JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J,—These appeals have been placed before us to answer the following questions: “1. Whether a person who has availed of the remedy provided to him under Section 62 and has failed to seek the relief therein can maintain a civil suit seeking possession of the land from which he has been forcibly dispossessed in view of the provisions contained in Section 64 of the Act? 2. Whether there will be any difference if the application made under Section 62 of the Act is dismissed on the ground of limitation or on merits?” 2. The material facts which led to the formulation of the aforesaid questions are as follows: 3. One Joti Ram, since deceased and represented by his legal representatives the present appellants had instituted a suit for possession of land measuring 4 biswas, comprising Khasra No. 412/ 104/2, Khata Khatauni No. 64/126, situated in Mauza Taruwaja, Pati Dayalgarh, Teh : Paonta, more specifically detailed in Tatirrm Shajara filed with the plaint (hereinafter referred to as the suit land1) and for damages in the sum of Rs. 200/-. The case as made out in the plaint is that the said Joti Ram was inducted as a tenant over the suit land by its owners, the defendants, in the year 1963 and he was liable to pay l/4th of Gala Batai as rent. It was further agreed between the parties that said Joti Ram could raise construction over a part of the suit land for purposes subservient to agricultural purposes. Pursuant to the terms of the tenancy said Joti Ram brought 7 Biswas of land out of the total land of 11 biswas comprising Khasra No. 412/104 under cultivation and on the remaining portion measuring 4 biswas thereof depicted in the Tatima as Khasra No. 412/104/2 constructed sheds for the purpose of residence, tethering cattle and to store chalf etc. On 6.5,1969 respondents Bhagat Singh and Saran Singh (since deceased and now represented by his legal representatives, that is, respondents Manmohan Singh, Jagjit Kaur and Jeewan Singh) taking advantage of the absence of Joti Ram took forcible possession of 4 biswas of land comprising khasra No. 412/104/2 and started construction thereon. On return to his house said Joti Ram requested them to resist from their un-lawful activities but of no avail. On return to his house said Joti Ram requested them to resist from their un-lawful activities but of no avail. Thereafter, respondent Bhagat Singh made an application to the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade Paonta for correction of revenue entries. The said application was decided on 7.2,1970 and the entries regarding possession of the land in suit were ordered to be made in favour of respondent-Bhagat Singh and deceased defendant Saran Singh. Joti Ram preferred an appeal against the said order of the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade and in the appeal said order was set-aside. In the meantime, the deceased plaintiff had applied for grant of right, title and interest of land owner to him in the suit land under Section 11 of the H.P. Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). On legal advice being given the said application was subsequently withdrawn. In the meanwhile, respondent No. 1 and deceased defendant Saran Singh constructed a house over the land, in suit. Had the deceased-plaintiff not been dis-possessed from the suit land he could have earned a sum of Rs. 500/-therefrom but in the suit he has restricted the claim for damages in the sum of Rs. 200/-. The repeated requests of the deceased plaintiff to Bhagat Singh and deceased defendant Saran Singh did not yield any positive result and on the contrary they refused to put the deceased plaintiff in possession of the suit land and to pay the compensation as requested by him. Hence, the deceased plaintiff instituted this suit on 17.1.1976. 4. During the pendency of the suit respondent Bhagat Singh sold one biswa of land out of the suit land to respondent Suchha Singh by a registered sale deed dated 1.10.1981 for consideration in the sum of Rs. 19,800/- despite knowing that said Bhagat Singh could not sell the land in view of the pendency of this suit. In view of this development during the pendency of the suit the plaint was suitably amended and said Suchha Singh was impleaded as a party defendant to the suit. 5. The defendants contested the suit of the plaintiff. 19,800/- despite knowing that said Bhagat Singh could not sell the land in view of the pendency of this suit. In view of this development during the pendency of the suit the plaint was suitably amended and said Suchha Singh was impleaded as a party defendant to the suit. 5. The defendants contested the suit of the plaintiff. The defendants-respondents other than Suchha Singh in their written statement raised the preliminary objections that the deceased had instituted a suit in the Revenue Court under Section 62 of the Act which was tried by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and after full trial, was dismissed. No appeal was preferred against the judgnlent in that case, therefore, the result of the said suit has become final between the parties, that the suit is barred by the principle of res judicata and that the suit is bad for the reasons that the plaintiff had purposely withheld the factum of the previous proceedings under Section 62 of the Act. On merits it was claimed that the defendants are the owners of the suit land and the plaintiff was never inducted as a tenant nor he came to possess the suit land in any capacity. It has further been averred that the defendants were owners of about 30 bighas of land out of which after retaining 11 biswas of land comprising Khasra No. 412/104 for construction purposes, they sold the remaining estate to the plaintiff and others in 1960 and thereabout. Since Khasra No. 412/104 was uncultivable and is on Paonta Sataun Road, therefore, defendants purposely kept it for construction purposes for themselves. Thus, there was no question of creation of any tenancy in favour of the plaintiff nor any tenancy was created. It has further been averred that the construction of houses by the defendants over the suit land was started and the houses were constructed much earlier to > the year 1969 and such construction was started in the presence of the plaintiff who had no right to object to such construction. The construction infact was completed in the year 1969 after spending about Rs, 20,000/-. The construction infact was completed in the year 1969 after spending about Rs, 20,000/-. It is also claimed that the suit land was rightly shown in the revenue entriles in the possession of the defendants and the plaintiff taking undue advantage of the defendants settling in U.P. manipulated the false entries of tenancy in the revenue records and then took illegal possession of about 5 to 7 biswas of land and constructed thatched huts thereon and got the entries about cultivation made in the revenue records whereas no part of the land in suit was under cultivation. The defendants were in possession of the suit land and also a part of Shamlat deh of the village and they started construction of houses in March/April, 1969 without any objection from any quarter. When the construction was at an advanced stage the plaintiff raised objection to such construction and institute this suit by taking undue advantage of the false entries in the revenue records. Hence, the claim as made out in the plaint has been denied. 6. Defendant-respondent Suchha Singh in his separate written statement which was filed after the aforesaid amendment of the plaint has by and large reiterated the same pleas as in the written statement of other defendants and has further claimed that he had purchased one biswa of land out of the suit land by a registered sale deed dated i. 10.1981 for consideration in the sum of Rs. 19,800/- and is a bona fide purchaser. At the time of such purchase there was no entry in the name of the plaintiff. It is further claimed that after the purchase he has constructed pucca kitchen, bath room, flush latrine over the land so purchased and has also made other alterations in his houses on incurring an expenditure in the sum of Rs. 30,000/ -. He has also thus denied the claim as made out in the plaint and has prayed for dismissal of the suit and in the alternative has claimed a sum of Rs, 52,000/- on account of construction and improvements made by him over the land purchased from Joti Ram. 7. Plaintiff filed replication reiterating his claim as made out in the plaint. 8. 7. Plaintiff filed replication reiterating his claim as made out in the plaint. 8. On the pleadings of the parties the learned trial Judge framed the following issues: "(i) Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try the present Suit?....OPD (ii) Whether the present suit is barred by principles of res judicata?.... OPD (iii) Whether the present suit has been correctly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction?... OPP (iv) Whether the plaintiff is/was tenant of the suit land as alleged?... OPP (v) Whether the plaintiff was dispossessed from the in the year 1969, as alleged?....OPP (vi) Whether plaintiff is entitled for any damages, if so, how much?.... OPP (vii) Whether defendants spent as tenancy thousand on construction over this suit land, as alleged, if so its effect?....OPD (vii-A) Whether the defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value of 1 biswa of suit land, if ad, its effect?....OPD (vii-B) Whether the suit is not within time?....OPD (viii) Relief.” 9. By its judgment dated 15.3.1986, learned trial Judge decided issue Nos. 1, 2, 7{a) and 7(b) against the defendants, issue No. 7 was decided in favour of the defendants and issue Nos. 3 to 6 were decided in favour of the plaintiff and as a result the suit was decreed. 10. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge, respondent Bhagat Ram preferred an appeal No. 17-N/13 of 1987 and respondent Suchha Singh preferred appeal No. 16-N/13 of 1987, By the impugned common judgment the appeals were accepted by the learned District Judge and the suit was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved by the said common judgment and decree the present appeals have been preferred. 11. During the pendency of these appeals Honble the Chief Justice who was then hearing these appeals vide order dated 30.7.1999 ordered in RSA No. 296/1988 that the matter be listed before, a Full Bench because it was better that the legal issues raised therein are decided by a Full Bench. By an order of the same date RSA No. 294/1988 was also ordered to be listed alongwith RSA No. 296/ 1988. 12. By an order of the same date RSA No. 294/1988 was also ordered to be listed alongwith RSA No. 296/ 1988. 12. The Full Bench formulated the following question for being answered: "Whether a Civil Suit filed by a tenant who has been dispossessed without his consent from his tenancy or any part thereof is time barred having regard to the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953?" 13. The Full Bench vide its order dated January 6, 2000 relying on the ratio of the judgment of Full Bench of Delhi High Court (Himachal Bench at Shimla) in Chuhary v. Sirtu (1968 Vol. IV The Delhi Law Times 412) answered the aforesaid question as follows: "We, therefore, hold that the civil suit filed by a tenant dispossessed without his consent from his tenancy or part thereof, will in our opinion be not barred if it is instituted after the expiry of one year as provided under Section 62 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties under the said Act.” The appeals were then ordered to be listed before a Single Bench. 14. When the matter came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge on 2.3.2000 he noticed that in view of the provisions contained in Section 64 of the Act two important questions of law already set out in para 1 of this judgment also requires determination. 15. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. 16. Be it stated here that it4is not in dispute, rather is admitted by the parties that the original plaintiff claiming to be a tenant forcibly dispossessed from the suit land by the defendants, had filed an application under Section 62 of the Act for restoration thereof which was dismissed by the concerned Revenue Officer vide order Ex, DW-2/G dated 4.10.1972.The dispute however, is that according to the plaintiff said application was dismissed as barred by time whereas according to the defendants it was dismissed not only as barred by time but also on merits. 17. 17. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that there is nothing in the Act which debars a tenant from instituting a suit for possession of his parcel of tenancy from which he had been forcibly dispossessed, before a Civil Court even if his application under Section 62 of the Act for restoration of possession has been dismissed, but his right to sue is specifically saved by Section 92 of the Act. Therefore, the plaintiffs suit is maintainable and the dismissal of the application whether on the ground of limitation or on merits will not make any difference. 18. The learned Counsel for the defendants had contended that in view of the provisions of Section 64 of the Act^ a person who has availed of the remedy under Section 62 of the Act and has failed, is specifically barred from instituting a suit for the same relief in a civil court irrespective of the ground of dismissal. It was further contended that once an application under Section 62 is dismissed, Section 92 of the Act will have no application in view of the specific bar created by Section 64. 19. We have perused the question as was formulated for being answered by the Full Bench and the decision thereon, operative part whereof has already been set out vide para 13 ante. It is evident from the perusal of the question formulated by the Full Bench that the questions which we are to answer are not included within the frame work of that question nor do we find a specific answer thereto in the penultimate decision of the Full Bench and it is so for the apparent reason that these questions were not specifically laid before the Full Bench for consideration and decision. The Full Bench has in fact agreed with and approved the judgment of the Delhi High Court (H.P. Bench) in Chuhary v. Sirtu (1968 Vol. IV DLT 412), wherein it was held that a civil suit filed by a tenant dispossessed without his consent from his tenancy or a part thereof would not be barred if it is instituted after the expiry of one year as provided in Section 62 of the Act. The question regarding competence of the suit instituted within one year of dispossession however was not answered and was left to be answered on a more appropriate occasion. The question regarding competence of the suit instituted within one year of dispossession however was not answered and was left to be answered on a more appropriate occasion. Thereafter, this question did not arise nor was answered in any case. However, there are few material observations made in Chuharys case (supra) which read as follows: "It is undoubtedly true that according to this provision, an application under Section 62 has to be disposed of by Revenue Officers as such, and as is clear from the language of Section 62, such application has to be made within one year from the date of possession or ejectment. But the Civil Courts jurisdiction is barred only from taking cognizance of to repeat the exact words, any dispute or matter with respect to which any such application or proceeding might be made or had. To put more simply, it seems to us that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts would only be barred regarding disputes or matters with respect to which an application might be made or a proceeding might be had. The language appear to us to prescribe the possibility of making an application or initiating proceedings in present at the time when cognizance of the Civil Court is invoked for the adjudication of any dispute on matter envisaged by Section 62. Now it is indisputable that an application under Section 62 could only be made within one year of Bhutus dispossession. The present suit admittedly was instituted long after such period of one year. Therefore, Section 110(1) (d) on its plain reading, would not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in so far as the present suit is concerned..... It appears to us that all that the provisions reproduced above deprive a tenant of is, his right to institute a civil suit during the period of one year when he has the right to approach the Revenue Officer for relief for wrongful dispossession or ejectment. The express bar of a suit under Section 9, Specific Relief Act, as provided in Section 65 of the Act, would also seem to lend some support to the view we are taking, because after excluding the summary remedy under the Specific Relief Act, the tenant has been provided with a summary under Section 62 available to him for a period of one year." 20. It is thus evident from the above quoted portions of the judgment in Chuharys case (supra) that a suit instituted by a tenant dispossessed from his tenancy without his consent after expiry of one year (the period prescribed for making an application under Section 62 of the Act) shall not be barred. The obiter however, is that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court shall be barred regarding disputes or matters with respect to which an application might be made or proceedings might be had. Thus, in this case the ratio whereof has been approved by the Full Bench leaves the questions we are faced with unanswered, but the obiter leans in favour of bar of the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognizance within one year of the date of dispossession. 21. The Full Bench of this Court, therefore, does not lay down the ratio which may be complete answer to the questions before us. The questions, are therefore required to be answered on consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act. 22. The relevant Sections of the Act which deserves consideration to answer the questions are reproduced here-in-below:— “62. If a tenant has been dispossessed without his consent from his tenancy or any part thereof otherwise than in execution of a decree or than in pursuance of any order under Section 57 he may, within one year from the date of his dispossession or ejectment, make an application for recovery of possession or for compensation, or for both. 64. No person whose application has been dismissed under Section 62 may institute a suit in a civil court to contest his liability to ejectment, or to recover possession or occupancy rights, or to recover compensation, 92. Nothing in this Act shall affect the right of any person to establish his claim in respect of any land or part thereof by due process of law in the court having jurisdiction. 110. Application and proceedings cognizable by Revenue Officers: (1) The following applications and proceedings shall be disposed of by Revenue Officers as such, and no Court shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter with respect to which any such application or proceeding might be made or had:— First Group (a) to (c) xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (d) applications under, Section 62 for recovery of possession or for compensation or for both.” 23. A bare perusal of Section 62 supra makes it clear that a tenant who has been dispossessed without his consent from his tenancy or any part thereof otherwise than under due process of law, can apply to the Revenue Officer for recovery of possession and for compensation or both within one year from the date of dispossession. It is further unambiguously clear from the provisions of Section 110(1), clause (d) of First Group supra that only a Revenue Officer shall dispose of an application under Section 62 and no Court shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter with respect to which such application or proceeding might be made or had. Thus, the effect of a combined reading of Section 62 and Section 110 above is that the claim which a tenant can make within the scope of Section 62, shall not be entertainable by a Court, though the bar created by Section 110 may operate only for a period of one year from the date of dispossession as is the ratio in Chuharys case. 24. It is further clear from the express and unambiguous provisions of Section 64 Supra that a person who has opted to make an application under Section 62 and such application has been dismissed is debarred from instituting a suit inter alia for recovery of possession and for compensation. This bar creates a legal disability in the person concerned td sue and take away his right to institute a suit inter alia for the reliefs he has claimed in his application under Section 62 and stood denied, by the dismissal of his application. 25. Section 92 provides that nothing contained in the Act shall affect the right of any person to establish his claim in respect of any land or part thereof by due process of law in the Court having jurisdiction. In our view these provisions despite the sweeping wording have no bearing or effect on the provisions of Sections 64 and 110, which govern expressly specified situations and for harmoneous interpretations of the relevant sections, these must be treated as exceptions to Section 92 failing which these provisions may be rendered as good as repealed. 26. It may also be pointed out that the Act provides jurisdictions^ bars by virtue of separate provisions in some of its Chapters. 26. It may also be pointed out that the Act provides jurisdictions^ bars by virtue of separate provisions in some of its Chapters. For example Section 12 in Chapter III, Section 62 in Chapter-IV, Section 97 in Chapter VIII, Section 110 in Chapter IX and Section 111 in Chapter IX bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court to take cognizance of the matters specified therein. Thus, it appears that such bars have been created in distinct chapters respectively relevant to the subject matter of the chapter in which these barring provisions are contained. Therefore, in view of the arrangement of the sections and chapters, the provisions of Section 92 appears to be intended to have application to the matters dealt within Chapter VIII. 27. The provisions of Section 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes almost similar provisions to enable a defendant who has been arrested or whose property has been attached or temporary injunction against him has been granted, in a suit which has been instituted against him without reasonable or probable ground or such arrest, attachment or injunction was applied for on insufficient grounds to apply to the court for compensation. An order determining such application shall bar any suit for compensation for such arrest, attachment or injunction. 28. While dealing with the scope of the bar so created by subsection (2) of Section 95 of the Code, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bank of India v. Lekhimoni Das and others, (2000) 3 SCC 640) held as follows : “8. As a general principle where two remedies are available under law one of them should not be taken as operating in derogation of the other. A regular suit will not be barred by a summary and a concurrent remedy being also provided therefor, but if a party has elected to pursue one remedy he is bound by it and cannot on his failing therein proceed under another provision. A regular suit for compensation is not barred by the omission to proceed under the summary procedure provided under Section 95 CPC, but if an application is made and disposed of, such disposal would operate as a bar to a regular suit, whatever may be the result of the application....” 29. A regular suit for compensation is not barred by the omission to proceed under the summary procedure provided under Section 95 CPC, but if an application is made and disposed of, such disposal would operate as a bar to a regular suit, whatever may be the result of the application....” 29. When judged in view of the above principle and the clear and unambiguous provisions contained in Section 64 of the Act, the bar to institute a suit thereby created is absolute and incapable of being treated as abrogated/superseded by the provisions of Section 92 of the Act. The remedy available to the person aggrieved by an order under Section 62 of the Act in law is to prefer an appeal against such order under Section 114 of the Act and not the suit in a Civil Court. 30. Since an order of dismissal of an application either on the ground of limitation or on merits is dismissal for all intents and purposes, therefore, irrespective of the grounds, of the dismissal, an application under Section 62 of the Act shall operate as a bar to the institution of a suit inter alia for the relief of recovery of possession and for compensation. 31. In view of the above discussion, we hold as follows:— (i) In view of the provisions of Section 64 of the Act a person who has availed of the remedy under Section 62 of the Act and had failed therein cannot maintain a Civil Suit for possession of the land from which he had been forcibly dispossessed and for compensation; and (ii) It will not make any difference qua the legal position (i) above if the application is dismissed being time barred and not on merits. The questions are accordingly answered. 32. In the ordinary course now the appeals would have been ordered to be listed before a single Bench for disposal, but keeping in view the fact that the litigation between the parties had started in the year 1972 and the matter had become very old, therefore, at the time of arguments before us we had proposed to dispose of these appeals finally without further listing and had given opportunity to the learned Counsel for the parties to point out if any other substantial question arises in these appeals as these were initially admitted without formulating any substantial question of law. 33. Sh. 33. Sh. Kuldip Singh learned Counsel for the appellants had urged that one more substantial question of law, i.e. Whether the lower Appellate Court has mis-read and mis-interpreted the oral and documentary evidence in the case, is involved in these appeals. 34. We have carefully gone through the material parts of the judgment wherein the lower appellate Court has discussed the evidence. We do not find any material irregularity or illegality having been committed in appreciating the evidence. On the contrary we find that the conclusion that the plaintiff was not a tenant in possession of the suit land is well reasoned and finds further support, from the undisputed fact that the defendants who owned about 30 bighas of the land had sold said land except an uncultivated piece of land measuring 0-11-0 biswas inclusive of the land in suit and settled in Uttar Pradesh. The plea of the defendants is that this piece of land was not sold by them and was retained for construction purposes as it was adjacent to a road, whereas the claim of the plaintiffs is that tenancy in favour of Joti Ram was created by the defendants on payment of l/4th gala batai as rent. It is quite natural and probable that a person (s) who sells his agricultural estate in one State and settles in another State will not retain a small piece of uncultivated land for creation of tenancy thereon on l/4th gala batai. Therefore, the very plea of creation of tenancy of such nature as taken by the plaintiff is absured. It appears plausible and natural that such a piece of land may be retained for construction purposes in future. The plea of the defendants, therefore, appears to be most probable. Thus, we find that no other or further substantial question of law is in fact involved in these appeals. 35. The above discussion and findings lead us to the conclusion that the learned District Judge has rightly dismissed the suit and the impugned judgment and decree call for no interference by this Court. 36. As a result both these appeals are dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree are affirmed. Parties are however left to bear their own costs. Appeals dismissed.