V. M. SAHAI, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition filed by a teacher appointed to short-term vacancy, one of the questions that arises for consideration is what is the effect of rescission of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981 (in brief second Order) by insertion of Section 33e in the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services selection Boards Act, 1982 (in brief the Act ). ( 2 ) MAHARSHI Durbasa Inter College, Kakara Dubawal, Allahabad (in brief institution) is a recognised and aided institution. Sri Yaduraj Singh an Assistant Teacher L. T. grade took medical leave from 1. 1. 1998 to 30. 6. 1998. The management on 1. 1. 1998 intimated the District Inspector of Schools (in brief D. I. O. S.) to fill the short-term vacancy. This letter does not appear to have been received by the D. I. O. S. The management notified the vacancy on 7. 1. 1998 on the notice board and on the same day advertisement was published in newspaper dainik Jagran. The petitioner was selected on 18. 1. 1998 and papers were forwarded to the D. I. O. S. for approval. It again is not clear whether this letter was received by the D. I. O. S. The management on 29. 1. 1998 appointed the petitioner as Assistant Teacher L. T. grade in the short-term vacancy and forwarded the papers to D. I. O. S. for approval. The D. I. O. S. with reference to this letter informed the management on 8. 4. 1998 that the appointment of the petitioner having been made without informing him, the liability to pay his salary was of the management. The management was further required to furnish details about the short-term vacancy. This letter was replied by the management on 23. 4. 1998. It informed that Sri Yuvraj Singh had taken leave from 1. 1. 1998 to 30. 6. 1998. The letter further assured the D. I. O. S. that the management would not make any appointment in future without obtaining prior approval. Therefore, the appointment of the petitioner be approved. But the D. I. O. S. did not agree. He disapproved the appointment on 6. 6. 1998 because it was made without prior information and taking approval. The other reason for non-approval was that advertisement was not published in two newspapers. Further, the application was not invited by registered post. Therefore, the appointment of the petitioner be approved. But the D. I. O. S. did not agree. He disapproved the appointment on 6. 6. 1998 because it was made without prior information and taking approval. The other reason for non-approval was that advertisement was not published in two newspapers. Further, the application was not invited by registered post. The petitioner filed an appeal/ representation on 16. 3. 1999 before the Regional Deputy Director of Education under paragraph 7 of the Uttar pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981 (in brief First Order ). He made another representation on 14. 11. 2000 to the Director of Education. He has filed photostat copies of attendance register for May, 1998, July, 1999 and January, 2000 to substantiate his claim that he is functioning as Assistant Teacher L. T. grade since his appointment till date. The petitioner has filed this petition challenging the order passed on 6. 6. 1998 by the D. I. O. S. and prayed that the Regional Deputy Director of Education and director of Education should decide his appeal/ representation. ( 3 ) SRI Uma Kant the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the management had appointed the petitioner on 29. 1. 1998 in short-term vacancy prior to the deletion of Second order. He is continuously working since the date of appointment, therefore, he is entitled for salary from 29. 1. 1998 till December, 2000. The learned counsel has further urged that deletion of Second Order with effect from 25. 1. 1999 would not affect the short-term appointments made prior to 25. 1. 1999 and such appointees are entitled to continue till the short-term vacancy exists. He placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in A. A. Calton v. Director of Education and another, AIR 1983 SC 1143 . He urged that under Regulation 9 [1] of Chapter-II of the regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, petitioner is entitled to continue in short-term vacancy irrespective of insertion of Section 33e in U. P. Act No. 5 of 1982. The learned counsel vehemently urged that advertisement having been made in one newspaper with wide circulation was sufficient and the order of D. I. O. S. being illegal is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel vehemently urged that advertisement having been made in one newspaper with wide circulation was sufficient and the order of D. I. O. S. being illegal is liable to be set aside. He placed reliance on a Division Bench decision in District Inspector of Schools, kanpur Nagar and others v. Diwakar Lal and others, 2000 (3) ESC 1670. He urged that no prior permission of the D. I. O. S. was necessary to fill short-term vacancy. He relied on Shri Niwas singh v. District Inspector of Schools, Ghazipur and others, 1998 (1) UPLBEC 276 , and the division Bench decision in Ashika Prasad Shukla v. District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad and another, 1998 (3) UPLBEC 1722 . The learned counsel, in the alternative, urged that the respondents be directed to decide his appeal/representation. ( 4 ) ON the other hand Sri K. K. Chand the learned standing counsel has urged that on 25. 1. 1999. Section 33e has been inserted in the Act by which First, Second, Third and Fourth Removal of difficulties Orders have been rescinded. The effect of rescission is that any appointment made under these orders came to an end on 25. 1. 1999 and petitioner could not be deemed to continue in service after 25. 1. 1999 nor he is entitled for any salary. The learned standing counsel did not dispute that prior permission of D. I. O. S. was not necessary for making appointment in short-term vacancy under the Second Removal of Difficulties Order. But he vehemently urged that short-term vacancies were required to be published in two newspapers of the State having adequate circulation. This procedure was mandatory. Since the short-term vacancy was advertised in only one newspaper, mandatory provision of publication of advertisement in two newspapers was not followed by the management and the D. I. O. S. rightly refused to grant approval to the appointment of the petitioner for not following this procedure. He placed reliance on the decisions in K. N. Dwivedi v. District Inspector of Schools, 1994 (1) UPLBEC 461, radha Raizada and others v. Committee of Management, Vidyawati Darbari Girls Inter College and others, 1994 (3) UPLBEC 1551 (FB) and Ashika Prasad Shukla (supra ). ( 5 ) THE first question is what is the effect of rescission of Second Order by insertion of Section 33e in the Act? ( 5 ) THE first question is what is the effect of rescission of Second Order by insertion of Section 33e in the Act? To answer this, it is necessary to examine the background in which the Act was passed and the purpose for which the Removal of Difficulties Orders were issued. A perusal of the object and reasons for enacting the law, shows that the Legislature felt that the selection of teachers which were governed by U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 was not satisfactory. Therefore, with an object to make selection of suitable teachers and to maintain standard of education in secondary institutions and to secure free and fair selection, the Legislature considered it necessary to constitute Secondary Education Service Commission at the State level, to select principals, lecturers, head masters and L. T. grade teachers. And on 10. 7. 1981, the Uttar pradesh Ordinance No. 8 of 1981 was promulgated. It was repealed by U. P. Ordinance No. 23 of 1981. This Ordinance was repealed by U. P. Act No. 5 of 1982, which came into effect from 14. 7. 1981. Section 36 of the Act provided that anything done or any action taken under U. P. Ordinance No. 23 of 1981 and U. P. Ordinance No. 8 of 1981 shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the Act as the Act was in force at all material times. The Commission was constituted by U. P. Ordinance No. 8 of 1981 but since its establishment was to take some time and it was felt that even after establishment of Commission, it would take time to make selection of teachers but it would create difficulty in view of vacancies existing in recognised institutions, the State Government issued Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties] Order, 1981 on 31. 7. 1981. It permitted the management to make ad hoc appointments in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 2 of the Order. The Uttar Pradesh secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981 was issued on 11. 9. 1981. It provided for filling short-term vacancy by the management by promotion of the permanent seniormost teacher of the institution. in the next lower grade. The Uttar Pradesh secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981 was issued on 11. 9. 1981. It provided for filling short-term vacancy by the management by promotion of the permanent seniormost teacher of the institution. in the next lower grade. Where the short-term vacancy could not be filled by promotion due to non-availability of teacher in the next lower grade, possessing the minimum prescribed qualifications, it was to be filled by direct recruitment. The Act was notified on 26. 2. 1982. It came into force with effect from 14. 7. 1981. Section 34 of the Act gave powers to the Commission/board to make regulations with the prior approval of the State Government for holding selections and interviews and the procedure to be followed by the Commission. Section 35 empowered the State Government to make Rules for carrying out the purpose of the Act. In exercise of powers under Section 34 of Uttar Pradesh secondary Education Services Commission First Regulations, 1983, were framed in 1983. The state Government also framed Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission Rules, 1983, 1995 and 1998. In 1999, Section 33e was inserted by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1999 in the Act with effect from 25. 1. 1999. It rescinded the First, Second, Third and Fourth Removal of difficulties Orders. ( 6 ) THE power to remove difficulties is given by the Legislature to the Government to make orders, which are not inconsistent with Act and for removal of difficulty or doubt in the application of the Act to a particular situation. The purpose for issuing Second Order was to make appointment in short-term vacancy in the situations mentioned in paragraph 2 of the Order in the manner provided therein. The Commission / Board became functional in 1983. Yet the orders continued and the appointment under the Second Order continued to be made. It was ultimately rescinded in 1999. The section rescinding the Orders did not save any action taken under these Orders. Section 33e is extracted below : "33e. Rescission of orders.--The Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981, the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981, the Uttar Pradesh Secondary education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Third) Order, 1982 and the Uttar pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Fourth) Order, 1982 are hereby rescinded. Rescission of orders.--The Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981, the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981, the Uttar Pradesh Secondary education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Third) Order, 1982 and the Uttar pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Fourth) Order, 1982 are hereby rescinded. " ( 7 ) THE absence of any saving clause in the section resulted in bringing an end to the appointments made in short-term vacancy. The petitioner cannot claim that even though the difficulty Orders have been rescinded but he having been appointed under the Difficulty Order, he would continue in the short-term vacancy. But on the arguments advanced by Sri Uma Kant, it is necessary to consider whether an appointee on a short-term vacancy could continue and claim his salary even after Section 33e was inserted on any principle of law or by applicability of General Clauses Act. In law, a person usually has a right under the statute or a right which accrues to him under law or he has a vested right. A vested right is one which has so completely and definitely accrued or settled in a person that it is not subject to be defeated or cancelled or deprived arbitrarily without injustice. An accrued right is a matured cause of action, as legal authority to demand redressal. A statutory right is one, which is conferred by an Act. A vested right or an accrued right cannot be taken away or curtailed except by retrospective operation of law. But a right under a statute comes to an end on the repeal of the statute unless such right is saved. The distinction between vested, accrued and right under a statute was explained by the apex Court in Thyssen Stahlunion Gmbh v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. , (1999) 9 SCC 334 . The Apex Court was concerned with pending reference under Arbitration Act, 1940. The question was whether Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which saved pending references under the old Act resulted in vested or accrued right in a party to arbitration proceedings to claim that the award under the old Act made after coming into force of the new act could be executed or enforced under the old Act only. The Court held that vested right for execution of the award would have accrued only if the proceedings for enforcement of award had commenced before the new Act was enforced. vested right accrues when proceedings for enforcement of award are taken and not before that. Right to take advantage of an enactment is not a vested right. The Court further explained that until award is made, no party has an accrued right. The Court approved a decision of the English Court in Abbott v. Minister of Lands, 1895 ac 425 : 64 LJPC 167 : 72 LT 402 (PC), which explained accrued right, "the mere right, existing at the date of a repealing statute, to take advantage of provisions of the statute repealed is not a right accrued within the meaning of the usual saving clause". What is a right under a statute was explained by the Apex Court in D. C. Bhatia v. Union of India, 1995 (1) SCC 104 . The Court was concerned with an amendment in Delhi Rent Control Act, which withdrew the protection enjoyed by a tenant paying Rs. 3,500 per month as rent. The claim of the tenant that they had acquired vested right which could not be disturbed unless the amending Act contained specific provision to that effect was repelled as the right of the tenant to resist eviction prior to the amending Act, was nothing more than a right to take advantage of that enactment. And once the statute ceases to be operative, the tenant cannot claim to have the statutory old protection. In the light of these principles. It is abundantly clear that a teacher appointed in a short-term vacancy under the Second Removal of Difficulties Order did not have either vested or accrued right. He had a right under the Second Removal of Difficulties Order and once that order was rescinded, his right to continue as a short-term teacher or the protection enjoyed by him that he shall continue till a regularly selected candidate joined came to an end. He had a right under the Second Removal of Difficulties Order and once that order was rescinded, his right to continue as a short-term teacher or the protection enjoyed by him that he shall continue till a regularly selected candidate joined came to an end. In A. A. Calton (supra)on which reliance was placed the Apex Court held that Section 16f of the U. P. Intermediate education Act, 1921 was amended in 1975, and the power of Director to grant approval was taken away but the proceedings for selection had commenced in 1973 and twice the Deputy director of Education had disapproved the recommendations, therefore, a right had accrued in the candidates for the selection to be completed under the unamended Act, and the Director could exercise jurisdiction even after 1975 as the proceedings having commenced under earlier act could be completed under the unamended Act. This decision cannot help the petitioner as the appointment came to an end due to rescission of the Second Order. The Act rescinding the second Order did not protect the rights of teachers appointed before, 1999. The petitioner did not have any vested or accrued right to continue even after rescission of the Order. In M. S. Shivananda v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and others, (1980) 1 SCC 149 , the apex Court while deciding rights of parties under Ordinance which was saved by repealing Act by using the expression, any thing done or any action taken, held that while considering the effect of an expiration of a temporary Act it requires very clear and unmistakable language in a subsequent Act of the Legislature to revive or recreate an expired right. If the right created by statute was of an enduring character and has vested in the person that right cannot be taken away even if the statute had expired. After making this observation the Court went on to hold that it would depend on the provision in the repealing Act whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities under the old Ordinance or it manifests an intention to destroy it. The absence of any provision like any thing done or any action taken make it abundantly clear that the Legislature intended to destroy the right from the date Section 33e was inserted. The absence of any provision like any thing done or any action taken make it abundantly clear that the Legislature intended to destroy the right from the date Section 33e was inserted. Once the provision for appointment on short-term vacancy was rescinded, no teacher can claim that he having been appointed earlier has a right to continue. A teacher appointed under the Removal of difficulties Orders could continue either if a right had accrued to him under the provision he was appointed or he has a vested right to continue. A teacher appointed under the Removal of difficulties Orders derives his right from the provisions contained thereunder. Therefore, once the order was rescinded, the right of petitioner came to an end. Even the provisions in the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 do not help the petitioner. For convenience, relevant part of Section 6 of the Act is extracted below : "6. Effect of repeal.--Where any (Uttar Pradesh) Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or thereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed ; or what it preserves is any right acquired or accrued under the repealed Act. Therefore, what was the right of the petitioner, it was to work as teacher in short-term vacancy under the Removal of difficulties Order. Once the provision under which the appointment was made was repealed, the right to work as teacher in short-term vacancy ceased. The order did not give rise to any right, which could be continued after its repeal. The claim of the petitioner that he has a right to continue cannot be accepted as this right did not accrue nor it was acquired under the Removal of Difficulties Order. ( 8 ) SECTION 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 is extracted below : "continuation of appointments, notifications, orders etc. The claim of the petitioner that he has a right to continue cannot be accepted as this right did not accrue nor it was acquired under the Removal of Difficulties Order. ( 8 ) SECTION 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 is extracted below : "continuation of appointments, notifications, orders etc. issued under enactments, repealed and re-enacted.-- Where any enactment is repealed and re- enacted by an Uttar Pradesh Act, with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, (or statutory instrument or form) made or issued under the repealed enactment shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, (or statutory instrument or form) made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted. " Section 24 continues only those appointments which were made under the repealed Act which had been re-enacted. In Hot Chand Sham Das v. Lala Shri Ram, AIR 1963 Alld 234, it was held that any action taken under an Act which has expired due to lapse of time does not survive. In balak Ram Vaishya v. Badri Prasad Awasthi, AIR 1969 Alld 88, it was held that appointment made under certain executive orders do not continue as Section 24 applies to appointments made under Act and not under executive order. Further, as noticed earlier. First and Second Orders were issued as the Commission could not be established by the State Government. Therefore, for removing the difficulties to fill the existing vacancies in the institutions. First and Second Orders were issued under Section 33 of the Act. The intention was that once the Commission becomes functional selection and appointment of teachers etc. would be made by it and these Difficulties orders issued under Section 33 of the Act would come to an end. It is no doubt true that these difficulties Orders continued for a fairly long time but these were temporary measures adopted by the State Government during the interregnum while the Government was in process of establishing a Commission and framing Regulations and Rules as provided under Sections 34 and 35 of the Act. It is no doubt true that these difficulties Orders continued for a fairly long time but these were temporary measures adopted by the State Government during the interregnum while the Government was in process of establishing a Commission and framing Regulations and Rules as provided under Sections 34 and 35 of the Act. The appointments made under temporary order issued by the Government under Section 33 of the Act once repealed, could not be treated to be continuing either under sections 6 or 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act. The appointments made under temporary second Order do not survive after 25. 1. 1999. In Ram Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, 1972 Cri LJ 1386, it was held that Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965 was a temporary provision. It was rescinded by the Government by notification dated 9. 9. 1971 without any saving clause. It was held that the proceedings started under 1965 Order could not be continued under Section 7 of the essential Commodities Act, 1955 pending at the time of rescission. ( 9 ) IN S. Krishnan v. State of Madras, AIR 1951 SC 301 , it was observed by Honble Patanjali shastri, J : "this general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against any person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires. " ( 10 ) SIMILARLY U. P. Act No. 13 of 1999 inserted Section 33e in U. P. Act No. 5 of 1982. It did not save appointments made under the Second Order. Therefore, all such appointments, which were made under the Second Order came to an end with effect from 25. 1. 1999. Thus, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that since the petitioner had continued as Assistant teacher L. T. grade and is working till date and is entitled for salary cannot be accepted. ( 11 ) THERE is yet another reason to reject the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner. The removal of Difficulties Orders were rescinded. In Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, the word rescind has been defined as under : "to abrogate, annul, avoid, or cancel a contract ; particularly, nullifying a contract by the act of a party. ( 11 ) THERE is yet another reason to reject the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner. The removal of Difficulties Orders were rescinded. In Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, the word rescind has been defined as under : "to abrogate, annul, avoid, or cancel a contract ; particularly, nullifying a contract by the act of a party. To declare a contract void in its inception and to put an end to it as though it never were. " The Legislature having used the word "rescind" instead of "repeal or delete", the intention is clear that the Order has ceased to be operative and an appointee under it cannot claim any right after the Order ceased to be operative. Therefore, once the order was rescinded, the petitioner cannot claim to continue on the basis of short-term appointment made under the order. ( 12 ) THE next question is whether the appointment of the petitioner made by the management was in accordance with law? The D. I. O. S. refused to grant approval on the ground that prior approval was not taken before filling the short-term vacancy and applications were not invited by registered post. Even assuming that the D. I. O. S. not was justified in refusing approval on these grounds, the order cannot be said to be bad as failure on the part of management to advertise the vacancy in two newspapers of the State having adequate circulation was fatal. The procedure of advertisement mentioned in paragraph 5 (2) of the First Order applies to appointments made under Second Order. The First Order clearly provides that the vacancy should be advertised in two newspapers having adequate circulation in Uttar Pradesh. Admittedly, this rule was not complied as advertisement was made in only one newspaper. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged placing reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in diwakar Lal (supra), that statutory provisions requiring advertisement is procedural in nature, therefore, it did not violate selection and appointment. This decision does not help the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged placing reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in diwakar Lal (supra), that statutory provisions requiring advertisement is procedural in nature, therefore, it did not violate selection and appointment. This decision does not help the petitioner. The learned Judges were persuaded to hold that selection under the Second Order without advertising the vacancy in two newspapers was not illegal because the requirement of advertisement being procedural as held in Arun Tiwari v. Zila Manasvi Shikshak Sangh and others, AIR 1998 SC 331, it was not void ab initio and in any case the selection having been completed on 1. 7. 1993 it was prior to decision by the Full Bench in Radha Raizada (supra ). It cannot be doubted that provision of advertisement is procedural. But the procedure prescribed by rule has to be followed. Where the rule provides that advertisement should be made in two newspapers of State having adequate circulation, then such provision is mandatory in nature and its non-compliance would render the appointment illegal. In Konch Degree College, Konch, jalaun and others v. Ram Sajiwan Shukla and another, (1997) 11 SCC 153 , the Apex Court had occasion to consider whether requirement in rules of publication in three newspapers was satisfied when the management advertised it in two newspapers only. The selection was made after advertising in two newspapers only. It was disapproved by the vice-chancellor as the advertisement was not made in three newspapers. The Apex Court held that the provision for publication in three newspapers was mandatory and the management should be insisted upon compliance of the rigour of the rule. They cannot take shelter that all that had applied for selection. This decision does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges. In Arun Tiwari (supra), the Apex Court was concerned with selection made after inviting applications from Employment Exchange. The candidates who were not selected approached the tribunal and Apex Court and one of the grounds raised was that the procedure of inviting applications from employment exchange instead by advertisement was unfair. The argument was repelled as the procedure adopted in the circumstances was neither unfair nor unjust. The Court was not concerned with any Rule that the selection should be held only by advertising it in newspaper. The argument was repelled as the procedure adopted in the circumstances was neither unfair nor unjust. The Court was not concerned with any Rule that the selection should be held only by advertising it in newspaper. The Division Bench in Diwakar Lal (supra) appears to have relied on Arun Tiwari (supra) to hold that failure to advertise in two newspapers as required by Removal of Difficulties orders did not vitiate appointment because it was concerned with an appointment made prior to 12. 7. 1994. In any case, the learned standing counsel rightly argued that the decision in Arun tiwari (supra) could not be used to whittle down the mandatory nature of the rule. Further, the appointment in this case was made after Radha Raizada (supra), therefore, it was against the law laid down by this Court in the Full Bench. It would not be out of place to mention that a learned single Judge of this Court in K. N. Dwivedi (supra) held. "in the aforesaid background though nobody has challenged the vires of clause (3) (1) of Para 2 of Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second)Order, 1981 to the extent it provides for notifying the vacancy on the notice board, the said provision having come to the notice of the Court and the Court being satisfied that the said provision is violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India, declare, that paragraph 2 (3) (i)of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981 the following words are ultra vires of Article 16 of the Constitution of india "shall also immediately notify the same on the notice board of the institution. " It is hereby directed that all vacancies under Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981 shall hereinafter be filled by notifying the vacancy atleast in two such newspapers which has wide circulation throughout the State and by an intimation to the local Employment Exchange. " It is hereby directed that all vacancies under Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981 shall hereinafter be filled by notifying the vacancy atleast in two such newspapers which has wide circulation throughout the State and by an intimation to the local Employment Exchange. " ( 13 ) IN a Full Bench decision of this Court in Radha Raizada and others v. Committee of management, Vidyawati Darbari Girls Inter College and others, 1994 (3) UPLBEC 1551 (FB), honble V. N. Khare, J. as he then was, who delivered the majority judgment almost used the same words as in K. N. Dwivedi (supra) and held in paragraph 43 that "the advertisement of short-term vacancy on the notice board of the institution, according to me, in fact no notice to the prospective eligible candidates as no prospective candidate is expected to visit each institution to see the notice board for finding out whether any short term vacancy has been advertised. Since the payment of salary to the teacher appointed against the short-term vacancy is the liability of the State Government, the advertisement of short-term vacancy must conform to the requirement of Article 16 (1) of the Constitution which prohibits the State from doing anything whether by making rule or by executive order which would deny equal opportunity to all the citizens. The provision contained in sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 2 of the Second Removal of Difficulties order which provides that the short-term vacancy shall be notified on the notice board of the institution, does not give equal opportunity to all the eligible candidates of the district, region or the State to apply for consideration for appointment against the short-term vacancy. Such kind of notice is an eye wash for the requirement of Article 16 of the Constitution. This aspect can be examined from another angle. If the notice of the short-term vacancy, through the notice board of the institution is accepted, it will throw open the doors for manipulation and nepotism. A management of an institution may or may not notify the short-term vacancy on the notice board of the institution and yet may show to the authority that such vacancy has been notified on the notice board of the institution and may process the application of its own candidate for the appointment against the short-term vacancy. A management of an institution may or may not notify the short-term vacancy on the notice board of the institution and yet may show to the authority that such vacancy has been notified on the notice board of the institution and may process the application of its own candidate for the appointment against the short-term vacancy. I am, therefore, of the view that the procedure for notifying the short-term vacancy should be the same as it is for the ad hoc appointment by direct recruitment under the First Removal of Difficulties Order. The management after intimating such vacancy to the District Inspector of Schools advertise such short-term vacancy atleast in two newspapers having adequate circulation in Uttar Pradesh in addition to notifying the said vacancy on the notice board of the institution and further the application may also be invited from the local employment exchange. Thus, the procedure provided for notifying the short-term vacancy should be the same as contained in sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 5 of the First removal of Difficulties Order. " ( 14 ) IN Ashika Prasad Shukla (supra), the Division Bench followed the view taken by Full Bench in Radha Raizada (supra) and K. N. Dwivedi (supra) and held that the mandatory procedure for advertisement in two newspapers would apply to selection and appointment on short-term vacancy made after the decisions in K. N. Dwivedi (supra) on 13. 1. 1994, approved by the Full bench in Radha Raizada (supra) decided on 12. 7. 1994. The effect of approval of single Judge decision in K. N. Dwivedi (supra) by the Full Bench was two-fold, one that the short-term vacancy had to be advertised in two newspapers of the State as the requirement of publication was mandatory, second the failure to advertise resulting in invalidity of appointment would apply to selections after 13. 1. 1994. In other words, the declaration of law was prospective in operation. Since the provision of advertisement in two newspapers having adequate circulation in the State before filling short-term vacancies was mandatory after 13. 1. 1994 and the petitioner was appointed on 29. 1. 1998 on a vacancy which was advertised in one newspaper only, therefore, it was illegal and the D. I. O. S. did not commit any error in refusing to grant approval to the appointment of the petitioner. 1. 1994 and the petitioner was appointed on 29. 1. 1998 on a vacancy which was advertised in one newspaper only, therefore, it was illegal and the D. I. O. S. did not commit any error in refusing to grant approval to the appointment of the petitioner. ( 15 ) THE argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that against the order passed by d. I. O. S. disapproving petitioners appointment, the petitioner has filed an appeal/representation on 16. 3. 1999 before the Deputy Director of Education and has also made a representation before the Director of Education on 14. 11. 2000 and a direction be issued for deciding the aforesaid appeal/representation. The argument is devoid of any merit for two reasons. Firstly, Second order under which the appointments on short-term vacancies are made, do not provide for any appeal/representation to the Deputy Director of Education or the Director of Education. The provision of appeal was only in First Order where appointments against substantive vacancies were made. Since the State Government did not provide for any appeal or representation to the educational authorities against short- term appointments, the appeal/ representations of the petitioner were not made under any provision of law, therefore, no direction can be issued for deciding the same. The other reason is that First and Second Orders have been deleted with effect from 25. 1. 1999 and they being no more in existence, any appeal/representation on under first or Second Orders could not be made by the petitioner. Further, it having been held that the appointment of petitioner was defective as it had been made without following the mandatory procedure under the Removal of Difficulties Orders no direction can be issued to educational authorities to decide the appeal/representation of the petitioner. ( 16 ) THE argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of Regulation 9 (1) of chapter-II of the Regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, the petitioner is entitled to continue in short-term vacancy irrespective of insertion of Section 33e in u. P. Act No. 5 of 1982 has no substance. This Court in Mukesh Kumar Sharma v. District inspector of Schools, Aligarh and others, 2000 (3) UPLBEC 2332 , has held that any ad hoc appointment after 25. 1. 1999 by the management is void. This Court in Mukesh Kumar Sharma v. District inspector of Schools, Aligarh and others, 2000 (3) UPLBEC 2332 , has held that any ad hoc appointment after 25. 1. 1999 by the management is void. The argument raised on applicability of regulation 9 is fully covered by the decision. ( 17 ) IT is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been teaching in the institution from January, 1998 till date and no salary has been paid to him. It would be open to the petitioner to file a civil suit against the management and claim his salary from the own funds of the management except the Government fund. ( 18 ) SUBJECT to the aforesaid observations, this writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. .