Honble SHETHNA, J.–The petitioner-Pali Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., Pali (for short ``the Bank) has filed this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution and challenged the impugned order dated 22.7.99 (Annex. 2) passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Jodhpur-respondent No.1 granting an application of the respondent No.2 workman prohibiting the petitioner Bank to contest the claim of the workman through its Advocate. (2). Learned counsel Mr. Mehta for the Bank vehemently submitted that having granted implied permission to represent the Bank through a lawyer, it was not open to the learned Tribunal to revoke such permission by subsequent order dated 22.7.99 on an application submitted by the workman. Mr. Mehta has taken me through the order-sheet at Annex.1 dated 22.6.98. The order-sheet dated 22.6.98 shows that Mr. M.P. Srivastava, the representative of the workman, and Mr. R.K. Kapoor Advocate presented his vakalatnama for the Bank. On subsequent date i.e. on 31.7.98, on behalf of the workman, his representative Mr. M.P. Srivastava was present and for the Bank Mr. Onkar Singh was present and the reply was filed by the Bank. (3). The order-sheet dated 28.8.98 shows that Mr. M.P. Srivastava, the representative of the workman, was present and for the Bank, Mr. Sanjay Kapoor Advocate was present. On that day, on behalf of the workman, an affidavit was filed. On 25.9.98, Mr. M.P. Srivastava, the representative of the workman, was present and Mr. Onkar Singh Cashier of the Bank was present for the Bank. On 30.10.98, Mr. M.P. Srivastava, the representative of the workman, was present and on behalf of the Bank, Mr. R.K. Kapoor Advocate was present. On 23.12.98 Mr. M.P. Srivastava, the representative of the workman, was present and for the Bank, Mr. Kailash Chandra Vyas was present. From the order-sheet dated 29.1.99, it appears that on behalf of the workman. Mr. Lalit Sharma appeared and filed his power in place of Mr. M.P. Srivastava and submitted an application under Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ``the Act) raising an objection that on behalf of the Bank, an Advocate cannot appear. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned from time to time on 26.3.99, 14.5.99 and 18.6.99 for one or the other reasons. (4). On 22.7.99, on behalf of the respondent workman, Mr. Lalit Sharma was present but on behalf of the Bank, no one was present. However, one Mr. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned from time to time on 26.3.99, 14.5.99 and 18.6.99 for one or the other reasons. (4). On 22.7.99, on behalf of the respondent workman, Mr. Lalit Sharma was present but on behalf of the Bank, no one was present. However, one Mr. Moti Lal Solanki Cashier was present without any power, therefore, he was not permitted to participate in the proceedings. (5). The Tribunal after hearing Mr. Lalit Sharma-representative of the workman and considering the application dated 21.1.99 objecting the appearance of an Advocate on behalf of the Bank under Section 36 of the Act, granted the application and refused to grant permission to the Bank to appear through its lawyer by an order dt. 22.7.99. This impugned order dated 22.7.99 (Annex.2) is under challenge in this petition. (6). In support of his submission, learned counsel Mr. Mehta for the Bank has relied upon a Single Bench judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of Calicut Co-operative Milk Supply Union vs. Calicut Co-operative Milk Supply Workers Union and another (1), A photostat copy of the same is produced on the record. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, it was submitted by Mr. Mehta that in this case also when the Bank appeared through its Advocate Mr. R.K. Kapoor on 22.6.98 before the Tribunal, there was an implied consent given by the workman which was never objected on atleast seven (7) occasions and it was for the first time objected on 29.1.99 when another representative Mr. Lalit Sharma appeared for the workman that the Advocate cannot appear for the Bank in view of Section 36 of the Act. He, therefore, submitted that having granted implied permission by the Tribunal on 22.6.98 when Mr. R.K. Kapoor Advocate filed his vakalatnama before the Tribunal, it was not open to the Tribunal to revoke its consent by a subsequent order dated 22.7.99 because there is no such provision under the Act to revoke such implied permission. (7). In Calicuts case (supra), the petitioner Union appeared before the Tribunal through lawyer who filed his vakalatnama on 2.9.83 and the first respondent Union also appeared before the Tribunal through lawyer who filed his vakalatnama on 7.9.83. The other two trade Unions impleaded as parties to the proceedings were not interested in the outcome of the proceedings, therefore, they were not participating in the case. The other two trade Unions impleaded as parties to the proceedings were not interested in the outcome of the proceedings, therefore, they were not participating in the case. However, on 8.11.85, the first respondent filed the petition before the Tribunal praying that it may be allowed to conduct the case without the assistance of the lawyer and that the vakalatnama filed by the counsel on its behalf be cancelled. Simultaneously, it objected the petitioner being represented by the lawyer and prayed that the Tribunal may direct the other Union to dispense with the service of the counsel who has also filed his vakalatnama on behalf of the Union earlier on 2.9.83. The said application was allowed by the Tribunal against which the petitioner Union filed an original petition before the Kerala High Court on the ground that having granted consent earlier, it cannot be revoked in absence of any specific provision under the Act. On facts of that case, it was held by the Kerala High Court that the consent once given by the party entitling the other party to be represented in the proceeding, by a lawyer would ensure to his benefit till the proceeding is finally disposed of. (8). Coming to the facts of the present case, it is clear from the order-sheet Annex.1, that the respondent workman was never appearing through his lawyer. On his behalf, one Mr. M.P. Srivastava was appearing as his representative. On the fourth date of hearing i.e. on 22.6.98, Mr. M.P. Srivastava, representative of the workman, was present and on behalf of the Bank, Mr. R.K. Kapoor appeared and filed his vakalatnama. The copy of the said vakalatnama or the original vakalatnama is not before the Court and in absence of it, it is unable to presume that the workman or his representative granted their consent to the Bank to appear through a lawyer. Later on, the case was adjounred from time to time i.e. on 31.7.98, 28.8.98 and 25.9.98 and on none of those dates, Mr. R.K. Kapoor appeared for the Bank and on behalf of the workman, his representative Mr. M.P. Srivastava was present. Mr. R.K. Kapoor remained present only on 30.10.98 and 27.11.98. It also appears from the order-sheet at Annex.1 that till 23.12.98, Mr. M.P. Srivastava was appearing as the representative of the workman. It is for the first time that on 29.1.99, Mr. M.P. Srivastava was present. Mr. R.K. Kapoor remained present only on 30.10.98 and 27.11.98. It also appears from the order-sheet at Annex.1 that till 23.12.98, Mr. M.P. Srivastava was appearing as the representative of the workman. It is for the first time that on 29.1.99, Mr. Lalit Sharma appeared in place of Mr. M.P. Srivastava as a representative of the workman and filed his power and on that very day, he raised an objection under Section 36 of the Act that the Bank cannot appear through a lawyer. The said application was accepted by the learned Tribunal by an impugned order dated 22.7.99 (Annex.2). (9). I have narrated the different dates and order-sheets in detail so as to point out that at no point of time, the respondent workman was present and he was represented initially by his representative M.P. Srivastava till 23.12.98 and later on by Lalit Sharma and, therefore, it could never be said that the respondent workman had given his consent or implied consent when Mr. R.K. Kapoor filed his vakalatnama before the Tribunal on 22.6.98. It is pertinent to note that Mr. M.P. Srivastava who was earlier representing the respondent workman had never filed any such application. It is also pertinent to note that as soon as Mr. Lalit Sharma replaced Mr. M.P. Srivastava as a representative of the respondent workman on 21.1.99, he immediately filed an application under Section 36 of the Act raising the objection about the appearance of lawyer for the Bank and in my opinion, the said objection was rightly upheld by the learned Tribunal by its order dated 22.7.99. Thus, on facts of this case, the judgment of Kerala High Court in Calicuts case (supra) has no application whatsoever. (10). With greatest respect to the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court, I may state that the learned Judge has not at all considered the provisions of Section 36(3) of the Act which provides that no party to the dispute shall be entitled to be represented by legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under the Act or in any proceedings before the Court. The court includes the Tribunal. The court includes the Tribunal. Thus, there is a clear embargo on a legal practitioner appearing in any proceedings before the Tribunal under Section 36(3) of the Act, however, the said embargo is lifted under Section 36(4) of the Act only if there is a consent of the other parties to the proceedings and that too with the leave of the Tribunal. Under the circumstances, mere filing of the vakalatnama by an Advocate for the Bank before the Tribunal was not sufficient. If the Bank wanted to be represented through its lawyer, then it was expected from the Bank to file an application before the learned Tribunal to that effect and seeking consent from the respondent workman for that, which was not done in this case. That apart, even assuming for the sake of arguments that when vakalatnama was filed by the lawyer for the Bank and the representative of the workman not objected to that, that itself was not sufficient because Section 36(4) of the Act clearly provides that it should be with the leave of the Tribunal. Unless and until the Tribunal grants leave or permission to the Bank to appear through the lawyer, it cannot be presumed that there was a consent. In any case, one can never presume that allowing the Advocate to file his vakalatnama for the Bank before it, the Tribunal deemed to have granted that leave or permission. There should be such order in writing. (11). With all humbleness and respect to the learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court, I am not at all in agreement with the view taken by him that the consent of the party can be inferred either from the surrounding circumstances as also the conduct of the consenting party and consent can be implied or Section 36(4) of the Act does not insist upon a written consent and such consent once given cannot be revoked at a later stage because there is no provision in the Act enabling such withdrawal or revocation. (12). In my humble opinion, the Court cannot infer from surrounding circumstances or from the conduct of the parties and come to the conclusion that there was an implied consent. There is no such provision under the Act which provides for implied consent. Under Section 36(4), there can be consent only in writing. (13). (12). In my humble opinion, the Court cannot infer from surrounding circumstances or from the conduct of the parties and come to the conclusion that there was an implied consent. There is no such provision under the Act which provides for implied consent. Under Section 36(4), there can be consent only in writing. (13). Under the circumstances, with the change of the representative of the respondent workman, when an application was filed before the Tribunal objecting the appearance of the Advocate of the Bank before the Tribunal in the proceedings and if that application is granted by the impugned order at Annex.2, then it is not possible for this Court to interfere with such order which was wholly just and proper and passed in accordance with law and in the right spirit of Section 36(4) of the Act. (14). In view of the above discussion, this petition fails and is dismissed. (15). Interim order granted earlier stands vacated forthwith. (16). Now, the Tribunal shall go on with the case and decide the same in accordance with law as early as possible.