T. N. VALLINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) THE l. rs of the second plaintiff, plaintiffs (f), (g), (h), (i) have preferred the above revision being aggrieved by the rejection of the application under order 6, Rule 17 by the trial court. ( 2 ) THE suit was one for partition and la. Xvi was filed by the plaintiffs seeking amendment of the plaint regarding the will dated 25-2-1986 propounded by them. The trial court considered the affidavit filed by the petitioners in La. V and orders passed by the court earlier to the following effect:"due Execution of the will and genuineness thereof are proved but the will is not valid and binding in view of decision in Thimmakka Kom Venkanna Naik v The Land Tribunal and others. In view of this, steps have to be taken for bringing the l. rs of ramanna gowda as per law". t he trial court also considered the dictum of this court in Smt. Vrushendramani v K. Venugopal Rai, wherein it has been held as follows:"that decision given by a court at an earlier stage of a case is binding at a later stage as well-settled though interlocutory judgments are open for adjudication by an appellate authority in an appeal against final judgment. It is apt to refer to certain observations made by the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v Deorajin Debi: 'the principles of res judicata apply also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or higher court, having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings'". on the basis of the above, the trial court held that the court had earlier expressed a view that though will was proved to be genuine, it is not valid and binding and it will have no impact on the shares of the parties and consequently amendment of pleadings sought for is devoid of merits. The contention of the right of the plaintiff to be brought on record cannot be nullified is a question to the validity of the document should be decided in the suit itself rather than in interlocutory application. The contention of the right of the plaintiff to be brought on record cannot be nullified is a question to the validity of the document should be decided in the suit itself rather than in interlocutory application. The trial court ultimately finds that the view of the court earlier was that the propounded will is not valid and binding and that order has become final and such an order cuts the root of the stand taken by the plaintiff. It has also held that it operates res judicata. Consequently, I a. Xvi was dismissed. ( 3 ) MR. Rajeev, appearing for the petitioner contended in this revision, will has been proved and the petitioners are legatees under the will executed by ramanna gowda. This has been decided so, while earlier i. a. v was ordered. But the contention was that under the will, tenancy rights cannot be bequeathed and what is bequeathed is occupancy rights, so the question of res judicata cannot come and the point has to be investigated at the time of final hearing and not in the beginning dates. ( 4 ) HEARD the respective counsel. ( 5 ) THE validity of the will has been held against the plaintiff and such a finding has become final in the light of the decision in vrushen- dramani's case, supra, and what was bequeathed was occupancy rights. The dictum of the Supreme Court in Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi (deceased) by L. rs v Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi and others, wherein it has held that the will is not valid and the Supreme Court has held to the following effect:"the assignment of any interest in the tenanted land will not be valid. A devise or a bequest under a will cannot be stated to fall outside the scope of the said provision inasmuch as such assign- ment disposes of or deals with the lease. When there is a disposi- tion of rights under a will though operates posthumously is nevertheless a recognition of the right of the legatee thereunder as to his rights of the tenanted land. In that event, there is an as- signment of the tenanted land, but that right will come into effect after the death of the testator. The purpose behind Section 21 is not to allow strangers to the family of the tenant to come upon the land. In that event, there is an as- signment of the tenanted land, but that right will come into effect after the death of the testator. The purpose behind Section 21 is not to allow strangers to the family of the tenant to come upon the land. The tenanted land is not allowed to be sub-let i. e. , to pass to the hands of a stranger nor any kind of assignment taking place in respect of the lease held. If, the tenant could assign his interest, strangers can come upon the land, and therefore, the expression 'assignment' in Section 21 will have to be given such meaning as to promote the object of the enactment. Therefore, the deceased tenant can assign his rights only to the heirs noticed in the provi- sion and such heirs could only be the spouse or any descendants or who is related to the deceased tenant by legitimate kinship. When it is possible for the tenant to pass the property to those who may not necessarily be the heirs under the ordinary law and who be- come heirs only by reason of a bequest under a will in which event, he would be a stranger to the family and imported on the land thus to the detriment of the landlord. In that event, it must be taken that a devise under a will also amount to an assignment and, therefore, not valid for the purpose of Section 21 of the act". in the light of the above dictum and also the dicta relied upon by the trial court, amendment now sought for cannot be permitted. It is also to be seen that amendment sought to be made was at the time when the matter was posted for final disposal in the special list. No doubt, amendment can be permitted at any stage, but the delay in seeking amendment is certainly a ground for refusal of amendment. In the light of the discussion above and the orders passed by the trial court, I do not find any reason to allow the crp. Crp is dismissed. --- *** --- .