JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, J. :- This appeal is filed by a private party who was the original complainant, after obtaining leave from this court, against an order of acquittal recorded by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, dated March 16, 1996, in Case No. 203 - 1 of 1992. 2. The case of the complainant was that he was an owner of land measuring 0-4 biswas, comprised in Khasra No. 330/328/7, Khata Khatauni No. 64/83 min, situated in village Daloh, Pargana Sunhani, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur. On August 9,1992, at about 9.30, A.M. all the accused entered into the above land, threatened the family members of the complainant, asked them to vacate the land as well as the house where they were residing, failing which they would be killed. It was further the allegation of the complainant that the accused removed 4000 stones valued about Rs.4000/-, belonging to the complainant which were lying there. With those stones, the accused persons constructed a wall in front of the doors of the complainants house. The house was thus, totally closed and thereby the accused committed an offence punishable under Section 342 and 347 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, "the Code"). It was also the case of the complainant that they had committed offence punishable under Section 5 read with Section 9 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955. Since there were more than five persons and the action was taken in furtherance of common object, they were liable to be dealt with for offences punishable under Sections 342, 447 read with Section 149 of the Code. 3. According to the complainant, though the incident took place on August 6, 1992, he was threatened by the accused not to take any action and, hence, immediate action could not be taken. After some time, however, on August 10, 1992, the complainant went to Police Station, Talai, and reported the matter. Though police official of Talai did not formally record the complaint as Rapat Roznamcha or FIR, he consoled the complainant and assured him that police will investigate the matter. According to the complainant, however, nothing was done in the matter by the police authorities’ inspite of several visits by the complainant and, hence, he was constrained to file a private complaint in a competent court on September 9, 1992. 4. According to the complainant, however, nothing was done in the matter by the police authorities’ inspite of several visits by the complainant and, hence, he was constrained to file a private complaint in a competent court on September 9, 1992. 4. On the basis of the complaint, notices were issued to the accused for offences punishable under Sections 342 and 447 of the Code. No notices were issued to the accused for offences punishable under Section 5 read with Section 9 of the Protection of civil Rights Act, 1955. 5. At the trial, prosecution examined five witnesses, including the complaint and his wife. The case of the accused was of total denial. In their further statements, they had also stated that they were falsely implicated. They also led defence evidence and examined four defence witnesses. 6. The learned Magistrate, on the basis of the evidence of prosecution as well as defence, held that it was not proved beyond reasonable doubt that on the day in question the accused entered into the land of the complainant with intend to forcibly occupy it and wrongfully confined the complainant and his family members. Accordingly, the learned Magistrate acquitted them. The said order is challenged by the complainant by filing the present appeal. 7. I have heard Mr. Rajiv Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. Rama Mehta, learned counsel for the accused, and Mr. M.L. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the State. 8. Mr. Sharma submitted that the learned Magistrate has committed an error of fact and of law in acquitting the accused for the offences with which they were charged. According to him, the court ought to have issued notice to the accused persons not only for offences punishable under Sections 342 and 447 of the Code but also for committing offences under the Protection of Civil Rights Act. He urged that in the light of prosecution evidence, it was clearly established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed criminal trespass into the land of the complainant and his family members were wrongfully confined. According to Mr. Sharma, the learned Magistrate was clearly in error in observing that since there was another door, there was no wrongful confinement. He urged that in the light of prosecution evidence, it was clearly established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed criminal trespass into the land of the complainant and his family members were wrongfully confined. According to Mr. Sharma, the learned Magistrate was clearly in error in observing that since there was another door, there was no wrongful confinement. The counsel submitted that when threat was administered by the accused persons that if the complainant and the members of his family would come out of their house, they would be done to death, the offence in question would be clearly established and the accused ought to have been convicted. The counsel also submitted that in deciding whether the accused had committed the crime, the consideration was not whether the complainant was real owner of the property but whether he was in possession thereof. Once it is established that the complainant was having his house on the suit land and was staying there with his family members, no action could have been taken nor he could have been wrongfully confined or restrained therein. It is urged that over and above the evidence of Pw-1, complainant, and PW-2, Kaushlaya, wife of PW-1, independent witnesses PW-4, Kashmira and PW-5, Sukh Ram, were also examined. The trial court was not right in observing that they were chance witnesses and, hence, their evidence could not be believed. They have clarified as to how they were present at the spot and in the light of the explanation, their evidence ought to have been believed, particularly, when nothing against them was even alleged by the defence. It was urged that the learned Magistrate was not right in observing that there was gross delay on the part of the complainant in lodging the complaint and no explanation was given for such delay. Finally, it was submitted that the complainant belongs to a lower strata of society - a Harijan by caste - and the accused persons who were Rajputs, - high strata of Society, could not tolerate Harijan being in the nearby vicinity. Relying on the provisions of the Protection of Civil Rights Act as also Article 17 of the Constitution of India, the learned counsel submitted that the learned Magistrate has not taken care in properly appreciating the background and sensitivity with which such matter ought to have been decided. Relying on the provisions of the Protection of Civil Rights Act as also Article 17 of the Constitution of India, the learned counsel submitted that the learned Magistrate has not taken care in properly appreciating the background and sensitivity with which such matter ought to have been decided. This has caused, in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, miscarriage of justice and the order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 9. Ms. Rama Mehta, learned counsel for the accused, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the learned Magistrate. She submitted that there is gross delay on the part of the complainant in approaching the Court. Though it was stated in the complaint that on August 10, 1992, the complainant had gone to Talai Police Station, nothing concrete was placed on record in proof thereof. Likewise, there is nothing which goes to show that between August 10, 1992, and September 9, 1992, the complainant had visited police authorities, as asserted by him in the complaint. In absence of such materials, the learned counsel contended, there was delay of one month in filing the complaint as the incident was of August 9, 1992, and the complaint was of September 9, 1992. It was also contended that, the complainant was not the owner of the suit property but he had made encroachment over the government land. A case would fall under Sections 342 and 447 of the Code provided the accused had committed trespass over the land of the complainant or they prevented him or his family members by confining at that place. It was submitted that there was a public road on which tractors and other vehicles were being plied. It was, however, damaged by the complainant and construction was made. Necessary action was also taken and the said fact has been brought on record by examining defence witnesses. In the light of all those circumstances, it cannot be said that accused had committed any offence. Moreover, no independent witnesses were examined by the prosecution. According to the learned counsel, PW-1 complainant and PW-2 Kaushlaya Devi, wife of the complainant, were "interested" witnesses. In the light of all those circumstances, it cannot be said that accused had committed any offence. Moreover, no independent witnesses were examined by the prosecution. According to the learned counsel, PW-1 complainant and PW-2 Kaushlaya Devi, wife of the complainant, were "interested" witnesses. Regarding PW-4 and PW-5, it was stated that their evidence was a rightly not relied upon by the trial court as they were staying at a distance of about 25 - 30 KMs from the place of occurrence and, thus, they were chance witnesses. Neither in the complaint nor in the substantive evidence, PW-1 complainant stated about the presence of PW-4 or PW-5. It was submitted that the complainant was well educated and serving as a teacher. Hence, he could have immediately approached a court of law. Finally, it was submitted that an order of acquittal has been recorded by the trail court and unless the said order is contrary to law or against evidence on record, this Court would not interfere with the same. She, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the learned Magistrate in acquitting the accused for the offences with which they were charged. Firstly, there is a delay in filing a complaint. It is no doubt true that in paragraph 6 of the complaint, it was stated by the complainant that since police authorities did not take any action, the complainant was constrained to appraoch the Court after some delay, but then, nothing has been brought on record to substantiate the assertion made by him. Apart from inconsistencies in the deposition of the complainant and his wife, (whether the complainant had visited police station about 10 times or only twice or thrice), the fact that the complaint was filed after one month cannot be said to be immaterial or irrelevant, particularly, when the said fact weighed with the learned Magistrate. 11. Regarding possession of land and construction made by the complainant, there appears to be conflicting stories. According to the defence the complainant had made encroachment over the government land and some proceedings were initiated against him. 11. Regarding possession of land and construction made by the complainant, there appears to be conflicting stories. According to the defence the complainant had made encroachment over the government land and some proceedings were initiated against him. In the present proceedings, I am not concerned with regard to the allegations and counter allegations made by one party and denied by the other but if in the light of that circumstance, the learned Magistrate did not think it fit to convict the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 342 and 447 of the Code, it could not be said that he had committed any illegality. 12. Regarding evidence of independent witnesses, it cannot be disputed that if independent evidence in the form of examination of PW-4 Kashmira and PW-5 Sukh Ram is believed, there was a good reason for recording conviction against the accused. But the learned magistrate, in my opinion, was right in observing that both the witnesses could be said to be "chance" witnesses inasmuch as they were staying at a different place - at a distance of 25-30 KMs. Ordinarily, if they were present on the day, which they claimed, the complainant would not miss the said important fact when he lodged his complaint, which was after considerable time of about one month as also when he was examined on oath before the court. Non mentioning of presence of PW-4 and PW-5 would thus go a long way in appreciating their evidence which the learned Magistrate has done. 13. On all these grounds, in my opinion, the order passed by the learned Magistrate cannot be said to be contrary to law. The appeal deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. Bail bonds stand discharged. Appeal dismissed