JUDGMENT - R.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---Rule, returnable forthwith. Matter is taken up with the consent of the respective parties, for final hearing. 2. Heard Shri B.R. Warma, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. S/Shri G.V. Wani with V.D. Hon, Advocate for respondent No. 1; Shri P.R. Katneshwarkar, for respondent No. 2 and R.N. Dhorde, Advocate for respondent No. 3, present and heard. The respondent No. 4 is absent, though served. The name of the petitioner No. 2 is deleted as per the leave dated 8-2-2000. 3. The petitioner No. 1 a registered trade union under the Trade Unions Act, 1926, is the union of workers working in the respondent No. 4 Pratap Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited, Amalner. The elections to the office-bearers of the trade union were held sometime in December, 1998. The respondent No. 3 was appointed as Election Officer so as to conduct the elections. Necessary elections were completed and twenty eight members are said to have been elected for the various posts in the executive body of the said trade union. 4. The respondent No. 1 Ranjeet Bhimsing Patil, who happens to be a member of the said trade union, having been dissatisfied with the conduct of the elections and the manner in which it was followed, in accordance with the provisions of section 28(1-A) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 read with Regulation 23 of the Bombay Trade Unions Regulations, 1927, approached the competent authority i.e. Deputy Registrar of the Trade Unions seeking necessary permission for initiating election dispute as regards the election which happens to be the subject-matter of this petition. The Deputy Registrar of the Trade Unions granted permission i.e. consent certificate in Form "K". This certificate is dated June 4, 1999. In pursuance of the said certificate, on 30th July, 1999, the dispute came to be referred to the Industrial Court. However, it is referred to the Industrial Court at Jalgaon, though the application which was made in Form "K" of the Regulations under Rule 23(1) refer to the name of the Industrial Court, Nasik. The learned Member of the Industrial Court, Jalgaon entertained the dispute and also entertained the application and prayer which was made for prohibitory order against the petitioners and granted the same relief, by his order dated 24-1-2000. The learned Member of the Industrial Court, Jalgaon entertained the dispute and also entertained the application and prayer which was made for prohibitory order against the petitioners and granted the same relief, by his order dated 24-1-2000. Needless to mention, prior to passing of the above-mentioned order, the present petitioners who happened to be the respondents there, were called upon to file their say to the interim application which was so filed by the petitioners raising preliminary objection as regards the very jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, Jalgaon. Along with this objection, other objection which were raised before the Industrial Court was as regards non-joinder of necessary parties. The learned Member of the Industrial Court, Jalgaon, after having heard the parties and taking into consideration the pleadings of the parties concerned, passed the above-mentioned order and the request which was made by the petitioners for framing preliminary issue as regards jurisdiction, came to be rejected. 5. Dissatisfied with the above-said decision, the petitioners have approached this Court, challenging the same through the present petition. 6. Shri B.R. Warma, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners vehemently urged that reference of the dispute under section 28(1-A) read with Regulation 23 to the Industrial Court at Jalgaon, at the instance of the present respondent No. 1, was totally incompetent as, according to Shri Warma, the dispute could have been referred to Nasik Court only and nowhere else. To re-enforce this contention, Mr. Warma, pointed out that in Form "K" which was filed by the respondent for referring the dispute which is a form under Rule 23(1) of the Regulations, the respondent No. 1 had specifically asked for referring the dispute to the Industrial Court at Nasik and not to the Court at Jalgaon. Shri Warma, therefore, vehemently urged that by no stretch of imagination, the Court at Jalgaon could entertain the dispute and hence the order passed by the Court at Jalgaon is an order by an incompetent Court. Shri Warma, further, argued that certificate under section 28(1-A) is a must before filing the dispute and the certificate has to be in the name of a specific Court. According to Shri Warma, it can be seen from the contents of form "K" under Rule 23(1) and Form "L" under Rule 23(2) provided under the Bombay Trade Unions Regulations, 1927, the name and the place is required to be mentioned. According to Shri Warma, it can be seen from the contents of form "K" under Rule 23(1) and Form "L" under Rule 23(2) provided under the Bombay Trade Unions Regulations, 1927, the name and the place is required to be mentioned. Shri Warma, argued that it is not disputed by the respondents also that the respondent No. 1 had asked for reference of the dispute to the Industrial Court at Nasik. However, factually the reference is made to the Industrial Court at Jalgaon. Shri Warma, therefore, contended that the learned Judge of the Industrial Court, Jalgaon committed an error in not framing the preliminary issue as regards the very jurisdiction of that Court and further committed an error in appointing an administrator over the union in question, prohibiting the elected body from functioning which, according to Shri Warma, virtually amounted to throttling the democratic process. 7. As against the arguments of Shri Warma, Shri V.D. Hon, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, scathingly assailing the arguments of Shri Warma, urged that a restricted meaning cannot be attributed to the provisions of section 28(1-A) and merely because the name of the town Nasik is referred to while applying in Form "K" and obtaining the certificate in Form "L", is nothing but a matter which was to be followed by way of procedure because, according to Shri Hon, in fact, in forms "K" and "L", the name of the city is referred only as "Bombay". Shri Hon, therefore, argued that referring to the name of Nasik Court in the application and the certificate would not, by itself, create a hurdle in referring the dispute to a Court at Jalgaon as according to Shri Hon, when the application was made under section 28(1-A) and the certificate was granted i.e. 6-4-1999 and 4-6-1999 respectively, there was no Industrial Court constituted and established at Jalgaon, within whose jurisdiction the present disputants to the present dispute reside and do the work of their business to be precise within whose territorial jurisdiction for, the present they lie. The Court at Jalgaon is constituted and established on July 5, 1999 for the first time and all those matters which fell within the jurisdiction of that Court and which were otherwise filed in Nasik Court all have been transferred to the Jalgaon Court on 7th July, 1999. The Court at Jalgaon is constituted and established on July 5, 1999 for the first time and all those matters which fell within the jurisdiction of that Court and which were otherwise filed in Nasik Court all have been transferred to the Jalgaon Court on 7th July, 1999. Shri Hon, therefore, argued that writing of Nasik and grant of certificate for Nasik Court, was nothing but a procedural part. Shri Hon, therefore, argued that reference of the name of Nasik or Jalgaon in the form and the certificate or referring a particular Court by the disputant in his form is in no way going to create or withdraw the jurisdiction of a particular Court as per the choice of the disputant, but this has to be strictly construed, understood and to be acted upon strictly in pursuance of the provisions of the Act itself. The authorities have no right to confer the jurisdiction on any particular Court by just referring the name of that Court, unless and until it is so made permissible under the provisions of the present Act itself. 8. So far as regards the merits are concerned, Shri Warma, urged that, in fact, all those elected persons should have been parties before the Industrial Court and since they are not joined as party-respondents, the very dispute should have been thrown out for non-joinder of necessary parties. Shri Warma, further, made an argument that, in any case, when the elected body is in the office, such a body cannot be restrained by way of an order which is under challenge in this petition. 9. Before considering the arguments of Shri Warma, on merits, it will have to be seen as to whether is there any force in the contention of Shri Warma, when he argued that the Court at Jalgaon should not have entertained the dispute, at all when the certificate did not make a reference to the name of the Court at Jalgaon. With the help of the learned Counsel representing in the matter I have gone through the provisions of section 28 of the Bombay Trade Unions Act, 1926; which is as under:--- "28(1-A). With the help of the learned Counsel representing in the matter I have gone through the provisions of section 28 of the Bombay Trade Unions Act, 1926; which is as under:--- "28(1-A). Powers of Industrial Court to decide certain disputes.---(1) Where there is a dispute as respects whether or not any person is an office bearer or member of a registered trade unions including any dispute relating to wrongful expulsion of any such office-bearer or member, or where there is any dispute relating to the property including the account books of any registered trade union, any member or such registered trade union for a period of not less than six months, may, with the consent of the Registrar and in such manner as may be prescribed, refer the dispute of the Industrial Court constituted under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 for (Bom. XI of 1947) decision. (2) The Industrial Court shall, after hearing the parties to the dispute, decide the dispute, and may require an office bearer or member of the registered trade union to be appointed whether by election or otherwise, under the supervision of such person as the Industrial Court may appoint in his behalf or removed, in accordance with the Rules of the trade unions. Provided that, the Industrial Court may, pending the decision of the dispute, make an interim order specifying or appointing any person or appointing a committee of administration for any purpose under the Act including the purpose of taking possession or control of the property in dispute and managing for the purpose of union pending the decision. (3) The decision of the Industrial Court shall be final and binding on the parties and shall not be called in question in any Civil Court. (4) No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or other proceeding in relation to the dispute referred to the Industrial Court as aforesaid, and if any suit or proceeding is pending in any such Court, the Civil Court, shall, on receipt of an intimation from the Industrial Court that it is seized of the question, cease to exercise jurisdiction in respect thereof. (5) Save as aforesaid, the Industrial Tribunal may, in deciding disputes under this section, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as it exercise or follows for the purpose of deciding industrial disputes under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bom. (5) Save as aforesaid, the Industrial Tribunal may, in deciding disputes under this section, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as it exercise or follows for the purpose of deciding industrial disputes under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bom. XI of 1947)." Reading of the above-said provision of section 28(1-A) makes it clear that if a dispute to which a reference is made to in that section is to be referred to the Industrial Court or where there is a dispute as regards property including the account books of the registered trade union, any member of such a registered trade union for a period not less than six months, may with the consent of the Registrar and in such a manner as may be prescribed, refer the dispute to the Industrial Court constituted under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 for decision. 10. Regulation 23 of the Bombay Trade Unions Regulations, 1927 has to be read in this context, which is as under:--- "23. Manner of referring dispute to Industrial Court under section 28(1-A).---(1) Any person desiring to obtain the consent of the Registrar under sub-section (1) of section 28(1-A) for the purpose of referring a dispute to the Industrial Court under that sub-section shall make an application to the Registrar in Form "K". (2) On receipt of the application under sub-rule (1), the Registrar shall make such inquiries as he may deemed fit; and if he is satisfied that any dispute of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of section 28(1-A) exists he may give his consent in Form "L", called the consent certificate. (3) On receipt of the consent certificate under sub-rule (2), the applicant shall then refer the dispute to the Industrial Court in Form "M" and enclose therewith the consent certificate in original." 11. Regulation 23 necessarily refers to three forms i.e. Form "K", "L" and "M". On the basis of this provision and the forms, Shri Warma, wanted to suggest that in any case, when the regulations are to be strictly followed, then according to Shri Warma, if an application is made for reference to a particular Court (i.e. Nasik Court in the present matter) the dispute has necessarily to be referred to that Court only and nowhere else. According to Shri Warma, the Registrar has specifically granted certificate for reference of the dispute to Nasik Court and not at Jalgaon Court and therefore, according to Shri Warma, entertaining the dispute by the Industrial Court at Jalgaon, virtually was without jurisdiction. According to him, the dispute is entertained by an incompetent Court. 12. To appreciate this argument of Shri Warma, it has become very much necessary to interpret the provisions of section 28 read with Regulation 23 along with the contents of the form to which a reference is made i.e. Forms "K", "L" and "M" appended to the regulations. Section 28(1-A) makes it incumbent before reference of any dispute to have a certificate from the Registrar and the whole purpose of section 28 is to have a check on unnecessary, frivolous and vexatious litigation. It is the Registrar who has to conduct himself in such a manner as is provided under the Regulations, to find out as to whether really any dispute existed for making a necessary reference to the Industrial Court and after having been satisfied with regard to existence of such a dispute, it is only then the Registrar shall grant certificate in form "L" under the Regulations which is known "consent certificate". So in short, this consent certificate is a passport for going to the Industrial Court without which the approach to the Industrial Court is absolutely banned under the provisions of this Act. It is pertinent to note that this reference is to be made to the Industrial Court which is so constituted under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act No. XI of 1947) for necessary decision. For the purposes of the present argument and at this stage we need not refer to sub-section (2) of section 28(1-A). It will have to be read at an appropriate time when the Court will be considering the argument of Shri Warma, on the merits of the order impugned. In the background of the provisions of section 28(1-A) if provisions of Regulations 23 are read, which specifically deal with the manner in which the dispute is to be referred to the Industrial Court under section 28(1-A), the person desirous of obtaining consent certificate from the Registrar under sub-section (1) of section 28(1-A) has to make an application to the Registrar in form "K". Form "K" is an application to be made under Rule 23(1) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Read with provisions of Trade Unions Act, 1926, the relevant paragraph of the form is reproduced as under:--- "I/We have, therefore, to request you to kindly make such inquiries as you deem fit under Regulation 23 of the Bombay Trade Unions Regulations, 1927, and if satisfied, to communicate your consent in writing to the undersigned so as to enable him/them to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court, Bombay." 13. In paragraph 2 of this form, a person applying makes a request to the authority concerned to conduct appropriate enquiries as would be deemed proper by the authority concerned under Regulation 23 of the Regulations, 1927 and if the authority concerned is so satisfied, to communicate the consent of the authority in writing to the person applying so as to enable the person applying to approach the Industrial Court, Bombay. Shri Warma, with all force in his argument, argued that when the word has been used in paragraph 2, such as "Industrial Court, Bombay" Shri Warma wanted to suggest by this that the person making an application has to make an application even as regards reference of the dispute to a particular Court, situated at a particular place. Shri Warma, further, argued that making a reference to the Industrial Court, Nasik in the application which was filed in form "K" by the applicant clearly indicated that the applicant had an intention to approach the Court only at Nasik and none else. Shri Warma, on the basis of this, further argued that in the consent certificate which is granted in Form "L", by the Registrar, the word "Nasik" used in place of "Bombay" which is referred to in Form "L" in the Regulations of 1927. Shri Warma, therefore, wanted to suggest that the applicants themselves created a fencing around themselves by restricting reference of their dispute only to Nasik Court. According to him, therefore, entertaining the dispute by the Industrial Court at Jalgaon is by the incompetent Court. This argument of Warma, though per se appears to be appealing, definitely is very hard to digest. This cannot be the intention of the provisions of the Act. 14. According to him, therefore, entertaining the dispute by the Industrial Court at Jalgaon is by the incompetent Court. This argument of Warma, though per se appears to be appealing, definitely is very hard to digest. This cannot be the intention of the provisions of the Act. 14. Section 28(1-A) makes no reference to any particular Court for which an application has to be made by the person who wants to get the certificate for referring the dispute. Section 28 does not restrict the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court in any manner, so as to have the limitations on the rights of the parties to get their disputes restricted to any particular Court. It is worth to note that the word used in section 28(1-A) is only the Industrial Court without any further specific reference to any specific Court situated at a specific or a particular place. This clearly means so far as regards referring the dispute to the Industrial Court is concerned, then an irresistible conclusion has to be drawn that it has to go to the Court which has the territorial jurisdiction over the dispute or over the parties concerned. However, what prompted Mr. Warma to argue as regards limitations of the place is only the name of the city as "Bombay" mentioned in Forms "K", "L" and "M". If it has to be restricted to Bombay as Bombay is only used in all the three forms then, in that case, even mentioning "Nasik" by the respondent No. 1 in his application Form "K" would also be of no use as it has to be "Bombay" only. However when the applicant at the relevant time i.e. at the time of making the application, was well within the territorial jurisdiction of Nasik Court, he referred it as Court at Nasik, which clearly means that the applicant at that particular time, was aware of the fact that his dispute was to be entertained by the Nasik Court only. The Court at Jalgaon as referred to above has come into existence or is constituted and established on July 5, 1999. It means that when the consent certificate was granted, even till then no Court had come into existence at Jalgaon. Therefore, the certificate also refers to the name of the town Nasik and not Jalgaon. The Court at Jalgaon as referred to above has come into existence or is constituted and established on July 5, 1999. It means that when the consent certificate was granted, even till then no Court had come into existence at Jalgaon. Therefore, the certificate also refers to the name of the town Nasik and not Jalgaon. The question is when the Court is established at Jalgaon after the grant of certificate but before the actual reference of the dispute will it be precluded from entertaining the dispute when a valid permission or consent certificate is there except that the name of the town "Jalgaon". Will it be appropriate to restrict the jurisdiction only to "Nasik" Court merely because application refers to the name of the city as Nasik and certificate also refers to the name Nasik. In short, can it be said that the Regulation 23 and the forms thereunder would control the provisions of section 28(1-A) of the Parent Act. The Parent Act as narrated earlier does not refer to any particular Court. Parent Act only refers to the necessary certificate to be obtained for reference of the dispute to the Industrial Court. Regulation of 1927 is a procedural matter to be adopted while giving effect to the provisions of the Act. Forms prescribed under "K", "L" and "M" are for the benefit of the litigant and the authorities and suggesting as to how the authorities are supposed to grant certificate. However neither Regulation 23 nor forms prescribed thereunder would be in a position to control the jurisdiction of any particular Court which is conferred on the Court under section 28(1-A) of the Act, else it would create chaos. It is necessary to see that when we had to read the provisions given in the Regulations, the same will have to be most liberally construed so as to see that the aims and objects of the parent Act are properly achieved. The construction has to be definitely in consonance with the provisions of the Act and the purpose behind it. 15. Another important aspect to be noted in the same context is that the Registrar to whom a reference is made happened to be the same even for the purpose of Industrial Court at Jalgaon. The construction has to be definitely in consonance with the provisions of the Act and the purpose behind it. 15. Another important aspect to be noted in the same context is that the Registrar to whom a reference is made happened to be the same even for the purpose of Industrial Court at Jalgaon. In short, the Registrar at Nasik since the establishment of the Industrial Court at Jalgaon is also competent to refer the dispute to Jalgaon Court also and it is so clear from the fact that on 7th July, 1999 all the disputes which otherwise fell within the jurisdiction of Nasik Court now have been transferred to Industrial Court at Jalgaon and none of the parties dispute this position before this Court. 16. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that though in the application Form "K" and in the certificate Form "M" the name of the Court has been referred to as at "Nasik", would not, by itself, debar the Court at Jalgaon to entertain the present dispute and hence this objection as regards the jurisdiction raised by Shri Warma through the present petition has to be rejected for the reasons mentioned hereinabove. 17. After having reached to the conclusion that the Industrial Court at Jalgaon is competent to entertain the present dispute, then this Court is necessarily required to consider the argument of Shri Warma which he made on the merits of the order passed by the Industrial Court. 18. After having heard the parties at length on this point, it is no doubt clear that all those who are said to have been elected in the election are not joined as respondents to the dispute. The question is whether would it straightway result into rejection of the dispute for non-joinder of necessary parties. Shri Hon, pointed out that the present petitioner No. 1 Narendra Sitaram Patil who has filed the present petition in his capacity as a Secretary, in fact, is doing all the things single handedly and is managing the affairs in a most arbitrary manner, thereby putting the interest of the union in jeopardy. Shri Hon, further, pointed out that out of 28 members who are said to have been elected, 27 have approached the respondent No. 1 objecting to the conduct of the petitioner No. 1 Secretary. Shri Hon, further, pointed out that out of 28 members who are said to have been elected, 27 have approached the respondent No. 1 objecting to the conduct of the petitioner No. 1 Secretary. It is also pertinent to note that the respondent No. 2 who is said to be the Pratinidhi Mandal represented through Shri P.R. Katneshwarkar, Adv., it is argued on behalf of the respondent No. 2 that Ramakant Shinde who is elected as President of the Union and according to Shri Katneshwarkar all those elected members except one i.e. petitioner No. 1-Narendra, are dissatisfied with the conduct of the petitioner No. 1 and, therefore, the order which is passed on merits by the Industrial Court, according to Shri Katneshwarkar, deserves to be maintained as that is the only order which is in the interest of the union. Shri Hon and Shri Katneshwarkar, Advocates, both expressed their willingness to file the affidavits of all those 27 persons to show their support and alliance to the respondents 1 and 2 and also expressing their dissatisfaction with the working of the present petitioner No. 1. In ordinary course, this Court would have directed S/Shri Hon and Katneshwarkar, Advocates to file their affidavits. However having noticed that this will unnecessarily again require adjournment of this matter for hearing as there is every possibility that the petitioners may also would like to have rejoinder on the record, this Court felt it not necessary to give permission to the respondents to file any additional affidavit at this stage. Suffice it is to refer the affidavit of the respondent No. 2 which is already well within the knowledge of the petitioners. Taking into consideration the contents of this affidavit alone, it is clear that it is for those people only who are likely to be prejudiced because of their non-joinder of parties to the dispute to come forward and say about the injustice caused to them by the order which is passed by the Industrial Court. This Court, therefore, taking into consideration the nature of the dispute as also the seriousness of the allegations which are made against the petitioner No. 1 is of the opinion that the learned Judge of the Industrial Court has passed an order apt in the situation and the circumstances at the relevant time. This Court, therefore, taking into consideration the nature of the dispute as also the seriousness of the allegations which are made against the petitioner No. 1 is of the opinion that the learned Judge of the Industrial Court has passed an order apt in the situation and the circumstances at the relevant time. This Court would not refer to other points which have been argued by Shri Hon, Advocate for respondent No. 1, as regards misconduct and misbehaviour of the petitioner and tackling the accounts and transfer of the amounts as the petitioner would be liable for the same independently if he is proceeded against in that matter. It would suffice to say that the order which is passed by the Industrial Court, neither suffers from any jurisdictional error nor does it suffer on merits on any count. 19. The third point which needs consideration is as regards intervention application which is filed on the record. Taking into consideration the nature of the dispute and the differences between the parties, and alleged high handedness of the petitioner's, this Court does not feel it appropriate to grant the intervention application, intervention application stands rejected. 20. In the circumstances, petition stands rejected, in motion hearing itself. Rule is discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs. Petition rejected. -----