( 1 ) IN this appeal, by special leave, against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in appeal from Appellate Decree No. 77 of 1966 dated 7-10-1977, the appellant is the tenant of the land in dispute. The respondents are the heirs of the original landlord (hereinafter referred to as "the landlord" ). The land in dispute was leased out by the owners to one Netai Maity. It appears he raised structures thereon. After his death his son succeeded as the tenant. The said son died and his wife and son Defendants 1 and 2 transferred the rights of tenancy inherited by them in favour of Defendant 3 under a registered sale deed of 5-4-1943. The successors-in-interest of the landlord the respondents filed the suit for ejection of Defendants 1 to 3 from the land in dispute. The case went through several vicissitudes after the trial court decreed the suit. Ultimately the decree of the trial court was confirmed by the first appellate court as well as by the High Court in second appeal by the impugned order. ( 2 ) MR N. R. Choudhary, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the courts below have misinterpreted the documents and arrived at an erroneous conclusion that the appellant is not a "thika tenant" under the calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 (in short "the Act" ). ( 3 ) IT may be pointed out that the question whether the appellant is a"thika tenant" within the meaning of the said Act has been concurrently found by all the three courts below against the appellant. Inasmuch as the question revolves around the interpretation of the definition of "thika tenant" contained in Section 2 (5) of the Act, it would be useful to refer to it here. It reads as follows:"2. (5) thika tenant means any person who holds, whether under a written lease or otherwise, land under another person, and is or but for a special contract would be liable to pay rent, at a monthly or at any other periodical rate, for that land to that another person and has erected or acquired by purchase or gift any structure on such land for a residential, manufacturing or business purpose and includes the successors-in-interest of such person. . . . . . . " ( 4 ) FROM a plain reading of the definition, extracted above, it is evident that it consists of three limbs. The first limb contemplates existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between two persons in respect of any land, be it under a written lease or for a monthly rent or at any other periodical rate; the second says the tenant should have either erected or acquired by purchase or gift any structure on such land for a residential, manufacturing or business purpose; and the third limb excludes person who does not fall within the meaning of that expression and they are as follows:" (A) who holds such land under that another person in perpetuity; or (b) who holds such land under that another person under a registered lease, in which the duration of the lease is expressly stated to be for a period of not less than twelve years; or (c) who holds such land under that another person and uses or occupies such land as a khattal. " ( 5 ) IT may be noted that the expression "thika tenant" includes successors- in-interest of a "thika tenant" also. ( 6 ) SO far as the first limb of the definition is concerned, mere is no dispute that the appellant satisfies its requirements. ( 7 ) THE requirements of the second limb are that the tenant should have erected the structures on such land or he should have acquired the structures on such land by purchase or gift for residential, manufacturing or business purposes. It is in regard to the second limb that the point has been found against the appellant. The courts below found that under the said sale deed of 5-4-1943, land alone was transferred in favour of the appellant. The plea of the appellant that he had purchased the structures on the land subsequently under Exhibit h dated 23-7-1943 had been found against him. However, he did not claim at any time earlier that he erected the structures. The courts below found that under the said sale deed of 5-4-1943, land alone was transferred in favour of the appellant. The plea of the appellant that he had purchased the structures on the land subsequently under Exhibit h dated 23-7-1943 had been found against him. However, he did not claim at any time earlier that he erected the structures. ( 8 ) IN view of the finding that the structure has not been purchased by the appellant under the said sale deed of 5-4-1943, Mr Choudhary has invited our attention to the recitals in the said sale deed; it is specifically stated therein that the structures have not been sold and it is added that the vendors therein would remove the structures within 15 days and in the event of their default to do so, it would be open to the appellant to demolish the same for which he would not be liable either civilly or criminally. Relying on this last recital, Mr choudhary submits that as the vendors failed to remove within the said 15 days, so it would be deemed that the appellant purchased it or obtained it under a gift. This contention has to be mentioned only to be rejected, because in the event of the vendors of the appellant not removing the structures on the land in question, the only right that he gets is to remove the same but he does not become entitled to own it. It would, in that event be abandoned structures by the true owner but that does not become the property of the appellant automatically for the acquisition postulated under the provision is either by purchase or by gift but not in any other way. It follows that the courts below and the High Court correctly held that the requirements of the definition are not satisfied. In the result, we do not find any illegality in the order under appeal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.