C. V. N. SASTRY, J. ( 1 ) THESE two second appeals can be disposed of by a common judgment as they arise out of two suits which were disposed by a common judgment. The sole defendant in both the suits, who is one and the same, is the appellant. ( 2 ) THE two suits were filed by two different plaintiffs-landlords against the same defendant-tenant for eviction from the demised premises and for damages for use and occupation. The facts are not in dispute. The suit premises were leased out by the plaintiffs to the defendant for running a school. Initially the leases were granted for one year from 1-5-1990 to 30-4-1991. Subsequently the leases were extended for a further period of two years i. e. , upto 30-4-1993. The agreed rent in one case is Rs. 3,000/- per month and in the other it is Rs. 2,000/- per month. The suits were filed after issuing quit notices to the defendant by registered post on 6-7-1993 terminating the tenancy with effect from 31-7-1993 and claiming damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- and Rs. 10,000/- per month respectively with effect from 1-8-1993. The quit notices were returned unserved with an endorsement of refusal. ( 3 ) THE suits were resisted mainly on the ground that there was no valid termination of tenancy. The trial Court, however, decreed the two suits holding that there was no need to issue any quit notice as the tenancy ended by efflux of time on 30-4-1993 and that, in any case, the notices dated 6-7-1993 are valid quit notices as per Section 106 of the Transfer of Property act and that the defendant refused to receive the same. The trial Court also granted damages at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month in one case and at the rate of rs. 7,029/- per month in the other case with effect from 1-8-1993. The lower Appellate court concurring with the said findings of the trial Court dismissed the appeals filed by the tenant. ( 4 ) SRI S. Venkat Reddy, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the appellant in these two second appeals, has raised the following substantial questions of law: (1) The notice dated 6-7-1993 is not a valid notice as contemplated under section 106 of T. P. Act. ( 4 ) SRI S. Venkat Reddy, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the appellant in these two second appeals, has raised the following substantial questions of law: (1) The notice dated 6-7-1993 is not a valid notice as contemplated under section 106 of T. P. Act. (2) The finding that mere is no need to issue any quit notice as the tenancy ended by efflux of time is unsustainable in law. (3) The suit is bad for want of a notice as per Section 26 of the A. P. Education act, 1982. It is also bad for want of prior permission of the Competent authority as per Rule 10 (22) of the a. P. Educational Institutions (Establishment, recognition, Administration and control of Schools under Private management) Rules, 1993. The learned Counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that he is not questioning the finding of both the Courts below that the defendant refused to receive the quit notice which was sent to him by registered post and also the quantum of damages awarded by the courts below. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, Sri T. Veerabhadrayya, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-plaintiffs has submitted that the view taken by the two courts below on points 1 and 2 formulated above is perfectly correct and sound and the second appeals are without any merit. So far as point No. 3 is concerned, the learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the same having not been raised in the two Courts below cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time at the second appellate stage. He further submitted that, in any case, the said contention has no substance as neither section 26 of the Education Act nor rule 10 (22) of the Rules relied on by the counsel for the appellant has any application to the instant case. Point No. 1 ( 6 ) IT is not in dispute that the contractual tenancy came to an end by 30-4-1993. Thereafter the plaintiffs got issued quit notices under Section 106 of the t. P. Act on 6-7-1993 through their Counsel to the defendant by registered post with acknowledgment due. The same were, however, returned unserved as refused. It is useful to extract relevant the portions of the quit notice which read as follows:"regd. Post with Ack. Due Notice Under section 106 T. P. Act. . . . The same were, however, returned unserved as refused. It is useful to extract relevant the portions of the quit notice which read as follows:"regd. Post with Ack. Due Notice Under section 106 T. P. Act. . . . You were obliged to vacate the premises on 1-5-1993 (First May, nineteen Ninety three) and deliver vacant possession over the lease premises to my client, in the natural course of events, the stipulated period having expired. However you made my client believe that you were in search of alternative accommodation and sought time. In view of the cordial relations obtaining between you and my client, my client allowed you to continue as such in the premises with the specific understanding that from 1-5-1993 (First May Nineteen ninety three) it will be deemed to be a month to month tenancy pending vacation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Whether you are a tenant at sufferance or a tenant holding over or a lessee continuing as a lease from month to month, providing for all the likely distortions that you may indulge in my client is entitled to terminate the lease and seek eviction statutorily. My client desires to terminate the tenancy in your favour with effect from 31-7-1993 (Thirty first July, Nineteen Ninety three ). . . . . My client has received the rent upto 30-6-1993 (June Thirty Nineteen ninety Three ). My client is prepared to refund the deposit standing to your credit with my client amounting to rs. 60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) at the time of vacating the premises subject to adjustments if any to which my client is entitled as per the statute and terms of the lease. You are, therefore, put on notice that the lease in your favour over the abovementioned premises shall stand terminated on 30-6-1993 (June Thirty, Nineteen Ninety Three ). You are obliged to deliver vacant possession to my client on such termination of lease. Failing which my client will be constrained to seek redress in the Court of law. Hence the notice. You are, therefore, put on notice that the lease in your favour over the abovementioned premises shall stand terminated on 30-6-1993 (June Thirty, Nineteen Ninety Three ). You are obliged to deliver vacant possession to my client on such termination of lease. Failing which my client will be constrained to seek redress in the Court of law. Hence the notice. Sd/- xxx advocate" ( 7 ) IT is the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that as it is clearly stated in the notice that the lease shall stand terminated on 30-6-1993 and as there was no 15 days prior notice ending with 30-6-1993 as required under section 106 of the T. P. Act, the suit is liable to be dismissed. The mention of the date 31-7-1993 in the earlier portion of the quit notice is the expression of a mere desire to terminate the tenancy with effect from 31-7-1993 but the lease was actually terminated with effect from 30-6-1993. On a proper interpretation of the notice it must be held that the lease was terminated with effect from 30-6-1993 but the tenant was granted time till 31-7-1993 to vacate the premises. When the language employed in the notice is clear and unambiguous, the invalid notice cannot be rendered valid by a process of interpretation. If two constructions are possible, the one which is favourable to the tenant must be adopted. In support of these contentions the learned Counsel for the appellant placed strong reliance on the decision of a learned single Judge of this court in Y. Krishna Murthy v. A. Subba rao, AIR 1988 AP 193 . In that case the material portion of the quit notice was as follows:"that my client hereby terminates the tenancy in your favour and requests you to vacate the premises by the end of october, 1977 by which date the tenancy expires, failing which my client will be constrained to take appropriate steps against you in a Court of law for eviction. "it was held that the words hereby terminates would indicate that the landlord intended to determine the lease by that notice from that date itself and has given one month time to the tenant to vacate the premises and as such the notice is invalid not being in accordance with Section 106 of the T. P. Act. "it was held that the words hereby terminates would indicate that the landlord intended to determine the lease by that notice from that date itself and has given one month time to the tenant to vacate the premises and as such the notice is invalid not being in accordance with Section 106 of the T. P. Act. This decision, though it appears to lend some support to the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, in my view, has no application to the case on hand. It also seems to run counter to the weight of authority. The principles governing the construction and interpretation of a quit notice under Section 106 of the t. P. Act are well established by a long catena of decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court. In Bhagbandas v. Bhagvandas, AIR 1977 SC 199, the Supreme court held that a notice to quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it, which would render it defective but it must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. In that case, the landlords issued a notice requiring the tenant to vacate the premises "within the month of October, 1962 otherwise he would be treated as trespasser from 1st November, 1962". It was held that the intention of the authors of the notice was clear that they were terminating the tenancy only with effect from the end of the month of October, 1962 and not with effect from any earlier point of time during the currency of that month and the notice was held to be valid. In Bhagyanagar Khadi samithi v. S. B. Chitnis, 1988 (5) ALT 199, a learned Judge of this Court, after referring to the earlier judgments held that the notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act should be construed broadly and it should not be defeated by inaccuracies either in the description of the premises or name of the tenant or the date of the expiry of the notice. From the language used in the quit notice, it must be endeavoured to ascertain the intention of the parties and the effect thereof and it should not be read in hypercritical manner but should be construed in common sense way. In that case the contractual tenancy expired on 31-7-1983 and thereafter the tenant continued in possession as a tenant holding over. In that case the contractual tenancy expired on 31-7-1983 and thereafter the tenant continued in possession as a tenant holding over. The landlord issued a quit notice dated 3-8-1986 terminating the tenancy and requesting the tenant to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the leased premises by the end of August, 1986. However, at the end of the notice, the tenant was asked to vacate the premises by 30th August, 1986 instead of 31st August, 1986. It was held that the mention of the date 30th August was a mistake by oversight or inadvertence or due to a clerical or a typographical mistake and that if the quit notice is read as a whole, an ordinary prudent man will understand that the landlord has determined the tenancy and the tenant is required to vacate the leased premises by the end of the calendar month of August, 1986. In my view the facts of that case are almost similar to the facts of the case on hand. The quit notice in our case is dated 6-7-1993. On the face of it the statement in the concluding* portion of the notice that the lease shall stand terminated on 30-6-1993 makes no sense and it will be an absurdity as 30-6-1993 has already passed. If it is stated in the notice that the lease stood terminated on 30-6-1993, it would be a different thing. On a reading of the entire notice, it is clear that the intention of the landlord was to terminate the tenancy with effect from 31-7-1993. The author of the notice was very much conscious of the fact that 15 days prior notice ending with the month of the tenancy is required under section 106 of the TP Act and accordingly he issued the notice on 6-7-1993 terminating the tenancy with effect from 31-7-1993. The subsequent mention of the date 30-6-1993 is obviously an accidental slip or inadvertent mistake. When once it is found that the mention of the date 30-6-1993 is a mistake, the fact that it is repeated in words is immaterial. If one is a mistake, it follows that the other also is a mistake. In G. K. Krishnan v. Meenakshikutty amma, AIR 1977 Ker. When once it is found that the mention of the date 30-6-1993 is a mistake, the fact that it is repeated in words is immaterial. If one is a mistake, it follows that the other also is a mistake. In G. K. Krishnan v. Meenakshikutty amma, AIR 1977 Ker. 199 , it is held that the benefit of any accidental error or slipshod phraseology in the notice should go to the tenant but wherein a notice of termination by obvious mistake the tenant is called upon to surrender the property on a past date, the mistake could not be made use of by the tenant to defeat the rightful claim of the landlord for eviction. This reasoning also would squarely apply to the facts on hand. For the foregoing reasons, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant on the first point and it is accordingly held against the appellant. Point No. 2 ( 8 ) SO far as the second point is concerned in view of the specific averments made in the quit notice as well as in the plaint to the effect that after the expiry of the lease period the plaintiff allowed the defendant to continue as tenant in the schedule premises with the specific understanding that it shall be deemed to be a month to month tenancy from 1-5-1993, it is not possible to agree with view taken by the Courts below that no quit notice under Section 106 of the t. P. Act is required as the tenancy ended by efflux of time. Though Sri T. Veerabhadraiah, the learned Counsel for the respondent sought to contend that the said averments were mistakenly made by the advocate and the party should not be penalised for a mistake committed by his counsel, I do not find any force in this submission. After all the pleadings are the foundation of the case and a party is bound by his own pleading. Point No. 2 is, therefore, held in favour of the appellant. Point No. 3 ( 9 ) ADMITTEDLY this point was not raised before the Courts below and it is sought to be raised for the first time in these second appeals. However, I feel that it is not a pure question of law unrelated to facts. Point No. 2 is, therefore, held in favour of the appellant. Point No. 3 ( 9 ) ADMITTEDLY this point was not raised before the Courts below and it is sought to be raised for the first time in these second appeals. However, I feel that it is not a pure question of law unrelated to facts. At best it is a mixed question which requires the examination of facts also. Though it is stated in Para 5 of the written statement that the suit premises was obtained by the defendant for running a High School and it is not easy for the defendant to shift the entire establishment to another building within such a short time and particularly during the academic year, no specific reference is made either to Section 26 of the a. P. Education Act or to Rule 10 (22) of the a. P. Educational Institutions (Establishment, recognition, Administration and Control of schools under Private Management) rules, 1993. As such the respondents had no opportunity to put forward their case in this behalf. I am, therefore, of the view that it would be unjust to permit the appellant to raise this question for the first time at the second appellate stage, as it is likely to cause prejudice to the respondents. Even otherwise I am of the view that the said provisions have no application whatsoever to the case on hand. It is true that section 106 of the T. P. Act is subject to any contract or local law or usage to the contrary and if there is any such local law it prevails over the said section. Sub-section (1) of section 26 of the A. P. Education Act, 1982 provides that save as otherwise provided in this Act, no private institution shall be closed down or discontinued unless a notice of not less than one academic year expiring with the end of any academic year and indicating the intention to do so has been given by the manager to the officer authorised by the competent Authority in this behalf. It is, therefore, manifest that the notice contemplated by the said provision is only a notice which is required to be given by the manager of an Education Institution to the competent Authority where the Management proposes to closed down or discontinue the educational institution. It is, therefore, manifest that the notice contemplated by the said provision is only a notice which is required to be given by the manager of an Education Institution to the competent Authority where the Management proposes to closed down or discontinue the educational institution. The said section nowhere lays down that the landlord in respect of the building where the educational institution is being run should also issue a similar notice before filing a suit for eviction. If it was the intention of the legislature to bring a suit of this nature also within the purview of the said section, it would have done so by making a similar provision in this behalf. Likewise Rule 10 (22) of the rules, which provides that prior permission of the Competent Authority is required for shifting the institution from one locality to another by the Management has no application to he present suit. I do not, therefore, find any substance in the third contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant. ( 10 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the second appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. However, considering the fact that an educational institution is being run in the suit premises for the last more than 40 years, the appellant is granted time till the end of the academic year 2000-2001 i. e. 31st May, 2001 for vacating the premises, subject to the condition that the appellant shall pay the damages for use and occupation as per the decrees. These second appeals having been set down for being mentioned on 7-3-2000 at the request of Counsel for the respondent, upon perusing this matter and the judgment in the above case the judgment of the High Court dated 2-3-2000 made in SA Nos. 406 and 407 of 1999 and upon hearing the arguments of both sides. The Court delivered the following judgment: sa Nos. 406 and 407 of 1999 order : At request of the learned counsel for the respondents, this matter is posted today for being mentioned. It is stated that hither-to the appellant has been paying only the agreed rent by virtue of the interim orders obtained by him and that the arrears of damages due as per the decrees upto the end of March, 2000 will be to the tune of Rs. It is stated that hither-to the appellant has been paying only the agreed rent by virtue of the interim orders obtained by him and that the arrears of damages due as per the decrees upto the end of March, 2000 will be to the tune of Rs. 6 lakhs and odd and that some reasonable time may be fixed for payment of the same. Learned Counsel for the appellant prayed for three months time for payment. Accordingly, the appellant is granted three months time from today to deposit the entire arrears of damages as per the decrees upto the end of March, 2000. In future, the damages shall be deposited as decreed by 10th of every succeeding month commencing from April, 2000. The respondents shall be at liberty to withdraw the same without furnishing any security. In the event of default to comply with any of these conditions, the direction granting time till 31st May, 2001 for vacating the premises, shall stand vacated and the decrees shall become executable forth-with.