D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is landlords revision under Section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Control Act (for short "the Act") challenging the non-concurrent judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court. The respondent - tenant has been served, but neither he is present nor any counsel has been engaged by him. As such Shri Mehul S. Shah for the revisionist has been heard and the Judgments of the two courts below and the relevant materials on record were examined. ( 2 ) BRIEF facts giving rise to this revision are as under : the demised property consisting of one room on the ground floor and two rooms on the first floor were let out by the revisionist to the respondent on monthly rent of Rs. 45. 00. In the plaint it was stated that this was also the standard rent, but in the notice of demand it was not mentioned that this was the standard rent, rather it was stated in the notice that it was contractual rate of rent. In addition to this, under the Agreement the respondent was to pay Rs. 3. 00 per month towards electricity charges. Rent and electricity charges upto 9. 1. 1974 were paid by the respondent and since 10. 1. 1974 Rs. 960. 00 became due towards rent and electricity charges. Notice of demand was sent on 22. 9. 1975, which was served on the tenant. The tenant respondent failed to pay the arrears of rent within one month of service of notice of demand and also failed to raise dispute of standard rent in the reply notice sent within a month of service of notice of demand. Consequently the Suit for eviction of the respondent and for recovery of arrears of rent, mesne profit, electricity charges and expenses for serving notice, etc. was filed. ( 3 ) THE tenants plea in the written statement was that the agreed rent was Rs. 13. 00 p. m. He did not raise dispute regarding electricity charges at Rs. 3. 00 p. m. The extent of accommodation let out to him was also not disputed by him. It was, however, pleaded that the rent from 10. 1. 1975 was sent by Money Order which was refused by the landlord. 13. 00 p. m. He did not raise dispute regarding electricity charges at Rs. 3. 00 p. m. The extent of accommodation let out to him was also not disputed by him. It was, however, pleaded that the rent from 10. 1. 1975 was sent by Money Order which was refused by the landlord. In this view of the matter it was pleaded that the tenant did not commit default in payment of rent and that the landlord was not issuing receipts for payment of rent. In the written statement, for the first time, dispute of standard rent was raised and according to the respondent even Rs. 13. 00 p. m. was excessive rent and the standard rent was less than this amount. ( 4 ) THE trial court, after considering the evidence on record, determined the standard rent at Rs. 45. 00 p. m. It observed that the tenant did not dispute the standard rent within a month of service of notice of demand and as such the case was covered by Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act. The trial Court further found that no amount was tendered or paid to the landlord within a month of service of notice of demand. With these findings the Suit for eviction of the respondent defendant and for recovery of rent, mesne profit, electricity charges, was decreed. Feeling aggrieved the tenant preferred Appeal. The Lower Appellate Court, however, concluded that since there was dispute of standard rent, the case was not covered by Section 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act. The Appellate Court did not agree with the findings of the trial Court that the standard rent could be Rs. 45. 00 p. m. On the other hand it found that Rs. 13. 00 p. m. could be reasonable standard rent. With these findings the decree for eviction was set aside by the lower Appellate Court and the decree for arrears of rent and mesene profit was accordingly modified. It is, therefore, this revision by the landlord. ( 5 ) AS indicated above since none has appeared from the side of the tenant - respondent the learned Counsel for the revisionist was heard and the material on record was examined. It is, therefore, this revision by the landlord. ( 5 ) AS indicated above since none has appeared from the side of the tenant - respondent the learned Counsel for the revisionist was heard and the material on record was examined. ( 6 ) THE first point for consideration in this revision is whether non-concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower Appellate Court regarding standard rent can be interfered in this revision. Normally the finding on standard rent is a finding of fact and unless it is found to be perverse or based upon misappropriation of evidence on record it cannot be interfered by the revisional Court. Likewise if it is found that the finding has been based on irrelevant consideration other than the material on record such finding can be interfered by the revisional Court. ( 7 ) THE trial Court after considering the entire material on record found that belated dispute of standard rent raised in the written statement by the tenant was malafide and in any event the reasonable standard rent could be Rs. 45. 00 p. m. which was also the agreed contractual rate of rent amongst the parties. The appellate Court, however, considered the annual letting value at Rs. 156/- and on the basis of this figure it calculated the standard rent to be Rs. 13. 00 p. m. The tenant respondent in the written statement did not disclose any amount which could be reasonable standard rent for the three roomed accommodation. Annual letting value was naturally for the entire house. The lower Appellate Court has also relied upon evidence that one room was let out to another tenant Mohmadali at Rs. 13/p. m. That room also forms part of entire accommodation including three roomed accommodation let out to the respondent. Consequently on the basis of annual letting value of Rs. 156. 00 the standard rent of the disputed premises could not be held to be Rs. 13. 00 p. m. Mohmedali was let out only one room at Rs. 13. 00 p. m. If this was so then the annual letting value of the room let out to Mohmedali alone could be Rs. 156. 00 p. a. As such this figure does not include annual letting value of the three rooms which were let out to the respondent. 13. 00 p. m. If this was so then the annual letting value of the room let out to Mohmedali alone could be Rs. 156. 00 p. a. As such this figure does not include annual letting value of the three rooms which were let out to the respondent. Since the trial Court was misled by this figure it can be said that the evidence was not properly appreciated rather it was misread inasmuch as it was not taken into consideration what should have been the annual letting value of three rooms let out to the respondent. ( 8 ) THE second ground which weighed with the appellate Court was that the counter-foils filed by the landlord were liable to be rejected. For this no cogent reason has been given by the Lower Appellate Court. The rent receipts were issued and counter foils were maintained by the landlord. It, therefore, follow that the defendants version that the receipts were not issued by the landlord was not worthy of belief. Arbitrary rejection of counter-foils from evidence is also a ground for interference in the revision because it can safely be said that the findings were recorded ignoring the relevant and material evidence on the point which could have turned the scale in favour of the other side. For these two reasons I am of the view that the standard rent fixed by the lower Appellate Court is arbitrary and is based on mis-appreciation of evidence on record and also ignoring material evidence on record. Consequently this finding of the Appellate Court has to be set aside and the finding of the trial court fixing the standard rent at Rs. 45. 00 has to be accepted. ( 9 ) THE second point for determination is whether the decree for eviction passed by the trial Court was in accordance with law and it was illegally set aside by the lower Appellate Court. For this, the provisions of Section 12 (3) (a) have to be kept in mind. It has to be seen whether it was a case of monthly tenancy. On this point there is no dispute between the parties. It is not a case where educational cess and other things were to be paid by the tenant along with rent. Electricity charges at the rate of Rs. 3. It has to be seen whether it was a case of monthly tenancy. On this point there is no dispute between the parties. It is not a case where educational cess and other things were to be paid by the tenant along with rent. Electricity charges at the rate of Rs. 3. 00 p. m. were to be paid seperately and it could not form part of the rent. Consequently it is established that it was a case of monthly tenancy. ( 10 ) THE next point for consideration is whether the dispute of standard rent was raised by the tenant within a month of service of notice of demand. The notice of demand Ex. 73 is dated 22. 9. 1975 which was served on the respondent on 23. 9. 1975. Ex. 78 is the reply notice dated 26. 9. 1975 sent by the defendant respondent. The copy of this as well as copy of reply notice were read over before me and translated. In the notice Ex. 73 it was not mentioned that Rs. 45. 00 p. m. denoted the standard rent. On the other hand at two place in the notice it was specifically mentioned that the agreed rate of rent for three rooms was at Rs. 45. 00 p. m. and Rs. 3. 00 p. m. were charged seperately towards electricity charges. In the reply notice dated 26. 9. 1975 vide Ex. 78 the respondent simply denied that Rs. 45. 00 p. m. represented the contractual rent. On the other hand according to him contractual rate of rent is Rs. 13. 00 p. m. Thus, from the reply notice it is clear that there was dispute regarding agreed rent between the parties and not about the standard rent of the disputed premises. The dispute of standard rent was for the first time raised in the written statement filed by the tenant respondent probably on the ground that in the plaint it was mentioned that Rs. 45. 00 p. m. is agreed rent as well as standard rent. The written statement was obviously filed on 9. 3. 1977 i. e. after a month of service of notice of demand. 45. 00 p. m. is agreed rent as well as standard rent. The written statement was obviously filed on 9. 3. 1977 i. e. after a month of service of notice of demand. The question is whether raising of dispute of standard rent in the written statement filed beyond one month of service of notice can be said to be a dispute of standard rent within the meaning of Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act. This question came up for consideration before the Full Bench of this Court (in the case of Ramniklal Dwarkadas Modi v/s. Mohanlal Laxmichand and Ors. , reported in 1977 (XVIII) G. L. R. 32) whether the question was referred to the Full Bench for determination whether it is not sufficient to raise a dispute as to the standard rent within one month in reply to the notice or even prior to the date of such demand of rent but it is necessary in either case also to make an application under Section 11 of the Bombay Rent Act within one month of the notice referred in Section 12 (2) of the Act in order to avoid decree of eviction under Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act. The answer of the Full Bench to this question in Para : 12 has been that a dispute as to the standard rent can be raised in any other manner like giving a notice disputing the standard rent prior to the demand notice under Section 12 (2) or by way of reply within one month of such notice. It is not that the only manner in which the dispute regarding standard rent can be brought into existence, for taking a case out of Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act, is to make an application for fixing the standard rent within one month of service of notice of demand. The Full Bench in Para : 11 of the Judgment has summarised the correct position of law as under : 11. WE completely agree with the position of law on the point in issue enunciated in Ambalals case and the reasons of our agreement are as set out in the said judgment and it is not necessary to repeat the same. WE completely agree with the position of law on the point in issue enunciated in Ambalals case and the reasons of our agreement are as set out in the said judgment and it is not necessary to repeat the same. To summarise the correct proposition of law on the point in issue : (A) If the tenant files an application to the Court under Section 11 (3) of the Act within the period of one month of the receipt of the notice referred to in Sec. 12 (2) of the Act, he shall be deemed to be ready and willing to pay the rent and permitted increases specified in the order made by the Court as per provisions of Section 12 read with the Explanation. (B) The tenant can also establish his readiness and willingness to pay the rent due by any other mode than the one indicated in the Explanation read with Sec. 12 of the Act, as for example, by tendering the demanded amount of rent in cash within one month of the receipt of the notice referred to in Sec. 12 (2) of the Act. This illustration regarding payment in cash is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. (C) The tenant can also claim protection from the operation of Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act by raising a dispute as to the standard rent either prior to the notice under Sec. 12 (2) of the Act or by reply to the notice but in this case the tenant must do so within one month from the receipt of the notice referred to in Sec. 12 (2) of the Act. From the third condition mentioned in clause (c) of Para : 11 it is obvious that according to the Full Bench of this Court the dispute regarding standard rent can be raised prior to the service of notice of demand. Likewise it can also be raised after service of notice of demand but then the time limit for raising such dispute is one month from the date of service of notice of demand. The next manner of raising dispute is by moving an application under Sec. 11 for fixation of standard rent. ( 11 ) IN Shah Ambalal Chhotalal v/s. Shah Babaldas Dahyabhai, reported in 3 G. L. R. 625 also similar view was taken. The next manner of raising dispute is by moving an application under Sec. 11 for fixation of standard rent. ( 11 ) IN Shah Ambalal Chhotalal v/s. Shah Babaldas Dahyabhai, reported in 3 G. L. R. 625 also similar view was taken. The Apex Court in Harbanslal Jagmohandas v/s. Prabhudas Shivlal, reported in 78 B. L. R. 213, had to resolve the question as to whether on receipt of notice from the landlord terminating the tenancy on the ground of arrears of rent the dispute as to the standard rent had to be raised before expiry of one month after service of notice. The Apex Court held that in order to avoid operation of Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act dispute as regard the standard rent or permitted increase must be raised latest before expiry of one month from the date of service of notice u/s. 12 (2) of the Act and it was not enough to raise dispute for the first time in the written statement (emphasis supplied ). It is thus clear that if the dispute of standard rent is raised for the first time in the written statement it cannot be a ground for excluding the operation of the provisions of Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act. ( 12 ) THE Bombay High Court in Dattu Subhana v/s. Gajanan Vithoba, reported in 73 B. L. R. 371 took the view that the tenant could raise dispute as to the standard rent by raising issue to the standard rent in the written statement and in taking this view the Bombay High Courtt relied upon Section 11 (4) of the Act. On this point the Apex Court affirmed the decision of this High Court in Amablals case (supra) and rejected the view of the Bombay High Court in Dattu Subhanas case (supra) observing as under :"the view of the Bombay High Court overlooks the limitation of time within which a dispute is to be raised as to standard rent. The view of the Bombay High Court is that disputing within one month of the service of the notice terminating the tenancy is one mode of raising a dispute and there is another mode of raising the dispute at any stage of the Suit. The view of the Bombay High Court is that disputing within one month of the service of the notice terminating the tenancy is one mode of raising a dispute and there is another mode of raising the dispute at any stage of the Suit. The view of the Bombay High Court nullifies the provisions contained in Sec. 12 and Explanation thereto and confers a right on the tenant where the legislation does not contemplate such a right. THE provisions in Section 11 (3) of the Actt deal with orders which may be passed by the Court during the pendency of the application disputing the rent. Provisions in Sec. 11 (4) of the Act deal with orders which may be passed consequent upon dispute as to rent. It is only when an application disputing rent is made within the time contemplated by Explanation I to Sec. 12 of the Act that the provisions in sub. sec. (3) and (4) of Sec. 11 are attracted. " ( 13 ) THUS, interpretation of the Bombay High Court on Section 11 (4) of the Act was not approved by the Apex Court and the view taken by this Court, on the other hand, was approved by the Apex Court. Consequently raising of dispute of standard rent by the tenant for the first time in the written statement can not take out the case from the ambit of Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act. ( 14 ) ON the factual side in this case it is established that more than six months rent was due from the respondent. Service of notice of demand is admitted. Admittedly no rent was tendered or paid to the landlord revisionist within one month of service of notice of demand. There is vague allegation that rent was remitted by Money Order, but it was refused. However, it could not be shown that the money order was tendered within a month of service of notice of demand by the tenant respondent. Consequently the provisions of Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act were fully made out and the view taken by the lower Appellate Court that the tenant is not liable for eviction is erroneous in law. Once, it is found that the case is covered by Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act the Courts below should have no option but to decree the Suit. Once, it is found that the case is covered by Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act the Courts below should have no option but to decree the Suit. The view taken by the trial Court therefore that the tenant was liable for eviction and was also liable to pay the standard rent at the rate of Rs. 45/p. m. is correct and the view to the contrary taken by the Lower Appellate Court is erroneous. ( 15 ) IN view of the above discussions the revision succeeds and is allowed. The Judgment and Decree of the Lower Appellate Court are set aside whereas the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court are restored. No order as to costs. .