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2000 DIGILAW 1530 (PNJ)

Gurpal Singh v. Avtar Singh

2000-12-12

V.S.AGGARWAL

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JUDGMENT V.S. Aggarwal, J. - This is an appeal preferred by Gurpal Singh, hereinafter described as "the appellant" directed against the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jalandhar, dated 13.12.1985. By virtue of the impugned award, the learned Tribunal had dismissed the claim petition filed by the appellant. 2. The relevant facts are that the appellant is about 38 years of age. He is an agriculturist by profession. As per his claim, on 6.4.1984 he was going to village Maiwal Arian, Tehsil Nakodar, on his tractor No. 8936 in order to meet his relations. He was driving the tractor at a moderate speed. When he reached near the Dera of Didar Singh in village Malsian, Tehsil Nakodar, Bus No. PJQ 5741 driven by Avtar Singh came at a high speed from Shahkot side. It struck against the tractor of the appellant as the result of which he received grievous injuries and suffered fracture of his right thigh and right arm. He was removed to Civil Hospital, Shahkot. He was given first aid and, therefore, removed to Bawa Hospital, Jalandhar. He remained admitted there for several days. On 25.3.1985, he was operated upon. A case was registered by the police on the basis of the statement of Karam Singh, father of the appellant. The appellant was under great mental agony and depression and was handicapped. He was unable to do his agricultural work. A compensation of Rs. 10 lacs was claimed. It has further been pleaded that because of the depression and the illness, he could not file the claim petition in time and accordingly it was prayed that the delay in filing of the petition may be condoned. 3. The petition has been contested. The respondents filed their separate written statements. Respondent Avtar Singh in his written statement pleaded that the claim petition is barred by time and further that no such accident took place. He further contended that the amount of compensation claimed is excessive. However, it was admitted that a criminal case had been registered after 17 days of the accident. The owner of the bus i.e. M/s. Amar Doaba Bus Service Lambra, in the separate written statement took up a similar plea. 4. Respondent No. 3, the Oriental Insurance Company, filed its separate reply and urged that the income claimed by the appellant is excessive. The owner of the bus i.e. M/s. Amar Doaba Bus Service Lambra, in the separate written statement took up a similar plea. 4. Respondent No. 3, the Oriental Insurance Company, filed its separate reply and urged that the income claimed by the appellant is excessive. It also denied the manner in which the accident took place (as alleged by the appellant). Liability to pay the compensation by the Insurance Company was denied. The plea raised was that the driver did not hold a valid driving licence. The vehicle did not have a fitness certificate. 5. The learned Tribunal framed the issues and recorded the evidence. With respect to the claim as to if there was just and sufficient ground for condonation of delay, the learned Tribunal held the claim petition has been filed after six months of the accident. The injured appellant had been discharged from the hospital after about 16-17 days of the operation i.e. 6.4.1984. He could very well file the claim petition during that period because he was again admitted only on 25.3.1985. It was concluded that there was no just and sufficient ground for condonation of delay. All the same, the learned Tribunal went into the controversy and assessed the compensation at Rs. 5,000/- because it was held that there is no other evidence to show as to what was the amount spent by the injured. It was further held that it was the driver of the bus who was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. Aggrieved by the same, present appeal has been preferred. 6. The first and the foremost question that comes up for consideration is as to if the application for seeking condonation of delay in filing the claim petition was rightly rejected or not ? In the application filed seeking condonation of delay, it had been pleaded that the accident took place on 6.4.1984. The appellant suffered fracture of the right arm and high. He was removed to Bawa Hospital, Jalandhar, for better treatment and operated upon on 25.3.1985. Due to mental depression and agony, he remained oblivious and could not file the claim petition. It was on 25.3.1985 that he handed over the papers to his counsel and in these circumstances the delay took place. 7. In the reply that has been filed, it has been insisted that there is no ground for condonation of delay. Due to mental depression and agony, he remained oblivious and could not file the claim petition. It was on 25.3.1985 that he handed over the papers to his counsel and in these circumstances the delay took place. 7. In the reply that has been filed, it has been insisted that there is no ground for condonation of delay. The delay is wilful and intentional. When the appellant was discharged from the hospital, he could file the claim petition at the appropriate time. 8. Sub-Section (3) of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, reads as under :- "(3) No application for compensation under this Section shall be entertained unless it is within six months of the occurrence of the accident : Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time." In this process, the Tribunal, indeed, had the jurisdiction to consider and see if there was just and sufficient ground for condonation of delay or not. 9. The law on the subject is not subject-matter of such controversy. A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Pijush Kanti Ghosh v. Smt. Maya Rani Chatterjee and others, AIR 1971 Calcutta 229, went on to hold that strict principles of limitation cannot be applied to sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short "the Act"). The precise findings were as under :- "Provision in sub-section (3) of Section 110-A is not a provision of limitation creating or extinguishing rights of parties. It is only a limit to the powers of Tribunal to entertain application for compensation. As such the principles and decisions that govern matters under Section 5, Limitation Act do not directly apply, though the Tribunal in exercise of discretion by the Proviso may and should keep in mind those principles, particularly in considering the question whether the applicant was prevented by sufficient causes from making the application in time..." 10. Judicial Commissioner, Goa, in the case of Branch Manager, The British Indian General Insurance Co. Judicial Commissioner, Goa, in the case of Branch Manager, The British Indian General Insurance Co. Ltd. Margao v. Chanbi Shaikh Abdul Kadar, AIR 1968 Goa, Daman & Diu 78, also referred to the object of the Act and took up the view that the provisions of Section 110-A(3) of the Act have to be construed liberally keeping in view the object of the Act. Identical is the view of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi and another v. Punjab Roadways, Ambala City and others, (1964)66 P.L.R. 156. This Court also held that a liberal construction has to be given though in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the judgment are illuminating and read as under :- "(19) This brings us to the consideration of the question whether the Tribunal was justified in extending the period of limitation. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the expression "sufficient cause" as used in the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act has to be interpreted in the same sense in which it is used in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and no sufficient cause for extension of time was made out in the present case. (20) Even dealing with a case under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, this Court has taken the view that the words "sufficient cause" would receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice where no serious negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputed to the claimant. Reference in this connection may be made to Shakuntala Devi v. Kashmirchand, AIR 1961 Punj 184. Generally the discretion exercised by a subordinate Court in extending the period of limitation finding that sufficient cause had been made out, is not to be interfered with unless it can be said that in exercising its discretion the Court had acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts and adopted an unjudicial approach. (21) On a careful consideration of the various facts and the circumstances brought on record, we find that it was an eminently fit case for extension of time, and the learned Tribunal quite properly exercised its powers under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 110-A." 11. (21) On a careful consideration of the various facts and the circumstances brought on record, we find that it was an eminently fit case for extension of time, and the learned Tribunal quite properly exercised its powers under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 110-A." 11. It is abundantly clear from the aforesaid that while constructing sub- section (3) to Section 110-A of the Act, the expression "sufficient cause" ordinarily has to be given the same meaning as under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. Even Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally to enhance the ends of justice. The compensation is provided to the people who have suffered bodily injuries and in case of death to the legal representatives. It is an enactment for the benefit of those persons. Therefore, the discretion has to go accordingly. 12. It transpired in the evidence of the appellant that though he was discharged from the hospital, he was suffering from mental agony and depression. He also stated that his father has been contacting the lawyers to file the claim petition. It is abundantly clear that the appellant had not given up the claim or was lethargic. Obviously, because of the mental depression, he failed to file the claim petition within time. The statement when read as a whole does indicate that there was sufficient ground for not filing the petition within time. Accordingly, taking stock of the totality of the circumstances, the delay in filing the claim petition is condoned. 13. There was no dispute raised regarding the finding of the learned Tribunal about the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that the compensation awarded is totally inadequate. 14. As mentioned above, the learned Tribunal has taken note of the fact that there is no evidence to indicate as to what was the amount spent in the hospital. Therefore, the medical expenses claimed were disallowed. There was no bill that has been produced. The learned Tribunal, thus, had also thought it appropriate to calculate the pain and suffering and for that Rs. 5000/- had been allowed. A perusal of the evidence, indeed, shows that even the Medical Officers have not stated as to how much charges were received from the appellant for the period he remained in the hospital. The learned Tribunal, thus, had also thought it appropriate to calculate the pain and suffering and for that Rs. 5000/- had been allowed. A perusal of the evidence, indeed, shows that even the Medical Officers have not stated as to how much charges were received from the appellant for the period he remained in the hospital. The adverse inference necessarily has to be drawn for not filing the receipt and the voucher regarding the said purpose. However, a fact that has been proved is that there was an accident and the appellant was operated upon. In that view of the matter, one cannot keep the common sense in cold storage. Certain expenses necessarily had been incurred. The expenses, therefore, can easily be calculated at Rs. 5000/- Thus, the appellant would be entitled to Rs. 10,000/- in all i.e. Rs. 5,000/- as medical expenses and Rs. 5000/- for pain and suffering. 15. For these reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugned award is set aside. Instead, it is directed that the respondents shall jointly and severally be liable to pay Rs. 10,000/- as compensation to the appellant. The respondents would also be liable to pay interest at the rate of 12% from the date of filing of the petition till final payment is made. Appeal allowed.