G. P. MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Peoples Union for Civil liberties (for short P. U. C. L.) praying that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the central Bureau of Investigation to investigate the incident which occurred on May 18, 2000 in which women were subjected to inhuman treatment and lathi charge by the police at Dehradun and for commanding the State of U. P. to hold disciplinary enquiry against the erring officers and to punish them in accordance with law and also for a direction to respondents to pay compensation to the victims of police atrocities. ( 2 ) THE petitioner (P. U. C. L.) claims that it is an organisation which is dedicated to upholding of human right, civil liberties and democratic rights. According to the petitioner, an organisation known as Uttarakhand Mahila Manch (hereinafter referred to as Mahila Manch) used to stage regular dharnas in the Court campus of Dehradun in connection with their demand of separate uttarakhand State. On May 18, 2000, some women activists of the Mahila Manch took out a silent procession as the Parliament had failed to pass the bill for creation of a separate State. When the procession reached near the gate of civil court, a large contingent of police force blocked their way and did not allow them to proceed further inspite of request made by the women activists. According to the petitioner, some women activists forcibly entered the Court compound but the policemen started beating them and they also resorted to lathi charge in which several members of the Mahila Manch received injuries. The petitioner thus prays that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate and hold enquiry regarding the alleged incident and police atrocities on the member of Mahila Manch, initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the erring officers and also prays that respondents may be directed to pay compensation to the members of the Mahila Manch who received injuries in the incident. ( 3 ) THE record shows that the writ petition was filed in the office of Registrar (Listing) on October 24, 2000 and came up for hearing before the Admission Bench presided by Honble the Chief justice on November 13, 2000. ( 3 ) THE record shows that the writ petition was filed in the office of Registrar (Listing) on October 24, 2000 and came up for hearing before the Admission Bench presided by Honble the Chief justice on November 13, 2000. Subsequently, by an order of nomination of Honble the Chief justice dated November 16, 2000 it was placed for admission before this Bench. The incident which has given rise to the present petition took place in Dehradun which after the appointed day is no longer within the State of Uttar Pradesh and falls within the territory of State of uttaranchal. The first question which requires consideration is whether the Allahabad High court has the jurisdiction to entertain and hear this petition. ( 4 ) THE Parliament enacted the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 (Act No. 29 of 2000) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to provide for reorganisation of the existing State of Uttar pradesh and for matters connected therewith. The Act came into force on August 25, 2000 and the "appointed day" as defined under Section 2 (a) of the Act, by virtue of notification issued by the Central Government in Official Gazette, is November 9, 2000. In view of Section 3 of the act, a separate State of Uttaranchal was formed from the "appointed day" which comprises the territories of certain districts of the erstwhile State of Uttar Pradesh including that of district dehradun. After the notification was issued, Dehradun ceased to be part of the existing State of uttar Pradesh. Part IV of the Act deals with High Court and Sections 26, 32, 33, 35, 37 and 38 of the Act which are relevant for the controversy in hand are reproduced below : "26. High Court of Uttaranchal.-- (1) As from the appointed day, there shall be a separate High court for the State of Uttaranchal (hereinafter referred to as the "the High Court of Uttaranchal")and the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad shall become the High Court for the State of Uttar pradesh (hereinafter referred to as the High Court at Allahabad ). (2) The principal seat of the High Court of Uttaranchal shall be at such place as the President may, by notified order, appoint. (2) The principal seat of the High Court of Uttaranchal shall be at such place as the President may, by notified order, appoint. (3) Notwithstanding any thing contained in sub-section (2), the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court of Uttaranchal may sit at such other place or places in the State of Uttaranchal other than its principal seat as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of uttaranchal, appoint. 32. Form of writs and other process.--The law in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to the form of writs and other processes used, issued or awarded by the High Court at Allahabad shall, with the necessary modifications, apply with respect to the form of writs and other processes used, issued or awarded by the High Court of Uttaranchal. 33. Powers of Judges.--The law in force immediately before the appointed day relating to the powers of the Chief Justice, single Judges and Division Courts of the High Court at Allahabad and with respect to all matters ancillary to the exercise of those powers shall, with the necessary modifications, apply in relation to the High Court of Uttaranchal. 35. Transfer of proceedings from Allahabad High Court to Uttaranchal High Court.-- (1) Except as hereinafter provided, the High Court at Allahabad shall, as from the appointed day, have no jurisdiction in respect of the transferred territory. (2) Such proceedings pending in the High Court at Allahabad immediately before the appointed day as are certified, whether before or after that day by the Chief Justice of that High Court, having regard to the place of accrual of the cause of action and other circumstances, to be proceedings which ought to be heard and decided by the High Court of Uttaranchal shall, as soon as may be after such certification, be transferred to the High Court of Uttaranchal. (3) Notwithstanding any-thing contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) of this section or in Section 28, but save as hereinafter provided, the High Court at Allahabad shall have, and the High Court of Uttaranchal shall not have, Jurisdiction to entertain, hear or dispose of appeals, applications for leave to the Supreme Court, applications for review and other proceedings where any such proceedings seek any relief in respect of any order passed by the High Court at Allahabad before the appointed day : provided that if after any such proceedings have been entertained by the High Court at allahabad, it appears to the Chief Justice of that High Court that they ought to be transferred to the High Court of Uttaranchal, he shall order that they shall be so transferred, and such proceedings shall thereupon be transferred accordingly. (4) Any order made by the High Court at Allahabad : (a) before the appointed day, in any proceedings transferred to the High Court of Uttaranchal by virtue of sub-section (2), or (b) in any proceedings with respect to which the High Court at Allahabad retains jurisdiction by virtue of sub-section (3), shall for all purposes have effect, not only as an order of the High Court at Allahabad, but also as an order made by the High Court of Uttaranchal. 37. Interpretation.--For the purposes of Section 35: (a) proceedings shall be deemed to be pending in a Court until that Court has disposed of all issues between the parties, including any issues with respect to the taxation of the costs of the proceeding and shall include appeals, applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, applications for review, petitions for revision and petitions for writs ; and (b) reference to a High Court shall be construed as including references to a Judge or a Division court thereof, and references to an order made by a Court or a Judge shall be construed as including references to a sentence, judgment or decree passed or made by that Court or Judge. 38. Savings.--Nothing in this Part shall affect the application to the High Court of Uttaranchal of any provisions of the Constitution, and this part shall have effect subject to any provision that may be made on or after the appointed day with respect to that High Court by any Legislature or other authority having power to make such provision. 38. Savings.--Nothing in this Part shall affect the application to the High Court of Uttaranchal of any provisions of the Constitution, and this part shall have effect subject to any provision that may be made on or after the appointed day with respect to that High Court by any Legislature or other authority having power to make such provision. Part X of the Act deals with Legal and Miscellaneous Provisions and Sections 90 and 91 thereof are reproduced below : 90. Legal proceedings.--Where, immediately before the appointed day the existing State of uttar Pradesh is a party to any legal proceedings with respect to any property, rights or liabilities subject to apportionment between the States of Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal under this Act, the state of Uttar Pradesh or Uttaranchal which succeeds to, or acquires a share in, that property or those rights or liabilities by virtue of any provision of this Act shall be deemed to be substituted for the existing State of Uttar Pradesh or added as a party to those proceedings, and the proceedings may continue accordingly. 91. Transfer of pending proceedings.-- (1) Every proceeding pending immediately before the appointed day before a Court (other than High Court), Tribunal, authority or officer in any area which on that day falls within the State of Uttar Pradesh shall, if it is a proceeding relating exclusively to the territory which as from that day are the territories of Uttaranchal State, stand transferred to the corresponding Court, Tribunal, authority or officer of that State. (2) If any question arises as to whether any proceeding should stand transferred under sub-section (1) it shall be referred to the High Court at Allahabad and the decision of that High court shall be final. (2) If any question arises as to whether any proceeding should stand transferred under sub-section (1) it shall be referred to the High Court at Allahabad and the decision of that High court shall be final. (3) In this section : (a) "proceeding" includes any suit, case or appeal ; and (b) "corresponding Court, Tribunal authority or officer" in the State of Uttaranchal means : (i) the Court, Tribunal, authority or officer in which, or before whom, the proce-eding would have laid if it had been instituted after the appointed day ; or (ii) in case of doubt, such Court, Tribunal, authority or officer in that State, as may be determined after the appointed day by the Government of that State or the Central Government, as the case may be, or before the appointed day by the Government of the existing State of Uttar pradesh to be the corresponding Court, Tribunal, authority or officer. " ( 5 ) SECTION 26 provides that there shall be a separate High Court for the State of Uttaranchal and there is no dispute that such a High Court has come into existence on the appointed day. Section 28 provides that with regard to the territories now included in the State of Uttaranchal, the High court of the said State shall exercise all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were being exercised by the High Court at Allahabad immediately before the appointed day. Therefore, the entire jurisdiction, powers and authority of the High Court at Allahabad with respect to the territories now part of the State of Uttaranchal shall be exercised by the High Court of uttaranchal. Sub-section (1) of Section 35 completely abolishes the jurisdiction of the High court at Allahabad with respect to the territories included in the State of Uttaranchal as from the appointed day. Sub-sections (2) and (3) carve out exception to sub-section (1) in certain categories of proceedings. Sub-section (3) starts with a non obstante clause and retains the jurisdiction of High Court at Allahabad to entertain, hear or dispose of appeals, applications for leave to the Supreme Court, applications for review and other proceedings where any such proceedings seek relief in respect of any order passed by the High Court at Allahabad before the appointed day. Sub-section (3) starts with a non obstante clause and retains the jurisdiction of High Court at Allahabad to entertain, hear or dispose of appeals, applications for leave to the Supreme Court, applications for review and other proceedings where any such proceedings seek relief in respect of any order passed by the High Court at Allahabad before the appointed day. The expression "where any such proceedings seek any relief in respect of any order passed by High Court at Allahabad before the appointed day" is important, and by virtue of sub-section (3), for such category of cases it is the High Court at Allahabad which shall have exclusive Jurisdiction and not the High Court of Uttaranchal. Basically these would be appeals against the decisions of the High Court like company court appeals or special appeals under chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules or applications for review of the judgment of the High Court or applications for leave to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court. ( 6 ) THE provision for the pending proceedings has been made in sub-section (2) of Section 35 and it is this provision which will be attracted to large number of cases arising out of territories which now form part of the State of Uttaranchal and which were pending in the High Court at allahabad on the "appointed day". This sub-section provides that such proceedings which were pending in the High Court at Allahabad immediately before the appointed day, on certificate being granted by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Allahabad to the effect that they ought to be heard and decided by the High Court at Uttaranchal shall as soon as may be after such certification be transferred to the High Court of Uttaranchal and the Chief Justice is empowered to grant such certificate at any time either before or after appointed day. Sub-section (4) is deeming clause which creates a fiction that any order made by the High Court at Allahabad before the appointed day in any proceedings transferred to High Court at Uttaranchal by virtue of sub-section (2) or any proceedings with respect to which High Court at Allahabad retains jurisdiction by virtue of sub-section (3) shall for all purposes have effect as an order both of high Court at Allahabad and High Court at Uttaranchal. ( 7 ) THE effect of sub-section (1) of Section 35 is very clear and it means that from the appointed day, the High Court at Allahabad shall have no jurisdiction with respect to territory now comprised in the State of Uttaranchal. Therefore, with effect from the said date, the High Court at Allahabad can entertain no proceedings where the cause of action has accrued entirely in the said State and proceedings seeking reliefs in such matters have to be instituted in the High Court of Uttaranchal. The difficulty arises in interpreting sub-section (2) which deals with "such proceedings which were pending in the High Court at Allahabad immediately before the appointed day. " The Legislature has given sufficient guideline regarding the end point till when a proceeding shall be deemed to be pending by enacting sub-section (a) of Section 37. It provides that for the purpose of Section 35, proceedings shall be deemed to be pending in the High Court until it disposes of all issues between the parties including any issue with respect to taxation of costs and shall include appeals, applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, applications for review, petitions for review and petitions for writs. The sub-section uses word "including" and this shows that the definition is not restrictive but is extensive in character. It is well settled that the word "includes" is used in interpretation clause to enlarge the meaning of the words and phrases occurring in the body of the statute and they must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. See Sri Gollaleshwar dev v. Gangauwa Kom Math, AIR 1986 SC 231 and C. I. T. , A. P. , v. Taj Mahal Hotel, AIR 1972 sc 168 . Therefore, till the disposal of all issues between the parties and final decision of the appeal, revision, writ petition or review petition, the proceeding shall be deemed to be pending. But the statute does not give any indication with regard to starting point from which the proceedings shall be deemed to be pending. Therefore, till the disposal of all issues between the parties and final decision of the appeal, revision, writ petition or review petition, the proceeding shall be deemed to be pending. But the statute does not give any indication with regard to starting point from which the proceedings shall be deemed to be pending. It is, therefore, necessary to refer to the meaning of word "pending" as contained in various dictonaries : Words and Phrases.-- (1) An action is pending from time it is commenced until its final determination ; (2) An action is pending when it is duly entered in Court and entry of action in Court is made by entry on docket of title of case by proper officer in due course of his official duty ; (3) An action is pending from time of filing the complaint until its final determination on appeal. Blacks Law Dictionary.-- (1) Begun, but not yet completed ; (2) An action is pending after it is commenced by either filing a complaint with the Court or by the service of summons ; websters Third New Inter-national Dictionary.-- Through the period of continuance or indeterminacy. The Law Laxicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyer.-- (1) An action is considered as pending from the time of commencement of the proceeding ; (2) An action is pending, the entire time from beginning of the action until final judgment has been pronounced and entered up. ( 8 ) IN Asgarali Nazarali v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 503 , it was held that a legal proceeding is pending as soon as it commenced and until it is concluded, i. e. , so long as the court having original cognizance of it can make an order on the matters in issue or to be dealt with therein. Therefore, any action commenced by filing a petition which comes on the docket of the Court is pending. As mentioned earlier, the present writ petition was filed before the registrar (Listing) on October 24, 2000 and was taken up for admission/hearing for the first time by the Admission Bench on November 13, 2000. Therefore, any action commenced by filing a petition which comes on the docket of the Court is pending. As mentioned earlier, the present writ petition was filed before the registrar (Listing) on October 24, 2000 and was taken up for admission/hearing for the first time by the Admission Bench on November 13, 2000. A doubt was raised as to whether a case like the present one, which had merely been filed in the office and had not been placed before the court before the appointed day but was placed for admission or for any other purpose before the court for the first time after the appointed day would also be deemed to be pending within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act. A similar question arose for determination under Section 5 (2) (a) of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which provides that upon publication of the notification under Section 4 (2), every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest for any land lying in the area to which the notification relates shall on an order being passed in that behalf by the Court before whom such suit or proceeding is pending stand abated. In Sheo Achal Mishra v. Ram Bali Mishra, 1971 RD 339. it was held that a second appeal presented for admission before the High Court will be deemed to be pending within the meaning of Section 5 (2) (a) and it will abate and the contention that the appeal can be deemed to be pending only after it has been heard under Order XLI, Rule 11 of Code of Civil procedure was negatived. Similar view was taken in Sahab Singh v. State of U. P. , 1969 ALJ 177. These authorities clearly show that application of judicial mind by the Court to the proceedings or admission of an appeal, revision or writ petition is wholly irrelevant for deciding the controversy. The moment a proceeding is filed in the office before the Registrar (Listing), the court is in a position to take cognizance of it or to deal with the same or make an order in issue and therefore the proceeding will be deemed to be pending. The moment a proceeding is filed in the office before the Registrar (Listing), the court is in a position to take cognizance of it or to deal with the same or make an order in issue and therefore the proceeding will be deemed to be pending. Therefore, there can be no manner of doubt that the present writ petition which was filed on October 24, 2000 was pending within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act. ( 9 ) SUB-SECTION (1) of Section 35 of the Act no doubt provides that the High Court at Allahabad shall have no jurisdiction in respect of the territories comprised in the State of Uttaranchal but this sub-section is not in absolute term and is preceded by the expression "except as hereinafter provided". The exceptions are contained in sub-sections (2) and (3 ). It is well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that exception is intended to restrain the enacting clause to particular cases. It, therefore, follows that the High Court at Allahabad shall continue to have jurisdiction over such proceedings which were pending before the appointed day. But if in such category of cases the Chief Justice certifies that proceedings ought to be heard and decided by the High court of Uttaranchal, they shall be transferred to the said High Court. Therefore, the High Court of Allahabad will continue to retain the jurisdiction only in such pending proceedings which have not been certified by the Chief Justice. All those proceedings which are certified by the chief Justice that they ought to be heard and decided by the Uttaranchal High, Court shall be transferred to the said High Court soon after such certificate is given. Consequently, Allahabad high Court will cease to have jurisdiction even in pending proceedings if a certificate as contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act is given by the Chief Justice. ( 10 ) IN this connection, it is necessary to notice a submission made by Sri Ravi Kant, learned senior counsel who has appeared for the Bar Association of Uttaranchal High Court. ( 10 ) IN this connection, it is necessary to notice a submission made by Sri Ravi Kant, learned senior counsel who has appeared for the Bar Association of Uttaranchal High Court. He has submitted that so far as pending writ petitions are concerned, the certificate of the Chief Justice alone is not the decisive factor for retaining the jurisdiction of Allahabad High Court as the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution which confer Jurisdiction on the High Court to issue appropriate writs will also have to be taken into consideration. Clause (1) of Article 226 lays down that every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature or habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. This clause came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of seven Judges in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 532 , and in para 14 it was held as under: ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What Article 226 requires is residence or location as a fact and if therefore there is a seat from which the Government functions as a fact even though that seat is not mentioned in the Constitution the High Court within whose territories that seat is located will be the High court having jurisdiction under Article 226 so far as the orders of the Government as such are concerned. Therefore, the view taken in 1953 SCR 1144 : AIR 1953 SC 210 (supra) and 1954 scr 738 : AIR 1954 SC 207 (supra), that there is two-fold limitation on the power of the High court to issue writ etc. Therefore, the view taken in 1953 SCR 1144 : AIR 1953 SC 210 (supra) and 1954 scr 738 : AIR 1954 SC 207 (supra), that there is two-fold limitation on the power of the High court to issue writ etc. under Article 226, namely, (i) the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, that is to say, the writs issued by the court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction, and (ii) the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be "within those territories" which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories, is the correct one. " ( 11 ) CLAUSE (1a) was thereafter inserted by the Fifteenth Amendment Act, 1963 and it has been renumbered as clause (2) by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment Act), 1976. This clause confers power upon the High Court to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person if cause of action wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Therefore, the High Court can exercise Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in relation to territories within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises. U. P. Reorganisation Act, 2000 can neither amend nor can it be interpreted in a manner which may have the effect of amending the provisions of the Constitution. The powers and jurisdiction of the High Court of Uttaranchal are completely saved by Sections 33 and 38 of the Act. U. P. Reorganisation Act, 2000 can neither amend nor can it be interpreted in a manner which may have the effect of amending the provisions of the Constitution. The powers and jurisdiction of the High Court of Uttaranchal are completely saved by Sections 33 and 38 of the Act. Therefore, such pending writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution which have not been certified by the Chief Justice to be proceedings which ought to be heard and decided by High Court of uttaranchal can be heard and disposed of by the High Court of Allahabad subject to the restrictions imposed by clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, namely, that the cause of action wholly or in part arises in territory comprised in the State of U. P. Unless a part of the cause of action arises in the State of U. P. , the High Court of Allahabad shall have no jurisdiction to issue a writ as contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution even with regard to such pending writ petitions which have not been certified by the Chief Justice for being heard and decided by the High Court of Uttaranchal. By sub-section (4) of Section 35, a fiction has been created for orders made by High Court of Allahabad but the applicability of this sub-section is restricted to certain category of cases. The order made before the appointed day in proceedings transferred to the High Court of Uttaranchal by virtue of sub-section (2) or the proceedings over which the High Court at Allahabad continues to retain Jurisdiction by virtue of sub-section (3) like appeals, application for leave to Supreme Court and applications for review etc. , where relief is sought in respect of order passed by Allahabad High Court before the appointed day, shall be deemed both as an order of High Court at Allahabad and also High Court of Uttaranchal. In such category of cases, the order having been deemed to be that of High Court of Uttaranchal, the question whether the cause of action has accrued wholly or in part in the territory over which the High Court of Allahabad has jurisdiction would not arise. In such category of cases, the order having been deemed to be that of High Court of Uttaranchal, the question whether the cause of action has accrued wholly or in part in the territory over which the High Court of Allahabad has jurisdiction would not arise. ( 12 ) SRI Ravi Kiran Jain, senior counsel for the petitioner has next contended that the pending proceeding can be transferred to the High Court of Uttaranchal only after certificate has been given by the Chief Justice and in view of the language used by the Legislature in sub-section (2), the grant of certificate cannot be a mechanical act but has to be a judicial act which has to be performed by the Chief Justice after hearing the parties. He has elaborated his argument by contending that in the matter of grant of certificate under sub-section (2), the Chief Justice has to exercise such power having regard to "place of accrual of cause of action and other circumstances" and thus wide discretion has been given to him. Sri Jain has submitted that a host of factors like convenience of parties, payment of entire fee by litigants, availability of a counsel of the choice of litigant or a similar matter involving the same question of law being heard by a bench of High Court at Allahabad may amount to a circumstance which is required to be taken into consideration by the Chief Justice while taking a decision whether any pending proceeding ought to be heard and decided by the High Court of Uttaranchal. According to learned counsel, the language used in sub-section (2) shows that the Chief Justice, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties, has to pass a judicial order whether proceedings should be certified that they ought to be heard and decided by the High Court of Uttaranchal and such a decision can be taken only if the party moves an application seeking a certificate that the proceedings are such which ought to be heard and decided by the High Court of Uttaranchal and no suo motu power can be exercised. Sri Jain also stressed that grant of a certificate being a judicial act can be done only after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties and recording a satisfaction on relevant consideration. Sri Jain also stressed that grant of a certificate being a judicial act can be done only after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties and recording a satisfaction on relevant consideration. ( 13 ) THE question which requires consideration is whether the grant of certificate by the Chief justice as contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 35 is an administrative act or a judicial act and what is the nature of the certificate which will be granted by the Chief Justice under the said sub-section. There can be no manner of doubt that if grant of certificate is a judicial act, then the same can be done only after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties and order to that effect has to be passed in each individual case on the basis of the relevant considerations and by a speaking order. If it is an administrative order, neither any opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the parties nor any elaborate reasons are to be recorded and "place of accrual of cause of action" can be the sole criteria for exercise of such a power. It may be noticed that power to grant certificate to the effect that proceedings are such which ought to be heard and decided by High Court of Uttaranchal has been conferred upon the Chief Justice alone and not upon the High Court. Wherever any judicial power is conferred either by the Constitution or by other Statutes, the same is conferred upon the High Court and not upon a particular Judge. Article 226 of the Constitution confers power to issue writs on the High Court and not upon any designated Judge. The power of second appeal and civil revision conferred by Sections 100 and 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, that of criminal appeal and criminal revision conferred by sections 374 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, that of answering reference under the income-tax Act or of revision under the U. P. Trade-tax Act, is a judicial power which has been conferred on the High Court and not upon any particular individual Judge. Article 229 of the constitution confers powers upon the Chief Justice to make appointment of the officers and servants in a High Court and this power is clearly an administrative power and not a judicial power. Article 229 of the constitution confers powers upon the Chief Justice to make appointment of the officers and servants in a High Court and this power is clearly an administrative power and not a judicial power. The administrative control of the High Court is with the Chief Justice alone and he has prerogative to constitute benches and allocate cases to the benches but he does not exercise any greater or extra-judicial power from other puisne Judge of the High Court. In State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chandra, (1998) 1 SCC 1, it was held in sub-para (1) of para 59 of the reports that administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice alone but on the judicial side, he is only the first amongst equal. In sub-para (2), it was held that the Chief Justice is the master of the roster and he alone has the prerogative to constitute Benches of the Court and allocate cases to the Benches so constituted. In Sanjay Kumar Singh v. Acting Chief Justice, 1996 AWC 644, a Full Bench of our Court, after analysing provisions of Government of India Act, 1915, government of India Act, 1935 and the Constitution held that a Chief Justice enjoins special status as he alone can assign work to a Judge sitting alone and to the Judges sitting in Division bench or to Judges sitting in Full Bench and he alone has jurisdiction to decide which case will be heard by a Judge sitting alone or by two or more Judges. The power of constitution of benches and allocation of work to them is an administrative power. These authorities show that wherever any power is conferred exclusively upon the Chief Justice either under the Constitution or under the statutes, such a power is administrative power but where judicial power is conferred, the same is conferred upon the High Court as a whole without making reference to any individual Judge. ( 14 ) THERE are certain attributes of a Judicial function. ( 14 ) THERE are certain attributes of a Judicial function. It presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and it involves four requisites, namely, (1) the presentation (oral or otherwise) of their case by the parties to the dispute ; (2) if the dispute involves a question of fact, the ascertainment of fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties ; (3) if the dispute is with regard to question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties ; and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter after recording finding upon the disputed questions of fact and application of law to the facts so found including where required a decision upon disputed questions of law raised. If these four requisites are present, the decision is a judicial decision. An administrative decision stands on altogether different footing. In Ram Jawaye v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549 , the Court observed that it may not be possible to frame an exhaustive definition of what executive function means and implies. Ordinarily the executive power connotes, residue of govern-mental function that remains after legislative and judicial functions are taken away. Normally an administrative function has following attributes. An administrative order is generally passed on governmental policy or expediency. There is no obligation to adopt judicial approach to the questions to be decided and decisions are usually subjective rather than objective. The authority is not bound by the rules of evidence and procedure unless relevant statute specifically imposes such an obligation. The administrative functions may be delegated unless there is a specific bar or prohibition in the nature. The administrative authority is not always bound by the principles of the natural justice unless the statute casts such a duty on the authority, either expressly or by necessary implication or it is required to act judicially. However, the true test which distinguishes a Judicial order and a quasi-judicial act from an administrative act is the duty to act judicially and, therefore in considering whether a particular authority is a quasi-judicial body or merely an administrative body, what has to be ascertained is whether the statutory body is duty bound to act judicially. However, the true test which distinguishes a Judicial order and a quasi-judicial act from an administrative act is the duty to act judicially and, therefore in considering whether a particular authority is a quasi-judicial body or merely an administrative body, what has to be ascertained is whether the statutory body is duty bound to act judicially. ( 15 ) SRI Jain has laid great stress on the fact that with regard to such proceedings which were pending in the High Court at Allahabad immediately before the appointed day, sub-section (2) of section 35 empowers the Chief Justice to certify that they ought to be heard and decided by the high Court of Uttaranchal and such certificate can be given on judicial consideration keeping in view the place of accrual of cause of action and other circumstances. According to Sri Jain, the grant of certificate is a serious matter which cannot be done in a routine or in a mechanical way and this shows that it is judicial act. Regarding the nature of function to be exercised while granting a certificate, the learned counsel placed reliance on Babu v. State of U. P. , AIR 1965 SC 1467 ; State of Assam v. Abdul Noor, AIR 1970 SC 1365 and State of Bihar v. Bhagirath, AIR 1973 SC 2198 , wherein it was held that the High Court should exercise their discretion sparingly with care as a similar care in Article 133 which allows appeal in civil cases had been consistently interpreted as including only those cases which involve questions of general public importance. It was further held that though that test need not necessarily be applied to a criminal case but mere questions of fact should not be referred for decision and certificate should not be granted unless there is some error of fundamental character. It was also held that the word certify is a strong word postulating the exercise of sound judicial discretion and the certificate should be given on judicial principles. In our opinion, the authorities cited have no application here as under Article 133 of the Constitution, the High Court has to certify that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance and that in its opinion the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. In our opinion, the authorities cited have no application here as under Article 133 of the Constitution, the High Court has to certify that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance and that in its opinion the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Similarly under Article 134 (1) (c) the High Court has to certify that it is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land and on certificate being granted either under Article 133 or 134 (1) (c) a party gets automatic right of appeal to the Supreme Court which right he normally does not have unless the Supreme Court grant special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. Under sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act, the certificate by the Chief Justice is altogether of a different character and it does not confer any kind of right of appeal or right of further prosecution of a case in a higher forum. The certificate merely empowers the Registry to do a ministerial act, viz. , to transfer pending cases from High Court of Allahabad to High Court of uttaranchal. In Vol. 14 corpus juris secundum the word certificate has been defined as under: "a certificate in its most general and widest sense has been defined as meaning a certain assurance of that which it states ; a declaration in writing ; an authoritative attestation ; a Writing giving assurance that a thing has or has not been done ;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . More specifically, the word has been defined as meaning a documentary declaration regarding facts from the public authority, as an attestation of facts contained in a public record. " According to Blacks Law Dictionary "certificate" means to authenticate or vouch for a thing in writing ; to attest as being true or as represented. According to Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha aiyer the meaning of the word is--to give certain knowledge or information of ; vouch for truth of ; to make statement as to matter of fact. The word certify has been used here in ordinary way. According to Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha aiyer the meaning of the word is--to give certain knowledge or information of ; vouch for truth of ; to make statement as to matter of fact. The word certify has been used here in ordinary way. A certificate in this sub-section would only mean authentication of the fact that proceeding ought to be heard and decided by the High Court of Uttaranchal. ( 16 ) AT the stage of grant of certificate under sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act, there is no lis between the parties and respective cases of the parties have not to be examined. The parties are not to be heard on merits of their case either on questions of fact or on questions of law nor a finding is to be recorded nor a decision is to be given on these matter. The certificate has absolutely no bearing of any kind touching the merits of the case of the parties. In Km. Neelima misra v. Dr. Harinder Kaur Parital, AIR 1990 SC 1402 , it was held as under: "an administrative functions is called quasi-judicial when there is an obligation to adopt the judicial approach and to comply with the basic requirement of justice. Where there is no such obligation, the decision is called purely administrative and there is no third category. . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 17 ) THE language used in sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act is pari materia with the language used in Section 59 (2) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. In W. W. Joshi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 Bom 363 , (para 22), it was held that a certificate of the Chief Justice of the former High Court of Judicature at Nagpur under Section 59 (2) of the said Act is not an order made on the judicial side of the Nagpur High Court. Therefore, the act of certifying that proceedings ought to be heard and decided by the High Court of Uttaranchal as contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act is purely an administrative act. Therefore, the act of certifying that proceedings ought to be heard and decided by the High Court of Uttaranchal as contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act is purely an administrative act. There is no fetter on the power of the Chief Justice or in the manner such power is to be exercised and the only relevant consideration is the place of accrual of the cause of action or any other circumstances which the chief Justice may consider proper. ( 18 ) WE are informed that there are more than thirty thousand pending cases which come within the purview of sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act. It will be almost an impossible job for the Chief Justice to pass judicial order in each case after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties and recording reasons. The Legislature cannot possibly be intended to have cast such an onerous duty on the Chief Justice. Part X of the Act deals with Legal Proceedings and Section 91 of the Act therein lays down that every proceeding pending immediately before the appointed day before a Court (other than High Court ). Tribunal, authority or officer in any area which on that day falls within the State of Uttar Pradesh shall, if it is a proceeding relating exclusively to the territory, which as from that day are the territories of Uttaranchal State, stand transferred to the corresponding Court, Tribunal, authority or officer of that State. Here neither a party has any choice in the matter nor any order is required to be passed by the Court, Tribunal or authority. By operation of law, all proceedings shall automatically stand transferred to corresponding court, Tribunal or authority in the State of Uttaranchal. This is indicative of the legislative intent that under sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act, the Chief Justice has to pass an administrative order without affording any opportunity of hearing to the party and such an order can be passed by him suo motu. ( 19 ) SRI Jain has lastly urged that such proceedings which were pending in High Court of allahabad immediately before the appointed day have to be heard and decided in the said High court and they cannot be transferred to the High Court of Uttaranchal as it will amount to change of forum during the pendency of the proceedings. ( 19 ) SRI Jain has lastly urged that such proceedings which were pending in High Court of allahabad immediately before the appointed day have to be heard and decided in the said High court and they cannot be transferred to the High Court of Uttaranchal as it will amount to change of forum during the pendency of the proceedings. According to Sri Jain, the litigants have acquired a vested right after initiation of proceedings in the High Court at Allahabad for their continuance and decision by the said High Court and the transfer of such proceeding to high Court of Uttaranchal will be illegal as it will take away their vested right. In support of this proposition, he has placed reliance on Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dhadi Sahu, 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 257, wherein it was held that the law which brings about change in the forum does not effect pending actions unless intention to the contrary is clearly shown. In our opinion, the contention raised is wholly misconceived. The Parliament as also the State Legislatures have plenary powers of legislation within field of legislation committed to them and subject to certain constitutional restrictions. They can legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively. It is, however, cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. See K. C. Arora v. State of Haryana, AIR 1984 SC 1 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rameshwar Rathod, AIR 1990 sc 1849 . Unless there are words in the statutes sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only. The position is different for statutes dealing with merely matters of procedure and they are presumed to be retrospective unless such construction is textually inadmissible. In Guru Bachan Singh v. Satya Pal Singh, AIR 1990 SC 209 and Union of India v. Sheo Kumar Pyne, AIR 1966 SC 1206 , it was observed that change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right it is not prospective. The position is, however, different with regard to statutes regulating appeals. An appeal is the right of entering a superior court and in effecting its aid and interposition to redress any error of the court below. The position is, however, different with regard to statutes regulating appeals. An appeal is the right of entering a superior court and in effecting its aid and interposition to redress any error of the court below. In Garikapati v. Subbiah Chaudhary, AIR 1957 SC 540 , it was held that right of appeal is not mere matter of procedure but is substantive right and the institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the carrier of the suit. It was also held that the right of appeal is vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant as on from the day lis commences and such right has to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institutions of the suit or proceedings and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of filing of appeal. The transfer of proceedings from High Court at Allahabad to high Court of Uttaranchal does not take away any vested right of the litigant. He will continue to have the same right of appeal or revision or under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ of the nature enumerated in the said Article even after the proceedings are transferred to uttaranchal High Court. This position will also be clear from Section 28 of the Act which lays down that the High Court of Uttaranchal shall have, in respect of any part of the territories included In the State of Uttaranchal, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, are exercisable in respect of that part of the said territory by the High Court at Allahabad. Thus, no right of a litigant will be affected in any manner by mere transfer of the proceedings to Uttaranchal High Court. Neither the statutes dealing with procedure nor the Constitution confer any right on a litigant to pursue remedy in a particular High Court but the right is given to approach a High Court. Thus, no right of a litigant will be affected in any manner by mere transfer of the proceedings to Uttaranchal High Court. Neither the statutes dealing with procedure nor the Constitution confer any right on a litigant to pursue remedy in a particular High Court but the right is given to approach a High Court. The transfer of proceedings do not at all impinge upon such a right of a litigant and he will continue to get the same reliefs which he would have got from the High Court at Allahabad, had the proceedings been not transferred. Therefore, the contention of Sri Jain is wholly without substance and must be rejected. ( 20 ) THE present writ petition having been filed before the Registrar (Listing) on October 24, 2000 comes within the expression "proceedings pending in High Court at Allahabad immediately before the appointed day" and is thus covered by sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act and until it is certified by the Chief Justice to be proceedings which ought to be heard and decided by the High Court at Uttaranchal, the High Court at Allahabad shall continue to have jurisdiction to hear the writ petition. Respondent No. 1 to the writ petition is State of U. P. through Principal secretary (Home), Lucknow and relief is claimed against the said respondent. A part of cause of action has accrued within the territory of the State of U. P. over which the High Court at allahabad exercises jurisdiction and, therefore, in view of clause (2) to Article 226 of the constitution there is no impediment in the way of this Court to issue appropriate writ to the said respondent. ( 21 ) THE writ petition may now be listed for admission.