N.K.Jain, J.: This writ appeal has been filed against the Order of the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No.17900 of 1999 dated 25.1.2000, whereby the learned single Judge, dismissed the writ petition, not interfering with the rejection order of the mercy petition passed by the President of India. 2. The brief facts that are necessary for the disposal of the writ appeal are that the appellant-accused was charge-sheeted under Sec.302, I.P.C. (Five counts) and after completion of the trial by order dated 24.6.1987, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Erode in S.C.No.104 of 1985, acquitted the accused-appellant finding that the charges were held not proved beyond doubt, On an appeal, in Criminal Appeal No.30 of 1988, preferred by the state, this Court found the appellant-accused guilty of charges under Sec.302, I.P.C. (5 counts), convicted thereunder and awarded capital punishment of death thereunder by judgment dated 2.9.1997, and accordingly reversed the finding of the trial Judge. Criminal Appeal No.900 of 1997 was preferred by the appellant-accused before the Honourable Supreme Court and it was dismissed by the Honourable Apex Court by judgment dated 22.4.1998. Then the appellant-accused filed a mercy petition to the President of India and the Governor of Tamil Nadu on 6.5.1998. The Governor of Tamil Nadu rejected the mercy petition on 2.9.1998. The President of India rejected the mercy petition of the accused on 27.10.1999, and it was communicated to him through the Superintendent of Police, Coimbatore on 30.10.1999. The execution of death sentence, was fixed on 9.11.1999. The appellant-condemned prisoner filed W.P.No.17900 of 1999 before this Court praying to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records in No.F.14/4/98-Judicial cell dated 27.10.1999 and to quash the same. Along with that a stay petition was filed praying to stay the execution of death sentence fixed on 9.11.1999. It is also alleged that the second mercy petition was sent to the President of India as well the Governor of Tamilnadu on 1.11.1999. 3. A detailed counter was filed by the State and the Jail Authority denying the allegations as alleged. It is stated that the original mercy petition filed on 6.5.1998 before the Governor of Tamilnadu was rejected on 2.9.1998 and as per the telegram received on 5.11.1999 the execution of sentence was stayed. 4. A counter was filed by the Union of India on 3.12.1999 denying the allegations as alleged. It is stated that the original mercy petition filed on 6.5.1998 before the Governor of Tamilnadu was rejected on 2.9.1998 and as per the telegram received on 5.11.1999 the execution of sentence was stayed. 4. A counter was filed by the Union of India on 3.12.1999 denying the allegations as alleged. It is submitted that no alleged second mercy petition dated 1.11.1999 was received. Even otherwise, once the mercy petition was rejected, there is no point in filing another mercy petition. After the rejection of the mercy petition by the President of India, the condemned prisoner cannot obtain and order of stay on execution of the death sentence, by submitting repeated mercy petitions. Again an additional affidavit was filed on 19.12.1999 explaining the time consumed along with the statement of events. It is submitted that after collecting the relevant materials, papers were placed along with the advice of the Council of Ministers before the President of India and after obtaining further opinion from the Attorney General, the Ministry of Law referred the file to Home Ministry, and thereafter with the advice so obtained, resubmitted to the Secretariat of the President on 9.7.1999. The mercy petition as rejected by the President on 20.10.1999, which was received by the Home Ministry on 26.10.1999 and ultimately the same was informed to the State Government on 27.10.1999. It is emphatically stated in the counter that there was no delay in disposing of the mercy petition of the appellant-accused. Before the learned single Judge, learned counsel for the appellant has given President of India and Governor of Tamilnadu as party respondents, who were initially made as respondents. Respondent 5, Dr.V.Suresh, General Secretary, People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Tamilnadu and Pondicherry and respondent 6 Mr.K.Manoharan, President Co-ordinator, Campaign against death penalty, Chennai-83. Separately moved petitions praying to implied them as party respondents in the writ petition, to enable to assist the court. The petitions were allowed vide order dated 7.1.2000 and they were impleaded as party respondents in the writ petition and they were heard. 5. Before the learned single Judge both the parties cited a number of cases to substantiate their contentions, The learned single Judge in detail considered all the aspects of the materials on record, heard extenso the arguments of the respective counsel, and elaborately discussed the case laws cited by them. 5. Before the learned single Judge both the parties cited a number of cases to substantiate their contentions, The learned single Judge in detail considered all the aspects of the materials on record, heard extenso the arguments of the respective counsel, and elaborately discussed the case laws cited by them. The learned single Judge, considering the decisions rendered in Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981)1 S.C.C. 107 and in Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989)1 S.C.C. 204 , which were relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner and also considering the power of pardon vested with the President of Constitution of India, found that the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers can be taken while disposing of the mercy petition of a condemned prisoner and the order of the President so passed on the basis of the aid and the advice of the Council of Ministers is justifiable. The learned single Judge relying on the decisions of the Honourable Apex Court rendered in A.Sajeevi Naidu v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1102 and also S.R.Bommai v. Union of India, (1994)3 S.C.C. 1 , found that the action of the President on the basis of the aid and advice of the individual minister is sufficient in the facts and circumstances of the given case. Learned single Judge found that the delay cannot be said to be unreasonable. It has been further observed that the argument of the counsel that the delay in disposing of the mercy petition is unreasonable and the executive had unduly delayed, cannot be countenanced. Finding that no reasons are required to be assigned for passing an order by the President of India dismissed the writ petition on 25.1.2000. However, as prayed, the learned single Judge suspended the implementation of the order of death sentence for ten days so as to enable the petitioner to prefer an appeal. 6. The case was listed, on lunch motion, before us on 4.2.2000, as per the direction of the Honourable Chief Justice, Additional Solicitor General, Southern Region sought time. The matter was posted on 8.2.2000 and the stay passed by the learned single Judge was extended in the meanwhile upto 14.2.2000. 7. 6. The case was listed, on lunch motion, before us on 4.2.2000, as per the direction of the Honourable Chief Justice, Additional Solicitor General, Southern Region sought time. The matter was posted on 8.2.2000 and the stay passed by the learned single Judge was extended in the meanwhile upto 14.2.2000. 7. On 8.2.2000 the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Additional Solicitor General, Southern Region for respondents 1 and 4, Mr.Patti Jaganathan, A.G.P. for respondents 2 and 3, Mr.N.G.R.Prasad for respondent 5 and Mr.V.S.Giridhar for respondent 6 were heard. Dr.V.Suresh, alleged Secretary for the People’s Union of Civil Liberties, Tamilnadu and Pondicherry and Mr.K.Manoharan, alleged President Coordinator, Campaign against death penalty, respondents 5 and 6 respectively, have not placed any material or record about their organisations, aims and objects of their Union/ Organisation, office-bearers and to show that they are the duly authorised persons to represent their respective organisations, when the condemned prisoner has already represented. As such they have no right to hear. But since they have been impleaded with a view to get legal assistance by the learned single Judge, we have also heard them. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the President of India cannot delegate or allocate the power of pardon and relied on the decision in B.K.Sardari Lal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1547. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision in U.N.R.Rao v. Indira Gandhi, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1002 and contended that Art.74(1) is mandatory and, therefore, the President cannot exercise the executive power without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and any exercise of executive power without such aid and advice will be unconstitutional in view of Art.53(1), He also contended that in this case, Art.74(1) has not been followed and as such the rejection of mercy petition, without proper aid and advice of Council of Ministers is bad. He submitted that any exercise of the executive power not in accordance with the Constitution will be liable to be set aside, and there is no doubt that the President of India is a person who has to be elected in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution but even show he is bound by the provisions of the Constitution. 10. 10. Learned counsel drew our attention to the decision reported in Abdul Majid v. Senior Superintendent, 1967 Crl.L.J. 1233 for the proposition that, Rule 3 of the Government of India (Transaction and Business) Rules, 1961 Provides that, “All business allotted to a department shall be disposed of by or under general order or special direction of Minister incharge.” Learned counsel submitted that while exercising the power of pardon under Art.72, the President of India, has to follow guidelines, which have not been followed in this case. According to the learned counsel, the advice tendered by the Home Minister is not to be construct as the advice of the Council of Ministers. He built upon his arguments on the base of the decision in Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989)1 S.C.C. 204 , wherein it was observed that “being an executive power the President has to exercise the same on the advice of Council of Ministers and it should not be based on his own.” It was also observed that “no separate guidelines can be issued and the guidelines framed in Maruam’s case, (1981)1 S.C.C. 107 have to be followed”. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the appellant is entitled to exemption under Sec.433-A of the Crl.P.C. 12. Much reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is inordinate delay in the disposal of mercy petition filed by the condemned prisoner. He relied on the decision in K.P.Mohammed v. State of Kerala, 1994 S.C.C. (Supp.) 684 and the decision in Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, (1989)1 S.C.C. 678 . 13. Learned counsel vehemently contended that when the matter involved the life problem of a person, Government cannot take asylum in the garb of stating that due to administrative reasons, such delay had occurred. He had gone to the extent of saying by quoting from the decision in Trivenben’s case, (1989)1 S.C.C. 678 , which says: “As between funeral fire and mental worry, it is the latter which is more devastating, for, funeral fire burns only the dead body while the mental worry burns the living one.” 14. Learned counsel further submitted that Tamilnadu Prisoner’s Rule were not followed scrupulously. Learned counsel further submitted that Tamilnadu Prisoner’s Rule were not followed scrupulously. The plank of attack made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that, when the pardon of power, which is a Constitutions power, was not exercised properly and with due care and caution, and when the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers was not in accordance with the provisions contemplated under Art.74(1) of the Constitution and when there is inordinate delay, which has not been explained properly, the mitigating circumstances has to be taken note of by this Court, while exercising the extraordinary and discretionary power under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, According to the learned counsel, the points which he pleaded before the learned single Judge were not taken into consideration and as such, he is raising the same before this Court. 15. Learned counsel pleaded that when a person is knocking the doors of the highest constitutional authority of the nation, pleading mercy, when all doors were shut for one reasons or the other, care should be taken in disposing of the same, which is absent in this case, and in such circumstances, only this Court can come to the help of the person, who is under great mental agony, taking into consideration the Right protected under Art.21 of the Constitution. 16. Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, learned counsel for 5th respondent Dr.V.Suresh, General Secretary, People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Madras reiterating the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the aid and advice of Council of Ministers was not taken in this case. He submitted that the reasons should be given by the President while rejecting the mercy petition as the right given under Art.72 relates to the right under Art.21 and that the procedure established by law should not only follow till conviction, but to be followed till mercy petition is disposed of under Art.72. He relied the decision in A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180, learned counsel further submitted that rejecting the mercy petition in a part of procedure established by law and the same has not been followed, as no advice of Council of Ministers was given. He further submitted that in this case, the mercy petition was not disposed of within three months and it amounts to delay which is also procedural defect. He further submitted that in this case, the mercy petition was not disposed of within three months and it amounts to delay which is also procedural defect. He relied on the decision of this Court rendered in Haja Moideen v. Government of India, 1991 Crl.L.J. 1325. 17. Learned Counsel submitted that Art.72 should be read along with Art.21. He pointed out that under Art.77 the executive power of the Government is expressed in the name of President. Learned Counsel further pointed out that in Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983)2 S. C. C. 344, the delay was too much and in Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, (1989)1 S.C.C. 678 , the delay was three months. Therefore, in such circumstances, the order of the President is liable to be set aside. 18. Mr.P.V.S.Girihar, learned counsel for the 6th respondent-President, Co-ordinator, Campaign against death penalty, while supporting the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that advice of Council of Ministers is a must and that Arts.72 and 161 should be distinguished. He further submitted that Art.72 is an independent one. Art.77 deals with framing of business of Government of India and therefore, so far as Art.72(1)(c) is concerned no such delegation of power is possible, He further submitted that under Art.258, the President can delegate the any power to state or any other body. He submitted that this point was not appreciated by the learned single Judge. 19. Mr.V.T.Gopalan, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for respondents 1 and 3, submitted that under Art.72, the President of India can pardon any convict for any offences. Learned counsel submitted that Art.72 has to be read along with Art.74 and Art.74 is bound to follow. He further submitted that immunity should be given to cabinet proceedings and cabinet documents. Learned Additional solicitor General, submitted that Art.77 relates to framing of business Rules of Government of India and drew our attention to the relevant portions in Sanjeevi Naidu’s case, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1102 and S.R.Bommai’s case, (1994)3 S.C.C. 1 , for the collective responsibility. His main argument placed before this Court is that in each case, the materials would be relevant to the exercise of the Constitutional function of the President of India under Art.72, and that the materials placed before the President must have the nexus. 20. The learned Additional Solicitor General further submitted that in such matters. His main argument placed before this Court is that in each case, the materials would be relevant to the exercise of the Constitutional function of the President of India under Art.72, and that the materials placed before the President must have the nexus. 20. The learned Additional Solicitor General further submitted that in such matters. The courts can go into the question as to what were the materials placed and whether relevant materials were placed before the President for consideration, and beyond that if cannot go. Drawing our attention to various paragraphs of the decision in Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981)1 S.C.C. 107 , learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that in that case. The Supreme Court framed guidelines had they all have been considered in this case. Learned counsel further submitted that Art.72 itself provides guidelines to follow. He further submitted that in that decision Fazal Ali, J. while concurring with the majority view even stated that, “in the present distressed and disturbed atmosphere we feel that if deterrent punishment is not restored to, there will be complete chaos in the entire country and criminals will let loose endangering the lives of thousands of innocent people of our country.” and keeping in mind that view, the case on hand has to be looked into. He submitted that in Bachan Singh’s case, the death sentence held to be Constitutional. The court also found that the distressed atmosphere in the year 1981 and now by the end of 1999, it is still worse; there are many organisations for abolition of capital punishment, but not a single organisation is voicing for the help of victims of those murderers. 21. The learned Additional Solicitor General further submitted that the President, is bound to follow the re-considered advice of the Council of Ministers. 21. The learned Additional Solicitor General further submitted that the President, is bound to follow the re-considered advice of the Council of Ministers. Relying on Maruram’s case, he further submitted that, advice of the Council of Ministers or by the concerned minister, cannot form part of the material, the Secretary of the advice is protected under Art.74(2), and immunity is not to the materials and it is only to the advice, Then learned Additional Solicitor General, relying on the decision in Kehar Singh and others v. Union of India and another, (1989)1 S.C.C. 204 submitted that the power to pardon is a part of the Constitutional scheme, and it is a Constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context, In Kehar Singh’s case (supra), it has been further held that the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who, subject to the provisions of Art.74(1) must act in accordance with such advice. According to the Additional Solicitor General even the constitutional function under Art.72 has to be exercised by the President of India under the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, which is very clear from the observations made in S.R.Bommai’s case (supra). He further submitted that the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, which pertain to the preventive detention orders, wherein communications are reasons and inordinate delay amounts to fatal of the case, that too subject to facts of each case, will not be applicable to the facts of the present case, wherein punitive deletion is the subject matter. He further submitted that Olga case cited by Mr.N.G.R.Prasad will not be applicable to the facts of case. Mr.Patti Jaganathan, learned A.G.P. submitted that the mercy petition filed by the appellant dated 6.5.1998 was rejected by the Governor of Tamil Nadu. On 3.8.1998 in accordance with provisions of Constitution and the date has been wrongly mentioned as 2.9.1998 and forwarded just in time on 13.8.1987 and the said rejection order has not been challenged. He relied on the decision in (1991)1 S.C.C. 752 paragraphs 5 and 21. 22. We have heard the learned counsel for respective side. The learned single Judge has dealt with the case law in detail, so it is not necessary to reproduce them. 23. He relied on the decision in (1991)1 S.C.C. 752 paragraphs 5 and 21. 22. We have heard the learned counsel for respective side. The learned single Judge has dealt with the case law in detail, so it is not necessary to reproduce them. 23. On the basis of the contentions raised by respective parties, we formulate the following question for our consideration. 1. Whether the order passed by the President of India on the mercy petition of the appellant on the aid and advice of Ministers, in the facts of the given, calls for any interference? 2. Whether there is any inordinate delay in disposing or the mercy petition of the appellant/accused, by the President of India, in the facts and circumstances of the given case? 3. Whether the order of the President of India can be vitiated for not giving the reasons while rejecting the mercy petition? 25. The main contention of the appellant is when the President has not acted on the aid and advice of Council of Ministers but acted only on the advice of Home Minister; the same is liable to be set aside as he has violated the procedure prescribed by law. 26. The law is well settled that The President of India under Art.72 of the Constitution of India has got power to grant pardon etc. to any person convicted of any offences. This power cannot be exercised by the President on his own. He has to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. 27. The President has to look the entire materials, mitigating circumstances, and scrutinise the evidence on record of the Criminal case and can go into the merits. 28. The President can also take a different view which will not amount to supersession of any judicial verdict. It will always presume that the President has acted properly, carefully and after an objective consideration of all aspects. The discretion lies with the President. The satisfaction of the President is necessary and not of the court. While deciding the mercy petition, after the conclusion of the President on mercy petition the court cannot substitute its own opinion, even if it comes to different conclusion. Being an executive power, the President has to act as per the aid and advice tendered, by the Council of Ministers. The order of the President cannot be challenged, nor its merits in such matters. Being an executive power, the President has to act as per the aid and advice tendered, by the Council of Ministers. The order of the President cannot be challenged, nor its merits in such matters. Judicial review is permissible only if the conclusion arrived at by the President is arbitrary or mala fide or against the constitutional provisions. 29. This has been supported in Kehar Singh’s case, (1989)1 S.C.C. 204 , as on earlier times the President was of the opinion that he cannot go into the merits of the case decided by the highest court. Kehar Singh’s case (supra), arose in a petition filed by Kehar Singh who was convicted, as his petition was dismissed only on this account. In such circumstances, their Lordships observed that the President has power under Art.72 and he can go into the merits of the case, can take a different view, but he must act as per the provisions of Art.74(1) and in accordance with such advice. Advice of the Government binds the Head of the State. In this case, their Lordships observed that they are confined only to the question as to the area and scope of the President’s power and not with the question regarding merits and judicial review on its merits is permissible to strict limitations as defined in Maru Ram’s case, (1981)1 S.C.C. 107 . 30. It will be relevant to note that in Maruram’s case, (1981)1 S.C.C. 107 . while considering Sec.433-A of the Crl.P.C. and upholding the vires, the Supreme Court held that exclusion of Secs.432 and 433(a) by Sec.433-A would not affect power under Arts.72 and 161, where Government’s grant of power is guided by proper rules or schemes framed in exercise of power under Art.72 or Art.161, that will override Art.433-A It was found that convicts are being released under the guise of some pardon by way of circular, invoking Art.161 of the Constitution, considering the minister’s visit at Jail as an auspicious one. While considering it was held that it was not open either to the President or the Governor to take independent decision or direct release or refuse to release of anyone of their own choice. While considering it was held that it was not open either to the President or the Governor to take independent decision or direct release or refuse to release of anyone of their own choice. It was also observed that in the matter of exercise of powers under Arts.72 and 161, the two highest dignitaries in our constitutional scheme act and must act not on their own judgment but in accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. It was also observed that it is all public power, including constitutional, power, shall never be exercisable arbitrarily or mala fide and, ordinarily, guidelines for fair and equal execution are guarantors of the valid play of power. While considering the concept of liberty under Art.21 of the Constitution. It was observed that liberty is not an one-sided concept, nor does Art.21 of the Constitution contemplates such a concept. It should be sent hat while considering the problem of penology we should not over look the plight of victimology and the sufferings of the people who die, suffer or are aimed at the hands of criminals where the accused has been fully heard, no questions of violation of Art.21 arises, when the question of punishment is being considered. 31. Art.53(1) says that "the executive power of the Union shall be vested in the President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. Art.72 gives the power to President of India to pardon any convict of any offences. It should be read along with Art.74(1). Art.77 speaks about the conduct of business of Government of India and all actions are taken in the name of the President of India. 32. In S.R.Bommai’s case, (1994)3 S.C.C. 1 , it has been held that Arts.74 and 77 are in a sense complimentary to each other, though they may operate in different fields. It has been further held that the court is not to enquired it is not concerned with whether any advice was tendered by any Minister or Council of Ministers to the President, and if so, what was that advice, while considering the power under Art.356 of the Constitution of India, which empowers the imposition of President Rule in the State, their Lordships observed that: "The President is clothed with several powers and functions by the Constitution. It is not necessary to detail them to except to say that Art.356 is one of them. When Art.74(1) Speaks of the President acting in the exercise of his functions. It refers to those powers and functions’. Besides the Constitution, several other enactments too confer and may hereinafter confer, certain powers and functions upon the President. They too will be converted by Art.74(1). To wit, the President shall exercise those powers and discharge those functions only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at its head.." ... ... ... ... ... ... Art.53(1) insofar as says that the executive power of the Union, which vests in the President, can be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the constitution stresses the very idea. Even where the acts directly, the President has to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers or the Minister concerned, as the case may be, (Advice tendered by a Minister is deemed to be the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers in view of the Principle of Joint responsibility of the Cabinet/Council of Ministers) If such act is questioned in a Court of Law, it is for the Minister concerned (according to rules of business) or an official of that Ministry to defend the Act, where the President acts through his subordinates, it is for that subordinate to defend the action." 33. In Sanjeevi’s case, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1102, the Supreme Court while dealing with Art.166 pertaining to the Conduct of Government Business Rules of the State, wherein the Governor has been authorised, for convenient transaction of business of the Government of the State and for the allocation amongst its Ministers, the business of the government, and in all matters excepting those in which governor is required to act in his discretion have to be allocated to one or the other of the Ministers on the advice of the Chief Minister, held that: "The cabinet is responsible to the legislature for every action taken in any of the ministries. That is the essence of the joint responsibility." It was also held that when those officials discharge the functions allocated to them, they are doing so as limbs of the Government and not as persons to whom the power of the Government had been delegated. 34. That is the essence of the joint responsibility." It was also held that when those officials discharge the functions allocated to them, they are doing so as limbs of the Government and not as persons to whom the power of the Government had been delegated. 34. As already pointed out, Art.77 of the Constitution contemplates Business Rules and no direct application in disposing of the mercy petition under Art.72 of the Constitution in India. But in view of Sanjeevi’s case, which dealt with the procedure, wherein it was held that cabinet is responsible for every action, taken by any minister and considering the essence of joint responsibility, in our view that the advice of the Home Minister would tantamount to the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, in view of the procedures adumbrated in Arts.74(1) and 77, as the final decision is to be taken by the President. We find no illegality in following the Constitutional procedures as required under Art.74(1). 35. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that Art.77 which deals with the general power cannot be equated with the specific power under Art.74 of the Constitution, is not acceptable in view of the observations made in S.R.Bommai’s case. 36. In view of the above discussion, the question of allegation does not arise and the argument of the learned counsel is not acceptable. 37. In the absence of any allegation on the ground of arbitrariness or mala fide on the part of the Government of India and as discussed above no interference is permissible. 38. As discussed above and in view of what has been stated above, we are of the firm view that the compliance of requirement of Constitution has been made and therefore the rejection of the mer6y petition by the President of India need not be interfered With, on this ground. This point is answered accordingly. 39. So far as the delay is concerned both the parties has relied on some cases which will be considered herein after. It is no doubt true that the mercy petition should be decided as early as possible. But no specific time frame can be stipulated. Expecting the expeditious disposal of the mercy petition is certainly a big thing. But at the same time, when it involves a life and death of the person concerned, it should be disposed of at an early point of time. 40. But no specific time frame can be stipulated. Expecting the expeditious disposal of the mercy petition is certainly a big thing. But at the same time, when it involves a life and death of the person concerned, it should be disposed of at an early point of time. 40. In the instant case, from the facts so culled out. the mercy petition of the appellant-condemned prisoner, dated 6.5.1988 was forwarded by the State of Tamil Nadu to the Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, on 13.8.1998. The Ministry of Home Affairs received the same on 26.8.1998. After examining the judgments of the trial court, High Court and Supreme Court, the file was sent to Home Minister for tendering advice on 2.11.1988. After getting the advice, the file was submitted to the President of India on 19.11.1998. The President of India sent direction to obtain opinion of the Attorney General on 9.2.1999. Reference was made on 17.2.1999 to obtain opinion of Attorney General and the opinion of Attorney General was received on 14.5.1999. Thereafter, it was submitted to Home Minister on 11.6.1999 and then to the Secretariat of the President on 9.7.1999. Ultimately, the President rejected the mercy petition on 20.10.1999 which was communicated to the Home Department on 26.10.1999 and to the State Government, on 27.10.1999 and the condemned prisoner was informed on 30.10.1999. Considering the argument of the appellant and the averments contained in the counter and the explanation. It cannot be said that the time spent at different stages which were necessary before placing the papers to the President of India cannot be said to be inordinate delay. We are not going into the merits of the order of the President nor this Court can go. What is to be seen is whether all relevant materials were placed for the consideration of the President. While considering the delay, it is to be sent that the file has to move from one place to another and the time taken for collecting the relevant materials as to the gravity of the offence he committed, the relevant circumstances and all aspects of the matter to be looked upon carefully by the President to arrive at a conclusion. The time spent in passing through the established procedures cannot be said to be delay. The time spent in passing through the established procedures cannot be said to be delay. It is also settled that delay by itself cannot be a ground to quash the order and the court can only examine the nature of delay caused and the circumstances for its disposal. However, each case depends on the facts of its own. In the instant case, the explanations and the cumulative effect of the circumstances have to be seen whether there is inordinate delay, in the order of the President of India. 41. Learned Additional Solicitor General also drew our attention siting that in the punitive detention, like the case one on hand, where fair trial and appeals had been concluded, such detention will not affect the personal liberty guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution, and in such cases no hard and fast rule can be framed regarding the delay factor. He further submitted that the appellant cannot take advantage of the cases of preventive detentions wherein without any count of trial or affording an opportunity they were detained and in such cases delay may be fatal. He submitted that each case depends on the merits of its own and on the facts and circumstances of each case, delay per se is not a ground and delay must be considered along with various other factors and one of them being the gravity of offence. He further submitted that in Vaitheeswaran’s case, it was held that two years is the limitation for disposal of mercy petition which was overruled in subsequent catana of decisions. To his submission he relied on the decision reported in Kuljects and Ranga v. Union of India, (1981)3 S.C.C. 324 and (1982)1 S.C.C. 417 . He had also drew the relevant portions of the Apex Court as to merits. 42. This Court cannot go into the merits of the case. Suffice to point out that the Honourable Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence vide order dated 22.4.1998 reported in (1998)4 S.C.C. 531 , wherein it was further observed that, “We only wish to add that the brutal manner in which the appellant wiped out the entire family of his uncle (except one of his sons, (P.W.8) who, fortunately at the materials time was studying in Coimbatore, obviously to grab his properties, has shocked our judicial conscience. Nonetheless, we looked into the record to find out whether there was any extenuating or mitigating circumstances in favour of the appellant but found none. If inspite thereof, we commute the death sentence to life imprisonment we will be yielding to spasmodic sentiment, unregulated benevolence and mis-placed sympathy.” The Supreme Court also considered the observations made in Mahesh v. State of M.P., (1987)3 S.C.C. 80 and observed that, “... It will be mockery, of justice to permit these appellants to escape the extreme penalty of law when faced with such evidence and such cruel acts. To give the lesser punishment for the appellants would be to render the justicing system of this country suspect. The common man will lose faith in courts. In such cases, he understands and appreciate the language of deterrence more than the reformative jargon. As the above observations squarely apply in the facts of the instant case we uphold the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant.” 43. Now we consider the case law. In Swaran Singh’s case, (1998)4 S.C.C. 75 , their Lordships considered the settled law in Maru Ram’s case (Maru Ram v. Union of India, 1981 1 S.C.C. 107), wherein it was held that judicial review of Presidential order cannot be exercised on merit except with strict limitations and observed that the power so exercised is arbitrary, mala fide or in absolute disregard of the finer canons of the constitutionalism and the Governor was not posted with material facts and apparently, the Governor was deprived of the opportunity to exercise the powers in a fair and just manner, as such the order of the Governor was interfered with a direction to reconsider. In the present case as already stated, the learned counsel for the appellant/ petitioner has not been able to show any arbitrariness or mala fides so also any disregardness to the constitutional procedure as discussed. Therefore, the petitioner cannot take advantage of this decision. 44. In Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983)2 S.C.C. 344 , their Lordships while considering the delay in execution of the T.V.Vaitheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983)2 S.C.C. 68 sentence and considering the decision reported in wherein the delay beyond two years in execution held to be violative of Art.21, held that the delay is impracticable and improper. 44. In Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983)2 S.C.C. 344 , their Lordships while considering the delay in execution of the T.V.Vaitheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983)2 S.C.C. 68 sentence and considering the decision reported in wherein the delay beyond two years in execution held to be violative of Art.21, held that the delay is impracticable and improper. It was observed that no time limit can be fixed by the court and each case depends upon the facts of its own. It was also observed that the Government of India and State Government should not take undue time to dispose of the petition under Arts.72 and 161 of the Constitution or under Secs.432 and 433 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the case must be disposed of expeditiously and every petition should be disposed of within a period of 3 months from the date of its receipt, but at the same time, it was observed that, no hard and fast time can be fixed and delay by itself cannot be a ground, for interference. The reason for delay and who is responsible for it has to be seen by the Court itself. As discussed above this case is not helpful to the petitioner as in the given case, the delay has sufficiently been explained. 45. In K.P.Mohammed v. State of Kerala, 1984 S.C.C. (Supp.) 684, their Lordships observed that some sensitive areas like those concerning life and death where the need for speedy justice is self-evident and even in matter like the disposal of an election petition, the Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides by Sec.86(7) that, “Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible...” It is perhaps time for accepting a self-imposed rule of discipline that mercy petitions shall be disposed of within, say, three months. “According to learned counsel for the appellant this has not been followed.” 46. In reply to the above the learned counsel for the respondent submits that no hard and fast rule can be fixed. He further draws our attention to the decision reported in (1988)4 S.C.C. 574 and (1989)1 S.C.C. 678 , wherein it is observed that all the circumstances including the background circumstances and motivation of the crime are to be placed before the President and it takes time. He further draws our attention to the decision reported in (1988)4 S.C.C. 574 and (1989)1 S.C.C. 678 , wherein it is observed that all the circumstances including the background circumstances and motivation of the crime are to be placed before the President and it takes time. He also submitted that even in the case cited supra Their Lordships observed that, “We do not hold or share the view that a sentence of death became in executable after the lapse of any particular number of years”. and therefore, petitioner cannot take advantage of this case more particularly when the time consumed was properly explained. 47. In Madhu Mehta’s case, (Madhu Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2299), their Lordships observed that speedy trial in criminal cases though may not be a fundamental right, is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Art.21 of the Constitution. Speedy trial is part of one’s fundamental right to life and liberty. This principal is no less important for disposal of mercy petition. It has been universally recognised that a condemned person has to suffer a degree of mental torture even though there is no physical mistreatment and no primitive torture and the court can only examine the nature of delay caused and the circumstances that on the death sentence was finally confirmed by the Judicial process and will have no jurisdiction to reopen the conclusions reached by the Court while finally maintaining the sentence of death and each case depends upon the facts of its own and as their Lordships did not find any reasons sufficiently commensurate to justify the long delay, directed that the sentence imposed be altered to imprisonment for life. 48. In Haja Moideen’s case, Haja Moideen v. Government of India, 1991 Crl.L.J. 1325, it was observed that lack of explanation for the undue delay strikes at the very root or foundation, necessitating the court to enter a verdict in favour of the prisoner. As in that case, the long period had not been sought to be justified by acceptable reasons, the only option open to the court was to direct that the death sentence should not be carried out and the sentence imposed on them be altered not one of imprisonment for life. But, in the instant case, as the delay has been properly explained, both the cases are not helpful to the appellant. But, in the instant case, as the delay has been properly explained, both the cases are not helpful to the appellant. The decision in Daya Singh v. Union of India, (1991)3 S.C.C. 61 , is not helpful to the facts of the case on hand, as that case the court found that the affidavit does not furnish any fact or circumstance in justification of the delay. So also the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in Javed Ahmed v. State of Maharasthra, (1985)1 S.C.C. 275 and in Ragupathy, R. In re., 1983 L.W. (Crl.) 321 are also not helpful. The other decisions cited, are of no assistance in the facts of the given case. 49. In view of our findings and above discussions we answer that there is no inordinate delay in disposing of the mercy petition and the order of the President cannot be set aside on that ground. Point No.2 is answered accordingly. 50. So far as the third point that the order of the President is liable to be vitiated for not giving reasons, is concerned, the learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that reasons cannot be furnished as the court itself has limited jurisdiction, learned counsel further submitted that otherwise also the incumbent cannot have a right to have reasons communicated. We have heard the argument of the respective counsel, undoubtedly, nobody has got right to have the reasons communicated. It is not necessary to communicate the reasons by which a conclusion has been arrived at. But the same time, the reasons already given cannot be added or supplemented at the latter stage. What is necessary is that the reasons should be available on the file, so as to arrive at a conclusion. However, the court can see the record. Now the question remains is whether in the instant case non-suppliance of the reason is fatal. As this Court has a limited jurisdiction and the order of the President cannot be gone into on its merits or subject to judicial review, where the mercy edition is dismissed by the President, it is not necessary to supply the reasons. The court holds that the reasons are not required to be given, in the facts and circumstances of the given case. This point is answered accordingly. 51. The court holds that the reasons are not required to be given, in the facts and circumstances of the given case. This point is answered accordingly. 51. So far as the argument of the learned counsel Mr.P.V.S.Giridher regarding interpretation of Art.258, which was not raised before the learned single Judge is concerned, the same cannot be permitted. Otherwise, also it is not necessary to deal with the controversy for the reasons stated above. 52. No doubt, under the constitution, the President of India is the overall Head. It will be presumed that the President of India has acted properly. Carefully and after objective consideration of all the aspects of the matter. It is an admitted fact that power should be exercised judiciously, to arrive at a conclusion in a judicious manner. When the Constitution provided so many safeguards to the President of India, who is the head of the nation, to function his duties effectively, under various Articles of the Constitution, no stipulation of time factor can be put into a straight jacket to perform such duties. Considering all these aspects of the matter in the facts of the given case, we are of the considered view, that the order of the President of India rejecting the mercy petition of the appellant cannot be said to be vitiated on any of the counts. 53. “On our direction, records were produced on 9.2.2000. We have also perused the original records of the proceedings produced by Government and Union of India carefully. We are satisfied that in the facts of the given case, the order passed by the President of India needs no interference on any account.” 54. In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, and in view of the discussions made by us on the relevant points framed by us, we are of the firm opinion that the order of the learned single Judge needs no interference. We further hold that the rejection order of the President made on the mercy petition of the appellant is not liable to be set aside on any of the grounds raised by the learned counsel for the appellant as well the learned counsel for the respondents 5 and 6, The writ appeal is dismissed, as stated above, connected C.M.P. is also disposed of