Judgment : The tenant in R.C.O.P.No.3163 of 1989 on the file of the Rent Controller-cum-XIV Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras. 2. Theeviction petition is filed by Ciscons Builders and Engineers represented by partner G.Karnani through power of Attorney Agent Wilfred Harding. In that eviction petition, it was alleged contended that the tenant has committed wilful default in payment of rents from May, 1989 to August, 1989 amounting to Rs.18,025. Before initiating proceedings, a legal notice was also issued informing the tenant that he has not paid the rent. 3. In the counter-statement filed by the tenant, he admitted that he is a tenant and the monthly rent is Rs.5,175. He also contended that he has paid Rs.50,000 as advance and the same could be adjusted as and when the rent becomes due. On 27. 1990. M/s.Ciscons Builders and Engineers filed M.P.No.554 of 1990 under Sec.11(4) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as Act. In the affidavit filed in support of the said application, it was stated that an amount of Rs.72,450 is due from the tenant and after adjusting the advance of Rs.50,000 a sum of Rs.22,450 is still payable by the tenant. That amount was deposited into court by the tenant. 4. Thereafter, M/s.Ciscons Builders and Engineers again filed M.P.No.470 of 1991 alleging that the tenant has further committed default in payment of rent from November, 1990 to May, 1991 and they are also entitled to advance of two months rent, totalling to Rs.46,575. That application was filed on 16. 1991. For the first time, the tenant took an objection contending that the application under Sec.11(4) of the Act is liable to be dismissed since M/s.Ciscons Builders and Engineers are not the landlords and he is a tenant only under Master Sharan G.Karnani, who is a minor. He also contended that the lease deed was executed by Govind G.Karnani as guardian of the minor son. The person who has filed the eviction petition is not the landlord. He prayed for dismissal of the application. Thereafter, he also filed an application to receive additional counter statement on 29. 1991. 5. Onfiling the additional statement M/s.Ciscons Builders and Engineers moved M.P.No.816 of 1991 seeking to amend the rent control application. The person who has filed the eviction petition is not the landlord. He prayed for dismissal of the application. Thereafter, he also filed an application to receive additional counter statement on 29. 1991. 5. Onfiling the additional statement M/s.Ciscons Builders and Engineers moved M.P.No.816 of 1991 seeking to amend the rent control application. In the affidavit filed in support of the application, they stated that the person who filed the petition was all along dealing with the tenant and he was collecting the rent and depositing the rent in the name of the minor. By mistake, M/s.Ciscons Builders and Engineers were named as petitioner and really the person who is ought to be impleaded as petitioner is Sharan G.Karnani represented by his father. The said application was seriously opposed by the tenant. 6. The Rent Controller as per order dated 1. 1992 allowed the application. The Rent Controller found that since the petitioner was collecting rent from the respondent, his capacity as power of Attorney Agent of Govind G.Karnani, father and natural grand-father of Master Sharan G.Karnani, the tenant will not be in any way prejudiced on account of the amendment and the same was allowed. Though an appeal was taken, the same was not successful and finally the tenant filed C.R.P.Nos.58 and 59 of 1995 before this Court. On 1. 1995. His Lordship Justice Shivappa disposes of the C.R.Ps. dismissing the same. It is better to extract the order of the learned Judge, which reads thus: “The two revision petition are filed to set aside the order of the lower appellate court. Keeping in view the admission made by the petitioner herein that the rent has been paid to the respondent/landlord, both the courts concurrently allowed the amendment. The question that the court has no jurisdiction to allow the amendment may be urged at the time of argument of the main matter. I see no infirmity in the findings of both the courts. Therefore, these revision petitions deserve dismissal even at the admission stage itself. Accordingly, both the revision petitions are dismissed. [Italics supplied] 7. Thereafter, the parties went on trial before the Rent Controller and as per order dated 1. 1996, the Rent Controller found that the tenant is liable to be evicted from the building on the ground that he is a wilful defaulter. 8. Accordingly, both the revision petitions are dismissed. [Italics supplied] 7. Thereafter, the parties went on trial before the Rent Controller and as per order dated 1. 1996, the Rent Controller found that the tenant is liable to be evicted from the building on the ground that he is a wilful defaulter. 8. The tenant preferred appeal before the Appellate Authority as R.C.A.No.558 of 1996 on the file of the VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras. The Appellate Authority also confirmed the findings of the Rent Controller by dismissing the appeal. 9. The concurrent judgments of the courts below are assailed in this revision under Sec.25 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. 10. Since caveat was entered by the respondent, with consent of parties, the revision itself was heard. Both the parties also produced the typed set of papers. Which they rely on. The lower court record was also called for. 11. The counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the main eviction petition itself was not maintainable since it was not instituted by a proper person. Justice Shivappa while disposing of the revisions has given an opportunity to agitate this question and therefore the petitioner is entitled to agitate whether the amendment was properly allowed. The counsel further argued that the application is also barred under Sec.10(8) of the Rent Control Act and the person who has filed the eviction petition is not competent to institute the same. It is also contended that when there is an advance of Rs.50,000, the landlord cannot claim eviction and the rent arrears are liable to be adjusted in the excess advance even without any demand. The decisions of the courts below taking a contrary view is illegal and the same is liable to be interfered with. 12. As against the said contention, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that no ground is made out for interference since there is no illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the orders of the courts below. 13. Heard both sides. 14. 12. As against the said contention, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that no ground is made out for interference since there is no illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the orders of the courts below. 13. Heard both sides. 14. Before going into the merits of the case, I have to taken note of Rule 28(7) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1974 which reads thus: “The controller of the Appellate Authority deciding the dispute shall record a brief note of the evidence of the parties and witnesses who attend, and upon the evidence so recorded, and after consideration of any documentary evidence produced by the parties a decision shall be given in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience by the controller or Appellate Authority. The decision given shall be reduced to writing. In the absence of any party duly summoned to attend, the dispute may be decided ex parte.” It is clear from the said Rule that decision of the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority must be in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience and the technicalities are not given that much of importance while deciding the case. 15. The first objection raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that M/s.Ciscons Builders and Engineers are not the landlords. They have nothing to do with the schedule building and when they have instituted the proceedings for eviction, the application should have been rejected summarily. The Rent Controller went wrong in impleading the minor Sharan G.Karnani represented by his father and guardian Govind G.Karnani in the place of the firm. His argument is that the rent controller who is the only statutory authority has no jurisdiction to substitute another petitioner in the name of the firm. 16. Both the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority held that the amendment is necessary and the same was allowed. The Rent Controller further found that the petitioner who filed the petition was admittedly collecting the rents form the respondent in his capacity as power agent of Govind G.Karnani who is the father and natural guardian of the minor. Though that amendment was challenged before this Court, the same was also dismissed. It is true that the learned Judge permitted the petitioner to question the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller in allowing the amendment during trial. Though that amendment was challenged before this Court, the same was also dismissed. It is true that the learned Judge permitted the petitioner to question the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller in allowing the amendment during trial. It is on the basis of that direction the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that in the place of the partnership firm, minor Sharan G.Karnani should not have been substituted. After hearing the counsel I did not find any merit in his submission. I had an occasion to consider the similar question in the decision reported in G.Jayapandian v. P.C.Manickam and another G.Jayapandian v. P.C.Manickam and another G.Jayapandian v. P.C.Manickam and another , (1996) 1 MLJ. 350 . In paragraph Nos.12 and 14 of the said judgment, after considering various decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts, I held thus: “It is in this connection we have to consider the purpose of the amendment. An amendment to a pleading is necessitated to avoid multiplicity of litigation and also to explain the vagueness, if any, in the pleadings, To decide the real matter in controversy, parties are permitted to amend the pleadings. In certain circumstances, the existing pleadings becomes insufficient or inappropriate onus to subsequent events. If amendment is refused and if the party is directed to file another suit or proceeding, the very purpose of coming to court will be defeated. We must understand that both courts and tribunals are intended to administer justice. When the Act or Rule confers certain powers on the authorities concerned, it does or follow that those are the only powers that could be exercised by them. It cannot be expected that the powers exercised by the tribunals should always be enumerated. All future contingencies cannot be exhausted while drafting a statute or rule. It is in that view, we have to consider whether a tribunal can exercise a power which is not specifically excluded. When a tribunal is more or less a court and is discharging judicial functions, even though it is a creature of a statue, unless it is specifically prohibited, we have to presume that the tribunal also will have the same powers as a court, and it can discharge these functions as well.“ In that decision, it was held that the Rent Control Court has got power to allow amendment. 17. 17. Order 1, Rule 10, Sub-Rule (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus: ”10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff: (1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff. The court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute do to do, order any person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the court thinks just. “ Under the above provision if a suit is filed in the name of wrong person as plaintiff and if it is found that it is bona fides mistake, the court is empowered to substitute the name of the real plaintiff in the place of the wrong person, who is shown as plaintiff. While passing an order, the court must also be satisfied that the substitution is necessary for the determination of the real matter in issue and the mistake committed is a bona fide mistake. Even though Code of Civil Procedure in terms may not apply to a proceeding under a Rent Control Act, the principles of Civil Procedure Code could be made applicable unless it is specifically excluded. 18. It is not the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the Rent Controller court is not entitled to correct the mistake whether it is committed by the party or by court. To correct a mistake in the proceedings, is the inherent power of any court or tribunal. It is consequent to the correction of the mistake the amendment has become necessary. In this case, even the tenant admitted in the reply notice and in his counter statement that the person who has filed the eviction petition is his landlord and he is paying the rent to it. He also contended that he has paid advance of Rs.50,000 and the same is liable to be adjusted in the rent arrears. When the landlord filed an application under Sec.11(4) of the Act, for the first time there also the tenant admitted that the person filing that application is the landlord. He also contended that he has paid advance of Rs.50,000 and the same is liable to be adjusted in the rent arrears. When the landlord filed an application under Sec.11(4) of the Act, for the first time there also the tenant admitted that the person filing that application is the landlord. Only when the second application was filed under Sec.11(4) of the Act, the tenant contended that the person who filed the eviction petition is not the landlord, but the minor is the landlord. Only then the mistake committed by the landlord was found out. That necessitated the filing of the amendment application which is allowed. The court really invoked the powers, applying the principles of O.1, Rule 10(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It cannot be said that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to invoke the principles enunciated under O.1, Rule 10(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure nor it can be said that the Rent Control Court has no jurisdiction to allow amendment. The first contention of the counsel appearing for the petitioner is therefore rejected. 19. The second contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner was that the person who has filed the eviction petition even after the minor has been impleaded, is not competent to represent and he is not a landlord. The said submission of the counsel is also without any merits. The minors father who is the natural guardian has been examined as P.W.2. He has stated that all along Wilfred Harding alone was collecting rents and he has been crediting that amount in the name of minor. P.W.2 has further stated that he has executed a power of attorney in favour of Wilfred Harding and he is really looking after the entire affairs and he has also authorised him to institute these proceedings. Thus, the evidence of P.W.2 is clear that Wilfred Harding was acting as landlord from the inception of tenancy and he alone was issuing receipts also. Under these circumstances, I do not think that the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner could be accepted. 20. In the decision reported in Kasturchand v. Raman Rajan and others Kasturchand v. Raman Rajan and others Kasturchand v. Raman Rajan and others , A.I.R. 1993 S.C.W. 3662 their Lordships considered the scope of Secs.2(6) and 10(8) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 20. In the decision reported in Kasturchand v. Raman Rajan and others Kasturchand v. Raman Rajan and others Kasturchand v. Raman Rajan and others , A.I.R. 1993 S.C.W. 3662 their Lordships considered the scope of Secs.2(6) and 10(8) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. At paragraph Nos.4 to 6, of the said judgments, this point is considered and it is thus: “Appearing for the appellant, Mr.Tarkunde contends that the definition of Landlord under Sec.2(6) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Act No.18 of 1960), shows that a person who acted on behalf of another being an agent is also a landlord, but Sec.10(8) of the Act says that such an agent is not entitled to institute proceedings except with the previous written consent of the landlord. Sec.10(8) reads: ”Sec.10(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section no person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building merely as an agent of the landlord shall, except with the previous written consent of the landlord, be entitled to apply for the eviction of a tenant.“ Sec.2(6) is an inclusive definition of landlord and it is wide in terms. In includes various persons in the category of landlord. Sub-sec.(6) of Sec.2 reads: ”Sec.2(6): “Landlord” includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant“. The sub-section thus shows that any person acting on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others is a landlord. In agent is defined as a Landlord; so is a trustee; so is a guardian. The definition being wide and also inclusive does not exclude a person who at all material times acted as a landlord to the knowledge of all the parties concerned and whose authority to deal with the premises has never been disputed. A person who so acts falls within the definition not as a mere agent, as defined under Sec.182 of the Contract Act. A person who so acts falls within the definition not as a mere agent, as defined under Sec.182 of the Contract Act. He may also be an agent, but not a mere agent, he is much more than that, particularly in the light of the facts of the case. It cannot be gainsaid that the respondent was for all purposes treated by all parties interested in the transaction as a landlord. In respect of such a person, Sec.10(8) which refers to a mere agent, is not attracted.” According to me the above decision fully answers the counsel appearing for the petitioner. 21. Taking into consideration the evidence of P.W.2 and the circumstances of the case and the fact that Wilfred Harding was collecting the rent and was transacting all correspondence, I do not think that the submission of the counsel could be accepted for a moment. Except for the belated statement or contention in the additional counter. the authority of Wilfred Harding as never questioned. The natural guardian has also executed a power of attorney which is also marked in the case. The contention of the counsel appearing for the petitioner is without merit. 22. The further argument that was taken by the counsel appearing for the petitioner is that on the date of filing the application, the petitioner has no cause of action and the application itself ought to have been rejected. The basis of the argument is that the rent arrears is only for a period of three months i.e., from May, 1989 to August, 1989 amounting to Rs.18,025. On the date of filing the eviction petition, the landlord was already in possession of excess advance. He has received a sum of Rs.50,000 and the rent arrears is liable to be adjusted in the excess advance. It is argued that except one months advance, the balance will have to be adjusted even without a demand from the tenant, whenever the rent becomes payable or becomes arrear. Reliance was also placed on the decision reported in National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Raj Kishore alias Sahu Jena and another National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Raj Kishore alias Sahu Jena and another National Aluminium Co. Reliance was also placed on the decision reported in National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Raj Kishore alias Sahu Jena and another National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Raj Kishore alias Sahu Jena and another National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Raj Kishore alias Sahu Jena and another , (1995)3 S.C.C. 44 In paragraph No.8 of the judgment, their Lordships held thus: “The provision clearly enacts the cause to be adopted in the case of any excess amount being paid by the tenant to the landlord, taking into account the factor that the tenant in certain circumstances may be compelled to make payment as advance or an amount in excess of that required to be paid to the landlord according to law. For that situation the provision imposes the legal obligation on the landlord to immediately refund the excess amount to the tenant unless the tenant exercises the option of requiring the landlord to adjust that amount towards any dues of the tenant or in any other manner indicated by the tenant. This provision has the effect of creating a corresponding enforceable right in the tenant to recover the excess amount from the landlord or to have it adjusted for his benefit in case the landlord fails to discharge his obligation of refunding that amount. The provision of adjustment of the excess amount at the option of the tenant clearly visualises its adjustment towards the rent due from the tenant since the jural relationship envisages payment only of rent by the tenant to the landlord towards which it can be adjusted.” [Italics supplied] It is true that on the basis of this judgment, the petitioner was justified in contending that the excess advance is liable to be adjusted in the rent payable by the tenant even without a demand from him. But that by itself may not be sufficient to hold that the petitioners contention is to be accepted for two reasons: (One The contention is liable to be rejected since minor Sharan G.Karnani was substituted only on 1. 1992 even if the court takes the date of application for substitution as the date when he become a party, that was only on 29. 1991. What was the state of affairs on that date will have to be considered. 1992 even if the court takes the date of application for substitution as the date when he become a party, that was only on 29. 1991. What was the state of affairs on that date will have to be considered. While considering the question of jurisdiction for amendment, I have stated that the Rent Control court was justified in following the principles of O.1, Rule 10(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. If that be so, the minor becomes a party to the proceedings only on 29. 1991. On that date, the entire advance have been adjusted in the rental arrears and the tenant also deposited a sum of Rs.22,450 being the balance payable after adjusting the amount of Rs.50,000. M.P.No.470 of 1991 was also filed on 16. 1991 on which date, a sum of Rs.46,575 was due towards rent arrears. It is true that no order has been passed on this application and by consent, this has been adjourned along with the Rent Control Petition. Even in June, 1991, huge amount was due from the tenant towards rent arrears. The minor was substituted only on the basis of his application on 29. 1991. On that date, more amount was due towards rent arrears. On the principle of O.1, Rule 10(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the minor can be deemed to be made a party to the proceedings only when he is substituted. If that be so, the petitioner cannot contend that the landlord has no cause of action. 23. This Court also entitled to take note of the subsequent events. The conduct of the petitioner before the eviction petition and subsequent to the eviction petition can be taken note of by this Court. As stated earlier, under Rule 28(7) of the Rent Control Rules, the decision of the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority is based on the justice, equity and good conscience, The fact that there are rent arrears is proved in this case. The non-payment is only because of the technical argument that the person who has filed the eviction petition is not the competent person. The tenant has no other explanation for having committed default when he has admitted that he has committed default. As on this date, few lakhs of rupees are due to the landlord by the tenant towards the rent arrears. The tenant has no other explanation for having committed default when he has admitted that he has committed default. As on this date, few lakhs of rupees are due to the landlord by the tenant towards the rent arrears. The tenant have paid an amount of Rs.22,450 only when an application under Sec.11(4) of the Act was filed. Thereafter, he did not bother to deposit any amount. Even after the minor was substituted, he did not think of depositing any amount. At the time of disposing the Rent Control Petition, Sec.11(4). Petition was still pending. Even then, the tenant did not think of depositing any amount. All these will have to be taken into consideration while considering the argument of the learned counsel, i.e., whether the landlord is entitled to any relief in this case. 24. When the authorities below have held that the tenant has committed default and he has no explanation to offer not paying the amount, this Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction cannot simply accept the technical argument as submitted by the counsel. The petitioner have to satisfy this Court by virtue of the decisions of the authorities below. Same injustice is done to him. When he has committed default in payment of rent and the authorities below have also held that it is wilful, I do not think that any injustice is done to him. On going through the decisions of the courts below, I find that they have taken the decisions “In accordance with law” and no ground is made out for interference under Sec.25 of the Rent Control Act. 25. In the result, confirming the judgments of the courts below, the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No.346 of 2000 is also dismissed.