JUDGMENT 1. :- Phalkoo alias Phalaksher r/o Suratgarh (presently lodged in Central Jail, Sriganganagar) through his brother Ali Sher, has preferred this petition seeking writ of habeas corpus against the orders (1) dated 24.5.2000 (Ann.4) of the State Government and (2) dated 21.4.2000 (Ann.1) of the District Magistrate Sriganganagar, whereby Phalkoo has been ordered to be detained under sub-sections (2) & (3) to Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (for brevity 'the Act') for a period of one year from 21.4.2000 to 20.4.2001. 2. It is the case of the detenu that on 21.4.2000 he was called by SHO P.S. Suratgarh and was then communicated that he has been ordered to be detained by the District Magistrate Sriganganagar under order dated 21.4.2000 (Ann.1) under Section 3(2) of the Act and accordingly he was furnished with memorandum of grounds (Ann.2) alongwith documents annexed thereto after having obtained his thumb impression by the authorities. It is also his case that the Deputy Secretary Home (Security) Government of Rajasthan (respondent No.2) communicated by order dated 29.4.2000 (Ann.4) as to approval of the State Government in respect of order of his detention passed by the District Magistrate on April 21, 2000. 3. The petitioner also submitted that he was brought to Jaipur and produced before the Advisory Board under the Act on 15.5.2000 and whereafter on or about 24.5.2000 the respondent No.2 communicated the impugned order (Ann.4) detaining him for one year, as indicated above. Hence this habeas corpus petition. 4. The respondents besides having filed parawise reply to the petition have also filed two affidavits of Mr. K.N. Gupta who had issued impugned order of detention, while functioning as District Magistrate, and another affidavit of Shri Anand Kumar during whose functioning as Deputy Secretary Home, the State Government approved detention of the petitioner. With aforesaid affidavits, notifications (Ann.AA.1 to AA.4) dated 6.12.99, 7.3.2000, 9.6.2000 & 7.9.2000 issued by the State Government directing the District Magistrates of all districts of Rajasthan State to exercise powers under Section 3(2) of the Act, have also been produced before this Court. 5. With aforesaid affidavits, notifications (Ann.AA.1 to AA.4) dated 6.12.99, 7.3.2000, 9.6.2000 & 7.9.2000 issued by the State Government directing the District Magistrates of all districts of Rajasthan State to exercise powers under Section 3(2) of the Act, have also been produced before this Court. 5. Shri Ravi Yadav learned counsel for the detenu contended that the incidents alleged in the grounds assigned for the detention under the impugned order have been formulated with oblique motive, because those incidents relate to the remote past and in most of which the detenu has been acquitted by the competent courts, inasmuch as those incidents are not of such nature so as to affect public order but they are of personal nature and that being so in no case can disturb public order, but all these aspects have been ignored by the respondents, rather public documents such as judgments referred to in the impugned grounds have not been procured, which shows hastiness on part of the respondents to issue detention order, hence the impugned order of detention of the petitioner suffers from non-application of mind. The learned counsel for the detenu has also drawn our attention to the facts stated in memo of writ petition by him in respect of his specific reply to the grounds of the impugned detention so as to show that particulars in the grounds have no bearing on the necessity for the impugned detention, and therefore, it has been contended that all the grounds of impugned detention suffer from lack of relevant material because the detenu had not been furnished with statements recorded under section 161 Criminal Procedure Code in criminal cases referred to in the detention order by the detaining authority, besides other particulars. 6. Shri Yadav learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decisions not only of the Apex Court but also of different High Courts including this Court viz. State of UP Vs. Kamal Kishore Saini ( 1988(1) SCC 287 ) , Mangu Singh v. Union of India ( 1998(1) RLR 239 =1998(2) WLC (Rajasthan) 460) , Madan Gopal alias Madan Bhaiya v. Union of India ( 1993(1) Crimes 483 ) , Ashok Kumar Singh v. Supdt. Central Jail Varanasi (1986 Cr.L.J. 1751) , Sucha Singh v. H.L. Tandan (1984(2) Crimes 311), Vikram Pratap Singh v. State of UP ( 1986 CrLJ 954 ) , Rakshpal Singh v. Jail Supdt. Central Jail Varanasi (1986 Cr.L.J. 1751) , Sucha Singh v. H.L. Tandan (1984(2) Crimes 311), Vikram Pratap Singh v. State of UP ( 1986 CrLJ 954 ) , Rakshpal Singh v. Jail Supdt. Rampura (1985(1) Crimes 175) , Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta (1995 SCC (Cr) 454) , Ajay Dixit v. State of UP AIR 1985 Supreme Court 18 , Tillu Mal v. State of Rajasthan (1987 CrLR (Raj) 739) , Nathulal Vs. State of Rajasthan ( 1988(1) RLR 858 =1988 RCrC 348) , Gajendra Singh Vs. District Magistrate Gorakhpur ( 1986 CrLJ 1576 ) , Ramkripal Singh Vs. State of UP (1986 Cr.LJ 1437) , P. Mukherjee v. State of WB AIR 1976 Supreme Court 852 , Moinuddin v. District Magistrate Beed (1987 CrLR (SC) 560) , Abhey Shridhar v. S.V. Bhave (1991(1) Crimes 290 ), S.N. Khatika Vs. State of Rajasthan (1993 RCrC 636) , Bhupendra Joshi v. State of M.P. ( 1988 CrLJ 1603 ) , Raheem Khan v. State of Rajasthan (1997(2) RLR 550=1998(1) WLC (Raj) 16) . 7. The learned counsel for the detenu also contended that the detenu has not been informed as to whether his case has been sent for consideration to the Central Government, thereby it has resulted in infringement of his legal rights, besides being violative of mandatory provisions of the Act. 8. Shri Mohd Rafiq learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents (State functionaries) contended that the grounds of the detention are elaborately stated after having found sufficient material and those were carefully taken into consideration on the basis of particulars bearing on the necessity as to the detention and both the District Magistrate as well as State Government had a subjective satisfaction before issuing detention order against the detenu petitioner and that apart, cumulative as well as total effect of all the grounds of detention is such so as to affect public order, and hence cannot be construed as law & order problem. Shri Rafiq cited various decisions viz. Amarchand v. KL Verma AIR 1989 Supreme Court 497 , Phulwari J Pathak v. RH Mendonca (2000(3) Crimes 112) , Meer Khan v. State of Rajasthan (1993(2) RLR 281) , Amanulla v. State of Gujrat ( 1999(5) SCC 613 ) , Tejaram Vs. Shri Rafiq cited various decisions viz. Amarchand v. KL Verma AIR 1989 Supreme Court 497 , Phulwari J Pathak v. RH Mendonca (2000(3) Crimes 112) , Meer Khan v. State of Rajasthan (1993(2) RLR 281) , Amanulla v. State of Gujrat ( 1999(5) SCC 613 ) , Tejaram Vs. State of Rajasthan ( 2000(1) RLR 291 ) , Vijay R. Yadav v. Commissioner of Police (1993(2) Crimes 357) , Hussain Khalaj v. Union of India (1994(3) Crimes 197) , Abhay Shridhar v. SV Shave AIR 1991 Supreme Court 397 , Madan Anand v. Union of India (1990(1) Crimes 251) , State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi AIR 1984 Supreme Court 444 , Nabani v. State of WB AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1706 , and Gulab S. Yadav v. State of UP (1993(2) Crimes 715) . 9. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and the facts of incidents on the basis of which grounds of impugned detention are formulated in the detention order against the detenu. It is an admitted position that about 15 criminal cases were registered and after usual investigation, charge sheets were produced before the criminal courts against the detenu for various offences punishable under different sections of the Indian Penal Code including sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 324, 325, 327/34, 332, 336, 341, 352, 363, 366(a), 376, 382, 395, 399, 427, 440, 447, 452, 504. Though criminal cases referred to in ground Nos. 1, 2 & 3 relate to the incidents having taken place on 9.6.87, 4.12.88 & 21.7.90 but in these criminal cases, the detenu had been convicted by trial courts on 29.3.95, 11.12.92, and 22.4.94 respectively. Rest of criminal cases referred to in ground Nos. 4 to 15 relate to the incidents which took place on 14.5.97, 6.8.97, 19.3.98, 19.3.98, 24.7.98, 7.4.99, 23.4.99, 13.5.99 & 13.10.99 and in these cases, trials are pending against the detenu in different criminal courts. Admittedly, in another five different cases, for the incidents having taken place on 24.11.99, 21.8.99, 8.12.99 etc., proceedings under Sections 107, 116(3), 151 and 110 Criminal Procedure Code were initiated against the detenu who had also been held responsible not only under Criminal Procedure Code but also under the Rajasthan Gunda Control Act, 1975 by the Executive Magistrate. 10. Admittedly, in another five different cases, for the incidents having taken place on 24.11.99, 21.8.99, 8.12.99 etc., proceedings under Sections 107, 116(3), 151 and 110 Criminal Procedure Code were initiated against the detenu who had also been held responsible not only under Criminal Procedure Code but also under the Rajasthan Gunda Control Act, 1975 by the Executive Magistrate. 10. It is pertinent to mention that in criminal case referred to in ground No.11 charge sheet was filed on 31.7.99 for offences under Sections 363, 366A and 376, Indian Penal Code. In FIRs (1) No. 34 dated 20.1.2000 ids 452, 352, 304, Indian Penal Code, (2) No. 52 dated 12.2.2000 under section 341, 307, 332, 353, 395, 336, 147, 148, 149 Indian Penal Code, and (3) No. 53 dated 12.2.2000 under section 452, 147, 148, 149, 504 Indian Penal Code, though co-accused persons have been arrested but the detenu was absconding with a view to evade arrest while the investigation was pending. 11. In State of U.P. Vs. Kamal Kishore Saini (supra), the learned counsel appearing for the State did not question before the Apex Court the validity & legality of the finding of the High Court in so far as it relates to the non-supply of relevant and vital materials viz. statements recorded under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code and non- placement of application made by co-accused before the judicial Magistrate. It was a case where names of the detenus were not mentioned in the FIR in respect of incident in ground No.1 and the basis of their complicity came to be known only in the material found during investigation, and the detenus were supplied only with the copy of the FIR & also extract of the charge sheet and not the statements under section 161 Criminal Procedure Code. In that case, the charge sheet was subsequently submitted in the court and the detenus were furnished with the copies of the statements under section 161 Criminal Procedure Code long after the passing of the detention order communicating the grounds of detention. In that case, the charge sheet was subsequently submitted in the court and the detenus were furnished with the copies of the statements under section 161 Criminal Procedure Code long after the passing of the detention order communicating the grounds of detention. In the case at hand, it is not the case of the detenu that in the FIRs on the basis of which criminal cases detailed out in the order of detention were registered, and after usual investigation charge sheets have been produced in the court after furnishing its complete set of documents accompanying the charge sheet, the detenu was not only named but also his complicity was disclosed in the commission of the offences mentioned therein. It is also not the case of the detenu that only extract of the charge sheet was furnished. Rather, from the material placed on record, it stands established that the detenu was furnished with complete charge sheet (not the extract) alongwith FIR in criminal cases under all grounds of detention, besides statements recorded under section 161 Criminal Procedure Code were furnished at the time of submitting charge sheet in the court to the detenu except in some of the criminal cases where investigation stood pending inasumuch as in FIRs of such cases pending investigation the detenu has been named and his complicity has been disclosed. Hence, we do not find any force in the contention of the detenu that it is a case of non-supply of statements recorded under section 161 Criminal Procedure Code in criminal cases thereby vitiating subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority so as to render the detention order illegal. Hence, the decision in State of UP Vs. Kamal Kishore Saini (supra) cited on behalf of the detenu does not help in advancing his case on the aspect of non-supply of vital document viz. statements under section 161 Criminal Procedure Code in the facts & circumstances of the case, in view of the settled law laid down in the decision of the Apex Court in Haridas v. K.L. Verma (supra) cited by the respondent State. statements under section 161 Criminal Procedure Code in the facts & circumstances of the case, in view of the settled law laid down in the decision of the Apex Court in Haridas v. K.L. Verma (supra) cited by the respondent State. In Haridas's case (supra), the Apex Court held that there is no dispute that all the documents which were considered by the detaining authority in reaching its subjective satisfaction and referred to in the grounds of detention have been furnished to the detenu and it is not necessary to furnish copies of all the documents which are not material and relevant for reaching the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority merely because they were mentioned in the panchnama and moreover, no application had been made before the detaining authority for giving the detenu the copies of relevant documents necessary for making an effective representation against the detention order. 12. It is trite law that the High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can only examine as to whether the detention order has been passed on the materials before it and if it is so found, then the Court cannot go further and examine whether the material was adequate or not as it is the function of the appellate authority. We lend support from the principles of law laid down by the apex court in State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam AIR 1981 Supreme Court 2005 followed in State of Gujarat v. Ismail Jumail Juma AIR 1982 Supreme Court 683 . Similarly, as laid down in Prakash Chand Mehta v. Commissioner, Govt. of Kerala 1986 CrLJ 786 ) by the Apex Court, the mere fact that some relevant material was not taken into consideration will not be sufficient, by itself, to invalidate the detention order automatically. Thus, it is settled law that the detention order will not become invalid merely because some material was not placed before the detaining authority for its consideration or that was not furnished to the detenu who is required to demand for it for making an effective representation, if any. The court has to consider the question whether the document or the material which was not placed before the detaining authority was relevant in the sense that its non-consideration will have the effect of vitiating the detention order. 13. The court has to consider the question whether the document or the material which was not placed before the detaining authority was relevant in the sense that its non-consideration will have the effect of vitiating the detention order. 13. In the case at hand, moreover, the satisfaction was not based on a single or stray incident. The assertions which are made in the detention order, have not been assailed by the detenu as untrue nor can they be said to be irrelevant for passing the detention order. In our considered view, for exercise of the power of the detaining authority it is not necessary to prove to the hilt that the detenu had committed any of the offences as stated in the Act and detailed out in the detention order. It is sufficient that from material available on record the detaining authority could reasonably feel satisfied as to the necessity for the detention of the detenu in order to prevent him from indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That being so, the Apex Court in Phulwari Jagdamba v. RH Mendonca (2000(3) Crimes 112 SC) held that in the absence of any provision specifying the type of material which may or may not be considered by the detaining authority and keeping in view the purpose with which the statute is intended to achieve, the power of the detaining authority should not be unduly restricted inasmuch as it is neither possible nor advisable to catalogue the types of materials which can form the basis of a detention order under the Act, and that will, therefore, depend on the facts & situation of each case. Hence, much emphasis is laid that the facts stated in the materials relied upon should be true and should have a reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the detention order is passed. 14. Hence, much emphasis is laid that the facts stated in the materials relied upon should be true and should have a reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the detention order is passed. 14. As regards the decisions cited on behalf of the detenu on the aspect of the stale and old grounds which have been based for the detention, in our considred view, no doubt it is settled law that the detention based on the stale and irrelevant grounds certainly deserves to be set aside entitling the detenu to be released and to that extent the order is subject to judicial review not on the ground of sufficiency of the grounds nor the truth of the grounds but only about the relevancy of the grounds which would come under judicial scrutiny. Thus, the detenu has to establish on record his detention being based on stale and irrelevant material. In Ajay Dixit v. State of UP (supra), the Apex Court held the detention of Ajay Dixit being based on stale and old ground because the respondents did not dispute the position of the detenu being acquitted on 2.2.1984 for offence of Section 307 Indian Penal Code having been committed on or about 10.4.1981 whereas the order of detention order was passed on 29.2.1984, and for certain criminal charges mentioned in grounds Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 the Apex Court held that there was no difficulty in arresting the detenu. Therefore, this decision does not help the present detenu in advancing his case because of the facts being distinguished. In Nathulal v. State of Rajasthan (supra) the detenu was involved in seven criminal cases including one wherein he was acquitted of offence under Section 307/326 Indian Penal Code and in others the bail was allowed to him inasmuch as he was not found guilty in any of the cases pending trial against him, hence this Court found his case having fallen within the definition of maintenance of law and order and not the public order. In Tillu v. Rajasthan State (supra), though the detention of the detenu relate to 22 incidents ' but out of which in many cases either the detenu was released or there was a compromise between the parties and nearly seven cases were pending trial in various courts, inasmuch as during earlier detention also, he was released on parole and most of criminal cases relate to offences punishable under sections 342, 323/341, 324/452, and 335/34 Indian Penal Code, having been committed by the detenu in 1985 and 1986 which according to this Court were not of serious nature as serious incidents were too remote and not proximate. In P. Mukherjee Vs. State of WB (supra), the Apex Court found some of grounds supplied to detenu valid and some invalid, so it held that it was not possible to gauge in such cases to what extent bad reasons operated on mind of detaining authority thereby it held the detention as ilelgal. This case relates to the preventive detention under the Preventive Detention Act 1950 for public safety and out of five, three of the grounds of detention did also contain to the incidents wherefor though he was detained but after some time the detenue was released, hence the Apex Court held as indicated above. Here also in the instant case, facts are not such, therefore, this decision (supra) does not help in any manner. In Mustakmiya Vs. M.M. Mehta (supra), the order relates to preventive detention under Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 according to which, the detaining authority was required to satisfy that the detenue was a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2(c) who habitually commits offences under Chapter XVI or XVII Indian Penal Code or Chapter V of the Arms Act. For one of the incidents alleged to have taken place on 24.4.1993 the detention order was passed on 19.8.1994 after a lapse of 16 months, the Apex Court held that this long lapse of time between the alleged prejudicial activity and the detention order loses its significant because the prejudicial conduct alleged was not approximate in point of time and had no rational connection. Other incidents since relate to the offences of Section 212/214 Indian Penal Code so also the beating of some person on suspicion that he was informing the police about criminal activities of the detenu, the Apex Court held that the incidents based for passing detention order would not provide a justification to hold that the detenu was habitually committing or attempting to commit or abetting the commission of offences as contemplated in Section 2(c) of the aforesaid Act of preventive detention because the expression 'habitually' postulates a thread of continuity in the commission of offence repeatedly and presistently. In these circumstances the Apex Court found no material leading to a reasonable conclusion that the detenu was habitually engaged in criminal activities and so a dangerous person. 15. As regards the aspect of the detenu having not been allegedly read over and explained the grounds of detention despite he being an illiterate person, the decision cited on behalf of the detenu in Raheem Khan v. State of Rajasthan (supra) does also not help the present detenu in advancing his case because in the cited decision (supra), it was the case on behalf of the detaining authority that since the detenu did not make request to read over and explain detention order the grounds of detention were not explained to him and in these circumstances this Court held that merely because the detenu did not make request to read over and explain the detention order, it does not absolve the detaining authority from its duty to read and explain detention order in language which detenu understood. In the case at hand, as is evident from a perusal of the detention order, itself, and the affidavit of the detaining authorities, the present detenu was read over and explained the grounds of detention and whereafter he put his thumb impression, inasmuch as the detenu has not at all been submitted his affidavit to the effect that he was not explained in language which he understood and therefore, the detention order impugned herein canot be quashed on this ground, as has been laid down by this Court in Meer Khan v. State of Rajasthan (supra) which has been relied upon by the detaining authority (respondent). 16. As regards the decisions cited on behalf of the detenu viz. Abhay Shridhar v. S.V. Bhave (supra) followed by this Court in Satyanarain Khatik Vs. 16. As regards the decisions cited on behalf of the detenu viz. Abhay Shridhar v. S.V. Bhave (supra) followed by this Court in Satyanarain Khatik Vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) on the aspect of delegation of powers to the District Magistrate, we are of the considered view that these decisions (supra) do also not render any help to the detenu in advancing his case because in the instant case as is evident from the notifications dated 6.12.99, 7.3.2000, 9.6.2000 and 7.9.2000 (Ann/AA/1 to AA4) filed with additional affidavit of the District Magistrate Sriganganagar on or about 17.9.2000, the State Government issuing authorisation in favour of the detaining authority has satisfied and mentioned in these notifications after having regard to the circumstances prevailing within the local limits of the jurisdiction of all the Distrcit Magistrates of the State of Rajasthan to exercise powers conferred and as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. In the cited decisions (supra), the State Government in the authorisation order had stated both the expressions, "prevailing" or "likely to prevail", therefore, the Apex Court as well as this Court held the authorisation of the District Magistrate not proper. Therefore, the facts in the cited decisions being distinguished are not applicable to the present case. 17. In the cited decisions (supra), the State Government in the authorisation order had stated both the expressions, "prevailing" or "likely to prevail", therefore, the Apex Court as well as this Court held the authorisation of the District Magistrate not proper. Therefore, the facts in the cited decisions being distinguished are not applicable to the present case. 17. As regards decisions cited on behalf of the detenu as to his assertion for having not filed counter affidavit by District Magistrate, we are of the view that the decisions in Munnatuin v. District Magistrate AIR 1982 Supreme Court 878 and Shaikh Hanif v. State of WB ( 1974 CrLJ 606 SC) do not also apply to the present case because herein the District Magistrate (detaining authority) so also the State Government both have also filed counter and reply to the habeas corpus petition besides affidavits stating inter alia that District Magistrate was authorised to exercise powers under section 3(2) of the Act and the State Government has been authorising District Magistrates of the State from time to time vide notifications (Ann AA1 to AA4) referred to above; that these notifications have been issued by the State Government after having regard to the circumstances prevailing i.e. anti-social activities in various parts of the State were presisting and certain undersirable elements were acting prejudicial to the security of the State and prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and also the maintenance of supplies and services, for which it was necessary to prevent anti-social elements and persons in an effective manner and with a view to put a decisive stop to curb communal riots, goondaism & public disorder. Further in his affidavit dated 4.9.2000 Anand Kumar who was working as Deputy Secretary Home (Security) (Group 9) Government of Rajasthan stated that the detention order dated 21.4.2000 of the detenu was approved by the State Government under section 3(4) of the Act by order dated 29.4.2000 and then confirming detention of the detenu by order dated 24.5.2000 under section 12(1) of the Act with the direction to detain the detenu for one year from 21.4.2000 to 20.4.2001 after having fully satisfied upon scrutiny of the grounds of detention besides supporting documents referred to therein. Shri Anand Kumar has also stated that the detention matter of the detenu (petitioner) was forwarded to the Advisory Board which too was of the view that sufficient cause for detention of the petitioner was exhasuted. Shri Anand Kumar has further stated that detention matter of the petitioner was too forwarded to the Central Government on the very day when the State Government passed order dated 29.4.2000 (Ann.3) and its receipt in token of acknowledgement was issued on 30.4.2000. 18. Similarly, K.N. Gupta who was the District Magistrate Sriganganagar and who has passed the impugned detention order against the petitioner, has filed his affidavit on 8.8.2000 stating inter alia that the detention order was passed after having carefully scrutinised and studied the grounds of detention and all the documents referred to therein and he was satisfied on the basis of those documents that the detention of the petitioner was necessary to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. He also stated that copies of the detention order, grounds of detention and supporting documents thereof containing 54 pages in two legible copies were delivered to the detenu through Superintendent District Jail, Sriganganagar with a forwarding letter informing that he was free to make representation against his detention to the State Government, Central Government, Advisory Board or the High Court. According to the affidavit of K.N. Gupta, a copy of the forwarding letter addressed to the detenu was also endorsed to the Superintendent District Jail Sriganganagar directing him to handover all the documents referred to above to the petitioner and with specific direction to read and explain the grounds of detention to the detenu and consequently, the petitioner was accordingly handed over these documents on 22.4.2000 itself and in token of having received the documents in 54 pages he had given a receipt by affixing his thumb impression and further acknowledged that these documents were read over and explained to him. Alongwith aforesaid affidavit, forwarding letter dated 22.4.2000 and copy thereof endorsed to the perintendent District Jail, Sriganganagar with aforesaid compliance have been annexed as Annexures A/1 and A/2. Alongwith aforesaid affidavit, forwarding letter dated 22.4.2000 and copy thereof endorsed to the perintendent District Jail, Sriganganagar with aforesaid compliance have been annexed as Annexures A/1 and A/2. In this view of the matter we do not find any substance in the contention on behalf of the detenu that the detention order being violative of provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and on account of non-compliance of the provisions of the Act deserves to be set aside. It is the case of the detenu that no affidavit of Superintendent of Jail has been filed to establish that he got the contents of the detention order read over and explained to the detenu, therefore, his detention is violative of the constitutional mandate. We are not impressed by this contention because as is laid down by the Apex Court in Madanlal Anand v. Union of India (supra) so also in State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh ( AIR 1984 Supreme Court 444 (FB) , no personal allegation of mala fide or bias has since been made against the Superintendent of Jail or against the detaining authority, therefore, merely because the authority has not sworn the affidavit in this regard, it will not in all circumstances be fatal to the detention order. In the case of present detenu, as is evident from the counter, reply and affidavits discussed above, it is not a case either of violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India or non-compliance of provisions of the Act. 19. It is settled law that the satisfaction of the detaining authority on consideration of the activities of the detenu after having formed an opinion that the activities are and have been affecting the maintenance of public order, therefore, it is essential to put the detenu under detention cannot be interfered with by the court of law merely on assertion of the detenu, and in our considered view it is not required to be stated in the grounds of detention as to why the detaining authority formed such opinion that the activities in question cannot be adequately dealt with under the relevant laws. It is also trite law that exercise of powers under Section 226 of the Constitution is very limited because this Court cannot sit in appeal against the detention order appreciating or reappreciating the material considered by the detaining authority, because this Court would not enter into propriety or sufficiency of the ground on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based nor it will substitute its own satisfaction for that of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. However, this does not imply that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is wholly immune from the power of a judicial review. 20. Having given our anxious and earnest consideration to entire gammut of the circumstances appearing on the material collected by the sponsoring and detaining authority and in the grounds of detention of the present detenu accompanying with papers thereto, in our considered view it is clear that the detaining authority based its subjective satisfaction on a series of contemporaneous incidents in which the detenu was involved. The satisfaction was not based on a single or stray incident. Moreover, the assertions made against the detenu are not assailed as untrue nor can they be said to be irrelevant for the purpose of the order. On such materials on record it cannot be said that there was no basis for detaining authority to feel satisfied that the detenu was either himself or as a member or leader of a gang was engaged in anti national activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and his activities were such which in their totality had the effect of disturbing even the tempo of public life and therefore, in our considered view, the impugned order of detention was perfectly justified warranting no intreference by this Court.Resultantly, we find no merit in this habeas corpus petition and thereby dismiss the same and uphold the detention of the present petitioner under the impugned order referred to above.Petition dismissed. *******