Oral) - The petitioners and their predecessors-in- interest having failed before all the revenue authorities and their claim for partition having been rejected, they have approached this Court through the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. A few facts as relevant for the decision of this case may be briefly noticed. 2. On June 1, 1990, Ram Singh - the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Nos. 1 to 5 and Ajaib Singh - the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner No. 6 filed an application for partition of land measuring 73 bighas before the Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Ambala. After detailed examination of the matter, the Assistant Collector found that the parties had carried out a private partition. It was reduced into writing on November 5, 1950. A copy of the order dated March 4, 1993 passed by the Assistant Collector has been produced as Annexure P.1. On the basis of this private partition, the consolidation authorities had allotted separate shares of land to the parties. In pursuance to the private partition and the consolidation proceedings, each of the parties had got possession separately. On these premises, it was held that the petition for partition was not maintainable. 3. Aggrieved by the order, Ram Singh and Ajaib Singh filed an appeal. It was dismissed by the Collector vide orders dated February 24, 1994. A copy of this order has been produced as Annexure P.3. The petitioners filed a revision petition before the Commissioner which was dismissed vide order dated August 24, 1994. A copy of this order has been produced as Annexure P.5. Undaunted, the petitioners filed a second revision petition before the Financial Commissioner. This too met with the same fate. A copy of the order dated January 6, 1997 passed by the Financial Commissioner has been produced as Annexure P.7. Hence this petition. The petitioners pray that the orders, copies of which have been produced as Annexures P.1, P.3, P.5 and P.7, be quashed. 4. In response to the notice of motion, the respondent Nos. 5 to 13 have filed a written statement controverting the claim made by the petitioners. 5. Counsel for the parties have been heard. 6. Mr. M.S. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners has made a two-fold submission. Firstly, it is contended that the revenue authorities have erred in rejecting the prayer for partition.
5 to 13 have filed a written statement controverting the claim made by the petitioners. 5. Counsel for the parties have been heard. 6. Mr. M.S. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners has made a two-fold submission. Firstly, it is contended that the revenue authorities have erred in rejecting the prayer for partition. Learned counsel has placed reliance on various decisions in support of the submission. Secondly, it has been contended that the finding recorded by the authorities that a private partition had taken place and that the consolidation authorities had allotted separate fields to the co-sharers is wrong in as much as a part of the land viz. 37 bighas had been actually purchased on May 27, 1953. Thus, neither the co-sharers nor the consolidation authorities could have partitioned this land in the year 1950. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted by Mr. H.S. Gill, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 5 to 13. 7. A perusal of the orders passed by the authorities shows that all the co- sharers had agreed to a private partition. This private partition was reduced into writing on November 5, 1950. The consolidation authorities had recorded this fact and on the basis thereof allotted separate fields to all the co- sharers. Thus, each of the parties was in possession of the land allotted to him/her during the consolidation proceedings. This being the situation, any one who wanted land different from the one allotted during consolidation had to initiate proceedings for possession by establishing clear title. 8. Mr Jain submits that the consolidation authorities could not have partitioned the land which was actually purchased by the parties on May 27, 1953. 9. At first flush, the contention appears to be undoubtedly very attractive. However, a slight probe shows the untenability of the submission. It is the admitted position that the land in question had been actually mortgaged with the parties in the year 1945. In 1950, this land which was under mortgage was also included in the holdings as a part of the consolidation proceedings. While allotting land, the share of each individual in respect of the mortgaged land had been taken into account. Land had been actually allotted on that basis. Ultimately, the land which was under mortgage was purchased by the parties in the year 1953. Resultantly, the position had remained unchanged. 10. Mr.
While allotting land, the share of each individual in respect of the mortgaged land had been taken into account. Land had been actually allotted on that basis. Ultimately, the land which was under mortgage was purchased by the parties in the year 1953. Resultantly, the position had remained unchanged. 10. Mr. Jain has placed reliance on the Division Bench decisions reported in Col. Prithipal Singh v. The Financial Commissioner (Appeals) Punjab, Chandigarh and another, 1992 PLJ 364, Pritam Singh v. Jaskaur Singh, 1992 PLJ 435 and Fauja Singh v. Pritam Singh and another, 1993 PLJ 398. It has been held that private partition should be reflected in revenue record. Merely raising of the question of title cannot operate as a bar to partition proceedings and that a private partition is not effective in the absence of an instrument of partition. There is no quarrel with the proposition enunciated in these decisions. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is clear that parties had not only partitioned the property but the private partition had been actually acted upon. The consolidation authorities had taken the private partition into consideration and allotted land accordingly. This had happened in the year 1950. The petitioners had sought to raise the dispute after a long lapse of 40 years. It was only an attempt to unsettle the settled position. The revenue authorities have rightly stifled the effort. No other point has been raised. In view of the above, we find no merit in this writ petition. It is, consequently, dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.