S. R. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THIS special appeal by Committee of Management, Madarsa Dairatul Ishlah chiragah-E-Uloom, Rasoolpura. Varanasi, is directed against the judgment and order dated May 15, 1998 passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 33983 of 1996. Walliullah v. District Minority Welfare Officer. Varanasi and others. Walliullah, the petitioner arrayed herein as party respondent No. 3 approached this Court for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the appointment of Mohd. Sabir Ansari, party respondent No. 4, to the post of principal, Madarsa Dairalul Ishlah Chiragh-E-Uloom, Rasoolpura, Varanasi, inter alia on the ground that though he was duly appointed to the post of Principal vide appointment letter dated 29. 6. 1994 which was approved by the District Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Varanasi on 2. 8. 1995 yet the post was later on readvertised pursuant to which the fourth respondent Mohd. Sabir Ansari was selected and appointed as Principal of the institution. The petitioner was opposed by the appellant. Committee of Management as well as the fourth respondent Mohd. Sabir Ansari, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner Walliullah was simply authorised to work as officiating principal being the seniormost teacher of the institution and was never duly appointed to the post of Principal. The learned single Judge being of the opinion that the petition involved the disputed questions of fact, disposed it of with the direction to the Director Minority Welfare to examine the matter on a representation being submitted by the petitioner and dispose of the same by a reasoned order after affording opportunity to the concerned parties. ( 2 ) THE judgment of the learned single Judge has been assailed by Shri R. N. Singh, learned senior Advocate appearing for the appellant basically on two grounds, firstly, that the direction issued by the learned single Judge is tantamount to creating an adjudicatory forum which being a legislative function ought not to be exercised by the Courts ; secondly, that the institution being a minority institution the direction given by the learned single Judge conferring adjudicatory power upon Director, Minority Welfare would violate Article SO (1) of the Constitution. Shri ashok Khare, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-respondent Walliullah urged that by virtue of various administrative powers vested in the Director of Minority Welfare in relation to arbi and Farsi Madarsas, an implied power to decide the dispute as to who amongst two rival claimants is the Principal of institution may be culled out in the Director Minority Welfare for administrative convenience and desirability. As to the argument of Sri R. N. Singh that the direction given by the learned single Judge to the Director of Minority Welfare to decide the dispute contravenes Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. Sri Ashok Khare urged that conferment of adjudicatory power with regard to employees of minority institutions upon outside agency would not contravene Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. ( 3 ) WE have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made across the Bar. Concededly, there is no express provision of law conferring any adjudicatory power in the director of Minority Welfare in respect of any dispute regarding appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff of Arbi and Farsi Madarsas. The institution in question is on the grant in aid list of the State Government. The question is whether the Director of Minority Welfare has any implied adjudicatory power. Pursuant to Government Orders dated January 31, 1996 being annexure-S. C. A. 2 to the Supplementary counter-affidavit, the functions of Education department of the Government in relation to minority institutions stood transferred to Minority welfare Department and with a view to ensuring timely payment of monthly salaries to teaching and non-teaching staff of Arbi and Farsi Madarsas, the Government issued another Government order, it being G. O. No. 664/52-3-96-4/10/96 Alp Sankhyak Kalyan Evarn Muslim Waqf anubhag-3. Lucknow dated 27. 6. 1996 thereby modifying the earlier Government Order dated 12. 7. 1990 in respect of timely payment of monthly salary to teaching and non-teaching staff of arbi and Farsi Madarsas by providing that in place of expression "shiksha Nideshak (Basic)Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow" the expression "nideshak, Alp Sankhyak Kalyan Vibhag, Uttar pradesh" and in place of "zila Baste Shlksha Adhikart", the expression "zila Alp Sankhyak kalyan Adhikari" be read in the Government Order dated 12. 7. 1990. 7. 1990. Zila Alpsankhyak Kalyan adhikari has been vested power to scrutinise the salary bills get the salary bills scrutinised through Lekha Adhikari posted in the office of District Basic Education Officer and to ensure disbursement and payment of salaries to teachers and non-teaching Staff of the Arbi and Farsi madarsas and furnish information in this regard to the Director Minority Welfare Department, uttar Pradesh and Secretary, Alpsankhyak Kalyan Evam Muslim Waqf Vibhag Uttar Pradesh, lucknow. The head of a minority institution has to interact with the Inspector and Zila alpsankhyak Kalyan Adhikari or the Director Minority Welfare Uttar Pradesh. Lucknow. Sri ashok Khare invited the attention of the Court to Manyata Evam Seva Niyamawali known as "uttar Pradesh Ashaskiy Arbi Tatha Farsi Madarason. Ki Manyata Niyamawali" which was approved by the Governor vide Government Order No. 3367/15-17-87-53 (5j-86 Shiksha (17)Anubhag, Lucknow dated August 22. 1987 in support of his contention that the Director minority Welfare has implied power to see as to whether a teacher appointed in such Madarsas has been duly appointed and working in the institution. The said Niyamawali though a non-statutory one lays down the qualifications for appointment of teachers including Head master/principal as well as the procedure to be adopted in respect of disciplinary actions against such teachers/head Masters. The Niymawali provides for in respect of the institution by the competent authority the power to issue appropriate direction for removal of defects, if any, found during inspection as visualised by Rule 37 of the Niymawali Rule 39 of the Niymawali lays down in no uncertain terms that in the event of maintenance grant being misused or misappropriated or in the event of committing any grave irregularity, the maintenance may be suspended. It further provides that in such eventuality, the Basic Shiksha Adhikari may himself withdraw the reimbursement and maintenance grant and pay directly to duly appointed teachers working in the institution. The Rule 39 being relevant is quoted below : "kisi bhi prakar ke shaskiy anudan ke liye keval sthayi manyata prapt madrase hi ahar honge. Anudan suchi par aane ke ilye sarnstha dwara aavedan karte samay yeh dekha Jayega ki manyata ki sharton ka pura palan ho raha hai. The Rule 39 being relevant is quoted below : "kisi bhi prakar ke shaskiy anudan ke liye keval sthayi manyata prapt madrase hi ahar honge. Anudan suchi par aane ke ilye sarnstha dwara aavedan karte samay yeh dekha Jayega ki manyata ki sharton ka pura palan ho raha hai. Pradatt anudan ka durupayog ya duruiniyog karne athua koi anya gambhir truti karn par anudan ka nilamban kiya ja sakega aur anudan ki dhanrashi sambandhtt basic shiksha adhikari dwara aahrtt karke sidhe sanstha ke vidhivat niyukt va karyarat adhyapakon ko unke vetanadi ke ley ke roop mein banti Ja sakegi. " (Emphasis is ours ). ( 4 ) THE underlined portion of Rule 39 of the Niymawali aforestated clearly suggests an implied power in the Basic Shiksha Adhikari to decide at the administrative level as to whether the salary is being paid by the Management to a lawfully appointed teacher working in the institution. But for such power. It would not be feasible to ensure that the maintenance is being utilised lawfully. The power of the Basic Shiksha Adhikari has since been delegated to the Minority Welfare department with the Director of the Minority Welfare at the Headquarter at Lucknow. In such view of the matter, it cannot be said that the direction issued by the learned single Judge to the director, Minority Welfare to decide the controversy in question is tantamount to creation of a forum which is a legislative function. In our considered opinion, where there exists an express or implied power in an authority to traverse upon a controversy, the argument that the Court has created a forum and has thereby usurped legislative function does not arise. ( 5 ) IN Committee of Management v. District Inspector of Schools, Meerut, 1978 AWC 124, a division Bench of this Court was called upon to decide the question as to whether the District inspector of Schools had been vested with the power to adjudicate upon claims of rival contending managing committees. The Division Bench, held that though there was no express provision conferring such power on the District Inspector of Schools, the latter did have an implied power to decide "on administrative level as to who according to him were validly elected office bearers of the institution". The same view was reiterated in Jaswant Singh and another v. District Inspector of Schools and another. The same view was reiterated in Jaswant Singh and another v. District Inspector of Schools and another. 1980 UPLBEC 43, wherein it has been clearly held that since the District Inspector of Schools has to perform various administrative function under the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Act. 1921 and the U. P. High School and Intermediate colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 and since these duties cannot be discharged by him unless he is in a position to find out an administrative level as to who are the real office bearers of the college, he for this limited purpose must of necessity satisfy as to who according to him are the validly elected office bearers of the institution. ( 6 ) SRI. R. N. Singh placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in Chiranjilal Srilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh and others, JT 1993 (2) SC 341, wherein it has been held that power to create or enlarge the jurisdiction is legislative in character. This legal proposition has not been disputed by sri Ashok Khare, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent. The decision aforestated, however, does not support the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and that the Director, Minority Welfare does not have the implied power to satisfy himself, for administrative purposes and/or for the purposes of payment of salary, as to who is the Principal of the institution. Upon regard being had to the administrative control that the Director of minority Welfare. U. P. exercises over the minority Institution. Particularly the provisions contained in Rule 39 of the Niymawali approved by the Government vide Government Order dated 22. 8. 1987, we are of the view that in case a dispute arises between two rival claimants to the post of Principal of minority institution, the District Minority Welfare Officer and/or the director Minority Welfare Uttar Pradesh. Lucknow has the power to decide, on administrative level, as to who amongst the two rival claimants had been duly appointed head of the institution by the Management at least for the purpose of disbursement of salary. ( 7 ) THE next question that arises for consideration is as to whether such implied power in the district Welfare Officer or Director Minority Welfare, Uttar Pradesh Offends Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. In re : Kerala Education Bill. ( 7 ) THE next question that arises for consideration is as to whether such implied power in the district Welfare Officer or Director Minority Welfare, Uttar Pradesh Offends Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. In re : Kerala Education Bill. 1957 : AIR 1958 SC 956 and in Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389 , it has been held that minority institutions have a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice but at the same time. It has been propounded that the right to administer cannot include the right to maladministration. Regulatory measures, it has been held therein, do not abridge the right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. Mathew. J. , discussing the type of action State would amount guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the Constitution observed thus : "the application of the term abridge may not be difficult in certain types of situations. The important ones are where a law is not a direct restriction of the right but is designed to accomplish another objective and the impact upon the right is secondary or indirect. Measures which are directed at other forms of activities but which have a secondary or direct or incidental effect upon the right do not generally abridge a right unless the content of the right is regulated. . . . . " ( 8 ) IN Christian Medical College Hospital Employees Union and another v. Christian Medical college Vellore Association and others, AIR 1988 SC 37 , the Supreme Court was faced with the question as to whether the Industrial Disputes Act offends Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. It has been held that the Industrial Disputes Act which is a general law for prevention and settlement of industrial disputes cannot be said to interfere with the right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. The argument that the application of the provisions of the Act will result in the abridgement of the right of the Management of the minority educational institution to administer such institutions was repelled by the Supreme court notwithstanding the power of the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court to set orders of the management in respect of their employees at naught. ( 9 ) IN St. ( 9 ) IN St. Xaviers case, (supra), the permission with respect to "selecting method of arbitration for settling major dispute connected with service of staff of educational institutions" was held not objectionable. What was held objectionable in that case was giving of power to the vice-Chancellor to nominate an umpire. Same principle has been reiterated in Lily Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and others, (1979) 2 SCC 124 . The decision of the Director Minority Welfare in the present case on the dispute as to who had been duly appointed head of the institution being an administrative decision is open to judicial review by this Court under Article 226 of the constitution of India and can also be assailed by the aggrieved party by means of a civil suit. Such adjudicatory power, in our to opinion, does not offend Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. ( 10 ) YUNUS Ali Sha v. Mohd. Abdul Kalam, 1999 (3) SCC 676 , reliance on which has been placed by Shri R. N. Singh has no application to the facts of the present case, in that case, Section 10 of the Orissa Education Act, 1969, which required prior approval of the Director before termination of the service of a teacher of an aided institution was held inapplicable to minority institution. The Supreme Court in that case has clearly held that while Director of Education. Orissa may have power to supervise the functioning of the said school in order to ensure that it does not malfunction or maladminister in view of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India, he wilt have no control over the actual management of the school including hiring or terminating of service of a teacher. In the instant case, the Director Minority Welfare, Uttar Pradesh has been called upon to decide the controversy between the two rival claimants to the post of head of the institution. This does not involve conferral power, to approve or disapprove appointment or termination of service of any teacher of the minority institution. Such implied power in the Director would not violate Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. ( 11 ) BEFORE parting with the case, we may observe that the Director Minority Welfare, Uttar pradesh took a decision in the matter aide order dated 11. 9. Such implied power in the Director would not violate Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. ( 11 ) BEFORE parting with the case, we may observe that the Director Minority Welfare, Uttar pradesh took a decision in the matter aide order dated 11. 9. 1998 pursuant to the impugned directions given by the learned single Judge but we refrain from expressing any opinion regarding legality or otherwise of the said order for that is the subject-matter of a separate writ petition pending consideration before appropriate single Judge Bench. ( 12 ) IN the conspectus of the above discussion, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge. The appeal fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs. .