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2000 DIGILAW 1575 (PNJ)

Krishan Lal v. Gram Panchayat, Hari Majra

2000-12-21

R.L.ANAND

body2000
JUDGMENT R.L. Anand, J. - This is a civil revision and has been directed against the order dated 30.8.2000 passed by the Additional District Judge, Patiala, who dismissed the appeal of the petitioner under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC by affirming the order dated 22.7.2000 passed by Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Rajpura. 2. Some facts can be noticed in the following manner: Krishan Lal, the present petitioner, was a lessee of the land in question belonging to Gram Panchayat, Hari Majra. The lease of the petitioner/plaintiff was upto 30.4.2000. It expired with the expiry of time. The plaintiff did not surrender the possession of the suit land to the Gram Panchayat and filed a suit for permanent injunction praying that he is occupying the suit land as a lessee holding over and, therefore, he cannot be ejected from the suit land except in due course of law. Along with the suit, the plaintiff also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC praying that during the pendency of the suit he should not be dispossessed from the land in question. The suit was contested by the Gram Panchayat. According to the Gram Panchayat, the lease of the petitioner expired on 30.4.2000 and, thereafter the land has been leased out to respondent No. 3. 3. Both the parties addressed arguments before the trial Court and vide order dated 22.7.2000, the application of the petitioner under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC was dismissed. Aggrieved by the order of the trial Court, the plaintiff/petitioner filed appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC, before the learned Additional District Judge, Patiala, who, for the following reasons as given in paras No. 9 and 11, dismissed the same : "9. The undisputed facts are that the land in question was on lease with the appellant for successive periods but the last lease deed expired on April 30, 2000. It is also undisputed that lease for subsequent period was not granted in favour of the appellant. That being so, the appellant was obliged to hand over peaceful, vacant possession of the suit land to the respondent- Gram Panchayat immediately after the expiry of the period of lease on April 30, 2000. It is also undisputed that lease for subsequent period was not granted in favour of the appellant. That being so, the appellant was obliged to hand over peaceful, vacant possession of the suit land to the respondent- Gram Panchayat immediately after the expiry of the period of lease on April 30, 2000. The contention that no resolution for leasing out the land to anybody else has been passed and particulars of the person in whose favour lease has been granted are not disclosed, is found to be totally fallacious and untenable. The appellant has no business to ask for these matters at this stage and in these proceedings. 10. The moment lease in favour of the appellant came to an end by efflux of time character of his possession over the suit land is nothing more than that of a trespasser. Discretionary relief of injunction cannot be adverted to safeguard the wrong-door and those who do not come forward to accomplish their part of the agreement. 11. Consequently, the order under appeal is found to be suffering from no illegality, irregularity or perversity. Same is accordingly maintained and affirmed and as a natural consequent, the appeal is found to be devoid of any substance and is hereby dismissed. The parties through their counsel are directed to be present before the learned trial Court on the date already fixed in the matter. Appeal file be consigned and trial Court record be returned after due compliance." Hence the present revision. 4. I have heard Mr. R.C. Dogra, Sr. Advocate on behalf of the petitioner, Mrs. Monika Jalota, Advocate on behalf of added respondent Bittu and with their assistance have gone through the records of the cases. 5. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the though the lease in favour of the petitioner was upto 30.4.2000 but he has never parted with the possession to the Gram Panchayat. At the most, the status of the petitioner is a tenant holding over. His possession is not illegal. Since the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land, he cannot be ejected from the suit land except in due course of law. At the most, the status of the petitioner is a tenant holding over. His possession is not illegal. Since the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land, he cannot be ejected from the suit land except in due course of law. The learned counsel relies upon the revenue record to show that the plaintiff is still in possession of the land in question and, therefore, his possession should be protected till he is so evicted by the landlord in accordance with the provisions of law. In support of his contention he relies upon Prataprian Kothari v. John Braganza, 1999(2) PLJ 73, where it was observed that a person who has been in long continuous possession can protect his possession by seeking injunction against any person in the world other than true owner and even true owner of property can get back possession only by resorting to due process of law. He further relies upon Mangli Ram v. Punjab Wakf Board, 1998(1) CLR (C. Cr. & Rev.) 646, where it was observed that no injunction can be granted against the true owner, but where a plaintiff is tenant of the land in dispute, he can only be evicted, after following the procedure prescribed under the statute. Yet support has also been taken from Mohan Lal and others v. The State of Punjab and others, 1971 P.L.J. 338. It was observed in this judgment of the Honble Supreme Court that even an unauthorised occupant can be evicted only in the manner authorised by law and this is the essence of the rule of law. 6. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the added respondent submits that the lease of the petitioner expired on 30.4.2000 and, thereafter the Gram Panchayat leased out the suit land to the contesting respondent, who is in possession of the same. Since the petitioner/plaintiff has no right, title or interest in the property after 30.4.200, therefore, his possession is that of a trespasser. He was bound to surrender the possession to the owner of the land on the expiry of lease. Now the contesting respondent is in actual physical possession of the land in dispute. She relies upon Sardara Singh v. B.D.P.O. and another, 2000(4) RCR(Civil) 532 and submits that a trespasser cannot get the injunction against the rightful owner of the property and a person who seeks equity must do equity. Now the contesting respondent is in actual physical possession of the land in dispute. She relies upon Sardara Singh v. B.D.P.O. and another, 2000(4) RCR(Civil) 532 and submits that a trespasser cannot get the injunction against the rightful owner of the property and a person who seeks equity must do equity. If the possession of the petitioner is without any right, he cannot be allowed to perpetuate his possession. She further relies upon Jiya Lal v. Muni Lal, 2000(3) RCR(Civil) 410, wherein it was observed that injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser against true owner and if temporary injunction is granted to a trespasser that would mean driving the true owner to go to civil Court and ask for possession against wrong-doer. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent also invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in Jit Singh v. Sardara Singh, 2000(3) RCR(Civil) 566, where it was held that if a person is in long possession of property without any right, title, grant, lease, such possession does not give any right to the person to retain possession against true owner and he is not entitled to injunction. 7. After considering the rival contentions of the parties, I am of the considered opinion that this revision must fail. We all know that relief of injunction is a relief of equity. A person who seeks equity must do equity. In this case the possession of the plaintiff/petitioner is not long. He got the suit land from the Gram Panchayat which auctioned the same in order to supplement its income. The possession of the land was handed over to the plaintiff/petitioner for a limited period of one year and the lease expired on 30.4.2000. It is yet to be decided by the trial Court whether the possession of the plaintiff was in the capacity of a lessee or licensee or in the capacity of a simple allottee for a limited period. Since the petitioner has already enjoyed the fruits of alleged lease, therefore, he cannot be allowed to retain the possession till eternity and such a person should not be granted the discretionary relief of injunction. Since the petitioner has already enjoyed the fruits of alleged lease, therefore, he cannot be allowed to retain the possession till eternity and such a person should not be granted the discretionary relief of injunction. Moreover, the High Court will be very slow in interfering in the order of the first Appellate Court when the Courts below have thought proper not to grant a discretionary relief under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC in favour of the plaintiff. All these aspects of the case were considered by me in the case of Jit Singh (supra). In this view of the matter, this revision is hereby dismissed with the observation that nothing stated above shall amount an expression of my opinion on the merits of the suit. The trial Court is directed to decide the case within six months. Revision dismissed.