H. K. RATHOD, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned advocates for the respective parties. ( 2 ) IN all these three petitions, Rule has been issued and the ad interim stay against the implementation of the respective awards has been granted. In Special Civil Application No. 3547 of 1996, this Court has passed an order to the effect that this petition be heard along with Special Civil Application No. 14033 of 1994 and Special Civil Application No. 10042 of 1995 and ad interim relief in terms of paragraph 7 was granted in the said petition. Therefore, with the consent of the learned advocates, all these three matters are taken up for final hearing today. In these matters, though the awards passed by the Industrial Tribunal being different, the question involved in all these petitions is common and the legal contentions raised therein being common, therefore also, these matters are decided by this common judgment. ( 3 ) THE facts of the writ petition being special Civil Application No. 3547 of 1996 are thus:the respondent-Usmangani Chhipa was working as a Sanitary Sub-Inspector under the petitioner-Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation ). It is alleged against the respondent-workman that on September 17 to 1984 when the Officers of the Corporation made a surprise visit, it was found that the respondent and his two:subordinate Mukadams along with 66 sweepers had not reported for duty even upto 6. 30 a. m. though they were expected to report for duty at 6 a. m. Thereafter, the respondent-workman has sent leave report and on that basis, the charge-sheet was served and punishment order was passed against the respondent-workman stopping two incremental stages with immediate effect and also treated the suspension period as suspension by an Order dated February 7, 1986. The fact remains that before passing the order of punishment by the competent authority, the departmental inquiry was initiated against the respondent-workman. The said inquiry was conducted by the Inquiry officer Shri J. N. Baxi. The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are at page 14, annexure-B to the petition. The Inquiry Officer has come to the conclusion that the allegations of misconduct alleged against the respondent are not found to be proved, and as a result, the respondent was exonerated of the charges levelled against him. The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are at page 14, annexure-B to the petition. The Inquiry Officer has come to the conclusion that the allegations of misconduct alleged against the respondent are not found to be proved, and as a result, the respondent was exonerated of the charges levelled against him. However, the disciplinary Authority, at page 19 of the petition has not agreed with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer. The disciplinary Authority has observed that the sanitary Sub-Inspector did not turn up for duty on the date of inspection does not absolve him from his responsibility of adequate supervision on the staff working under him. That, such attendance of Safai Kamdars on the given day of inspection does not show that they were late by chance. It has been observed by the disciplinary Authority that Shri Chhipa was fully responsible for total deterioration in the discipline and regular attendance of the staff at the muster station in question. Therefore, the disciplinary authority has imposed punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect and also treated the suspension period as suspension. The said punishment order has been challenged by the respondent before the industrial Tribunal at Ahmedabad being Reference No. 4 of 1987. Before the Industrial tribunal, the legality and validity of the departmental inquiry has not been challenged. The Industrial Tribunal, after considering the report of the Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary Authority has come to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the respondent-workman are not found to be proved, and accordingly, the order dated december 24, 1984 passed by the Disciplinary authority was set aside and the petitioner-Corporation was directed to pay all the increments to the workman which they had deducted in pursuance of the suspension order. This Award has been passed by the Industrial tribunal on September 20, 1995. ( 4 ) THE facts of the writ petition being special Civil Application No. 10042 of 1995 are as under:the two namely Shri Riyazahemad Dinmohamad and Semul Denial were working with the petitioner-Corporation at its Central workshop. It is alleged that these two Drivers had disobeyed the orders of their superior officer and of their own they had loaded truck with industrial waste from the private property. It is alleged that these two Drivers had disobeyed the orders of their superior officer and of their own they had loaded truck with industrial waste from the private property. Therefore, the petitioner-Corporation served the charge-sheet upon both the Drivers and after completion of the departmental inquiry, imposed the punishment of stoppage of one increment with permanent effect and treated the suspension period as suspension. The said punishment order has been challenged by the respondent herein by raising industrial dispute before the Industrial Tribunal at ahmedabad, being Reference 114 of 1989. The Industrial Tribunal after considering the material available on record has come to the conclusion that the suspension period of the workman concerned for more than three months is to be treated as duty period. The industrial Tribunal has held that one increment of the workman concerned be withheld upto the date of the Award and thereafter the increment should be released the said Award was passed by the Industrial tribunal on July 20, 1995. ( 5 ) THE short facts of the Special Civil application No. 14033 of 1994 are: the respondent-Shri Atul Chandrakanl desai was working as a Senior Clerk with the petitioner-Corporation. On September 23, 1989 when he was on duty at Narol-Sarkhej octroi Naka, between 10 p. m. and 6. a. m. , he allowed one matador No. GRP 6396 carrying furniture of Rs. 6000/- of one Shri Harshadbhai mohanlal Dabla to pass through the Naka without paying the Octroi duty on the same. It was alleged that illegal gratification of Rs. 200/- was taken by the respondent in letting the matador pass through the Octroi Naka into the municipal Limits of the City. It was thus alleged that the respondent-workman Shri desai instead of recovering the Octroi duty had illegally taken gratification of Rs. 200/- and letting the matador to pass through the Naka. On the basis of these charges, the respondent-workman was charge- sheeted and disciplinary inquiry was initiated against him and after completion of the departmental inquiry the workman was held guilty of negligence and misconduct in stopping the matador and then allowing it to pass through the Naka without recovery of the octroi duty thereon. On the basis of these charges, the respondent-workman was charge- sheeted and disciplinary inquiry was initiated against him and after completion of the departmental inquiry the workman was held guilty of negligence and misconduct in stopping the matador and then allowing it to pass through the Naka without recovery of the octroi duty thereon. The petitioner-Corporation served show-cause notice dated April 5, 1990 upon the respondent-workman as to why he should not be dismissed and after considering the reply thereto dated April 30, 1990, the competent authority passed an order dated June 18, 1990 reverted the respondent- workman to the minimum of Junior Clerks grade and treated the period from the date of suspension to June 18, 1990 as suspension. The said punishment order passed by the competent authority was challenged by the respondent workman before the Industrial Tribunal at Ahmedabad being reference in No. 736 of 1991. The Industrial tribunal, by an Award dated June 18, 1990, modified the said punishment and he was posted to his original post of Senior Clerk from the date of the said award. By the said Award, the past increments which have been stopped as a result of the above order dated June 18, 1990 will remain as it is and the same are not to be paid to him and his future increments in the grade of Senior Clerk are released from the date of the said Award. This Award was published on June 6, 1994 by the Labour commissioner, Gujarat State. By means of this petition, the said Award has been challenged by the petitioner-Corporation. ( 6 ) LEARNED advocate Ms. Anand appearing on behalf of the petitioner Corporation while assailing the orders passed by the Industrial Tribunal, under challenge in all these three petitions, has contended that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to modify the punishment imposed upon the respective workmen, particularly when it has come to the conclusion that the allegation of misconduct has been found to be proved. She has submitted that the Industrial Tribunal has no power to come to a different conclusion in case, other than those of dismissal/ removal/discharge. She has pointed out that the powers of the Industrial tribunal under Section 11-A of the Industrial disputes Act other than that in case of. She has submitted that the Industrial Tribunal has no power to come to a different conclusion in case, other than those of dismissal/ removal/discharge. She has pointed out that the powers of the Industrial tribunal under Section 11-A of the Industrial disputes Act other than that in case of. dismissal, removal, discharge of termination are not available, and therefore, the Industrial tribunal has committed gross error while modifying the punishment in question, and therefore, the Awards made by the Industrial tribunal are required to be quashed and set aside. In support of her contention, she has relied upon the judgments of Rajasthan High court, Division Bench of this Court and other high Courts reported in Rajasthan State Road transport Corporation v. Labour Court, 1994-I-LLJ-542 and T. Muthuswamy v. P. O. , labour Court, Coimbatore and Anr. , 1991-II-LLJ-405 (Mad-DB ). She has submitted that looking to the merits of each case, the punishment imposed by the petitioner Corporation in each of the cases is quite reasonable, legal and valid which does not require interference at the hands of the industrial Tribunal while deciding the reference. She has further submitted that the imposition of punishment is a managerial function which normally Courts should not interfere with, and therefore also, the Industrial tribunal has committed gross error by modifying the punishment. According to the learned advocate, each workman concerned has committed serious misconduct and even though minor punishment has been imposed, the said penalty has even been interfered with by the Industrial Tribunal very lightly. ( 7 ) ON the other side, learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective workmen have pointed out that the Industrial Tribunal has sufficient jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment under the provision of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act itself because it has derived the said jurisdiction from the terms of reference, and therefore, even before enacting the provision of Section 11-A in the statute book, Industrial Tribunal has power to interfere with the penalty in cases other than that of dismissal, removal, termination or discharge, and therefore, the Industrial tribunal has not committed error in ordering modification of the punishment and such orders are quite legal and valid. ( 8 ) I have considered the submissions made by the rival parties. ( 8 ) I have considered the submissions made by the rival parties. The Industrial Tribunal derives jurisdiction from the terms of reference itself which has been referred to it under section 10, sub-clause (1) of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947. The said Terms of reference have been quoted and referred to in the respective Awards itself, which reads as under:"terms of Reference referred in Reference (II) No. 4 of 1987; under challenge in special Civil Application No. 3547 of 1996: in the matter whether the order of suspension passed against Shri Usmangani a. Chhipa, Sanitary Sub-Inspector for the period from September 17, 1984 till september 20, 1994 should be set aside and all the benefits entitled should be given to him and also order dated February 7, 1986 reducing his increments should be set aside and he be given all the benefits? terms of Reference referred in Reference (II) No. 114 of 1989; under challenge in special Civil Application No. 10042 of 1995: in matter of setting aside Orders Nos. 88 and 89 withholding one increment with permanent effect and treating suspension period as suspension respectively passed against Shri Riyazahemad Dinmohmed driver in Municipal Central Workshop. Terms of Reference referred in Reference (II) No. 336 of 1991; under challenge in special Civil Application No. 14033 of 1995: in the matter of setting aside the Order dated june 18, 1990 reverting Shri Atul Kumar chandrakant Desai, Senior Clerk in the lower grade. ( 9 ) THE said terms by itself suggest that the industrial Tribunal has powers to adjudicate the said dispute on merits and if the Industrial tribunal comes to the conclusion that the punishment in question is disproportionate and harsh then it has jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment by way of modifying the same according to its discretionary powers. This aspect has been considered by the Division bench of this Court in the matter of Municipal commissioner, Baroda v. Sanat Kumar D. Brahmbhatt, 1993-III-LLJ (Suppl)-882 (Guj-DB) wherein the very nature of question was raised. The facts of that case are the dispute which was adjudicated by the Industrial tribunal, reached to the conclusion that looking to the charges which were proved, punishment of stoppage of three yearly increments with future effect would be too harsh and consequently, punishment oi stoppage of one yearly increment without future effect was substituted. The facts of that case are the dispute which was adjudicated by the Industrial tribunal, reached to the conclusion that looking to the charges which were proved, punishment of stoppage of three yearly increments with future effect would be too harsh and consequently, punishment oi stoppage of one yearly increment without future effect was substituted. This was the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, reached to the conclusion that looking to the charges which were proved, punishment of stoppage of three yearly increments with future effect would be too harsh and consequently, punishment of stoppage of one yearly increment without future effect was substituted. This was the order passed by the industrial Tribunal wherein the contention was raised by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner-Vadodara Municipal Corporation that on the express language of Section 11- A of the Act, such controversy could not be covered by the said provision relating to only discharge or dismissal of a workman. The answer has been given by the Division Bend of this Court that. . . . . . however, on the fact of the present case, the very dispute which is referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication centres around the legality and propriety of the imposition of punishment of stoppage of three yearly increments with future effect. Once that dispute is referred for idjudication, the Industrial Tribunal in exercise of its power under Section 11 -A was bound to adjudicate upon that dispute and pronounce jpon it. The term, industrial dispute is defined by Section 2 (k) to mean any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen. It cannot be gainsaid that there is no difference or dispute between the employer and employee in connection with the punishment imposed on the workman. Therefore, de hors Section 11-A, the legality and impropriety of the punishment had to be examined by the Industrial Tribunal while adjudicating this very dispute which was referred for adjudication. Consequently, when the Industrial Tribunal considered the gravity of the punishment in the light of the charges having been held proved, it cannot be said that it was exercising jurisdiction not vested in it. In fact, it was its obligation to adjudicate this very dispute which was referred for adjudication. Consequently, when the Industrial Tribunal considered the gravity of the punishment in the light of the charges having been held proved, it cannot be said that it was exercising jurisdiction not vested in it. In fact, it was its obligation to adjudicate this very dispute which was referred for adjudication. ( 10 ) SIMILARLY, the very question has been examined by the other Division Bench of this court in the matter of Gujarat State Road transport Corporation v. Prabhashanker K. Acharya, reported in 1992 (2) GLH 354 . While dealing with the same contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation, the Division Bench, in paragraph 19 of its judgment has observed as under:"19. The submission of Shri Shelat, learned advocate for the management that the tribunal has no jurisdiction at all to interfere with the order in inquiry in which the punishment other than that of the discharge or dismissal is imposed cannot be accepted. Shri Shelat submits that provisions of Section 11-A of Industrial Disputes Act only empowers the Tribunal to interfere with the order in which the punishment of discharge or dismissal is imposed and in no other order in which the other punishment is imposed. There is no provision under the Act prohibiting the tribunal in exercising the jurisdiction except in the case of punishment of discharge or dismissal. We have extensively discussed the provisions of Sections 7, 7-A and 15 of the schedule, and it is evident that the Tribunal has jurisdiction even to interfere with the order imposing the punishment other than that of discharge or dismissal. Even prior to the incorporation of Section 11-A Industrial disputes Act, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment is recognized and accepted by the Courts, of course, that is only under certain circumstances as discussed above. The acceptance of the submission would lead to absurd results and even in case of punishment other than that of discharge or dismissal which may lead to victimization, the Tribunal will not be in a position to interfere and give proper justice to the workman. The acceptance of the submission would lead to absurd results and even in case of punishment other than that of discharge or dismissal which may lead to victimization, the Tribunal will not be in a position to interfere and give proper justice to the workman. " ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid two decisions of the Division Bench of this Court, the question now does not survive further, and therefore, according to my opinion, the Industrial Tribunal has powers to modify or substitute punishment in case Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the punishment in question is harsh, unjust and arbitrary. Therefore, the learned Tribunal has rightly exercised its jurisdiction and interfered with the punishment. ( 12 ) FURTHER, I had gone through the entire award passed by the Industrial Tribunal which is under challenge in Special Civil Application no. 3547 of 1996. In paragraph 8 of the: award, the Industrial Tribunal has given cogent reasons in support of its conclusion that the charges levelled against the respondent- workman Shri Chhipa have not been found to be proved by the Inquiry Officer and though this being the position, the competent authority has given contrary findings without any justifiable reason and as a result, the Industrial tribunal has set aside the said findings and the punishment imposed by the competent authority. According to the Industrial Tribunal, the Inquiry Officer has considered the relevant provisions of the BPMC Act and also considered various aspects of the matter and come to the conclusion that the respondent-workman was not at all responsible for the said misconduct, and therefore, the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal is reasonable, just, legal and proper which did not require any interference, while exercising the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of India. The Industrial Tribunal has applied its mind and have given cogent reasons in support of its conclusion, and therefore, the Award dated September 20, 1995 does not suffer from any infirmity either in law or on facts, and therefore, the Award is quite reasonable, just and legal. ( 13 ) I had also gone through the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, under challenge in Special Civil Application No. 10042 of 1995. The Tribunal has considered the evidence on record and the gravity of misconduct alleged, and also the explanation given by the workman concerned. ( 13 ) I had also gone through the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, under challenge in Special Civil Application No. 10042 of 1995. The Tribunal has considered the evidence on record and the gravity of misconduct alleged, and also the explanation given by the workman concerned. The Tribunal has also considered the cumulative effect of stoppage of increment which affects adversely the entire service career of the workman. Not only that the Tribunal has based its decision in light of the reported decision of this Court in the matter of Vijaykumar Muljibhai Jasani v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, rajkot, 1987 (1) GLR 139 but also had come to the conclusion that looking to the misconduct in question, the punishment which has been imposed by the competent authority is disproportionate and unjust and it amounts to victimization apart from adversely affecting the pensionary right of the respondent-workman, and therefore, considering the said punishment to be too harsh and unjust, the Industrial tribunal has modified the same by an Award dated July 28, 1995. According to my opinion, the said Award is quite just, legal, and proper. ( 14 ) I had also gone through the Award dated June 15, 1994 passed by the Industrial tribunal in Reference (II) No. 336 of 1991, which has been brought under challenge in special Civil Application No. 14033 of 1994. The Tribunal, after considering the evidence on record has come to the conclusion that when the charge of misappropriation has not been proved, only on the mere charge of negligence, the punishment of reverting the workman to the minimum of the grade of Junior Clerk is harsh, unjust, and therefore, the Tribunal has rightly modified the punishment of reversal by giving suitable directions that such reversion from june 18, 1990 shall remain in force upto the date of the award only. The Tribunal has thus, rightly limited the period of reversion of the respondent workman from June 18, 1992 to july 6, 1994. According to my opinion, the tribunal has applied its mind while modifying the punishment and had also given cogent reasons in respect to its findings. Thus, industrial Tribunal has not committed any error while exercising jurisdiction and power under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 15 ) I had also gone through the citations referred to by the learned advocate Ms. Anand. Thus, industrial Tribunal has not committed any error while exercising jurisdiction and power under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 15 ) I had also gone through the citations referred to by the learned advocate Ms. Anand. However, there are three decisions of this court on the same issue. Out of the said three iecisions, two are rendered by the Division ench of this Court and one, by the learned igle Judge. And therefore, I am bound by the id decisions of the Division Bench hereunder the very same question has been aborately considered and discussed and it has en held that the Industrial Tribunal has power ider Section 11-A and Section 10 of the dustrial Disputes Act to interfere with the mishment other than dismissal, discharge or rmination of the workman concerned. therefore, the contentions raised by Ms. nand on this point cannot be accepted. Learned advocate Ms. Anand has not raised any other contention with respect to infirmity or otherwise any error of law committed by the tribunal in passing the respective awards under challenge in the three petitions. ( 16 ) THIS Court exercising powers under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of india has very limited jurisdiction to interfere with the said Awards and it cannot act as an appellate Court and cannot reappreciate the evidence which has been led before the tribunal concerned, and therefore, as per the decisions rendered in the matter of Ahmedabad municipal Corporation v. Virendrakumar jayantibhai Patel, 1999-II-LLJ- 765 (SC) and of Ms. Renudrego v. Lalchand Soni, AIR 1998 sc Weekly 1840, I am of the opinion that these petitions are required to be dismissed. Accordingly these petitions stand dismissed. The petitioner-Corporation shall forthwith implement the Awards passed by the Industrial tribunal in respect of the matters and pay the amount of arrears and wages to the respondents-workmen according to the directions given in the respective awards, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Rule is discharged. Ad interim relief granted earlier in each of these matters shall stand vacated. Parties to bear their own costs. .