GURURAJAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is filed by the Management of Vokkaligara Sangha "challenging the order dated 10. 9. 99 passing in MA (EAT) No. 22/99. The petitioner institution is running Bangalore Institute of Technology in Bangalore. Which is a private Education Institution and it is also an unaided Institution. The respondent was the principal of the bangalore Institute of Technology, and engineering College run by the petitioner. He was issued with an office order dated 29. 9. 1979 appointing him as a professor in another Department of Mechanical engineering for the initial period of three years vide order dated ( 2 ) 9. 1979. In the meantime he was placed as In-charge Principal from 8. 9. 1984. On 13. 7. 1985 he was appointed as a principal of the bangalore Institute of Technology in accordance with the resolution passed in the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Vokkaligara sangha. The age of superannuation is 58 years for employees including the petitioner in terms of the rules of the Institution Sangha. The respondent attained the age of superannuation and he was to be superannuated on his completion of 58 years. At that time respondent sought for extension of his service as per his application dated 25. 5. 1998. The petitioner by order dated 13. 1. 1999 re- appointed him as principal for a period of one year with effect from 7. 6. 1998. 2. It is further stated that he is deemed to have been relieved of his duties on the forenoon of 6. 6. 98 on attaining the age of superannuation. He continued as such for the period of one year. Later, in April 1999 he filed a petition before the Educational Appellate tribunal seeking for setting aside the order dated 13. 1. 99 and also sought for a direction to continue till he attains the age of 62 years. Along with the said application he also filed an I. A. seeking for continuation of his services even beyond the period granted in terms of the office order dated 13. 1. 99. The said application was contested and after contest an order has been passed by the Tribunal on 10. 9. 99 allowing the I. A. thereby an order dated 13. 1. 99 was stayed till the disposal of the main appeal or till the respondent attaining the age of 60 years whichever is earlier. 1. 99. The said application was contested and after contest an order has been passed by the Tribunal on 10. 9. 99 allowing the I. A. thereby an order dated 13. 1. 99 was stayed till the disposal of the main appeal or till the respondent attaining the age of 60 years whichever is earlier. It is this order that is challenged before me. ( 3 ) NOTICE was issued and in pursuant to my notice respondent has entered his appearance through counsel. ( 4 ) THE matter was posting for hearing. An attempt for settlement was made but unfortunately, the settlement could not be arrived at by the parties. Hence, the matter was taken up for final disposal. ( 5 ) SRI Ramadas, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that the Learned Judge committed an error in granting the interim relief. He complained that the Tribunal could not have granted an interim order on the facts of this case. His arguments is that at the request of the Respondent his services were extended by one year. Now he cannot turn back and contend that he is to continue for 62 years. According to the Counsel, the age of superannuation is 58 years in the institution. The Tribunal according to him has failed to comply the well known principles of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury in passing the impugned order. ( 6 ) PER contra, Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel supported the order and contended that the age of superannuation is 62 years. At any rate it is not 58 years. He invites my attention to section 23 of the Bangalore University Statutes and contends that the present superannuation at 58 is illegal and unsustainable. A mere representation of the petitioner should not come in the way of his enforcing legal right. He argued that a case was made out and the court after being convinced has granted the interim order. This Court should not interfere in this matter in his arguments. ( 7 ) AFTER hearing the Counsel on either sides i pass the following order:- the material facts reveal that the petitioner after joining the petitioner -institute as a professor has been appointed as the principal subsequently. This Court should not interfere in this matter in his arguments. ( 7 ) AFTER hearing the Counsel on either sides i pass the following order:- the material facts reveal that the petitioner after joining the petitioner -institute as a professor has been appointed as the principal subsequently. It cannot be forgotten that a principal is incharge of entire administration of the institute and he is supposed to know the age of superannuation of the employees in general and the age of superannuation of the Respondent in particular. He pleads ignorance of the age of superannuation, He knowing fully well that the age of superannuation is 58 years, has submitted a representation for continuing him for a further period of one year after 58 years. It is after getting an order of extension vide order dated 13. 1. 99 he had chosen to file the petition before the EAT, that too after eight months, ie. , at the fag end of his term. ( 8 ) THE Tribunal essentially bases its order in favour of the respondent on two grounds. One is that the petitioner -management did not produce any material with regard to adoption of K. C. S. Rules for fixing the age of retirement at 58 years. The finding is that no material is place evidencing the retirement age at 58 years. The second reason of the Tribunal is that the contention of the petitioner with regard to the applicability of the Act is not tenable. ( 9 ) IT is well settled law that a Court while granting a discretionary order has to consider the well-known principles of prima facie case, irreparable injury, balance of convenience etc. In the case on hand it is rightly argued by Sri Ramadas, learned Counsel that the Tribunal cannot find fault with the petitioner for want of material with regard to the fixation of age of superannuation at 58 years. The material on record and the status of the petitioner coupled with his own letter seeking for extension after 58 years and the subsequent extension order would show that the age of superannuation is 58 years in the petitioner-institution. Therefore, the first finding which prevailed on the Tribunal to grant the interim order, in my view is unsustainable. The petitioner has asserted that K. C. S. Rules is followed and the same is not disputed by the Respondents. Therefore, the first finding which prevailed on the Tribunal to grant the interim order, in my view is unsustainable. The petitioner has asserted that K. C. S. Rules is followed and the same is not disputed by the Respondents. In the case on hand the petitioner has fixed the age at 58 years after adopting the government Rules. Whether those rules are good or bad in the light of statute 23. 20 (a) of the Statutes is a matter which require a detailed examination at the time of trial. The Respondent at any rate was fully aware of the age of superannuation at 58 years. He has also sought for extension and extension was also granted for a period of one year. The said period of one year has come to an end i. e. , one year period. He has filed the petition at the fag end of one year period and the Court has granted an order in his favour. Now by virtue of the interim order he has completed the entire one year period and he is also continuing subsequently. In the circumstances, eventhough the petitioner may have a primafacie case the balance of convenience lies in favour of the petitioner. The Respondent who has made a request and who had the benefit of concession cannot be permitted to turn around and contend contra that too at the fag end of one year period in terms of the extension order. In fact, the prayer in the appeal is only to set aside the order dated 13. 1. 1999 on the ground of premature retirement of superannuation. He further wants to continue upto 62 years. Whether the petitioner can continue upto 58 years, 60 years or 62 years is a matter yet to be decided. The Court cannot presume in the absence of any material to hold that the petitioner is to be continued beyond the rules of superannuation in the institution. ( 10 ) IN the circumstances, in my view the Tribunal has committed an error in not properly considering the principles of balance of convenience which is in favour of the petitioner herein. ( 11 ) THE Tribunal also in my opinion has failed to consider the well accepted principles of irreparable injury assuming that the petitioner has right to continue in service. ( 11 ) THE Tribunal also in my opinion has failed to consider the well accepted principles of irreparable injury assuming that the petitioner has right to continue in service. In the event of the Court coming to a conclusion in favour of the Respondent, the Respondent could as well be compensated in terms of money. Now on account of the interim order irreparable injury is caused to the petitioner. Petitioner is now compelled to act against its rules of 58 years and it is also required to act contrary to the request and subsequent board Resolution dated 13. 1. 1999. The continuance of the petitioner as principal in view of the interim order has blocked the further promotion of other teachers waiting for promotion. All these aspects has not been properly appreciated while granting the discretionary relief. The Court has virtually granted the final relief in the case on hand. In these circumstances, Mr. Ramadas, learned Counsel is right in contending that the Tribunal has committed a manifest error in exercising its jurisdiction contrary to the well accepted principles of grant of injunction. ( 12 ) MR. K. Subba Rao, learned Counsel argued that I should not interfere on the facts of this case. I am unable to agree with this submission. When a Court exercise the jurisdiction contrary to the well accepted principles, this Court cannot simply confirm the said order. The Tribunal as I mentioned earlier has committed an error and such errors has to be corrected by. Revisional Court. In the circumstances, I am of the view that I am right in setting aside the order on the peculiar facts of this case. ( 13 ) MR. K. Subba Rao, learned Counsel relies on the Judgment reported in UTTAR PRADESH CO-OPERATIVE FEDERATION limited vs SUNDER BROS. , DELHI. In the said case the Supreme court after noticing the powers of the Appellate Court also notices that in exercising its discretion if Trial Court acts unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts, then it would be open to the Appellate Court to interfere with the Trial Court's exercise of discretion. In this case I have already" held that ignoring relevant facts and the consequences an interim order has been granted by the Tribunal. Hence, I am justified in interfering with the order. ( 14 ) MR. In this case I have already" held that ignoring relevant facts and the consequences an interim order has been granted by the Tribunal. Hence, I am justified in interfering with the order. ( 14 ) MR. Ramadas, learned Counsel invited my attention to the well-known Judgment of this Court reported in GOWRISHANKARA swamigalu vs SIDDHAGANGA MUTT AND OTHERS this Court notices that:-"in other words the existence of a prima facie case or even a very strong prima facie case does not permit leap-forgging by the plaintiff directly to an injunction without crossing the other hurdles in between. Even granting that the plaintiff has an invisible prima facie case, he will not be entitled ex debitiae justiciae, to the grant of an injunction unmindful of other consequences. If the consequences of granting an injunction are detrimental in nature then an injunction will not be granted even though the plaintiff might have an unbeatable prima facie case. "this case is one such case, when the consequences of granting an injunction is detrimental in forcing the petitioner to continue the respondent contrary to its own existing regulation. The decision whether or not to grant a Temporary Injunction has to be taken at a time when the existence of legal right assailed by the party coming to the Court and has alleged violation or both contested and uncertain till they established their trial on evidence. The relief by way of an interim Order is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the petitioner (plaintiff) during the time before the uncertainty is resolved. The object of an interim order is to protect the party against the injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated any damages recoverable in the action, if the uncertainty is resolved in his favour at the trial. At the same time, the protection has to be vacated against the corresponding right or need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his being prevented from exercising his legal right for which he could not be adequately compensated. The balance of convenience in the case on hand lies on the facts of this case more in favour of the petitioner. ( 15 ) IN the circumstances, the C. R. P. is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Parties are to bear their respective costs. The balance of convenience in the case on hand lies on the facts of this case more in favour of the petitioner. ( 15 ) IN the circumstances, the C. R. P. is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Parties are to bear their respective costs. However, I direct the Tribunal to dispose of this case on merits within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. --- *** --- .