( 1 ) THIS appeal by special leave is directed against judgment of the High court of Sikkim dated 21-2-1991. ( 2 ) SHORN of details, facts giving rise to the filing of this appeal are as follows: on the basis of telephonic information received at Police Station Sadar on 18-7-1986 at about 12. 10 a. m. from Shri K. T. Bhutia, Advocate, a first information report (FIR) came to be registered. The names of the accused were not disclosed in the telephonic message and all that was stated was that "two unknown persons" came to the house of Advocate Smt Manju Sharma at P. N. G. Road and fired shots at her and her husband, who were lying in an injured condition in the house. The telephonic message was received by Shri suresh Pradhan, Night Duty Officer at the police station. The officer in charge of the police station, Shri B. K. Rokha, PW 4 marked the FIR to Sub- inspector D. P. Bhutia for investigation. The victims Shri Prem Pal Singh and smt Manju Sharma, both lawyers, were removed to S. T. N. M. Hospital where they were medically examined and admitted. The appellant was arrested by pw 4 D. P. Bhutia at 12. 40 a. m. from his residence. Both the victims left the hospital on their own and made themselves scarce without informing the police. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for offences under Sections 450/307 IPC. Charge was, however, framed by the trial court against the appellant for an offence under Section 307 IPC only. The prosecution led evidence in support of their case. The prosecution, however, did not produce either of the two victims, Shri Prem Pal Singh or smt Manju Sharma at the trial, because their "whereabouts were not known" and they had left Sikkim. ( 3 ) THE trial court after recording evidence of the prosecution witnesses came to the conclusion that the prosecution had not been able to prove that it was the appellant who had committed the alleged offence. The trial court went on to record that the prosecution had not even been able to show any circumstance in the prosecution evidence against the appellant which could implicate him in the commission of the alleged crime. These findings of the trial court were based on appreciation of evidence led before it. The trial court went on to record that the prosecution had not even been able to show any circumstance in the prosecution evidence against the appellant which could implicate him in the commission of the alleged crime. These findings of the trial court were based on appreciation of evidence led before it. The trial court had noticed that the names of the alleged assailants who were stated to be two in number in the FIR were not disclosed in the FIR and there was no indication about the identity of either of the two assailants in the FIR. In the trial court, Shri D. P. Bhutia, PW 4 admitted in his cross-examination that he had caused the arrest of the appellant at the instance of the Superintendent of police (East) and the District Magistrate (East ). The witness conceded that he had caused arrest of the appellant at the instance of his superiors, though actually he had no clue about the complicity of the appellant in the alleged crime. On appreciation of the evidence, the trial court recorded an order of acquittal. The trial court also noted the submission of the Public Prosecutor that in the absence of the material witnesses, meaning thereby the victims, the prosecution has miserably failed to bring home the charge against the appellant for an offence under Section 307 IPC, but the order of acquittal was not based on this submission of the Public Prosecutor. ( 4 ) THE State did not file any appeal against acquittal of the appellant. ( 5 ) RESPONDENT 1 James Basnett filed a petition in the High Court, which was treated as criminal revision petition in which he asserted that no efforts were made, either by the prosecuting agency or the court to examine the victims and that those two witnesses should be examined and case reopened and a fresh trial conducted. It was asserted that the appellant had been wrongly acquitted on account of the "deliberate" default of the prosecuting agency. The High Court accepted the revision petition and vide order dated 21-2-1991 directed the examination of the victims under Section 540 of the code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code" ). The trial court was directed to record evidence of those witnesses without taking recourse to a de novo trial in the case and decide the case afresh, in accordance with law, thereafter. The trial court was directed to record evidence of those witnesses without taking recourse to a de novo trial in the case and decide the case afresh, in accordance with law, thereafter. The appellant was directed to be taken into custody and released on furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs 5000 with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Registrar of the High Court. Aggrieved by the said order of the High Court, the appellant is in appeal by special leave before us. ( 6 ) INDEED, it is the obligation of the prosecution or the defence to adduce the best available evidence. But, in case either of them fail to do so or deliberately withhold it, and the court is of the opinion that in order to find out the truth and render a just decision, the examination of some other witnesses, not produced before the trial court, is necessary, then at any stage of the proceedings or trial, the court has the jurisdiction by taking recourse to section 540 of the Code to direct examination of such witness to prevent miscarriage of justice. ( 7 ) BY virtue of the powers under Section 401 Crpc the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the proceedings of inferior courts if the necessity for doing so is brought to its notice in any manner. Under Section 397 of the code, the High Court possesses general power of superintendence over actions of the courts subordinate to it and that discretionary power, when administered on the judicial side, is termed as the power of "revision". ( 8 ) WHILE giving its reasoned judgment in Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary a Division Bench of this Court speaking through Pandian, J. (as His Lordship then was) dealt with the object of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in the following words:"130. The object of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 is to confer power upon superior criminal courts a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precaution or apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted, on the one hand, or on the other hand in some undeserved hardship to individuals. The controlling power of the High Court is discretionary and it must be exercised in the interest of justice with regard to all facts and circumstances of each particular case, anxious attention being given to the said facts and circumstances which vary greatly from case to case". (emphasis supplied)THE Bench then went on to say that:"132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. " ( 9 ) WE are in agreement with the above exposition of law. We are of the opinion that though the High Court has revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code and can exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to correct miscarriage of justice, but whether or not, there is justification for the exercise of that discretionary jurisdiction would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The controlling power of the High Court under section 401 of the Code being discretionary is required to be exercised only in the interest of justice, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of each particular case and not mechanically. ( 10 ) WAS there any justification, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, for the High Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction on a petition filed by a third party and not the State, is the question requiring our consideration. Even though we , have some doubts about the locus of respondent 1 to file a criminal revision petition in the High Court, however, we refrain from dealing with that issue in this case as, in our opinion, the order of the High Court, for what follows is even otherwise not sustainable. Even though we , have some doubts about the locus of respondent 1 to file a criminal revision petition in the High Court, however, we refrain from dealing with that issue in this case as, in our opinion, the order of the High Court, for what follows is even otherwise not sustainable. ( 11 ) AS already noticed, in the FIR which was based on a telephonic message, the names of the assailants were not given and on the other hand all that was stated was that there were "two unknown persons" who had fired the shots. The investigating officer did not get any clue about the identity of the assailants on the basis of the investigation carried out by him. He arrested the appellant, as admitted by him, under directions of the Superintendent of police and the District Magistrate, conceding that he had not found any clue about the identity of the appellant before or even after arresting the appellant. Neither the Superintendent of Police, nor the District Magistrate have appeared as witnesses at the trial to disclose as to how and why they had directed arrest of the appellant. Even the statement of the first informant at the trial, who appeared as PW 2 did not implicate the appellant as the assailant. There was no other evidence either to establish the identity of the appellant as the assailant. Who the other person was has remained a mystery. The submission that the appellant was arrested on a misguided suspicion and for "ulterior motives", in the facts and circumstances of the case, assumes some significance. There was no evidence before the trial court on the basis of which the appellant could have been linked with the alleged offence. The trial court was, thus, justified on the basis of the material before it, to record an order of acquittal. The High Court in its order did not find the order of the trial court to be suffering from any perversity or unreasonableness. Under the circumstances, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of acquittal and ordered a retrial for the purpose of examining the two victims under Section 540 Crpc, even though their statements had not been recorded even under Section 161 Crpc by the investigating officer to fill in the lacuna in the prosecution case. Under the circumstances, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of acquittal and ordered a retrial for the purpose of examining the two victims under Section 540 Crpc, even though their statements had not been recorded even under Section 161 Crpc by the investigating officer to fill in the lacuna in the prosecution case. In this connection, it also deserves to be mentioned that in the counter-affidavit filed by the State of Sikkim before this Court on 11-8-1991, it has been specifically asserted that:"the State did not file an appeal against the order of acquittal, because the acquittal is unassailable. "therefore, the interference by the High Court, in the established facts and circumstances of the case, in a revision petition filed by a third party, with the order of acquittal was not justified. ( 12 ) THUS, for the reasons which we have indicated above, we are of the opinion, that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The order of the High Court dated 21-2-1991 is set aside. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged.