R. B. DIXIT, J. ( 1 ) RESPONDENT-APPLICANT had initiated proceedings under Section 23-A (b) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short 'act') being a widow lady, for eviction of the shop of her house bearing Municipal No. 40/574 situated in Daulatganj, Lashkar:gwalior, against petitioner/non-applicant, before the Rent Controlling Authority, Gwalior (in short 'r. C. A. '), on the ground that the shop was let out to non-applicant under a rent note dated 7-9-1974. The son of the applicant-land lady Manish Kumar Agrawal has passed B. E. (Mechanical) in the year 1990 and roaming unemployed. The applicant needs this shop for starting business of her son for sale of electrical goods. ( 2 ) THE petitioner/non-applicant had contested the proceedings on the ground that the shop was given to him on rent by late Suman Kant, who was husband of the applicant and Suman Kant during his lifetime, under a family arrangement, had transferred the disputed shop to his son Manish Kumar and further directed non-applicant-petitioner to pay rent of the shop to Manish Kumar. In the circumstances, ownership of the applicant in so far as disputed shop is concerned, was denied and it was further pleaded that the proceedings for eviction of the shop are not maintainable in absence of all the necessary heirs of late Suman Kant. ( 3 ) THE occasion to file present revision arose at the time when applicant/respondent was examined before the said authority and during her cross-examination, she admitted that her husband Suman Kant was adopted by late Jagannath Prasad and Kishan was the natural father of Suman Kant. The petitioner then filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC for amendment in the written statement to the effect that plaintiff failed to prove ownership of the suit property in name of her husband Suman Kant. The learned R. C. A. by impugned order found that in facts and circumstances of the case, the proposed amendment is wholly irrelevant and, therefore, rejected the application. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order, petitioner/tenant has come up in this revision praying for redressal of his grievance as sought for. The learned R. C. A. by impugned order found that in facts and circumstances of the case, the proposed amendment is wholly irrelevant and, therefore, rejected the application. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order, petitioner/tenant has come up in this revision praying for redressal of his grievance as sought for. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel of the petitioner has vehemently argued that the learned R. C. A. has misread the provisions envisaged under Section 23 (a) and (b) of the Act wherein the word 'owner' has been used but that cannot be construed synonymous to 'landlord' as defined under Section 2 (b) of the Act, word 'landlord' has been defined as a person, who for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any accommodation, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the accommodation were let to a tenant and includes every person not being a tenant who from time to time derives title under a landlord. It seems that in every case it is not necessary that landlord should be owner of the property, but where the question of eviction of an accommodation in special proceedings as envisaged under Section 23 (a) (b) arises, the ownership of the property should be proved so as to justify need for eviction under such proceedings. No doubt, title to the property and ownership of the property becomes two different situations in so far as tenanted accommodation is concerned. Obviously tenant is estopped to challenge title of the property, but not the ownership of it. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 embodies the principle of estoppel arising from the contract of tenancy. It is based upon a healthy and statutory principle of law and justice that a tenant who could not have got possession but for his contract of tenancy admitting the right of the landlord, should not be allowed to launch his landlord in some inequitable situation taking undue advantage of the possession that he got and any probable defect in the title of his landlord. Of course, he can deny his title after he gives up the possession having thus restored status quo ante. Of course, he can deny his title after he gives up the possession having thus restored status quo ante. All that is necessary for the application of the above principle is that there was a contract of tenancy and that the tenant took possession of the land under the title or with the permission of the landlord or the person then in possession. Possession and permission being established estoppel would bind the tenant during the continuance of the tenancy and until he surrenders his possession. A person in possession within the meaning of this section need not be a full owner, mortgagee, lessee or any other person have right to or is in actual possession. However, defective title of such a person or of the landlord, may be at the time of the creation of the tenancy, the person inducted under the term of the contract cannot be permitted to rely on that defect to his advantage or to perpetuate his possession or to act in detriment to the landlord's right. ( 5 ) IN a decision of Gujarat High Court rendered in the case of Niranjan Amritlal v. Manhar Lal Jivan Lal reported in AIR 1984 Gujarat 24 where the plaintiff-appellant had filed a suit on behalf of himself and his co-owners for obtaining possession on the basis of title. It was held that one co-owner can file a suit for eviction against trespasser, without joining other co-owners. It was further observed that in such a case, it is not necessary for all the co-owners to join in a suit to evict a trespasser. Anyone of the co-owners can file such a suit. Further, it was clarified that it is open to the present appellant-plaintiff to amend the plaint and implead the other co-owners in such a suit, even though they are merely proper parties. The facts of the present case are somewhat different in the sense that here the dispute is between a tenant and applicant claiming to be owner of the property. ( 6 ) IN a Division Bench decision of this Court rendered in the case of Shivraj Jat v. Asha Lata Yadav reported in 1989 MPLJ 202 , where the leased premises required for starting business of major son of landlady falling under Section 23-J of the Act. ( 6 ) IN a Division Bench decision of this Court rendered in the case of Shivraj Jat v. Asha Lata Yadav reported in 1989 MPLJ 202 , where the leased premises required for starting business of major son of landlady falling under Section 23-J of the Act. It was observed that a suit by joint landlords out of whom one is a landlord within the meaning of that expression as defined by Section 23-J of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, can be entertained by the Rent Controlling Authority and when the other co-owners, if any, do not object to eviction, the relief of eviction can be granted if the accommodation is bona fide required by the landlord for starting the business of the major son or daughter. ( 7 ) IN another Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Harbans Singh v. Smt. Margret G. Bhingardive reported in 1990 JLJ 97 : ( AIR 1990 MP 191 ), where a widow co-landlord with her married sons filed an eviction application without impleading sons under Section 23-A of the Act it was pointed out that the widow alone can maintain an action for eviction of the tenant with the consent of other co-owners, on the ground of bona fide need of herself and that of her married sons and their children, who are members of her family. ( 8 ) IN a decision of Apex Court in the case of Dadan Bai v. Arjundas reported in (1995) 3 SCC 412 , where the eviction petition filed by the landlady-lessor was dismissed by the High Court as she was not the owner since even on her own admission, the premises belonged to the Municipal Corporation. It was pointed out that the word 'owner' used in Section 23-A (b) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act was narrowly construed by the High Court. A lessor whose title cannot be disputed by the lessee undoubtedly is owner at whose instance the proceedings for eviction were maintainable. ( 9 ) THE learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Kailash Chandra v. Dr. A lessor whose title cannot be disputed by the lessee undoubtedly is owner at whose instance the proceedings for eviction were maintainable. ( 9 ) THE learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Kailash Chandra v. Dr. Kamla reported in 1998 (1) MPLJ 110 observed that law nowhere says that a woman would be entitled to the benefit under Section 23-J read with Section 23-A if the premises were let out when she was not a widow and the need arose only after she became a widow. The concession is shown to the person and the cause of action would accrue in favour of such landlord only when they need the premises. The cause of action for eviction would not accrue on the date when the tenancy was created. The similar view was expressed in another decision of this Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar Mahawar v. Smt. Shakuntala Makhan Lal Kesarwani reported in 2000 (1) MPLJ 44 : (1999 AIHC 4700 ). ( 10 ) ANOTHER decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Anar Devi v. Nathuram reported in 1994 JLJ 486 : (1994 AIR SCW 2637) is the complete answer. . . . . . . . to the position of a title holder and that of a landlord as defined under Section 2 (b) of the Act. Their Lordships observed that no tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. Ever since, the accepted position is that Section 116 of the Evidence Act applies and estops even a person already in possession as tenant under one landlord from denying the title of his subsequent landlord when once he acknowledges him as his landlord by attornment or conduct. Therefore, a tenant of immovable property under landlord who becomes a tenant under another landlord by accepting him to be the owner who had derived title from the former landlord, cannot be permitted to deny the latter's title, even when he is sought to be evicted by the letter on a permitted ground. Therefore, a tenant of immovable property under landlord who becomes a tenant under another landlord by accepting him to be the owner who had derived title from the former landlord, cannot be permitted to deny the latter's title, even when he is sought to be evicted by the letter on a permitted ground. When a tenant is estopped from denying his landlord's title to accommodation, whether he was there either from the beginning of the tenancy or had become a tenant subsequently by acknowledging the landlord's title, it is difficult to think that the words 'if he is the owner thereof' used in Clause (b) of Section 23-A are intended to require the landlord to plead in his application for recovery of possession made under the clause, his ownership of accommodation, and establish the same by evidence aliunde, to succeed in recovery of possession of such accommodation from the tenant. It would be so, particularly, when he was not so required to plead or establish on an application if had been made by him for recovery of possession of the accommodation on the self-same ground under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. It is also difficult to think that the said words 'if he is the owner thereof' in the clause, require that the landlord should plead and establish his title to the accommodation for recovery of its possession from the tenant, for that would be as good as asking him to go to Civil Court for establishing his title to the property and recover its possession from the tenant, which if is the correct position, would, instead of advancing the aforesaid object of the provisions in the Chapter, squarely result in its defeat. Therefore, what could be said of the words 'if he is the owner thereof' used in Clause (b) of Section 23a, is that they are although meant to enable the landlord, who is the owner of the accommodation, to submit an application under that clause for recovery of possession of the accommodation from his tenant, they are not intended to require such landlord to plead in his application that he is the owner of such accommodation and adduce evidence aliunde in that behalf for succeeding in that application. ( 11 ) TAKING into consideration the implications arising out of the decision of the Apex Court in case of Anar Devi (supra), it is clear that under such special proceedings, the tenant is estopped from challenging the title of the landlord. However, ownership of the applicant can be denied under the facts and circumstances, which vary from case to case where the tenant had admitted payment of rent to one of the co-owners, he is estopped from denying his title of ownership unless some 3rd party comes in for objecting the same. In so far as the present case is concerned, petitioner has admitted his tenancy from the time of applicant's husband. Certainly the applicant-respondent had inherited the suit accommodation from her husband and since she is claiming the accommodation for the need of her son, Manish Kumar and the petitioner has further admitted that the late husband had directed him to pay the rent to Manish Kumar, in such a situation, the petitioner-tenant is estopped from challenging further title of the landlady by proposing an amendment that her husband was adopted by Jagannath Prasad and, therefore, her title to the accommodation is not perfect. The tenant cannot be permitted to shift his allegation regarding ownership of the landlord to the effect like a civil suit for declaration of title. The ambit of scope of enquiry regarding ownership in such case is limited only for the purpose of examining the relation of tenant and landlord and to further ascertain whether the person, who is claiming eviction, is the real person entitled for possession of the accommodation from the tenant. 11-A. In facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner can challenge the ownership of the applicant only to the extent that the suit shop in question fell in share of the applicant under the alleged family arrangement, if any. The fact of adoption of the husband of the applicant, in the circumstances, had no relevancy, whatsoever, in so far as the petitioner-tenant is concerned, which will amount to denying the title of the landlord by the tenant and is clearly out of the scope of enquiry in such special proceedings. The learned Rent Controlling Authority has, therefore, rightly rejected the proposed amendment application of the petitioner. ( 12 ) FOR the reasons stated hereinabove, the revision is devoid of any merit and is dismissed accordingly. Petition dismissed. .