JUDGMENT - S.S. NIJJAR, J.:---This order will dispose of Notice of Motion No. 643 of 1997 and Notice of Motion No. 262 of 1998. 2.Notice of Motion No. 643 of 1997 has been taken out by the caveatrix for a number of reliefs. Prayer Clauses (b) and (c) are for appointment of Receiver. Prayer Clauses (d) is for an injunction. Prayer Clause (a) seeks a direction to the plaintiff petitioner to disclose on oath all the properties and assets in Bombay, Ankleshwar, Ahmedabad and elsewhere of the deceased Mr. Vipin Dalsukhram Pandya. A further direction is sought to amend the schedule to the petition for Letters of Administration. 3.At the outset it needs to be stated that this Notice of Motion has been argued on four different dates as testamentary matters are taken only on Thursday. It also needs to be stated that the Notice of Motion has been argued as if the testamentary suit itself is to be finally disposed of. This, I think, is not the correct approach when the Court has merely to decide an interim application by way of a notice of motion. 4.The petition has been filed by one Ila Vipin Pandya for obtaining Letters of Administration with respect to the estate of the deceased Vipin Dalsukhram Pandya, hereinafter referred to as "the deceased" who died at Bombay on or about 4th November, 1995. In the above petition the petitioner has stated that she is the widow of the deceased who died intestate. She claims to be the sole surviving legal heir of the deceased according to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Thus, she claims to be entitled to all the estate of the deceased which is mentioned in schedule-I to the petition. In schedule-II, the petitioner has set forth the liabilities. The net value of the estate, according to the petitioner, comes to Rs. 93,61,214/-. 5.Smita Ambalal Patel, filed caveat in the aforesaid petition on 7th March, 1996 opposing the grant of Letters of Administration to the petitioner. She has filed an affidavit in support of the caveat dated 13th March, 1996. The petition, therefore, became contentious and was converted into a suit. 6.At the threshold, the petitioner took out Chamber Summons No. 990 of 1996 claiming therein that the caveat dated 7th March, 1996 be dismissed. A prayer was also made for expediting the hearing of the suit. The petition, therefore, became contentious and was converted into a suit. 6.At the threshold, the petitioner took out Chamber Summons No. 990 of 1996 claiming therein that the caveat dated 7th March, 1996 be dismissed. A prayer was also made for expediting the hearing of the suit. In support of this Chamber Summons, an affidavit dated 7th March, 1996 was filed. The caveatrix, hereinafter referred to as "Patel" filed an affidavit in reply. No rejoinder was filed to this affidavit in reply. The matter ultimately came up for final hearing before Dr. (Mrs.) P.D. Upasani, J. The Chamber Summons was disposed of by an order dated 23rd December, 1996. After hearing lengthy arguments the Chamber Summons was dismissed. Patel had argued that petitioner has not disclosed in the petition that she is a divorcee and that her marriage with the deceased stood dissolved. She had submitted that the plaintiff is falsely claiming herself to be a widow of the said deceased. She had attached with the affidavit in reply a certified copy of the divorce decree which, it transpires, had been obtained by the deceased himself. After carefully considering all the arguments put forward by the parties the Court observed that the petitioner has nowhere disclosed her true relationship with the deceased. She has nowhere stated when she got married or remarried the deceased. The petition is as cryptic as it could be. It is held that there is no reason why she should suppress the facts. There are other elaborate reasons given which need not be noticed at present. It was contended by the Counsel appearing for the petitioner that a marriage certificate was in existence and it was sought to be produced in Court. This contention was also rejected with the observation that formal proof of the documents as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be dispensed with. That is not permissible and no conclusive finding can be given about legal status of any person unless the evidence is recorded and documents which are sought to be tendered are proved as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned Judge further observes as under: "Therefore, the plaintiff will have to prove that she got in fact remarried with the deceased after her marriage was dissolved by decree of competent Court. The learned Judge further observes as under: "Therefore, the plaintiff will have to prove that she got in fact remarried with the deceased after her marriage was dissolved by decree of competent Court. Her status as a widow of the deceased is prima facie not proved and her legal status is thus under a cloud. Therefore, there is much substance when the caveatrix states that the plaintiff is not a fit person in favour of whom letters of administration with respect to the estate of the deceased should be granted." From the above it becomes evident that although the caveatrix may have locus standi to file the petition but at this stage it cannot be concluded that she will be granted Letters of Administration. That, according to the learned Judge, will have to be done after the whole evidence is led and is evaluated by the trial Court. The other significant finding returned by Upasani, J., are as follows:- "15. Normally a mere creditor of the deceased may not be said to have any interest in the estate so as to be enable to oppose the grant of Letters of Administration. His interest is only to see that the assets are sufficient to pay the debt of the deceased. The remedy of the credit or of the deceased under the normal circumstances would be to file suit to recover the debt against the person in whose favour grant of Probate or Letters of Administration has been made. However, in the present case, the facts are so peculiar that it will have to be held that the caveatrix as a creditor of the deceased has an interest to oppose the grant of Letters of Administration in favour of the plaintiff who claim to be the widow of the said deceased but whose claim appears to be dubious. Therefore, I am not at all inclined to grant prayer of the petitioner that the caveat filed by the caveatrix be dismissed at the outset. Even prayer (b) which is for expeditious hearing of the suit, which is the alternative prayer, need not be granted as no urgency of any sort is shown by the plaintiff. The suit, therefore, will come up for hearing in normal course. Parties of course will have to complete all the pretrial formalities, but no directions for expeditious hearing need be given. The suit, therefore, will come up for hearing in normal course. Parties of course will have to complete all the pretrial formalities, but no directions for expeditious hearing need be given. Hence the following order: Chamber Summons No. 990 of 1996 dated 8th October, 1996 is dismissed. No order as to costs. Matter stands adjourned to 29-1-1997." From the above, it becomes apparent that the status of the petitioner is still under a cloud and that the right of Patel to move the caveat is accepted. 7.Not satisfied with the aforesaid observations of the learned Single Judge, the petitioner filed Appeal No. 74 of 1997 against the aforesaid order. The Division Bench has dismissed the appeal in the following words. "The appellant has taken out the Chamber Summons before the learned Single Judge for dismissing the caveat filed by the respondent opposing grant of Letters of Administration to the appellant." 2. The appellant has admitted that she had taken divorce from the deceased in the year 1984. Divorce decree was passed on 5th December, 1984. However, it is her contention that she had remarried the deceased for which some form was filed in. That remarriage is denied by the respondent. 3. As against this, it is the case of the respondent that she had married the deceased on 15th October, 1991. It is true that this fact is not properly stated by the respondent, who appeared in person, in the affidavit-in-reply to the Chamber Summons. 4. Considering the dispute between the parties, it cannot be said that the order passed by the learned Single Judge rejecting the Chamber Summons calls for any interference. 5. Hence, this appeal is dismissed." It is agreed by the Counsel for the petitioner and Patel that the matter was carried to the Supreme Court by way of S.L.P. This S.L.P. has also been dismissed. 8.Faced with this situation, it would be difficult for this Court to give finding contrary to the findings which had been recorded by Upasani, J. As noted earlier, we are only at a prima facie stage. Therefore, I am not inclined to go into the affidavits which have been filed on behalf of the petitioner to show that she has remarried and that the claims put forward by Patel are not worthy of investigation. Therefore, I am not inclined to go into the affidavits which have been filed on behalf of the petitioner to show that she has remarried and that the claims put forward by Patel are not worthy of investigation. 9.Prima facie I am of the view that the whole story put forward about remarriage smacks of collusiveness. Patel has placed on record a certified copy of the original petition which was filed in the Bombay City Civil Court in M.J. Petition No. 290 of 1994. In this petition it is stated that the petitioner could not give birth to a child and therefore all members of the deceased family started taunting and misbehaving the petitioner. She claims to have been cruelly treated as she was responsible for not giving birth to a child. She claims that the deceased had abused her, assaulted her, beaten her and neglected her totally. She even claims mental torture. She claims that as a result of this mental torture she developed blood-pressure, diabetes, skull trouble, tumour. Consequently she claims that she had to undergo operations twice. She further states that in order to overcome these cruel attitudes she suggested to the deceased to adopt a newly born child from Ashram which would bring peace and tranquillity to the petitioner herself but the deceased and his relations did not agree to the said proposal. She also narrates that the deceased had developed friendship and intimacies with other ladies. She claims that about two years prior to the filing of the divorce petition, the deceased had deserted her i.e. from January, 1982. She states that the address A/17. Asian Staff Quarters, Manmala Tank Road, Post Mahim, Bombay-400 016 is only kept as a matrimonial home for business purposes. She claims that she has not been permitted to visit her parents at Ahmedabad. She claims that the petitioner apprehends danger to her life and health and see no chance for returning to the happy married life. She claims that the deceased is not providing for maintenance. She further claims that she has never enjoyed her conjugal rights even though she is under the matrimonial roof. She emphatically states that during the stay together she had been treated with such cruelty both physical and mental which has created reasonable doubt in her mind that to live together is not safe. She further claims that she has never enjoyed her conjugal rights even though she is under the matrimonial roof. She emphatically states that during the stay together she had been treated with such cruelty both physical and mental which has created reasonable doubt in her mind that to live together is not safe. She has stated in the petition that the deceased is a prominent builder of Bombay. In para 14 of the petition, she states that there is no collusion or connivance between the petitioner and the deceased in any manner whatsoever. The petitioner stepped into the witness box and reiterated some of the averments made in the petition. There is no cross-examination of this statement by the deceased. Thus it becomes apparent that although some horrendous events have been narrated in the petition. Yet the deceased did not even care to defend himself. A perusal of the decree shows that the Counsel for the deceased had made a statement that the respondent does not wish to contest the petition or to lead any evidence or to cross examine the petitioner. Yet a statement is made on oath in the petition that there is no collusion in presentation of the petition. Thus prima facie I am of the view that the whole proceedings were collusive in nature. If there was an agreement between the parties to get a divorce there is a provisions for obtaining a divorce by mutual consent under section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. But this was not a divorce by mutual consent. Having obtained this divorce, the learned Counsel has been at pains to point out, in affidavit after affidavits that the parties had reconciled and thereafter remarried. Certificate of marriage is produced. Numerous instances have been shown of the deceased and the petitioner living together happily. The Court is left with the distinct impression that the deceased as well as the petitioner were prepared to go to any length to secure favourable orders from the Court. The Court has not been given any reason for the so called reconciliation. The bone of contention between the husband and wife was the inability of the wife to produce a child. No child was adopted by the couple, as suggested by the wife earlier. The Court has not been given any reason for the so called reconciliation. The bone of contention between the husband and wife was the inability of the wife to produce a child. No child was adopted by the couple, as suggested by the wife earlier. Thus the Court is left with an impression, that the divorce was procured by misleading the Court, for reasons wholly different from the grounds put forward. According to Patel, the divorce was only to hoodwink the Taxation Authorities. On the basis of the material before me, this possibility cannot be ruled out, at this stage. This is in addition to what has been held by Upasani, J., that the petitioner has not come to Court with clean hands. 10.At this prima facie stage all that is necessary for the Court is to see whether there is some prima facie evidence of the amounts of the claim put forward by Patel as a creditor. The fact that there were claims and counter claims has to be accepted at this prima facie stage for a number of reasons. Sometime in the year 1996, the matter was sought to be amicably settled between the petitioner and Patel. One Mr. Markand Gandhi, Solicitor, had sent two draft arbitration agreements to Mr. S.K. Desai, a Retired Judge of the High Court. There is correspondence between S.K. Desai and Markand Gandhi detailing the various meetings which had taken place between the parties. There are allegations and counter allegations. Neither of these allegations can be thrown out at the outset. The evidentiary value of these letters which criss-crossed between Patel, Markand Gandhi and S.K. Desai will be seen at the trial of the case. Suffice it to say, prior to this arbitration, a criminal complaint had been filed by Patel. This criminal complaint was investigated by the police. Some statements were recorded. In that complaint, the claim made by Patel was in the sum of Rs. 85 lakhs. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no quantification of the claim at the time when the matter went for arbitration. Patel had also relied on a letter written by the deceased on 25th September, 1995. If this letter is taken at its face value, it transpires that the deceased was being harassed by the police. He makes reference to payment of Rs. Patel had also relied on a letter written by the deceased on 25th September, 1995. If this letter is taken at its face value, it transpires that the deceased was being harassed by the police. He makes reference to payment of Rs. 20 lakhs as soon as certain amounts are received from sale of the properties mentioned therein. He also mentions that he will immediately deposit Rs. 1 crore in the Bank Account of Patel. There are number of other details mentioned in this letter. But again the authenticity and the correctness of this letter cannot be gone into at this stage. That is a matter of evidence which will have to be established at the time when the matter is argued but it is sufficient to lend prima facie credence to the claims which are put forward by Patel. During the course of arguments I had informed Patel that the arguments should be limited only to the quantification of the claim as her locus standi as a creditor had been established in Chamber Summons No. 990 of 1996 which has been decided by Upasani, J. Those findings are binding on me. Not only the findings are given on the same controversy but they have been affirmed by the Division Bench. This Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings of the Division Bench. There proceedings cannot be turned into a review of the order of Upasani, J., on the basis of some material which may be produced before this Court now. All this material was available to the petitioner at the time when the Chamber Summons was being decided. In my view, sufficient material has been placed on the record to establish that the estate of the deceased is indebted to the petitioner for a substantial amount. Her claim now is Rs. 1,84,00,000/-. It is the claim of Patel that properties mentioned in schedule-A do not reflect the true estate of the deceased. It is also claimed that the properties mentioned therein have not been properly valued. She has also given details of various other properties which, according to her, form part of the estate. This Notice of Motion has been taken out by Patel on the ground that the petitioner is disposing of encumbering and creating third party rights in the estate of the deceased. 11.In reply, Ms. Sethna has addressed very lengthy arguments. She has also given details of various other properties which, according to her, form part of the estate. This Notice of Motion has been taken out by Patel on the ground that the petitioner is disposing of encumbering and creating third party rights in the estate of the deceased. 11.In reply, Ms. Sethna has addressed very lengthy arguments. These arguments are, however, comprised into a compilation along with the judgments. Learned Counsel has argued that in consonance with the governing principles of Hindu Law that "inheritance can never be in abeyance", on the death of the deceased, the petitioner being the nearest their succeeded simultaneously to his property and became entitled at once to the property left by him. The right of succession vested in her "immediately on the death of the owner of the property". By virtue of the statutory right conferred under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the petitioner holds the property as full owner. There is no dispute whatsoever with this proposition of law but it has already been observed by Upasani, J., that her legal status as a wife is yet to be established. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner automatically has a right to deal with the property. She may have a right to file the petition for Letters of Administration but the same would only be granted on the Court being satisfied that there was a second marriage as is sought to be now pleaded. Ms. Sethna thereafter submitted that the marriage is duly proved as the marriage certificate has been produced. She submits that there is a strong presumption in favour of validity of a marriage. Again, there is no dispute with this proposition. But such a presumption would only operate if there is no dispute to the marriage. The presumption itself would not be equated with the finding of fact and law on the status of the marriage which can only be decided after the evidence has been led and appreciated. Here the second marriage has been denied by Patel in the very first affidavit filed in support of the caveat. Thereafter the learned Counsel had sought to argue that the findings returned by Upasani, J., were affirmed by the Court of Appeal only on the impression that the two widows were claiming to be the legal heir. Here the second marriage has been denied by Patel in the very first affidavit filed in support of the caveat. Thereafter the learned Counsel had sought to argue that the findings returned by Upasani, J., were affirmed by the Court of Appeal only on the impression that the two widows were claiming to be the legal heir. Whatever was the reason for which the Division Bench dismissed the appeal cannot be gone into by this Court. The findings of the Appellate Court have been reproduced above. These findings are given on the basis of the grounds of appeal, which were attached to the memorandum of appeal. A perusal of these grounds of appeal shows that the findings of the learned Single Judge with regard to Patel being creditor was assailed. Some of the ground which were specifically urged may be reproduced. "(m) The learned Judge failed to appreciate the fact that the appellant and the deceased had got remarried despite copies of remarriage certificate having been tendered to her. (n) The learned Judge erred in holding that the question of deciding marital status cannot be done by tendering of the marriage certificate. (o) The learned Judge erred in on the one hand holding that formal proof of the marriage certificate as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be dispensed with and on the other hand admitting a caveat to oppose grant of Letters of Administration, which does not disclose interest of the caveatrix and is prima facie not maintainable. (q) The learned Judge erred in holding that the appellant has not come before the Court with clean hands." There are other grounds which more or less covered the arguments which have been addressed in this Court. The appeal having been dismissed these grounds would no longer be open for argument in the present Notice of Motion. The grounds having been taken in the Memorandum of Appeal, are to be taken either as not pressed or rejected. This is the settled law. Thereafter the learned Counsel had argued that not only are the claims false, bogus, dishonest, frivolous and wholly devoid of merit, but almost all the purported claims are time barred. The grounds having been taken in the Memorandum of Appeal, are to be taken either as not pressed or rejected. This is the settled law. Thereafter the learned Counsel had argued that not only are the claims false, bogus, dishonest, frivolous and wholly devoid of merit, but almost all the purported claims are time barred. It is submitted that it is the duty of the Court under section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to consider as to whether or not the suit is barred by limitation even if no such defence is taken by the defendant. I am unable to agree with the submission made by the learned Counsel. The period of limitation will start not from the date when the payments are made but it will start from the date when the debtor refuses to return the money. Prima facie there is evidence that admission of liability was made in the letter dated 25th September, 1995. Prima facie, there is evidence that arbitration proceedings were commenced before S.K. Desai in the year 1996. Even the correspondence which has been produced with the latest affidavit which has been filed would show that even Markand Gandhi had accepted that the drafts of the arbitration agreements were sent to S.K. Desai. The correspondence also shows that there are difference of opinion between Markand Gandhi and S.K. Desai as to what were the discussions held. Therefore, it would not be possible to hold that the claim put forward by Patel are time barred at least at this stage. Thereafter the learned Counsel has argued that it is not the province of the Court to go into the questions of title to property of which the Letters of Administration is sought. Again, there is no dispute with this proposition. The Court can proceed on the basis that the properties mentioned in the schedule to the petition are indeed the ownership of the deceased. Thereafter the learned Counsel had argued that in any event the relief of Receiver cannot be granted to Patel as she has not made out any prima facie case. I am unable to agree with this submission of the learned Counsel. On the very day when the matter was going to be argued, Mr. Sanghvi, Senior Advocate came and took seat in the Court. On enquiry it was discovered that Mr. I am unable to agree with this submission of the learned Counsel. On the very day when the matter was going to be argued, Mr. Sanghvi, Senior Advocate came and took seat in the Court. On enquiry it was discovered that Mr. Sanghvi had come purely to protect the interest of his clients who happened to b M/s. Space Age Developers Pvt. Ltd. The property mentioned at Item No. 9 of the schedule has been agreed to be sold to M/s. Space Age Developers Pvt. Ltd. by an agreement dated 20th June, 1996 for a consideration of Rs. 7,21,00,000/-. This agreement has been executed by the petitioner. When it came to the evaluation of the property with the petition its value is shown as Rs. 5 lakhs. The valuation in the schedule may or may not be correct. The learned Counsel had argued that under the estate duty rules, a different formula is given for the valuation. But the solid factor remains that the property is worth Rs. 7.21 crores. It is also apparent that without the Letters of Administration having been granted to the petitioner, the property is sought to be sold. Mr. Sanghvi has stated that under the terms of agreement for payment, a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs have already been paid. The agreement also provides that the balance amount of consideration is to be paid as follows. "(a) Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten lakhs only) on or before the execution hereof, (the payment and receipt whereof the vendor both hereby admit and acknowledge). (b) Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy lakhs only) upon the purchasers completing construction upto plinth level on the said property or within a period of three years from the date hereof, whichever is earlier. (c) Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy lakhs only) upon completion of 1st slab of the proposed building or within a period of 6 months from the date of payment mentioned in Clause 5(b) above. (d) Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy lakhs only) upon completion of 2nd slab of the proposed building or within a period of 6 months from the date of payment mentioned in Clause 5(c) above. (e) Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seven lakhs only) upon completion of 3rd slab of the proposed building or within a period of 6 months from the date of payment mentioned in Clause 5(d) above. (f) Rs. (e) Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seven lakhs only) upon completion of 3rd slab of the proposed building or within a period of 6 months from the date of payment mentioned in Clause 5(d) above. (f) Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy lakhs only) upon completion of 4th slab of the proposed building or within a period of 6 months from the date of payment mentioned in Clause 5(e) above. (g) Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy lakhs only) upon completion of 5th slab of the proposed building or within a period of 6 months from the date of payment mentioned in Clause 5(f) above. (h) Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy lakhs only) upon completion of 6th slab of the proposed building or within a period of 6 months from the date of payment mentioned in Clause 5(g) above. (i) Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy lakhs only) upon completion of 7th slab of the proposed building or within a period of 6 months from the date of payment mentioned in Clause 5(h) above. (j) Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy lakhs only) upon completion of 8th slab of the proposed building or within a period of 6 months from the date of payment mentioned in Clause (i) above. (k) Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy lakhs only) on receipt of occupation certificate from Bombay Municipal Corporation. (l) The last and the balance amount of Rs. 11,00,000/- (Rupees Eleven lakhs only) shall be paid upon execution of conveyance or any other final document of the said property in favour of the purchasers and/or their nominees. It is agreed that the purchasers and/or their nominees shall take conveyance of the said property within a maximum period of eighteen months from the date of last payment mentioned under sub-clause 5 (K) above, failing which the purchasers shall pay the said balance sum of Rs. 11,00,000/- to the vendors, provided the vendor has obtained her 230-A Income Tax Clearance Certificate under the Income Tax Act and the purchasers have furnished with six copies of duly approved draft conveyance to the vendor at least three months before the expiry of the period of completion or eighteen months as the case may be. 11,00,000/- to the vendors, provided the vendor has obtained her 230-A Income Tax Clearance Certificate under the Income Tax Act and the purchasers have furnished with six copies of duly approved draft conveyance to the vendor at least three months before the expiry of the period of completion or eighteen months as the case may be. It is further agreed between the parties hereto that at the request of the purchasers the vendor shall bring 230-A Income tax Clearance Certificate at any time earlier the said amount is due and payable." Patel has also put on record a number of agreements and Power of Attornies executed by the petitioner in favour of third parties authorising them to of dispose of various other properties which form part of the estate of the deceased. Details of these Memorandum of Understandings. Agreements and Power of Attorneys can be found in the affidavit of Patel dated 29-2-2000. Apart from this, there is another factor which would tend to show that the estate of the deceased needs to be protected. Some arbitration proceedings were conducted between the deceased and one Jaymal Shah. On the basis of these arbitration proceedings Mr. Markand Gandhi had given an Award in favour of Jaymal Shah in the sum of Rs. 85 lakhs. This Award is now subject matter of an Arbitration Petition No. 158 of 1996. In that petition the Court was pleased to pass an order of injunction directing the petitioner not to dispose of any of the properties mentioned in Exhibit-C. Inspite of this injunction, the petitioner has sought to deal with the property. 12.Taking into consideration all these facts, the Court has to decide, whether a prima facie case has been made out by the petitioner. If so, wherein lies the balance of convenience? who will suffer irretrievable loss? 13. Taking into consideration the above legal position and the facts mentioned above, the conduct of the petitioner and Patel has to be evaluated. So far as the petitioner is concerned, it can be seen that firstly before the Family Court a collusive decree was obtained which was never acted upon. Thus the Court was not taken into confidence about the true state of affairs. It was just a paper decree. A perusal of the certified copy of the Decree of Divorce shows that the Decree was passed on 5-12-1984. Thus the Court was not taken into confidence about the true state of affairs. It was just a paper decree. A perusal of the certified copy of the Decree of Divorce shows that the Decree was passed on 5-12-1984. The deceased made an application for a certified copy on 30-7-93. It was delivered to him on 6-8-1993. Since the petitioner claims to have remarried the deceased in 1987, the question arises as to the need for a certified copy in 1993. If there is no substance in the claim of Patel, that she had married the deceased, then why was the certified copy of the decree presented to her by the deceased? It is the claim of Patel, that she had confronted the deceased about the bogus divorce. Patel further claims that it was to convince her that there was no remarriage with the petitioner that the deceased had given her the certified copy of the decree of divorce. Prima facie there seems to be substance in the claim made by Patel. For what other purpose it was used is not discernible as at present. One hopes that the truth will emerge through cross-examination of the petitioner at the trial. In the High Court the proceedings in the Divorce Court or the remarriage were never initially disclosed. Thereafter the petitioner even went so far as to deny any relationship between the deceased and Patel. This is prima facie falsified from the correspondence of Mr. Markand Gandhi which has been attached with the affidavit dated 29th February, 2000. Time and again it is reiterated by Mr. Markand Gandhi that there were close relations between the deceased and Patel. Even in the Divorce Petition it is stated on oath by the petitioner that the deceased had developed intimate relations with other ladies. Details of the efforts of the petitioner to dispose of part of the estate of the deceased have been given above. Even during the pendency of these proceedings an agreement for sale has been entered into of the property mentioned at Schedule-9 above. It has also come on the record that the properties mentioned in Schedule-I do not reflect the true estate of the deceased. Prima facie it appears that the estate has been wholly undervalued. Injunction order issued by this Court in Arbitration Petition No. 158 of 1996, has not been honoured. It has also come on the record that the properties mentioned in Schedule-I do not reflect the true estate of the deceased. Prima facie it appears that the estate has been wholly undervalued. Injunction order issued by this Court in Arbitration Petition No. 158 of 1996, has not been honoured. In such circumstances it would be difficult to hold that balance of convenience lies in favour of the petitioner. It would have to be, prima facie, held that irretrievable loss would be caused to Patel, if the estate of the deceased is not protected. Taking all the aforesaid facts and circumstances into consideration, I am prima facie of the opinion that the petitioner has not come to Court with clean hands. It is a settled principle of law that no equities can possibly arise in favour of a dishonest litigant. It has been observed by Upasani, J., that the petitioner has not come to Court with clean hands. That finding has been affirmed by the Division Bench in Appeal No. 74 of 1997. From a perusal of the facts narrated above my, prima facie, finding are in addition to the findings recorded by Upasani, J. I am, therefore, of the opinion prima facie that the estate of the deceased needs to be protected. 14.In view of the above, Notice of Motion No. 643 of 1997 is made absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (a) and (d). In addition, a direction is issued to M/s. Space Age Developers Pvt. Ltd., to deposit the future instalments under the Agreement dated 20th June, 1996 with the Prothonotary and Sr. Master which would be kept to the credit of the suit account and for satisfaction of Patel or any other creditor which may make a claim against the estate of the deceased. In view of prayer Clause (a), the petitioner is directed to give upto date details of all the estate of the deceased wherever he may have any interest whatsoever. 15.Patel is at liberty to bring to the notice of the Court any other properties which may be found to be in the ownership of the deceased. 16.In view of the above, no separate order is required in the Notice of Motion No. 262 of 1998. Both the notices of motion are disposed of accordingly. Certified copy expedited. Rule made absolute accordingly.