JUDGMENT 1. - These three revisions have been filed by the petitioners against three orders passed by the learned trial court on 20.8.1998 in three suits being Nos. 13, 12, and 14 of 1998 respectively. The parties to the litigation in all these three revisions are virtually common in as much as the petitioner in the three revisions is the same while the non-petitioner-plaintiff in Revision No. 817/98 is the son of plaintiff-non-petitioner in Revision No. 814/98. While the plaintiff-non-petitioner in Revision No. 815/98 is the wife of plaintiff-non petitioner in Revision No. 814/98. The facts of the three suits and the questions involved in the three revisions are practically identical. hence all these three revisions are being decided by this common order. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs filed the suit under O. 37 C.P.C. alleging that on different dates mentioned in different plaints, the plaintiff deposited different amounts covered by different suits with the to defendant's authorised representative Shri Chandan Singh (who happens to be the sole proprietor) in Jodhpur by way of demand draft, which amount was deposited with a oral stipulation to yield 18% interest, and that if the interest is not received voluntarily by the plaintiff, the amount of interest shall accumulate in the principle amount and would further yield interest at the same rate. It was also stipulated that interest amount shall be payable after every six months. The receipt for having received that draft in Jodhpur has been filed along with the plaint. The plaintiff's further case is that after expiry of first six months since the date of deposit, the interest was paid by the defendant which was remitted to the plaintiff by way of demand draft payable at Jodhpur, which was duly received and deposited by the plaintiff in the bank account. In the case of plaintiff Amit it is further pleaded that thereafter the defendant sent another sum of Rs. 60,000/- by way of demand draft of UCO Bank, Jodhpur on 6.3.95. The plaintiff's further case in all the three cases is that the amount of accruing interest was continued to accumulate with the defendant, the defendant showed the statement of account from time to time showing the credited interest. 60,000/- by way of demand draft of UCO Bank, Jodhpur on 6.3.95. The plaintiff's further case in all the three cases is that the amount of accruing interest was continued to accumulate with the defendant, the defendant showed the statement of account from time to time showing the credited interest. It was then alleged that on 3.2.98 the plaintiff made a demand of the aforesaid amount by serving registered notice through advocate, as on being orally requested on telephone the defendant gave evasive reply. According to the plaintiff's averment since the suit is so based on the written document (receipt of deposit in the form of demand draft) it being a written contract, the suit is cognizable under O. 37. 3. After filation of the suit summons were sent to the defendant for appearance, who entered appearance and thereafter on plaintiff filing the requisites, summons for judgment were also served on the defendant. After receipt of summon for judgment the defendant submitted an application under O. 37 Rule 3(5) read with section 151 C.P.C. and also filed an affidavit of one Piyus Mahendra Bhai Acharya, purported power of attorney holder of Chandan Singh, the proprietor of defendant petitioner M/s. Ransi Roadways, seeking leave to defend. This application was contested on the side of the plaintiffs. The learned trial court vide impugned order, dismissed the said application. Thereafter the petitioner filed yet another application before learned trial court purportedly under Section 151 C.P.C. seeking to recall the impugned order, and then also filed a review petition seeking to review the impugned order. In this review petition the petitioner sought to raise few more grounds of defence to the suit. It is a different story that the review petition was not supported by an affidavit. Be that as it may. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner by relying upon various judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court being reported in Mechalec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment, AIR 1977 SC 577 , Mrs. It is a different story that the review petition was not supported by an affidavit. Be that as it may. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner by relying upon various judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court being reported in Mechalec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment, AIR 1977 SC 577 , Mrs. Raj Duggal v. Ramesh Kumar Bansal, AIR 1990 SC 2218 and M/s. Sunil Enterprises and another v. SBI Commercial and International Bank Ltd., AIR 1998 SC 2317 strenuously assailed the impugned order by contending that the learned trial court has clearly travelled beyond its jurisdiction in proceeding to decline the leave to defend by embarking upon merits of the suit, so also on the merits of the objection raised in application for leave to defend Another submission made was that in the document being subject matter of the suit, there is no stipulation of interest still the plaintiff has claimed interest, and therefore it cannot be said that within the meaning of the parameters propounded by Hon'ble the Supreme Court the defendant had no defence, or that the defence set up is illusory, or sham, or practically moonshine. It was also contended that the learned trial court has not even considered the question as to whether the suit was at all maintainable under O. 37 C.P.C., as the receipt which is the basis of the suit is neither a written contract, nor is it a negotiable instrument, nor does the suit fall in any of the clauses (ii). (iii) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of 0. 37. The next submission made was that even on the averments of the plaint itself, and from the material on record, the suit was ex-facie barred by time, therefore, also the petitioner was entitled to be granted unconditional leave to defend. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the document (receipt) also did require an interpretation as to its nature, and the question about liability of the defendant, and whenever a question of interpretation of plaintiff's document is involved the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the document (receipt) also did require an interpretation as to its nature, and the question about liability of the defendant, and whenever a question of interpretation of plaintiff's document is involved the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. 5. Controverting these submissions learned counsel for the plaintiff non-petitioner contended that a look at the language of O. 37 Rule 3(5) would show that the defendant after service of summons for judgment is to apply for leave to defend by `disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend' and such facts may be disclosed by affidavit or otherwise. It was also contended that a look at the first proviso would show that leave to defend may be refused if the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate that he has a substantial defence to indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise or that the defence intended to be put up by the defendant is frivolous or vexatious", on this basis it was contended that, the learned trial court, while considering the application for leave to defend, was supposed to examine only the facts pleaded and contention raised by the defendant in his application for leave to defend and was not entitled to even permit the defendant to argue any other defences for seeking leave to defend, which have not been pleaded in the application. Elaborating the argument it has been contended further that in the suit of Amit, no objection on the anvil of Suit being barred by time has been raised, while no ground has been taken in the application for leave to defend about the suit not falling under O. 37 C.P.C. on account of it being not based on a written contract, nor it has been contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim interest, or that the document on the basis of which the suit is filed does not attract any liability of the defendant, or that it requires any interpretation, or the like. It is also contended that the petitioner in his entire application for leave to defend has no where even disputed to have received the draft has no where even disputed to have received the draft by way of deposit, to have paid interest on the expiry of first six months, has not denied the draft to have been received by Shri Chandan Singh (proprietor of defendant Ransi Roadways) himself in Jodhpur, rather it has been admitted so that the draft which was given to the defendant by the plaintiff regarding the disputed amount was encashed by the defendant. In such circumstances it is contended that the facts disclosed in the application for leave to defend, on any parameters do not entitle the petitioner to any leave to defend, as the defence intended to be put up was clearly frivolous or vexatious, as the defendant simply wanted to avoid payment of amount received by the petitioner by way of deposit. Replying the contention about limitation which has been raised in the two suits of Bhikam Chand and Harshlata, it has been contended that the amount was given to the defendant as deposit, and therefore, according to the learned counsel in absence of any stipulation to the contrary about the deposit being refundable only either before or after a specified date, the suit is clearly covered by Article 22 of the Limitation Act, as there are only two articles which could cover the controversy one being to Article 21 and other being Article 22. Both being mutually exclusive, and since the matter is not covered by Article 21 it has rightly been held by the learned trial court to be covered by Article 22, and since, in the application for leave to defend, the defendant has not disclosed or pleaded any fact entitling the defendant to have the limitation computed, from any earlier date the objection of limitation also cannot be said to be a substantial defence available to be raised to the defendant. It is contended that on the other hand the defendant has pleaded that the plaintiff never made any demand for payment of the amount.Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the record and impugned order, I am of the view that the revision petitions have no merit. 6. It is contended that on the other hand the defendant has pleaded that the plaintiff never made any demand for payment of the amount.Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the record and impugned order, I am of the view that the revision petitions have no merit. 6. So far as the various judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court cited by the petitioner as referred above are concerned, with all respect there is no dispute about the proposition of law laid down therein. I am fully alive to the guidelines given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, and the only question is as to whether on those guidelines the petitioner is entitled to leave to defend, whether unconditional, or on conditions, or has rightly been refused leave to defend? 7. At the outset I may observe that in view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in rejoinder, it is clear that there is no dispute between the parties that for deciding the question as to whether the defendant is to be granted leave to defend or not, only the facts as disclosed In the application for leave to defend are to be considered and on those facts the Court is to come to conclusion either ways as to whether those facts indicate if the defendant has substantial defence to raise or not. In other words if the facts disclosed in the application for leave to defend satisfy the Court that he has a good defence to the claim on its merit or that they raise a triable issue indicating that defendant has a fair or bonafide or reasonable defence although not a positively good defence, the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave. Then if the defendant discloses such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend i.e. the affidavit does not positively and immediately make it clear that he has a defence, yet shows such a state of facts as leads to the inference that at the trial of the action he may be able to establish a defence to the plaintiff's claim, the defendant is entitled to leave to defend on certain terms. In this view of the matter I have to see as to whether the learned trial court has rightly considered and decided the petitioner's application for leave to defend. 8. In this view of the matter I have to see as to whether the learned trial court has rightly considered and decided the petitioner's application for leave to defend. 8. In view of the above I am only to see the facts disclosed in the application for leave to defend. A look at the application shows that the first ground taken is that in the plaint requisite expression is not inserted about the suit being under O. 37 C.P.C. immediately after case number. This objection has been rightly dealt with by the learned trial court, in as much as before commencement of the pleading and immediately after defendant's name it is mentioned that the suit is for recovery of the amount mentioned and thereafter it is mentioned that the suit is under O. 37 CRC. That apart after receiving summons under O. 37 Rule 2 the defendant entered appearance, then he was served summons for judgments whereupon he did apply for leave to defend and thus the defendant was well aware that the suit is one under O. 37 C.P.C., and therefore, this has rightly been held to be not providing any defence to the defendant. 9. The next objection taken is regarding territorial jurisdiction of the learned trial court and for raising this objection of the defence the facts disclosed are that from the stipulation printed on the top of the receipt regarding jurisdiction it is clear that if any dispute arises between the parties, only Ahmedabad shall have the territorial jurisdiction, and since this is an agreement, Jodhpur Court have no jurisdiction. The other facts disclosed is that the draft given by the plaintiff to the defendant was encashed in Ahmedabad from bank at Ahmedabad and the receipt was given at Ahmedabad, only Ahmedabad court has territorial jurisdiction. On these facts it is contended that the defendant is entitled to leave to defend. The learned trial court has considered this contention and has found that the stipulation printed on the receipt cannot be said to be having the effect of excluding the jurisdiction of all other courts and conferring exclusive territorial jurisdiction on Ahmedabad Courts. The learned trial court has further found that the defendant has not disputed that the draft was delivered to the defendant at Jodhpur and that the first payment of interest was also made to the plaintiff at Jodhpur. The learned trial court has further found that the defendant has not disputed that the draft was delivered to the defendant at Jodhpur and that the first payment of interest was also made to the plaintiff at Jodhpur. Considering these facts by relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. A.P. Agencies, AIR 1989 SC 1239 , has found that the facts disclosed regarding jurisdiction do not provide any defence to the defendant. 10. In my view assuming facts disclosed in the application for leave to defend relating to the objection of jurisdiction, being that there is printed condition on the receipt, the defendant having encashed draft at Ahmedabad, and having given the receipt in Ahmedabad, these facts do not indicate that at the trial of the action he may be able to establish a defence to the plaintiff's claim, more particularly in view of defendant having not denied to have received the draft from the plaintiff in Jodhpur, and to have sent the first remittance of interest to the plaintiff at Jodhpur. Coming to the legal aspect of the consequence of the facts disclosed by the defendant in the application for leave to defend, in my view the learned trial court has rightly followed the judgment in A.B.C. Laminart's case. 11. Thus so far as the controversy involved in Amit's case, it stands completely answered against the petitioner. 12. Coming to the cases for Bhikam Chand and Harshlata where an objection of limitation has also been taken. The facts disclosed in the application for leave to defend regarding limitation are only contained in para 3 of the application being that the plaintiff has alleged to have paid the amount by draft on 27.9.93 and thereafter the defendant to have paid interest on 13.4.94, thereafter no payment was made by the defendant nor any demand was made by the plaintiff. Suffice it to say that the plaintiff has so alleged that the plaintiff made a demand of the amount on telephone and there. by serving a notice through advocate on 3.2.98. It is significant to note that whether rightly, or even wrongly, the defendant has not even dared to aver that no notice was received by him, or that no demand was made from i him by the plaintiff. by serving a notice through advocate on 3.2.98. It is significant to note that whether rightly, or even wrongly, the defendant has not even dared to aver that no notice was received by him, or that no demand was made from i him by the plaintiff. It is also significant to note that the defendant in his application for leave to defend is only referring to the averments of the plaintiff and has not disclosed any facts of his own. It is in this background, that I have looked at the order of the learned trial court which has found the suit to be covered by Article 22 of the Limitation Act, and has found it to be within time. 13. It has of course been observed by the learned trial court that since the defendant has not denied the amount of the plaintiff to be outstanding and therefore by virtue of provisions of O. 8 Rule 5 it should be deemed to to have been admitted and thus it does not disclose any triable issue. However even excluding or ignoring this part of the observation of the learned trial court, the objection taken by the defendant about the suit being barred by lime also does not bring the case of the defendant in any of the first four categories propounded by the Apex court in M/s. Mechalec Engineers & Manufacturer's case. 14. The learned trial court has rightly relied upon Article 22 of the Limitation Act in-as-much as this is the only article applicable to the suits for recovery of the money deposited, as distinguished from the loans advanced to the defendant. There is plethora of judgments of various High Courts indicating as to, to which type of deposits this Article 22 applies, in as much as it has been held applicable to the deposit with a trader, to the deposit with a person for specific purpose e.g. for investment, to the amount of salary allowed by the employee to be accumulated with his master, to the money deposited by the younger member of the family with the elder member. In (1926) 29 Bombay Law Reporter-427, this Article 22 has been held applicable in a case where partner opened a separate account in the partnership firm in the name of his daughter and daughter filing a suit against surviving partners after death of the father and so on. In (1926) 29 Bombay Law Reporter-427, this Article 22 has been held applicable in a case where partner opened a separate account in the partnership firm in the name of his daughter and daughter filing a suit against surviving partners after death of the father and so on. In this view of the matter even this objection does not entitle the defendant to leave to defend. 15. As a result of the aforesaid discussion these revision petitions have no force and are hereby dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs. The record of the learned trial court be returned forthwith.Revision dismissed. *******