There cannot be any other better example than the present one of judicial delays. Age-old saying that Justice Delayed is Justice denied is clearly reflected when a reference is made to the file of the trial Court which was summoned by this Court in this revision. By judicial process as well as on account of technicalities of law, a suit that was filed more than twenty years ago is still at the stage of defendants witnesses. To be precise it may be noted that plaint in the instant case was filed on 10-6-1980 and record of the case further shows that issues were framed on 12-12-1980. Case was ordered to be listed for the first time for plaintiffs evidence on 14-1-1980 (it should be 1981). After the evidence of plaintiffs was closed ton 27-5-1986 case is being listed for defendants evidence. It is because of such like laws that the people are losing faith in the system which is already over-burdened and may be if this state of affairs continues, day is not far off when it will crack under its own weight. Leaving the matter here only let this revision be dealt with now. 2. A suit for specific performance was filed by Keemti Lal Jain and Shashi Pal Jain (Plaintiffs) Respondents 1 and 2 in this revision petition, against Balbir Kumar Jain and Koshalaya Devi Jain (Defendants) Respondents 3 and 4 in this revision petition As already observed, plaint was filed on 10-6-1980 and this suit is pending trial before the trial Court. Sanjogta Jain, petitioner in the present revision petition, is the daughter of Smt Koshalaya Devi Jain and sister of Balbir Kumar Jain (defendants). This suit was based on an agreement to sell purported to have been executed by Respondents 3 and 4 on 23-2-1978, whereby the property described in it was agreed to be sold for a consideration of Rs. 18.000/- by them to Respondents 1 and 2 (plaintiffs). Out of the agreed sale consideration according to Respondents 1 and 2 a sum of Rs. 3.000/- was received as an advance. According to Respondents 1 and 2 on the failure of the Respondents 3 and 4 to execute the sale deed in question and get it registered they were constrained to file the suit. 3. Out of the agreed sale consideration according to Respondents 1 and 2 a sum of Rs. 3.000/- was received as an advance. According to Respondents 1 and 2 on the failure of the Respondents 3 and 4 to execute the sale deed in question and get it registered they were constrained to file the suit. 3. When this suit was pending trial, Respondents 3 and 4 were called upon to produce their evidence at their own risk and responsibility. Since then also the matter is pending for the evidence of defendants-respondents 3 and 4. Amongst other things, Respondents 3 and 4 were also permitted to examine two of the witnesses who were residing at Kapurthala and Delhi, on open Commission. When the case was in the process of evidence of the Respondents 3 and 4, petitioner Sanjogta Jain filed an application before the trial Court with a prayer for impleading her as a defendant in the suit. This application was contested and resisted by the Respondents 1 and 2, plaintiffs. Trial Court after hearing the parties has dismissed the same vide order dated 10-7-1996, hence this revision by her. 4. This revision was filed on 1-10-1996, record was summoned, therefore, proceedings remained stayed. 5. Shri Johal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, urged that his client is a necessary party and suit cant proceed in her absence. He further pointed out that petitioner is a Class I heir of late Kasturi Lal and thus has got interest in the property, as such in her absence no effective decree can be passed. These pleas have been controverted on behalf of respondents 1 & 2, Shri Wazir, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 & 2, submitted that this application has been filed at the behest as well as benefit of respondents 3 & 4, who are close relations of the petitioner. This application is nothing but an abuse of process of law and the Court actuated with the sole purpose to delay the already protracted litigation between the parties before the trial Court. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the parties were not at variance that admittedly petitioner is not a party to the agreement in question, specific performance whereof is sought for by a decree for which suit has been filed by the respondents 1 & 2 against respondents 3 & 4. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the parties were not at variance that admittedly petitioner is not a party to the agreement in question, specific performance whereof is sought for by a decree for which suit has been filed by the respondents 1 & 2 against respondents 3 & 4. It is in this background that it has to be determined whether the petitioner is a necessary party or not. Reliance is placed by Shri Johal on the following cases: (1) AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 350, M. Veera Raghavlah v. M. China Veeriah. (2) AIR 1990 Madras 243, Mookkammal v. Chitravedivammal. (3) AIR 1984 Andh. Pra. 166, Bala Narasimha v. Gangaputra Co-operative Housing Society. (4) AIR 1994 Pun). & Har. 365, Atul Sharma v. Gurinder Singh, and (5) AIR 1989 Kerala 167, K. S. Abraham v. Mrs. Chandy Rosamma. 7. On the other hand, Shri Wazir, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 & 2, has placed reliance on the following cases : (1) AIR 1975 Guj 178, Rasiklal Shankerlal Son! v. Natverlal Shankerlal Upadhayaya. (2) AIR 1976 Madh. Pra. 148, Panne Khushali v. Jeewanlal Mathoo Khatik. (3) AIR 1984 Patna 218, Ram Bllash Pandey v. Jai Narayan Gupta, and (4) AIR 1987 PunJ. & Har. 197, Krishan Lal v. Tek Chand. These are being discussed hereinafter. 8. In the case of M. Veera Raghaviah v. M. China Veeriah (AIR 1975 Andh. Pra. 350) (supra) reliance was placed by Shri Johal, learned counsel appearing for petitioner, on para 25 wherein It has been held that where father and his sons were members of a joint family and the father entered Into an agreement to sell the Joint family property to a third party and the agreement was found collusive transaction and not binding on the sons, specific performance could not be ordered even In regard to fathers share. This decision is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. 9. Similarly, the decision In the case of Mookkammal v. Chitravadi-Vammal (AIR 1980 Madras 243) (supra) does not apply at all so far facts of the present case are concerned. It is a case of impartible assets while dealing with S. 23 of the Hindu Succession Act (1956). Its perusal shows that under what circumstances a female member is entitled to sue for partition and possession of her share in the property. It is a case of impartible assets while dealing with S. 23 of the Hindu Succession Act (1956). Its perusal shows that under what circumstances a female member is entitled to sue for partition and possession of her share in the property. Again reliance placed on the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Atul Sharma v. Gurinder Singh (AIR 1984 Pun] & Har 365) (supra) on behalf of the petitioner is of no benefit to her. Reason being that petitioner is admittedly a married female residing with her husband, she cannot be a member of the co-parcenary, as such in no case her rights can be put at part with that of a coparcener so as to hold that by virtue of being a member of the co-parcenary she is a necessary party to the suit out of which present revision has arisen. 10. As already observed, petitioner is a married lady, she has neither a right of residence in the dwelling house which is only available to a female heir i.e. a daughter, in case she is either unmarried or has been deserted or has separated from her husband or is a widow. None of these situations admittedly exists in the present case. Similarly, petitioner is neither a person claiming under earlier agreement of sale in her favour muchless being in possession of the suit property, therefore, she is not a necessary party, as such her case is not advanced even by the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Bala Narasimha v. Gangaputra Co-operative Housing Society (AIR 1984 Andh. Pra. 166) (supra). 11. For the reasons set out hereinabove as well as in view of the fact that petitioner is admittedly not a party to the agreement in question specific performance whereof is sought for, it cannot be said that she is either a necessary or a proper party. This position is further reinforced from the fact that respondents 1 & 2 - Plaintiffs have opposed her application for impleadment as a party before the trial Court and are even no opposing her tooth and nail. 12. On the other hand, few decisions directly relating to the matters concerning specific performance in the circumstances like those of the present case, need to be noted, which were relied upon by Shri Wazir, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 & 2. 12. On the other hand, few decisions directly relating to the matters concerning specific performance in the circumstances like those of the present case, need to be noted, which were relied upon by Shri Wazir, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 & 2. 13. In the case of Rasiklal Shankerlal Soni v. Natverlal Shankerlal Upadhayaya, AIR 1975 Guj. 178 (supra) what was observed and is relevant in the context of present case was in the following terms: - 6. "............................. The parties to the agreement are the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. The plaintiff is willing to take the risk and he can get whatever title his vender has. The plaintiff is willing to take such title which his vendor has. A simple suit for specific enforcement of an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 cannot be permitted to be converted into a suit for establishing title and that too against the wish of the plaintiff. In view of the peculiar facts of this case, it cannot be said that opponents Nos. 2 and 3 are necessary parties to the suit or their presence is necessary to adjudicate upon all the questions involved in the case." 14. A Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Panne Khushali v. Jeewanlaf Mathoo Khatik, AIR 1976 Madh. Pra. 148 (supra) was called upon to decide the following question: "3. 2 and 3 are necessary parties to the suit or their presence is necessary to adjudicate upon all the questions involved in the case." 14. A Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Panne Khushali v. Jeewanlaf Mathoo Khatik, AIR 1976 Madh. Pra. 148 (supra) was called upon to decide the following question: "3. In view of the controversy involved, the question for decision by this Bench is formulated thus: "Whether in a suit for a specific performance of a contract for sale, instituted by a purchaser against the vendor, a stranger to the contract, who contending that the contracted property is a joint family property of which he is also the co-owner, wants to intervene in the suit, is entitled to be added as a party." After examining the case law including decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1958 SC 886, Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum and AIR 1953 SC 521, Deputy Commissioner v. Rama Krishna the a/oresaid question was answered in para 16 in the following terms: "Strangers to the contract making a claim adverse to the title of the defendant (vendor) contending that they are the co-owners of the contracted property are neither necessary nor proper party and are, therefore, not entitled to be joined as parties to the suit." Decision in this case is very near and akin to the facts of the present revision petition. 15 Again in almost identical circumstances as of the present revision, in the case of Ram Vilash Pandey v. Jai Narayan Gupta, AIR 1984 Patna 218 (supra) it was held as under: "3. Ordinarily a plaintiff to a suit is dominus litis. It is for him to decide the forum where the suit is to be instituted and the persons who have to be impleaded as a party. His choice as to the place of institution of the suit or the parties to it can only be altered or interfered with by the Court under powers given to it by the statute. ... "5. Now the question as to whether the property had been acquired by the defendant-opposite party 3 with joint family property, was wholly foreign to the scope of the suit. On the allegations made in the plaint and in the written statement filed by opposite party 3, the adjudication of this question was not necessary. ... "5. Now the question as to whether the property had been acquired by the defendant-opposite party 3 with joint family property, was wholly foreign to the scope of the suit. On the allegations made in the plaint and in the written statement filed by opposite party 3, the adjudication of this question was not necessary. It cannot, therefore, be said that the intervener-applicant were necessary parties to the suit. The only question which requires examination is whether they fall under the category of proper party." "7......................... The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, after a careful examination of the various decisions of different Courts, came to the conclusion that the interveners were neither necessary parties and proper parties. They could not be given the benefit of Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Code. It accordingly turned down the request of the interveners to be impleaded as parties to the suit for specific performance." "9. As already observed earlier, a party to a suit cannot be thrust on an unwilling plaintiff, unless otherwise provided by law. The suit is between the purchaser on one hand and the vendor on the other except such unusual cases as are referred to in the case of Rasiklal Shankerlal Soni, AIR 1975 Guj. 178 (supra), no other person is entitled to be impleaded as a party to the suit. In case the intervener-applicants prayer for impleadment had been allowed the result would have been to convert the suit as a dispute between the defendants inter se. At all events the controversy in the suit would have been unnecessarily enlarged by the introduction of facts with which the plaintiff would have no direct concern." and consequently revision petition, was dismissed. 16. In the case of Krishen Lal v. Tek Chand AIR 1997 Pun] Har 197 (supra), Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court while examining plea of a person not party to agreement to sell who claimed to be joint owner of the suit property, held that such a party is not entitled to be impleaded in a suit for specific performance of contract of sale. Observations made in this behalf in para 4 and what was held in para 13 was in the following terms: - "4. Observations made in this behalf in para 4 and what was held in para 13 was in the following terms: - "4. In a simple suit for specific performance of a contract for sale a decree sought against the defendant is for the purpose of enforcement of the contract entered into between the executants. No relief is sought against strangers to the agreement for sale and, indeed, there is no right of relief in such a suit against a person, who is not a party to the agreement. The question involved in the suit does not relate to any liabilities or rights of the strangers in the property in dispute. In such a case, the plaintiff would, in the event of his getting a decree for specific performance, get executed a sale deed which will bind only the executants thereof, namely, the plaintiff and the defendant and would not affect the position of persons who are not parties to the agreement. S. 19 of the Specific Relief Act clearly lays down that specific performance of a contract may be enforced against either party thereto. So, in such a suit a person who is not a party to the agreement for sale is neither a necessary nor a proper party. It is well recognized that the plaintiff is the dominus litus in a suit. He should not, unless the provisions of any statute so require, be enforced to fight against a person against whom he does not claim or seek any relief. The scope of the suit ought not to be enlarged and the suit turned into a title suit between one of the either parties to the contract and a stranger to the contract. The provisions of sub-rule (2) of R. 10 of O. 1, Civil P.C. empower the Court to direct that any person who ought to have been joined as a plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit be added as parties. The crucial test is that the presence of such a person should be necessary to settle the questions involved in the suit. The crucial test is that the presence of such a person should be necessary to settle the questions involved in the suit. In a suit for specific performance the questions involved in the suit are the execution of the contract for sale, the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract and the refusal or inability of the defendant to execute the contract. For settling these questions the presence of strangers who are not parties to the contract is not necessary. It is not even proper. A person who claims title adverse to the parties to the contract is not a necessary or a proper party. No relief is sought against such a person. The addition of such a person will enlarge the scope of the suit and change its nature and turn it into a title suit. This is not the object of sub-rule (2) of R. 10 of Or. 1 Civil P.C. The provisions of R. 10 are ex facie enabling and clearly indicate the conditions for the exercise of that power. It is only when the Court comes to the conclusion that for the purpose of full adjudication of the matter in issue, a party which is not added is necessary that the provisions of sub-rule (2) of R. 10 are attracted. It is, thus, plain that unless a party proposed to be added has directly an interest in the controversy and its adjudication, the power cannot be invoked." "13. In the result we are of the view that the preponderance of judicial opinion in the country is in favour of the view that in a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale, a person not party to the agreement to sell, and claiming to be joint owner of the subject-matter of the suit, is not entitled to be impleaded as a defendant. He is neither a necessary nor a proper party and we fully agree in this view and answer the question posed at the threshhold in the negative. We further hold that the decisions in Gurdev Singh v. Paras Ram, 1985 Punj LJ 315, and Atul Sharma v. Gurvinder Singh, 1985 Rev LR 226: (AIR 1984 Punj & Har 365), do not lay down the correct law and are overruled. No costs. Petition dismissed." 17. We further hold that the decisions in Gurdev Singh v. Paras Ram, 1985 Punj LJ 315, and Atul Sharma v. Gurvinder Singh, 1985 Rev LR 226: (AIR 1984 Punj & Har 365), do not lay down the correct law and are overruled. No costs. Petition dismissed." 17. Another fact which is noteworthy in this case is that before the institution of the present suit petitioner had filed a suit for permanent injunction against all the respondents to this revision petition. This suit was instituted on 28-4-1978 and was titled as Kumari Sanjogta Jain v. Koshalya Devi. This was a suit restraining Koshayala Devi and her brother Balbir Kumar Jain by a permanent injunction from selling or transferring House No. 61 situate in Mohalla Chodrian, Jammu, i.e. subject matter of the present suit, in favour of Keemti Lal and Shashi Pal sons of Chaman Lal. 18. At the time of bearing of this petition, it was stated at the Bar by Shri Johal, learned counsel for the petitioner, that on assurance having been held out by the mother and brother of the petitioner that they wound not sell the property in question, however, there is nothing on record to suggest anything in that behalf. Filing of this suit clearly suggests that the petitioner was well aware that her mother and brother are in the process of selling the property in question. This suit was filed after the agreement to sell dated 23-2-1979 had been executed by both respondents 3 & 4. In the suit petitioner has specifically stated regarding the bargain of sale having been entered between the parties for consideration of Rupees 18,000/- and for which some document of agreement to sell having already been executed. This further goes to show that it is not a case where petitioner was neither aware and or kept in dark or something having taken place in a clandestine manner behind her back between respondents 1 & 2 on one side and respondents 3 & 4 on the other. She decided to sleep over the matter and has filed this application after a gap of about more than 15/2 years. Reasons are not difficult to find. Here the observations made at the very outset of this judgment and filing of the present application assumes significance. She decided to sleep over the matter and has filed this application after a gap of about more than 15/2 years. Reasons are not difficult to find. Here the observations made at the very outset of this judgment and filing of the present application assumes significance. At the risk of repetition, I am constrained to observe that respondents 3 & 4 defendants, as well as for their benefit and at their behest petitioner has not hesitated to abuse the process of law and the Court and thus delay the already delayed litigation. 19. No other point is urged. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this revision petition, which is accordingly dismissed, with costs which are quantified at Rs. 1,000/-. 21. Respondents 1 & 2 shall be at liberty to execute and recover the costs from the petitioner in execution on the strength of this order. 22. Record of the case is here, it be returned to the trial Court forthwith by the Registry so as to reach there on or before 23-9-2000, on which date the parties present through their learned counsel have been directed to appear before the trial Court. 23. Since respondents 3 & 4 defendants are un-represented in this Court, trial Court will issue notice to them through the learned counsel, who represented them in the trial Court and to no other party, because date has been fixed by this Court. In the peculiar circumstances of this case it has become necessary to direct that with a view to expedite its decision trial Court will not fix a date for more than 15 days. In case any of the witness (s) still remains to be examined on behalf of the defendants, Dasti notice will be given to defendants for getting them served. In case witnesses on Commission are still to be examined and trial Court had not closed the right to examine both of them at Kapurthala and Delhi, the Commissioner appointed for the said purpose shall do the needful within this period. In case witnesses on Commission are still to be examined and trial Court had not closed the right to examine both of them at Kapurthala and Delhi, the Commissioner appointed for the said purpose shall do the needful within this period. Attendance of the witnesses who are to be examined by the defendants at these two places shall be arranged by the defendants for which a date shall be fixed by the local Commissioner after issuing notice to the parties through their learned counsel, and on such date, time and place, the defendants will ensure that both the witnesses are present and are examined. After the closure of the evidence of the defendants, within three dates at a span of 15 days each as aforesaid, the rebuttal evidence, if any, shall be examined by the plaintiffs, who shall also take Dasti notices for their witness (s) if any, to be examined by them. Case will be finally heard and disposed of on or before 28-2-2001 by all means. Such a direction has been necessitated to ensure that the case is decided immediately by the trial Court, keeping in view the fact that it was filed more than twenty years ago. 24. Trial Court is directed to monitor progress of the case after every hearing through the Registrar Vigilance of this Court, by sending timely information of every date of hearing. 25. Registry is directed to return the record to the Court below, so as to reach well before the date fixed.