JUDGMENT : B.P. Das, J. - This revision is directed against the order dated 22-11-1999 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge, Balasore, in S.T. No. 51/100 of 1998 entertaining a petition u/s 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('Cr. P.C.' in short) and directing issuance of process against the Petitioner. 2. The background leading to the impugned order is that the three brothers of the Petitioner have been arrayed as accused persons and are facing trial in the aforesaid sessions trial on being charge-sheeted u/s 324, 323, 307/34,1. P.C. The present Petitioner is not an accused in the aforesaid case. In para 10 of the revision petition it is stated that on 20-11-1999 and 22-11-1999 the prosecution examined two witnesses, namely, the informant-Dharanidhar Parida (opposite party No. 2) as p.w. 1 and the eye-witness-Rama Chandra Behera as p. w. 2, but before their cross-examination, on the basis of the statements of those prosecution witnesses, and without giving a chance to the defence to rebut the same by way of cross-examination, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge entertained an application filed by the prosecution u/s 319, Cr. P.C. praying to add the Petitioner as an accused and directed him to face the trial tor the offence u/s 304. I.P.C. along with the other accused persons. Consequently, process was issued against: the Petitioner. 3. The main plank of the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the trial court should have allowed the defence to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses in order to test the veracity of their statements and by not giving such a chance, the order of the trial court directing issuance of process is erroneous and cannot withstand the rigor of judicial scrutiny. Petitioner's further case is that the provisions of Section 319, Cr. P.C. should be used sparingly and statement of the witness in examination-in-chief cannot be said to be evidence upon which the court can act u/s 319, Cr. P.C., because, according to the Petitioner, such statement in examination-in-chief is nothing but incomplete statement of the witness. 4. Before proceeding to examine the aforesaid contention of the Petitioner, let me see the provisions of Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure which read thus: 319. P.C., because, according to the Petitioner, such statement in examination-in-chief is nothing but incomplete statement of the witness. 4. Before proceeding to examine the aforesaid contention of the Petitioner, let me see the provisions of Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure which read thus: 319. Power to proceed against to her persons appearing to be guilty of offence: (1) Where; in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such persons could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under Sub-section (1) then (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and witnesses re-heard; (b) subject to the provisions of Clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. Let me now examine whether the statements of the witnesses recorded in examination-in-chief can be construed as evidence or not. The principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ranjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab are relevant on the point. ln para 8 of the aforesaid decision it is held: "8. Now it is well heigh settled that 'evidence' envisaged in Section 319 of the Code is the evidence tendered during trial of the case if the offence is triable by a Court of Session. The material placed before the committal court cannot be treated as evidence collected during enquiry or trial... Thus, as per the aforesaid decision, a Court before exercising the power u/s 319, Cr. The material placed before the committal court cannot be treated as evidence collected during enquiry or trial... Thus, as per the aforesaid decision, a Court before exercising the power u/s 319, Cr. P.C. should be satisfied that there is existence of some evidence during trial so that the Court can prima facie hold that a person though not an accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused. 5. The next question is whether the statement in examination-in-chief can be said to be evidence or not. In this connection, I may refer to a decision of this Court in Mitu ' Prasidha Moharathi v. State of Orissa (1999) 16 O.C.R. 30, wherein the question was discussed elaborately as follows: If evidence would be taken to be co-terminus with examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination, there would not have been any necessity to incorporate the Proviso relating to right and opportunity to cross-examine, as envisaged in the second proviso. The very fact that Legislature thought it fit to incorporate a Proviso relating to admissibility of evidence only where the adverse party had the right and opportunity to cross-examine only goes to indicate that the statement of a person made in Court in examination-in-chief is other- wise considered to be 'evidence'. It may be said that the evidence is not complete until the opportunity to cross-exemine is given, but it cannot be said that until a person is cross-examined or until opportunity of cross-examination is given, the statement made by the person is not evidence, as envisaged in Section 3(1) of the Evidence Act. Dealing with the stage when the power u/s 319, Cr. P.C. is to be exercised, this Court in the judgment referred to above, further held: ...If the Court feels at a particular stage that on the basis of evidence already recorded, that is to say, on the basis of examination-in-chief, any other accused person is to be summoned, there may not be any cross-examination at that stage, as otherwise, such a course may well turn out to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the witness is bound to be re-examined after summoning the new accused person. The cross-examination, if any, by other accused persons at that stage would be evidently in cross-examination may not be of any assistance to the person or persons not before the Court In the present case, the Petitioner is not attending the court and since he is not attending the court, the question of cross-examination of the witnesses by the Petitioner at that stage absolutely does not arise. 6. In view of the aforesaid decision, coming to the facts of the present case, the prosecution has examined two witnesses and one of such witness has been duly cross-examined by the defence. Be that as it may, cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses by the accused persons will not be helpful to the Petitioner and the Petitioner can avail the opportunity of re-examination of the said witnesses after his appearance before the trial court. In the particular case, as I find from the L.C.R., the Petitioner has been implicated by the informant right from the stage of F.I.R.. P. w. 1 in his evidence has corroborated the story made out in the F.l.R. and he has been cross-examined by the defence, i.e., the accused persons, who are no other than the brothers of the Petitioner. The evidence of p. w. 2 also corroborated the F. 1. R. story. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid facts and the legal position as enunciated in the decision referred to above, the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the order of the trial court is erroneous and there has been no cross- examination, does not hold good. The learned Counsel argues that the power vested u/s 319, Cr. P.C. should be exercised sparingly and he has cited several decisions in this regard. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, and particularly when the Petitioner has been implicated in the F.I.R. and as revealed from the evidence of the p. ws. recorded during trial, in my view the trial court has not exceeded in its jurisdiction by issuing process against the Petitioner in exercise of the power u/s 319. Cr. P.C.. 7. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner during the course of argument has filed an application with a prayer that in the event this revision is dismissed, the Petitioner. Who is a bank employee, be released on bail. Unless the Petitioner is released, there will be a stigma in his service career. Cr. P.C.. 7. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner during the course of argument has filed an application with a prayer that in the event this revision is dismissed, the Petitioner. Who is a bank employee, be released on bail. Unless the Petitioner is released, there will be a stigma in his service career. It is also stated that the Petitioner shall surrender before the Sessions Judge. Balasore,without expressing opinion on this aspect, I direct that the N.B.W., issued against the Petitioner shall remain stayed till 9th April, 2000, on which day the Petitioner shall surrender before the trial court and if any application for bail is moved by the Petitioner, the same shall be considered and disposed of by the trial court on the same day. 8. For the reasons indicated above, I do not find any merit in this revision application which is accordingly dismissed. The L.C. R. be sent back immediately. Revision dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed